DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 395 517 FL 023 890

AUTHOR	Bouton, Lawrence F., Ed.; Kachru, Yamuna, Ed.
TITLE	Pragmatics and Language Learning, Volume 3.
INSTITUTION	Illinois Univ., Urbana. Div. of English as an International Language.
PUB DATE	92
NOTE	242p.; For individual articles or papers, see FL 023 891-904.
PUB TYPE	Collected Works - Serials (022)
JOURNAL CIT	Pragmatics and Language Learning; v3 1992
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC10 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	Code Switching (Language); Communicative Competence (Languages); Comparative Analysis; Cultural Traits; Discourse Analysis; English (Second Language); English for Academic Purposes; English for Special Purposes; Error Patterns; Interlanguage; Interpersonal Communication; Language Patterns; Language Research; Latin American Literature; Learning Processes; Linguistic Theory; Native Speakers; Periodicals; *Pragmatics; Regional Dialects; Second Language Learning; *Second Languages; Spanish; Spanish Speaking; Story Telling; Swahili; Uncommonly Taught Languages; Written Language
IDENTIFIERS	Apologies; Mexico; *Politeness; South Africa

ABSTRACT

Monographs on pragmatics and language learning include: "Do We All Apologize the Same?--An Empirical Study on the Act of Apologizing by Spanish Speakers Learning English" (Montserrat Mir); "Conversational Openings in Kiswahili: The Pragmatic Performance of Native and Non-Native Speakers" (Alwiya S. Omar); "Experimental and Observational Data in the Study of Interlanguage Pragmatics" (Beverly S. Hartford, Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig); "The Interpretation of Implicature in English by NNS: Does It Come Automatically--Without Being Explicitly Taught?" (Lawrence F. Bouton); "Linguistic and Pragmatic Competence: Their Relationship in the Overall Competence of the Language Learner" (Sheila Hoffman-Hicks); "Discourse Domains Revisited: Expertise and Investment in Conversation" (Shona Whyte); "Politeness Phenomena in South African Black English" (Elizabeth de Kadt); "Gender and Function of Language Use: Quantitative and Qualitative Evidence from Japanese" (Sachiko Ide); "Seeking a Pedagogically Useful Understanding of Given-New: An Analysis of Native-Speaker Errors in Written Discourse" (Asha Tickoo); "The Telling of a Tale: Discourse Structure and Tense Use in Learners' Narratives" (Bardovi-Harlig); "Pragmatics of Elusive Languages" (Salikoko S. Mufwene); "The Pragmatics of Codeswitching in Mexican Political, Literary, and News Magazines" (Erica McClure); "Modality as a Strategy in Interaction: Epistemic Modality in the Language of Native and Non-Native Speakers of English" (Elise Karkainen); and "Pragmatics of the Use of Nominals in Academic and Professional Genres" (Vijay K. Bhatia). (MSE)

Pragmatics and Language Learning

Monograph Series Volume 3 1992

ED 395 517

Lawrence F. Bouton and Yamuna Kachru

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)
☒ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.
• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE AND DISSEMINATE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Lawrence F. Bouton
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

Pragmatics and Language Learning consists of papers selected each year from those presented at the annual conference sponsored by the Division of English as an International Language and the Intensive English Institute at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The general theme of this conference each year is on the interaction of pragmatics (including discourse analysis and conversation analysis) with the teaching and/or learning of a second or foreign language (especially English) in either formal or informal surroundings. Individual papers may be focused on any of the following or related topics.

1. the contribution of pragmatics to our understanding of what we mean by communicative competence
2. research into specific facets of English discourse
3. contrastive pragmatics
4. analysis of the discourse patterns found in the language classroom

The purpose of both the conference and this monograph series is to serve as a forum for research into the pragmatics of the language learning process and to encourage the interaction of scholars involved in pragmatics and in language pedagogy in a common effort to increase the level of communicative competence achieved in the language classroom.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

Pragmatics and Language Learning is published once each year in the spring. Copies can be obtained at a cost of $10.00 each by writing to:

Editors
Pragmatics and Language Learning
DEIL
University of Illinois
3070 Foreign Languages Building
707 South Mathews Avenue
Urbana, Illinois 61801
U.S.A.

Pragmatics and Language Learning

Volume 3
1992

Editors
Lawrence F. Bouton and Yamuna Kachru

Published by
Division of English as an International Language
Intensive English Institute
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Copyright © 1992

Pragmatics and Language Learning

Monograph Series Volume 3 1992

CONTENTS

i *Introduction*

1 Do We All Apologize the Same? -- An Empirical Study on the Act of Apologizing by Spanish Speakers Learning English, *Montserrat Mir*

20 Conversational Openings in Kiswahili: The Pragmatic Performance of Native and Non-native Speakers, *Alwiya S. Omar*

33 Experimental and Observational Data in the Study of Interlanguage Pragmatics, *Beverly S. Hartford and Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig*

53 The Interpretation of Implicature in English by NNS: Does It Come Automatically -- Without Being Explicitly Taught? *Lawrence F. Bouton*

66 Linguistic and Pragmatic Competence: Their Relationship in the Overall Competence of the Language Learner, *Sheila Hoffman-Hicks*

81 Discourse Domains Revisited: Expertise and Investment in Conversation, *Shona Whyte*

103 Politeness Phenomena in South African Black English, *Elizabeth de Kadt*

117 Gender and Function of Language Use: Quantitative and Qualitative Evidence from Japanese, *Sachiko Ide*

130 Seeking a Pedagogically Useful Understanding of Given-New: An Analysis of Native-Speaker Errors in Written Discourse, *Asha Tickoo*

144 The Telling of a Tale: Discourse Structure and Tense Use in Learners' Narratives, *Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig*

162 Pragmatics of Elusive Languages, *Salikoko S. Mufwene*

182 The Pragmatics of Codeswitching in Mexican Political, Literary and News Magazines, *Erica McClure*

197 Modality as a Strategy in Interaction: Epistemic Modality in the Language of Native and Non-native Speakers of English, *Elise Kärkäinen*

217 Pragmatics of the Use of Nominals in Academic and Professional Genres, *Vijay K. Bhatia*

INTRODUCTION

Volume 3 of the **Pragmatics and Language Learning** monograph series begins with two papers comparing speech acts in English with those of others cultures. First, Mir, in "Do We All Apologize the Same? -- an Empirical Study on the Act of Apologizing by Spanish Speakers Learning English," looks at apologies as they are performed by speakers of peninsular Spanish and American English. Citing the work of Owen, Blum-Kulka, Olshtain, Cohen, and Trosberg as the basis for her own, Mir sets out to answer two main questions: 1) whether the apology strategies used by the native speakers of these two languages are culture-specific or whether they are common to speakers of both languages and are governed instead by the situation in which an apology might occur, and 2) whether native speakers of Spanish tend to intensify English apologies more than the American NS do. In the process, she also attempts to discover to what extent the pragmatic competence associated with the native language of a second language learner interferes with that person's developing pragmatic competence in the target language. Her conclusions: that the specific apology strategies that occur in different circumstances and the frequency with which they are used tend to be language specific, but that certain contextual factors such as the age of the victim and the severity of the offense tend to affect the apologies in the same way in both cultures, thus suggesting that some facets of apology are cross-cultural if not universal. All of this, she argues effectively, means that more attention needs to be paid to the details of the context within which communication takes place as we prepare students to communicate in a second language.

Omar also demonstrates the impact of the language learner's native pragmatic competence on his/her second language use. In her paper, "Conversational Openings in Kiswahili: The Pragmatic Performance of Native and Non-native," Omar notes significant differences between conversation openers in Kiswahili and in American English, especially in the number and types of turns devoted to the process, the speed with which those turns are "recycled," and how the relative age of the participants affects the role of each. Using various examples, Omar notes the types of pragmatic failure found in the attempts by American English speakers to take part in Kiswahili conversation openings, suggests that the skills needed to overcome these failures seem to develop in essentially the same order from one learner to another, she also notes that truly native-like proficiency was achieved only by those of her subjects who had had "some exposure to the target language environment."

Hartford and Bardovi-Harlig's "Experimental and Observational Data in the Study of Interlanguage Pragmatics" makes an important contribution to the continuing discussion of the relative merits of various research devices employed by those working in pragmatics. They compare data collected from actual face-to-face interactions between advisors and advisees concerning course schedules for an upcoming semester with similar data collected using a discourse completion task (DCT) like that employed by Blum-Kulka, et al., in the well known CCSARP project. Their conclusions are balanced and significant: 1) for a number of reasons, the DCT elicits a narrower range of semantic formulas, with some formulas occurring in the face-to-face data that do not appear at all in the DCT data; 2) these differences in the data can be explained by differences in the tasks imposed by the different elicitation techniques and the contexts in which they are used; and 3) in spite of the deviations of DCT data from that found in natural conversation, when used together these two devices complement each other, with each providing valuable information that the other cannot.

Bouton's paper, "The Interpretation of Implicature in English by NNS: Does It Come Automatically - Without Being Explicitly Taught, " is a report on another phase of his investigation of the relative ability of NNS to interpret implicature as American NS do. This time, Bouton compares the ability of NNS to interpret implicatures when they first arrived in the United States in 1986 with the ability demonstrated by 30 of those same NNS 4 1/2 years later. The results show that, while there are still some differences between the interpretation of the NNS and those of American NS, those differences were no longer systematic. No specific *type* of implicature that was a problem for the NNS in 1986 was still a problem for those subjects in 1992. The difficulties that the NNS did experience were related to isolated bits of cultural information that were necessary in order for someone to interpret the specific implicature appropriately - information that the American NS understood but the NNS apparently did not.

Hoffman-Hicks, "Linguistic and Pragmatic Competence: Their Relationship in the Overall Competence of the Language Learner," investigates the extent to which *linguistic* competence in a foreign language is necessary to and sufficient for the development of *pragmatic* competence in that language. The target language in her study is French and the subjects are advanced language learners preparing for study abroad. The author uses a DCT and a multiple choice questionnaire as her measures of pragmatic competence. The relative success of the subjects on these measures was compared with their success on a test of their linguistic proficiency. The author's conclusions: linguistic competence is necessary but not sufficient for the development of pragmatic competence. However, she also notes "the crucial need for the development of new means of measurement and comparison of these disparate types of data." Only when we better understand the relationship between these two types of competence, the author concludes, will we "arrive at a more complete picture of what it means to *know* a language and [be able to] better prepare our students for this challenging task."

Whyte's "Domains Revisited: Expertise and Investment in Conversation" compares the concepts *schema* and *discourse domain* with regard to their elaborateness, stability, importance to the speaker and their use and development within a conversation. Her purpose is to reexamine the discourse domain through a careful analysis of segments of two conversations - one between an American and a French student and the other between a British student with that same French student. The result is an interesting description of factors contributing to a speaker's discourse domain in any particular conversation. Furthermore, Whyte shows clearly that in spite of the relative strength and stability of a discourse domain over time, its expression in any particular interaction can be affected by the speaker's assessment of the hearer's knowledge and the personal investment in the topic area manifested by the hearer.

Politeness is the focus of the next two papers. The first of these, by deKadt, investigates the relative directness of requests in Zulu, South African English, and Zulu English, using the methodology of the CCSARP project. She finds that in both Zulu and Zulu English pervasively used request forms are much more direct than those of English. This suggests a transfer of request strategics from Zulu, but more important, it seems also to cast doubt on the link between indirectness and politeness postulated by Brown and Levinson. In this respect, she argues that "one cannot adequately analyze politeness in terms of a single request, abstracted from the context of the conversation. Rather, politeness seems to be negotiated primarily by means of the non-verbal dimensions of the interaction...which create a context of politeness within which a direct request may well lose the implication of low politeness it could have according to a theory of politeness based on individual utterances."

The second article focusing on politeness is that of Ide, "Gender and Function of Language Use: Quantitative and Qualitative Evidence from Japanese." The first part of this paper presents quantitative data that permits Ide to compare the perceptions of Japanese male and female subjects concerning 1) the relative politeness of specific honorific forms, 2) the degree of politeness due to various interlocutors, and 3) the specific form that would be used by each subject in interacting with each of those interlocutors. From this data, she argues that the reason that Japanese women employ language with a higher politeness level than that of men can be explained as follows: "since women are more frequently engaged in interactions which call for higher linguistic forms, they end up using higher linguistic forms frequently. It is a general tendency that the frequent use of some linguistic forms will gradually exhaust their politeness value. Women's lower assessment of politeness level can be considered to be such a case." Futhermore, Ide points out, the type of politeness represented by the assignment of honorific forms to a particular conversation "is mainly a matter of conforming to the social conventions for the choice of linguistic forms...a passive and automatic choice imposed on the speaker by social norms." Ide then turns to a second type of politeness - that involving strategies performed according to "the speaker's active and intentional choice" and designed "to save the faces of the interactants." The strategies designed to save the speaker's own face, Ide calls discernment; those that save the face of the audience she labels deference. Both of these sets of strategies are part of the politer language of the Japanese woman, she argues. But that language is not, she concludes, "the language of a powerless class." Rather, "the function of demeanor certainly outweighs the function of deference, and demeanor is inevitably associated with the speaker's prestigious status."

Tickoo's paper, "Seeking a Pedagogically Useful Understanding of Given-New: an Analysis of Native Speaker Error in Written Discourse," directs our attention to a common problem of the composition instructor - how to explain to unsophisticated writers why their work lacks the cohesion that is expected of it in an academic context. Such an explanation, she says, lies in an understanding of how given-new information must be organized in the autonomous, decontextualized context involved in academic writing. But to be useful in this respect, Tickoo argues, our present understanding of the given-new relationship must be enriched. She then introduces us to two new constraints on the given-new organization and demonstrates that these are subtle enough to explain weaknesses in two student papers and yet simple and specific enough to give direction to the student writers as they prepare their next drafts.

Bardovi-Harlig, in "The Telling of a Tale: Discourse Structure and Tense Use in Learner's Narratives," looks at another aspect of interlanguage that seems to be affected by discourse structure - the choice of verb tense and aspect. Building on somewhat contradictory findings in the work of Kumpf (1984), Flashner (1989) and Givon (1982), Bardovi-Harlig expands the number of subjects and finds that approximately half of them tend to let their choice of verb tense and aspect be affected by the discourse structure of their narratives and half do not: with these latter subjects the frequency with which they used the past tense appropriately was consistent (approximately 56% of the time) whether relating foreground or background elements of the narrative. The other subjects used both tenses and aspect to distinguish foreground from background. Nor can membership in these two groups of learners be predicted on the basis of their native languages.

Then Bardovi-Harlig goes on to make one more interesting point. Noting that Shuman (1987) finds that very low level language learners use neither tense nor aspect to make semantic distinctions - and that native English speakers tend not to rely on either tense or aspect to distinguish foreground from background, she argues that the intermediate speakers who do use tense and aspect in this way have learned a device for making that distinction that they will have to unlearn later. Perhaps, she suggests, it is because of the language learners "newly developing, and therefore limited, linguistic resources" that some of them use tense and aspect as a discourse marker in this way, and that only as they approach near native competence in the language will they cease doing so and turn instead to those markers that are used by the natives themselves.

Mufwene's "Pragmatics of Elusive Languages," stands by itself. At the onset, the author raises the question of whether this paper should be in a volume focused on pragmatics at all, since it does not "discuss aspects of what has been commonly characterized as 'language use' relative either to context or to the psychological dispostion of the speaker." But he quickly affirms that it should be. One can impose such a criterion as a definition of pragmatics, he argues, only if one assumes that the identity of the code is generally unequivocal. "And one of the points of this paper is that there are several cases where the code is not clearly identifiable."

The central question that Mufwene raises in this paper is how one determines when a speaker of Gullah is using English and when he is using the creole, since neither the structures nor the lexicon employed at any particular moment can be identified as belonging 100% to one or the other. "Does the fact that African Americans who are sterotypically associated with AAEV or Gullah communicate among themselves necessarily predetermine their discourse chunks as AAEV or Gullah? Does the fact of using forms and constructions that are English-like necessarily make one's speech acts less AAEV or Gullah?" Every speaker of Gullah varies the pronunciation, structures and lexicon that he uses - sometimes, perhaps, as an "act of identity," yet sometimes, Mufwene argues, those adjustments can be seen only as a means of accommodating the listeners, of making sure that they can understand what is being said. Furthermore, since these same kinds of adjustments are made by speakers of more standard varieties of English, varieties that need not be associated with linguistic change, there is no reason to assume that the adjustments of Gullah speakers are necessarily change oriented at any particular instance. Instead, Mufwene would say that the language of each of these speakers is a variety of English, or at least that there is no systematic method of determining exactly when a speaker is speaking English and when the creole. Speakers of Gullah, then, cannot be said to be codeswitching when they use a variety of forms because they are not moving between two languages; rather, like speakers of more standard dialects, they are taking advantage of the range of expressions available to them to use for identity, for clarity, or for any other purpose. And it is in this linking of choice of form to nonlinguistic context that this paper, like the others in this volume, contributes to the enrichment of our understanding of pragmatics and its applications to language and language learning.

McClure's "The Pragmatics of Codeswitching in Mexican Political, Literary and News Magazines" compares codeswitching in the written medium of the Mexican magazines with that in the oral communication among Chicanos within the United States. The data supporting her description of the Mexican magazines was taken from the 1989 and 1990 issues of 5 different publications and included 535 codeswitches altogether. The description of the Chicano oral codeswitching comes from earlier work by Valdes (1990). After first describing Mexican attitudes toward the United States that she believes contribute to the various functions of codeswitching in the Mexican magazines, McClure goes on to describe and illustrate some 10 of those functions and explains why they are different from those of the Chicano oral language when they are. Some of the factors that she sees as producing the differences she finds are (1) the difference in the medium of expression, (2) the attitude in Mexico toward the type of codeswitching used by the Chicano, (3) the relative status of English and Spanish in the two countries. In short, McClure finds that "The ambivalence toward both the U.S. and its language is reflected in its use in the Mexican press. Not only is it employed to evoke a more precise image than a Spanish word or phase, but also to create a sophisticated or erudite tone…and in satirical, ironic or sarcastic attacks on American politics and American values."

The next to the last article in this volume, Karkkainen's "Modality as a Strategy in Interaction: Epistemic Modality in the Language of Native and Non-Native Speakers of English" demonstrates nicely the pragmatic function of different types of modals, the difficulty that some of these cause for Finnish NNS, and their potential unteachability because their function is implicit and difficult to define clearly. The data that the author uses to arrive at these conclusions comes from a study conducted between 1985-88 at the University of Oulu, which had as its central focus the semantic system of modality from the point of view of discourse analysis and pragmatics. Since much of the data grew from cross cultural interactions between Finnish speaking and English speaking subjects, the extension of the study into the investigation represented by this paper was natural. The review of previous work on modals, the authors extension of our understanding of modals to their off-the-record politeness function, and the impact of what she has found on the teaching of English to Finns and other NNS will prove valuable to anyone involved in the teaching NNS to use English effectively.

The last paper in this volume is "Pragmatics of the Use of Nominals in Academic and Professional Genres" by Bhatia and provides an analysis of three different types of complex nominal expression, each of which is associated with particular genres of written English. *Complex nominal phrases* (after Quirk et al, 1982), Bhatia shows to be particularly common in advertising; *nominal compounds*, in academic and scientific writing; and *nominalizations*, in legal documents. Each of these types of complex noun phrase has its own structure and function and it is the latter that makes each particularly useful in the genre of which it seems to be a definitive characteristic. Because of this melding of form and function in these (and one assumes other) genres of written English, Bhatia argues that those who want to learn to write and read one or another of them should focus on the particular genre in question rather than on what he has shown to be the general and rather amorphous area of *written English*. "This," Bhatia says, "will make [the learner] better aware of the rationale of the text-genres that he is required to read and write...to become sensitive to the conventions in order to ensure [the text's] pragmatic success in the academic or the professional context in which it is likely to be used."

LFB

Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series, Vol. 3, 1992

Do We All Apologize the Same? -- An Empirical Study on the Act of Apologizing by Spanish Speakers Learning English

Montserrat Mir

The present study examines the production of English apology strategies by Spanish speakers learning English. Based on the pioneering treatment of the remedial interchange given by Erving Goffman (1971), this study analyzes the nature of the remedial move in native and non-native social interactions. In order to restore harmony whenever an offensive act has been committed, remedial interchanges are performed according to the rules of speaking (Wolfson, 1989) and social norms of the speech community. Therefore, different cultural patterns in the act of apologizing will be reflected in the use of different apology strategies and their intensification during remedial work.

An oral elicitation technique was employed in this study. The variables, i.e., degree of severity of the offense, age of interactants, and degree of familiarity between interactants, were systematically varied in order to observe their effect on the apologies elicited. The results obtained reveal interesting cultural dissimilarities between the Peninsular Spanish apology system and the American English one and the subsequent transfer strategies of native rules of speaking to the target language during the act of apologizing. Also, the data show different degrees of intensification between native and non-native responses.

INTRODUCTION

According to Goffman (1971), negative rites occur when there is an infraction of a social rule. These infractions are offensive acts in which two interactants or more (the offender and one or more offended) are involved in a threatening situation which must be resolved. A *remedial interchange* is then required to reestablish social harmony. The *remedial interchange* consists of a dialogue in which the offender provides excuses and accounts for his offense and the offended shows some sign of acceptance and sometimes appreciation for the offender's corrective behavior.[1]

Since remedial interchanges are the result of a violation of a social rule, their performance will be affected by the social rules that characterize the speech community in question. The individual's awareness of any given social rule is crucial in order to provide the appropriate interchange. Since social norms are perceived diversely by different groups of individuals, they are also responded to differently. "The *situation* of the offender must therefore be considered, the world he is in, and it is considered, implicitly if not explicitly" (Goffman, 1971: 102). There are some social norms that are accepted by the great majority of social groups regardless of cultural, educational or language background. As accepted norms, their violation in any context whatsoever, implies some sort of remedial work. For example, hitting someone in the face is generally perceived as an offense and the victim expects some excuse. However, social norms also vary according to the culture to which they are related. For instance, in a Spanish context kissing as a greeting device between young acquainted people is usual and commonly expected, but, in the North American context, this action may be conceived as an offense between interactants because of the invasion of personal territory and violation of privacy that this gesture represents. Similarly, failure to kiss in Spain may also cause offense under specific circumstances. Goffman observed individual differences in the perception of social norms depending on the context of the situation. Therefore, the same situation may trigger different reactions according to the individuals' perception of social norms. On the other hand, a whole social group may agree on the nature of a set of norms, although this description may vary cross-culturally.

Wolfson (1989) talks about "sociolinguistic rules" or "rules of speaking"[2] which she defines as "patterns and conventions of language behavior" (p. 14). These rules of speaking are understood as part of the communicative competence which differentiates members of one speech community[3] from members of another. Such rules are "culture specific" and "unconsciously held" (Wolfson, 1983, 1989) which means that, although native speakers are perfectly competent in the uses and interpretation of their rules, they are not aware of "the patterned nature of their own speech behavior" (Wolfson, 1989, p. 37). According to Wolfson, native speakers are always attentive to the correctness and appropriateness of the language production of their interlocutors in order to respond to possible deviations in the most reasonable way under the circumstances. However, they are unable to explain the nature of their own rules of speaking which makes it extremely difficult for non-native speakers when they are blamed, without explanation, for their inappropriate or incorrect speech behavior.

Nevertheless, native speakers are able to recognize when a sociolinguistic rule has been broken and what they think *should* be done; they are able to express the *norms* of their own speech communities. But, these norms are ideal conventions of human behavior, very far from actual behavior, which is based on the rules of speaking that guide a human being's language production and interpretation. However, the main problem lies in the way non-native speakers are able to conform to the rules that guide the target language behavior: "If learners are to be able to interpret and conform to the rules, they will need instruction based on how people *actually* speak in their everyday interactions, not about how they *think* they speak" (Wolfson, 1989, p. 63). Therefore, a more systematic analytic study of everyday spontaneous interactions is necessary to discover the rules of speaking defining a particular speech community and the norms to which the speakers always refer to base their own behavior.

Owen (1980) examined apologies on actually occurring speech and suggested that the appropriateness of strategies in the act of apologizing will depend on features of the offense and on cultural criteria. Owen offered the distinction between merely ritual moves, which she considers the most common in remedial interchanges, and substantive moves (e.g., repair damage, provide compensation) and pointed out that different cultures may consider substantive or ritual apology strategies differently. Several researchers followed Owen's suggestions and developed the Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Project (CCSRAP) which looked at apologies and requests in eight languages (Australian English, American English, British English, Canadian French, Danish, German, Hebrew and Russian). For each language, data were collected from both native and non-native speakers using a discourse completion test as the elicitation procedure. This project concluded that social variables such as distance, power, and age may be considered as potential candidates for universality which may affect the type of speech act performed. Furthermore, the distributive comparison of realization patterns revealed rich cross-cultural variability (Blum-Kulka and Olshtain, 1984).

In order to investigate how first language norms interfered with second language learners' ability to perform appropriate speech acts in the target language, Cohen and Olshtain (1981), Olshtain and Cohen (1983), and Olshtain (1983) compared native and non-native apologies in Hebrew and English. Some data were collected following a carefully controlled elicitation procedure in which subjects were asked to role-play their reactions to a variety of situations. Each offensive action was graded in terms of severity of the offense and the social status of their interlocutors. The results showed that native speakers' choices of apology formulas were highly patterned and that the most common strategies used were expression of an apology (e.g., "I'm sorry") and expression of responsibility. Other strategies such as explanation, offer of repair, and promise of forbearance were used depending on the degree of severity of the offense and the interlocutors' social status. Based on data from discourse completion questionnaires, it was found that speakers of American English apologized much more frequently than Hebrew-speaking Israelis. The non-native responses were discussed as follows. First, there were cases where non-natives used a semantic formula considerably less than native English speakers did. Second, the lack of non-natives' grammatical competence in the target language explained cases where the frequency of use of semantic formulas by native English and Hebrew speakers seemed similar and yet non-natives tended to use these formulas less. Third, there were cases when non-natives responded like native English speakers even when Hebrew speakers responded quite differently in Hebrew.

On the basis of the studies briefly outlined above, the present study examines the possibility that there are some cultural differences in the use of apologies by Spanish and American speakers, which would indicate different rules of speaking for both communities. Also, an examination of non-native speakers' production of English apologies will tell us to what extent non-native speakers transfer their own rules of speaking into the target language. In order to conclude that Spanish and English speakers have different apology systems, one needs to investigate to what extent contextual factors influence the speakers' production of apology strategies, their use and intensity in their native and non-native languages. Therefore, two specific objectives of this study are to discover whether -- and if so, to what extent:

1. the use of apology strategies is *language specific* and/or *situation specific*
2. non-native speakers tend to intensify English apologies more than native speakers.

PROCEDURE

Subjects

Two groups of informants participated in this study: 29 native speakers of English from the U.S. and 29 native Peninsular Spanish speakers learning English. The American speakers were all students at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign or at Parkland College in Champaign, Illinois. Their ages were between 18-37 (Mean: 23.5, Mode: 19). There were 22 females and 7 males. The native Spanish speakers were taking an intensive English course at the North American Language Institute in Barcelona, Spain. All of them were students at that moment, but they came from very different professional fields. Some of them were still in high school, others were in the university and others were already professionals (teachers, doctors, and so forth). Their ages ranged from 15 to 40 years (Mean: 21.6, Mode: 16, 24). There were 21 females and 8 males. These 29 subjects served as informants for the native Spanish responses as well as for the second language responses. All the subjects volunteered to participate in the study.

In order to assess the subjects' second language linguistic proficiency, the English Placement Test used in the University of Illinois was administered to the Spanish subjects. The mean score obtained was 76.3 (N: 25, Range: 64-88, Mode: 70, 74, 76) which corresponds to an intermediate level of proficiency according to the standards followed in the English Institute at the University of Illinois.[4]

Elicitation Material and Elicitation Technique

In order to ensure cross-cultural comparability, a controlled elicitation procedure was employed to obtain relevant data. The chosen instrument was a role-play exercise originally developed for comparing the speech act realization patterns of native and non-native speakers and learners (Cohen and Olshtain, 1981, Olshtain and Cohen, 1983). The test consisted of a set of eight situations, all of which included an offensive action.[5] All the situations were placed in different contexts, and they each presented a different type of offense characterized by the following different social variables:

1. degree of severity of the offense: severe vs. non-severe
2. degree of familiarity between interactants: familiar vs. non-familiar
3. age of the offended: young vs. old.

A combination of these three variables led to the configuration of the eight situations used in the study. Here follows a brief description of each of the situations and the variables represented in them:[6]

1. *Severe-Familiar-Young*: Your friend places his glasses on the couch and without noticing, you sit on his glasses bending them very badly.
2. *Severe-Familiar-Old*: You are on the bus with the lady of the house where

you are staying during your stay in the U.S. You two have become very good friends. Your shopping bag, that was on the luggage rack in the bus, falls down and breaks the lady's glasses into pieces.

3. *Severe-Unfamiliar-Young*: Backing out of a parking place, you run into the side of another car driven by a young driver unknown to you.
4. *Severe-Unfamiliar-Old*: You return a damaged book to your old professor.
5. *Non-severe-Familiar-Young*: You arrive late for a casual basketball game with your friends.
6. *Non-severe-Familiar-Old*: You are in a restaurant with your friends and their parents, that you also know for a long time. Without noticing, you take your friend's father's drink and you drink it.
7. *Non-severe-Unfamiliar-Young*: Lost in the middle of a big city you interrupt a group of young students who are talking to ask for directions.
8. *Non-severe-Unfamiliar-Old* : Walking on the street, you bump into an old lady shaking her up a bit without hurting her.

The situations were typed on separate cards and were presented randomly to each subject. At the beginning of each interview, the subject was given a card with the instructions for the task. Half of the Spanish speakers were first interviewed in English and the other half in Spanish. After a week the subjects were interviewed in the other language. The descriptions of the situations were written in the language to be tested. The situations were set up to elicit an apologetic response without a reply from the receiver. At the end of the description of each situation, there was the following question: *What would you say?*, to which the subjects had to respond as if they were placed in the context being described. The aim of the task was to obtain responses which were as spontaneous and natural as possible. Therefore, the role-plays had to present problems and characters which were familiar to those involved. Furthermore, the subjects being interviewed were not asked to play a role different from themselves; they were asked to perform a role that was part of their normal life or personality. Each interview lasted around 10 minutes and was tape-recorded.

In order to compare what the subjects produced in the role-plays with their impressions of the English apology system, an English written questionnaire was administered to all the Spanish subjects who participated in the study. The questionnaire was given after the subjects had finished with the role-playing task.[7] These are two of the questions included in the questionnaire and the results obtained:[8]

1. Do you feel that speakers of English apologize more or less than speakers of your native language?

   More: 65.2% Less: 4.3% Same: 26% Don't know: 4.3%

2. Do you feel that speakers of English apologize differently than speakers of your own language?

   Yes: 65.2% No: 34.7%

Following Olshtain's analysis (1983) when respondents expressed the belief that English speakers apologize differently (whether more or less) than speakers of their native language, the response was interpreted in favor of *language specificity* -- difference between languages under the same social constraints. On the other hand, if the respondents claimed that one apologizes according to the situation (contextual variables) regardless of the language in question, then the answer was interpreted as viewing apology as a universal speech act (*situation specific*). According to these criteria, the responses elicited in this questionnaire support the notion of *language specificity*.

However, the phenomenon of *language specificity* should also be reflected in the subjects' responses obtained in the role-plays in order to claim language specific differences in the apology system. Consequently, if the tendency was to consider the act of apologizing as *language specific*, the responses elicited in this study would show that each language group reacted differently with respect to the use and frequency of the strategies produced regardless of the contextual variables. Furthermore, it would be expected that subjects when interviewed in the second language would attempt to adjust to the non-native context and behave differently than in the first language situations. If, on the other hand, responses were similar between the native groups, this would support the *situation specificity* phenomenon, which would indicate that the context in which the offense is committed is the key factor for the selection and frequency of use of apology strategies regardless of the language in which they are produced.

Data Categorization and Analysis

The responses obtained were categorized according to the following apology strategies or semantic formulas (Trosborg, 1987):

(1) Denial of apology: "I didn't do it"
(2) Minimization of the offense: "Oh, that's nothing"
(3) Acknowledgement of responsibility: "It was my fault"
(4) Offer of apology: "I'm sorry"
(5) Explanation: "Sorry, I'm late but I missed the bus"
(6) Offer of repair:[9] "I'll pay for the glasses"
(7) Promise of forbearance: "This won't happen again"

The data obtained in this study were analyzed by conducting systematic comparisons between native and non-native responses. The frequency of use of semantic formulas was examined and analyses of variance (ANOVA) were run to check for significant differences between groups on the total number of responses elicited in the entire test as well as under each contextual variable. Next the frequency of use of intensified apologetic responses was investigated and chi-square analyses were run to observe differences between groups on the total number of intensified responses offered in the task and under each contextual variable.

It should be noted that informants in this study could have used more than one different strategy in each situation. Therefore, each response obtained for each individual may be as simple as one single apology strategy but as complex as a combination of more than one different strategy and/ or repetition of strategies. For the purpose of this study, the responses elicited have been analyzed in terms of type and frequency of use of strategies produced by each subject (repetition of strategies was ignored) regardless of the type of combination utilized in the response.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Use of Semantic Strategies Overall.

The analyses of variance for the total number of responses obtained in the role-play exercise showed a significant main effect for group [NES/SLL: F (1,56)= 14.37, p <.001; NES/NSS: F (1,56)= 8.44, p < .01]. Native English speakers (NES) produced more responses than native Spanish speakers (NSS) and second language learners (SLL). (Cell Means: NSS: 2.01, SLL: 1.88, NES: 2.45). These results, then, support the notion of *language specificity:* native language groups behave differently; in this case, the difference lies in the total frequency of the strategies used.

The results displayed in Table 1 reflect the frequency of use of the semantic formulas. These results represent the number of subjects for each group (transformed into percentages) who used a particular strategy in the eight situations. Note that a subject may have used more than one different strategy, therefore, the sum of the percentages in each column does not result in 100%.[10]

Table 1. Use of Semantic Strategies Overall.

Strategies	NSS	SLL	NES
DEN.	6.5	6.9	3.0
MINIM.	8.6	3.9	4.3
ACKNOW.	28.4	20.2	28.4
APOL.	67.2	81.9	88.4
EXPL.	37.5	35.8	33.6
REPA.	39.6	28.0	62.0
FORB.	0.4	0.4	0.4

We can see a tendency to decrease the frequency of use of some strategies in the second language. For instance, second language learners underused the strategy expressing acknowledgement of responsibility for the act committed (20%). A possible explanation could be the extent to which lack of linguistic knowledge in the second language may force the learner to deviate from the standard usage, which is shared by L1 and L2. The particular nature of this strategy -- acknowledgement of responsibility -- may give us some insights into what caused this verbal outcome. As Trosborg noted (1987), the speaker may perform six different sub-formulas in order to express acknowledgement of responsibility (e.g., expression of lack of intent, expression of embarrassment, self-deficiency, acceptance of blame, implicit and explicit acknowledgement). Although these formulas do not appear linguistically complex in terms of their syntactic and lexical components, second language learners may have some difficulty in producing them as part of the remedial interchange. A simple routinized expression such as "I'm sorry" seems to be more easily internalized and, therefore, preferred.

Furthermore, along with the lack of linguistic knowledge in the L2 (grammatical knowledge), it could also be suggested that second language learners use an avoidance strategy as a communicative technique to succeed in the act of apologizing. Second language learners may be aware of all the linguistic possibilities to express acknowledgement of responsibility or other apology strategies but because of the artificial nature of the test or perhaps because of being uncomfortable when speaking in the L2, they avoid any complex linguistic strategies and overuse simple apologetic expressions (i.e., "I'm sorry") as a communicative strategy. In addition, it could also be hypothesized that second language learners may be aware of all the possibilities of apologizing in English but they are unsure about the sociolinguistic rules of speaking that guide the production of apologies in American English.

The cultural distance existing between peninsular Spanish and American English is also evidenced by the use of offers of repair and apologies. As we can see in Table 1, overall, NSS (67.2%) used apologies considerably less than NES (88.4%). However, it seems that SLL were aware of this cultural dissimilarity, and therefore, increased their production of apologies in order to emulate the American standards (SLL: 81.9%). These results seem to indicate that Spanish speakers prefer to produce other strategies without having to always rely on the performance of an apologetic expression as part of their remedial move. In fact, it would seem that expressions of apology such as "I'm sorry" or "excuse me" are routinized expressions in the American social rule system to be used in almost every offensive situation. In this sense, the production of apology expressions by Spanish and American subjects can also be considered *language specific*.

Considering offers of repair, we observe that this strategy is not used very frequently by Spanish speakers (NSS: 39.6%, SLL: 28%, NES: 62%). Since an offer of repair does not seem to be an immediate apologetic expression in peninsular Spanish, second language learners believe that this is also the case in the American system and accordingly they negatively transfer its lack of usage into the target language setting. These results, then, suggest that an offer of repair is also a *language specific* strategy.

Use of Semantic Strategies According to Contextual Variables

Severity: The analysis of variance comparing SLL and NES and NSS and NES showed a significant main effect for severity [SLL/NES: F (1,56) = 112.15, p < .001; NSS/NES: F (1,56) = 178.10, p < .001]. All groups of subjects increased their number of responses under contexts where the offense was described as severe. Furthermore, although across groups the number of responses increased in severe situation, the increase was greater for NES subjects than for SLL subjects, as shown by the interaction found in the analysis of variance [SLL/NES: F (1, 56)= 7.80, p < .01] These results clearly support the notion of *situation specificity*, which claims that the groups interviewed in the study behave similarly under the same conditions.

A closer examination of the type of strategies used by each group provides some evidence for interpreting the apology as a universal speech act (see Table, 2[11]. For instance, strategies such as acknowledgment of responsibility were produced more under the severe condition than under the non-severe context by all the groups. This behavior was expected since a severe offensive action seems to require a type of remedial work marked by the speaker's acceptance of responsibility in order to emphasize his regret for the act committed. It could also be argued that, for the same reason, repairs were offered more frequently in the severe condition; although, the nature of the events being narrated may also be responsible for this verbal behavior. Only two of the situations in the non-severe condition (#6, #8) elicited offers of repair, whereas all four situations which included a severe action elicited this strategy since objects were damaged.

On the other hand, *language specific* strategies were also discovered in the use of formulas such as explanations and apologies where native groups reacted differently and second language learners possibly transferred their use from the first language. Whereas NES maintained the same number of explanations under both conditions, NSS increased their frequency when the offenses were non-severe. Probably as a result of this cultural dissimilarity between the two native languages, SLL did not react according to the American standards and simply negatively transferred from L1 to L2 producing similar responses to the ones obtained in the first language settings. With respect to the use of apologies, NES did not vary considerably from one context to another. However, NSS and SLL produced more apologies in the severe condition.

Finally, the results obtained in the production of denials and minimizations by NSS and SLL in the severe condition are surprising since this type of strategy does not seem to fit properly in remedial work destined to express sincere regret and responsibility for an action which caused some damage to the victim (e.g., breaking the victim's glasses or damaging his book). A detailed analysis of the situations used for this study indicated that in some contexts the Spanish subjects denied their responsibility for the act because they felt the action committed was not their fault. Although this belief was also expressed by the American subjects, they did not manifest it as part of their remedial work, contrary to NSS. The oral behavior of Spanish subjects seems to be characterized by a more direct form of expression, which seems to be illustrated by the type of responses discussed here. Spanish subjects directly expressed their lack of acceptance of responsibility by denying the act committed or trying to minimize it, whereas native English speakers preferred to obey the politeness requirement involved in the remedial work.

Table 2. Use of Semantic Strategies under the Severity Condition

Conditions	Strategies	NSS	SLL	NES
SEVERE	DEN.	8.6	11.2	4.3
(Situations # 1,2,3,4)	MINIM.	12.0	2.5	4.3
	ACKNOW	37.0	26.7	44.0
	APOL.	75.0	84.5	86.2
	EXPL.	34.4	29.3	33.6
	REPA.	62.0	44.0	89.6
	FORB.	0.0	0.85	0.0
NON-SEVE	DEN.	4.3	2.6	1.7
(Situations # 5,6,7,8)	MINIM.	5.2	5.2	5.2
	ACKNOW	19.8	13.8	13.0
	APOL.	59.5	79.3	90.5
	EXPLA.	40.5	42.2	33.6
	REPA.	17.2	12.1	34.4
	FORB.	0.85	0.0	0.85

Familiarity: The analyses of variance showed a language by familiarity interaction when comparing SLL and NES [F (1, 56)= 10.67, p < .01] and NES and NSS [F (1, 56)= 6.70, p < .05]. Whereas North Americans tend to use more responses or strategies when the interlocutor is unfamiliar to them, NSS prefer to diminish their number of responses in the same context, and this behavior is also transferred into the second language (see Table 3).

These results may be interpreted according to the native Spanish subjects' perception of the American social norms. During the role-play exercises and some informal talks I had with the Spanish subjects, I observed that my subjects repeatedly commented on the polite aspect of the American social system reflected in everyday language use. Therefore, it was expected that these subjects would become more polite in their English responses by increasing the frequency of use of their responses in unfamiliar contexts as Americans did. However, second language learners simply transferred the type of strategies used in their Spanish responses into English and followed their native intuition about the behavior expected with unfamiliar or familiar interlocutors. Second language learners were unaware of the specific effect of this contextual variable on the American apology system. These results seem to favor the notion of language specificity -- the difference between groups is due to the different effect of the familiarity factor on the subjects' verbal reactions.

With relation to the production of specific apology strategies, it was observed that each native group produced different types and frequency of formulas under different conditions, which offers more evidence for the *language specificity* phenomenon. First of all, NES increased the production of apologies and explanations in the unfamiliar condition, whereas NSS and SLL used these two strategies very similarly in the two conditions. Also, an unequal distribution of offers of repair in the responses elicited from each native group was observed -- NSS used this strategy more in the unfamiliar condition whereas NES increased their production in the familiar context. The Spanish speakers' conduct with relation to the production of offers of repairs might be triggered by the presence of unfamiliar interactants which impelled them to offer more repairs. According to the statistical results, NES significantly increased their number of responses with unfamiliar interlocutors, as is illustrated by the higher frequency of use of all the strategies except an offer of repair. Since this is the only strategy that does not follow the expected pattern, it might also be the case that the specific conditions of the situations described were responsible for the production of more repairs in the familiar condition.

Table 3. Use of Semantic Strategies under the Familiarity Condition

Condition	Strategies	NSS	SLL	NES
FAMILIAR	DEN.	10.3	10.3	5.2
(Situations # 1, 2, 5, 6)	MINIM.	8.6	6.8	7.8
	ACKNOW	32.7	25.0	27.6
	APOL.	66.4	82.0	84.5
	EXPL.	38.8	36.2	23.2
	REPA.	35.4	25.0	66.4
	FORB.	0.0	0.85	0.0
UNFAMIL.	DEN.	2.6	3.4	0.85
(Situations # 3,4, 7, 8)	MINIM.	8.6	0.85	1.7
	ACKNOW	24.1	15.5	29.3
	APOL.	68.1	82.0	92.2
	EXPL.	36.2	35.3	44.0
	REPA.	44.0	21.5	57.7
	FORB.	0	0	0

Age: The three groups of subjects reacted to the age factor described in the situations, as shown by the significant main effects for age obtained in the analysis of variance [SLL/NES: F (1,56)= 33.15, p <.001; NSS/NES: F (1,56)= 54.73, p <.001]. All the subjects used more responses in addressing an older person, which seems understandable since offenses committed against older subjects are generally perceived to be more severe (see Table 4). An increase in the production of expressions of acknowledgement of responsibility and offers of repairs seems to characterize those situations which involved an old offended person. The similar behavior between the three groups supports the notion of situation specificity.

Table 4. Use of Semantic Strategies under the Age Condition.

Condition	Strategies	NSS	SLL	NES
YOUNG (Situations #1,3,5,7)	DEN.	6.9	7.8	5.2
	MINIM.	8.6	2.5	1.7
	ACKNOW	22.4	16.3	24.1
	APOL.	64.6	83.6	90.5
	EXPL.	36.2	37.0	32.8
	REPA.	28.4	18.0	44.0
	FORB.	0.0	0.85	0.0
OLD (Situations #2, 4, 6, 8)	DEN.	6.0	6.0	0.85
	MINIM.	6.8	5.1	7.8
	ACKNOW	34.5	24.1	32.8
	APOL.	69.8	80.2	86.2
	EXPL.	38.8	34.5	34.5
	REPA.	50.8	38.0	80.1
	FORB.	0.85	0.0	0.85

Degree of Intensification

In order to analyze the degree of intensification of the speakers' responses, a close examination of the subjects' use of expressions of apology (i.e., "I'm sorry") was undertaken. These expressions were divided into two main categories:

(1) Apologetic expressions with adverbs of intensification. For instance, "I'm awfully sorry", "I'm very sorry", and so forth.

(2) Combination of expressions, such as "excuse me", "I'm sorry" or repetition of the same expression. For instance, "excuse me, excuse me."

According to the chi-square analyses carried out to analyze these data, native English speakers produced a significant higher frequency of intensified apologetic expressions than the other two groups (see Table 5) [SLL/NES: ^{2}(1, N= 464) = 21.86, p <.01; NSS/NES: ^{2}(1, N= 464) = 13.84, p < .01)]. A closer examination of the results obtained for each of the three contextual variables also supports this thesis. When the offense was considered severe (see Table 6) all speakers across groups intensified their apologetic responses, although NES showed more intensification than NSS. The increase of intensification is comprehensible since a severe offense requires a deeper feeling of regret on the part of the speaker. However, SLL were more inclined to behave as in the first language which indicates that they did not respond to the demand imposed by the second language context.[12] However, the degree of familiarity between the interactants (see Table 7) and the age of the victim (see Table 8) seemed to affect the amount of intensification produced slightly. For instance, the contexts which involved an old victim produced more intensified apologies by NSS and NES but not by SLL.

Table 5. Overall Intensification Percentages

NSS	SLL	NES
18.0	14.6	33.0

Table 6. Degree of Intensification under the Severity Condition

	NSS	SLL	NES
SEVERE	28.4	20.7	47.7
NON-SEVERE	7.8	8.6	19.0

Table 7. Degree of Intensification under the Familiarity Condition

	NSS	SLL	NES
FAMILIAR	21.5	17.2	32.8
UNFAMILIAR	14.6	11.2	33.6

Table 8. Degree of Intensification under the Age Condition

	NSS	SLL	NES
YOUNG	15.5	14.6	28.4
OLD	20.7	14.6	37.9

In all, the most important outcome relates to the consistent high frequency of intensification displayed by NES across all conditions in comparison with the native Spanish group and the second language learners. According to the Spanish subjects' impressions of the English apology system, Americans apologize more than Spaniards. If intensification is understood as another way of emphasizing the purpose of the remedial work (apart from selecting more than one apology strategies), then the intensified apologetic expressions found in the NES responses would be in accordance with the belief that Americans apologize more than Spaniards. Consequently, the results obtained in the analyses of intensified apologetic responses by the three groups provide more evidence for the *language specificity* hypothesis.

CONCLUSIONS

The results obtained in this study have shown that the act of apologizing is cross-culturally universal since all subjects in this experiment provided some sort of remedial work regardless of their native language. However, some differences in the use and intensification of apology strategies by Spanish speakers and American speakers appeared in the data analyzed, which seems to indicate that Peninsular Spanish and American English speech communities differ in their "rules of speaking", to a certain extent. First of all, the different frequency of use of apology semantic formulas and use of intensification of apologetic expressions obtained for the three groups supports the notion of *language specificity* -- native language groups apologize differently in terms of frequency of responses and intensification of expressions of apology. In particular, native English speakers provided a higher number of apology strategies and intensified their apologetic expressions more than native Spanish speakers when tested in Spanish or in English. Further support for the existence of a *language specificity* phenomenon is provided by an examination of the familiarity factor, since it seems to have different effects on the frequency of use and type of semantic formulas for the three groups. However, the contextual variables severity and age have similar effects on the responses of the three groups, which seems to support the *situation specificity* hypothesis.

With respect to the type of strategies or semantic formulas used, the most interesting result is the use of apologies and offers of repair. Both strategies are used differently by the native groups, which further supports *language specificity*. Recall that NES used more apologies and offers of repairs than NSS and SLL in all contexts. Furthermore, SLL only reacted to this cultural difference in the case of apologies by increasing their frequency of use and thus, trying to emulate American standards. Such an outcome may indicate three things. First, learners may be unaware of the use and importance of other apology strategies in the target language, and therefore, they simply transfer native language apology patterns to the target context. Second, learners' lack of linguistic knowledge in L2 may be affecting their performance. Third, a teaching effect may be operating here -- there seems to exist an emphasis on teaching apologetic expressions (e.g., "I'm sorry") as the only strategy for apologizing in English; and since SLL believe that Americans apologize more than they do in their native language, they tend to increase the number of such apologetic expressions, since they are unaware of other strategy types.[13]

SOME TEACHING IMPLICATIONS

The most important implication that derives from this study is the importance of instructing second language learners in the acquisition of pragmatic and sociolinguistic competence. More specifically, the incorporation of different contextual variables in activities requiring apologies by the learners should be stressed in the classroom in order to sensitize the learner to the different sociocultural meanings of the speaker and to the situational context. Marcum (1986) argues that pragmatic competence will not necessarily develop as a consequence of exposure to L2 culture as Rintell (1979) seems to suggest. On the contrary, in order to enhance the acquisition of pragmatic competence of the second language learner in the classroom a *perception-teaching approach* needs to be attempted. Such approach, according to Marcum, should have the following behavioral objectives:

1. Make the learner aware of the variety of possible meanings of utterances in context.
2. Encourage learners to consciously monitor the cross-cultural context and the given context of the social environment in which interaction takes place.
3. Make learners explicitly aware of the various levels of contest operating in the environment during any instance of spoken discourse and relevant C2 (=L2 culture) contextual cues.
4. Aid learners in acquiring the ability to assess the C2 contextual cues, to draw appropriate inferences about speakers' intentions, and to respond without succumbing to (a) 'pragmalinguistic failure' (assigning C1L1 force to utterances or inappropriately transferring speech act strategies from L1 to L2) or (b) 'sociopragmatic failure' (perceiving and interpreting L2C2 behavior through a C1 set of social conditions placed on language use).

The effect of instruction on the acquisition of pragmatic elements of the target language has not been thoroughly investigated. One particular study conducted by Olshtain and Cohen (1990) is of special interest for the purpose of this paper since the researchers considered the effect of explicit teaching of the speech act of apologizing to advanced EFL learners. Olshtain and Cohen based their study on the data elicited from previous studies on the production of apologies and requests by non-native speakers. Similarly to what the study presented in this paper showed, Olshtain and Cohen's data also revealed the need for teaching elements such as choice of semantic formulas, appropriate length of realization patterns, use of intensifiers, judgement of appropriateness, etc. In the light of these results, Olshtain and Cohen (1990) developed a series of teaching materials designed to make the learners aware of the nature of the apology speech act and its different levels of appropriateness for different situational contexts. Although the quantitative results obtained in Olshtain and Cohen's study did not reach statistical significance, the researchers were still able to draw some interesting conclusions based on the observed qualitative data.

For instance, the data showed that fine points of speech act behavior such as (a) types of intensification and downgrading, (b) subtle differences between strategy realization, and (c) considerations of situational features, can and should be taught in the second and foreign language classrooms.

In conclusion, the teaching of sociocultural and pragmatic competence is necessary in the language classroom. Furthermore, this particular aspect of the target language should be specifically stressed in EFL situations (such as the one from which the subjects in this experiment come). The incorporation of sociocultural aspects of L2 in the EFL classroom is particularly difficult since the learner tends to approach the new culture from a very unrealistic perspective, which negatively affects the acquisition of the sociocultural aspects of L2. However, an attempt to provide authentic language activities focused on speech act performance should be carried out. The acquisition of speech acts in the target language should be more thoroughly analyzed by examining the production of such communicative acts in the learners' native language. A careful description of native and non-native verbal patterns will help the researcher and, consequently, the teacher, design teaching techniques directed to the acquisition of sociolinguistic rules of speaking in L2.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank Lawrence Bouton and Erica McClure for their help and support in conducting this study.

THE AUTHOR

Montserrat Mir is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Educational Psychology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Research interests are Second and Foreign Language Acquisition, Learning, and Teaching, Pragmatics, Discourse Analysis, and Sociolinguistics.

NOTES

[1] The structure of the remedial interchange is very flexible and may change according to the context in which the threatening act takes place. However, the presence of an apology strategy is relevant for the accomplishment of a remedial interchange. This apology can be expressed in very different ways across languages and cultures but its purpose of expressing regret for the act committed is considered universal.

[2] Dell Hymes was the first to introduce this term and the theoretical framework on which Wolfson built her further work.

[3] Hymes (1972) defines a speech community as "a community sharing rules for the conduct and interpretation of speech, and rules for the interpretation of at least one linguistic variety" (p. 54). Not all speakers of a language share the same set of rules of speaking, and therefore, not all may belong to the same speech community. We must recognize that speakers of a single language may constitute different speech communities with their own norms and rules of speaking.

[4]Moreover, the subjects in this study were enrolled in English courses at the North American Language Institute in Barcelona and their level was considered high-intermediate according to the criterion adopted in the Institute.

[5]In order to determine the degree of severity of the offense, a judgment test was presented to 31 native Spanish speakers and 8 native American speakers. The test consisted of a brief description of the situations to be used in the study. The subjects had to judge whether the situation described offered a severe or a non-severe offense (the judgement was designed to be dichotomous to facilitate the interpretation of responses).

[6]Different situations were used to represent each set of variables because it was expected that the use of situations in which only one social variable differed would not make the subjects think carefully about the situations presented and instead they would respond similarly to the previous similar situations. Therefore, the severity of the offense is not identical in all the severe offenses described. However, the purpose of the task was to differentiate between severe and non-severe offenses.

[7]The subjects answered this questionnaire voluntarily in the language of their choice, English, Spanish or Catalan.

[8]Two more questions were included in the questionnaire:

3. Do you have any problems with respect to when and how to use English apologies? Why?
4. Would you like to comment on any of the responses on the ten situations?

The most common answers to these questions are the following. To question 3, most of the subjects acknowledged their difficulty in apologizing in English due to their lack of mastery of the second language, their lack of knowledge of the English social rules, the type of teaching received, etc. Very few people answered the fourth question and the most frequent responses referred to the subjects' lack of linguistic mastery of the target language, the lack of naturalness in the responses due to the nature of the exercise and to the absence of the interlocutor's reaction to the remedy provided.

Since the responses obtained in these two questions were not very systematic across subjects, the information they provided was not directly used to answer the objectives proposed in this study.

[9]In this particular study, this strategy aims to offer to replace or fix the object being damaged during the offensive action and also to express concern for the hearer. Some researchers, such as Trosborg (1987), have treated this last expression (i.e., concern for the hearer) separately to indicate intensification on the part of the speaker. However, because I included some situations in which the offense did not only include damaging a physical object but also inflicting pain on the subject, I decided to categorize both sub-types under the same formula.

[10]In order to maintain consistency in reporting the results obtained in the study, an arbitrary figure of 8 percentage has been set up. Only those results that differ by more than 8 points will be considered for further discussion.

[11]The percentages displayed in this table and subsequent tables have been obtained by summing up the total number of responses under each strategy type of-

fered by each group and dividing them by the total number of possible responses (since each individual's response was counted only once, regardless of whether he repeated a strategy more than once, the total number of possible responses was calculated by multiplying the total number of subjects, i.e. 29, by the four situations under each contextual variable). Since each subject may have provided more than one strategy (= response) as part of his remedial action, the total number of different strategies in each column expressed in percentages may not equal 100%.

[12] Although, it could be argued that the lack of linguistic proficiency in the second language may be responsible for the behavior of SLL, I would not claim that this is the only reason why these subjects did not increase their intensification in the apologies provided. The linguistic knowledge necessary to intensify an apology does not need to be very extensive since a simple adverbial form, such as *very* could provide the required intensification.

[13] From an analysis of the use of "I'm sorry" and "excuse me" displayed in the subjects' responses obtained in this study, it was concluded that non-native speakers are unaware of the uses of "excuse me", since an overuse of "I'm sorry" by non-native speakers was found in the data. Such results were explained in the light of a teaching effect that seems to overemphasize the use of "I'm sorry" as the only apology strategy in English. For more information on these analyses, see Mir (1991).

REFERENCES

Blum-Kulka, S. and Olshtain, E. (1984). Requests and Apologies: A Cross-Cultural Study of Speech Act Realization Patterns (CCSARP). *Applied Linguistics*, 5 (3): 196-213.

Cohen, A., & Olshtain, E. (1981). Developing a measure of Sociocultural Competence: The Case of Apology. *Language Learning*, 31 (1): 113-131.

Goffman E. (1967). *Interaction Ritual*. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.

______ (1971). *Relations in Public*. New York: Harper Colophon Books.

Marcum, K.L. (Spring 1986) Teaching to Enhance Acquisition of Pragmatic Competence. *WATESOL Working Papers 3*.

Mir, M. (1991). *The Case of Apology and Its English Use by Native Spanish Speakers*. Unpublished M.A. Thesis at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

Olshtain, E. (1983). Sociocultural Competence and Language Transfer : The Case of Apology. S. Gass & L. Selinker.(Ed.). *Language Transfer in Language Learning*. Mass: Rowley.

Olshtain, E. and Cohen, A. (March 1990) The Learning of Complex Speech Act Behaviour. *TESL Canada Journal*, 7 (2): 45-65.

Olshtain, E. & Cohen, D. (1983). Apology: A Speech-Act Set. N. Wolfson & E. Judd (Ed.). *Sociolinguistics and Language Acquisition*. Series on Issues in Second Language Research. Mass: Rowley.

Owen, M. (1983). *Apologies and Remedial Interchanges*. New York: Mouton Publishers.

Rintell, E. (1979) Getting Your Speech Act Together: The Pragmatic Ability of Second Language Learners. *Working Papers in Bilingualism*, 17: 97-106.

Trosborg, A. (Feb, 1987). Apology Strategies in Natives/Non-Natives. *Journal of Pragmatics* 11 (1): 147-167.

Wolfson, N. (1989). *Perspectives*. New York: Newbury House Pub.

______ (1983). Rules of Speaking. *Language and Communication*. New York: Longman.

Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series, Vol. 3, 1992

Conversational Openings in Kiswahili: The Pragmatic Performance of Native and Non-native Speakers

Alwiya S. Omar

Native speakers of Kiswahili usually engage in lengthy openings which include several Phatic Inquiries (PIs) and Phatic Responses (PRs). The number and manner in which the PIs and PRs are produced depend on the age difference between participants. Participants of the same age compete in the PI production. As a result there are PI/PR and PI/PI overlaps, and successive PIs produced by one participant. The PIs and PRs are produced at a relatively rapid tempo. If there is an age difference, the younger participant initiates the opening by producing a respectful greeting form. Then the older person produces most of the PIs.

Non-native speakers, in this case, five advanced learners who have been to the target language environment, are pragmatically aware of Kiswahili conversational openings and are native-like in the way they engage in lengthy greetings. Upon examination, the learners' openings are produced at a slow pace resulting in a non-overlapping reciprocity with each participant waiting for his or her turn. The results show that there is variability in the learners' performance not only across individual learners but also across situations.

INTRODUCTION

This study examines how native speakers (NS) and advanced non-native speakers (NNS) of Kiswahili open conversations. It is based on an earlier work in which I found variability in the performance of greetings by beginning and intermediate students. In particular, the learners performed minimal greetings (Omar, 1991). I suggested that this area of inquiry be expanded to include learners of Kiswahili who have had exposure to the target language environment, since it is possible that the foreign language setting may have some influence on the pragmatic performance of the learners. This paper specifically examines the effect of the setting on the performance of advanced learners of Kiswahili who had been in a Kiswahili speaking environment. The paper also elaborates native speaker openings presented in the earlier work.

The manner of opening conversations is such an important discourse function in a Kiswahili speaking community that Kiswahili children, from a very early age, are taught the art of greeting, and they are reprimanded if they do not perform this function appropriately. However, minimal research has been done on how speakers of Kiswahili, native and non-native, perform this important aspect of discourse. Most studies on pragmatics and language learning have focused on the performance of English language learners. It is important to examine the pragmatic knowledge of learners of other languages as well.

PART ONE: THE PERFORMANCE OF NATIVE SPEAKERS

Method

Native speaker data was collected for a period of one month in Zanzibar by means of participant observation. People greeting at home, in the streets, and in offices, were observed and their conversations were tape recorded. When it was not possible to get recorded data, dialogues were reconstructed shortly after the conversations. Native speakers, male and female, and of different ages, participated in this study. The results show that 'age' is the major sociolinguistic parameter in opening conversations in Kiswahili.

Results and Discussion

Components of a conversational opening. A conversational opening in Kiswahili consists of several parts. One major part of a conversational opening is made up of Phatic Inquiries (PIs) and Phatic Responses (PRs). I am using Kasper's (1989) definitions of the terms PI and PR based on the work of Goffman (1972), Schegloff (1972), among others. Kasper defines Phatic Inquiry as a ritualized inquiry after the interlocutor's wellbeing, realized by a routine formula; it has an eliciting discourse function. A Phatic Reply, he defines, as a ritualized response to Phatic Inquiry realized by a routine formula; it has a responding discourse function. For example, routine formulae for PIs in Kiswahili are *Hujambo?* 'How are you?', *Habari?* 'News?' etc., and the respective routine formulae for PRs are *Sijambo* 'I'm fine', *Nzuri* 'Good' etc. The rapidity in which PIs and PRs are produced results in either PI/PR overlap, PI/PI overlap, or two PIs in a row.

Another part of a Kiswahili conversational opening is a respectful greeting sequence which usually precedes the PI/PR sequence when there is an age difference between participants in a conversation. The younger person is expected to use the greeting *Shikamoo*[1] and the older person responds with a routine formula, *Marahaba*, meaning 'alright'.

A verbal recognition, like calling out somebody's name or an expression of joy at meeting another person, is another component of a conversational opening in Kiswahili. It may precede the PI/PR sequence or the respectful greeting sequence.

All the above sequences are preceded by a unique opening *Hodi* when one visits the house of another person. *Hodi* is the equivalent of English 'knock, knock' and its response is *Karibu* -- 'welcome'.

Age as a major sociolinguistic parameter. Conversational openings are conducted variously depending on the age of the interlocutors. When there is an age difference, it is considered polite for the younger participant to initiate the opening by using a respectful greeting form. Then the older person will respond and take an active role in the production of PIs. The younger person has a passive role and produces PRs with limited or no PIs. With participants of the same age, no respectful form is required and both participants compete for the active role of producing

PIs. As in Wolof greetings (Irvine, 1974), the younger person in a Kiswahili conversational opening adopts a self lowering role by producing a respectful greeting form as X does in turn 1 of (1).[2] Unlike the Wolof greetings, however, it is the older person who produces the most PIs.[3] X produces only one PI, in turn 13 while Y, the older one produces 5 PIs.

(1) Different age; PI domination (30 year old man, X, passes a 55 year old female acquaintance, Y)

1. X: Shikamoo — Shikamoo
2. Y: Marahaba. Habari? — OK. News? (PI)
3. X: Nzu|ri. — Good. (PR)
4. Y: |Hujambo? — Are you fine?
5. X: Sijambo. — I am fine.
6. Y: Habari za kwenu? — News of your home?
7. X: Nzuri. — Good.
8. Y: Watu wote hawajambo? — Is every body fine?
9. X: Hawajambo. — They are fine.
10. Y: Watoto? — The children?
11. X: Hawajambo. — They are fine.
12. Y: Haya bwana. — OK, bwana.
13. X: Je, salama? — Peaceful?

(2) PI competition; PI/PR partial overlap (R and S are two women friends of same age, around 40 who haven't seen each other for a long time)

1. R: Iiii (indicating that she has seen S)
2. S: Habari za miaka? — News of many years?
3. R: Nzu|ri — Good
4. S: |Salama, salama?[5] — Peaceful? (emphasized)
5. R: Sala|ma. — Peaceful.
6. S: |Hamjambo nyote? — Are you all fine?
7. R: Hatujambo. — We are fine.
8. S: Haya... — OK.....
9. R: Habari zaidi? — More news?
10. S: A Sala|ma tu. — Just peaceful.
11. R: |Watoto hawajambo? — Are the children fine?
12. S: Hawajambo. Nyie tu? — They are fine. And you?

When the participants are of the same age, each will strive for an active role, and a respectful greeting form is not required. It is possible that one participant may dominate the PIs at the beginning by producing them at a rapid tempo even before the PRs of the other participant are complete, causing partial overlaps between PIs and PRs as in turns 3 to 6 in Example (2). When the other participant gets the floor for the PIs, s/he will try to do the same. In (2), S asks the PIs from turns 2, 4, 6, and again in turn 12 while R gets the chance to ask 2 PIs only in turns 9 and 11.[4]

Sometimes, PI overlaps occur because each participant wants to have the active role. An example of a PI overlap is seen in turns 3 and 4 of (3) in which Q initiated the PIs and maintained the active role until R managed to take over and produced her second PI in turn 13. In the attempt to maintain an active role, a participant may produce two PIs in a row. Q in (3), turn 10, produces two PIs in a row. The first PI is usually ignored and a response is given to the second PI as R did in turn 11.

(3) PI/PI total overlap, PIs in a row, and recycled PIs and PRs (R and Q, female acquaintances of the same age, pass each other in the street)

1. R:	Mosi!	(A woman's name)
2. Q:	ooo, habari zako?	Yeah, your news?
3. R:	Nzuri. /Hujambo?/	Good. How are you?
4. Q:	/Mzima?/	Are you OK?
5. R:	Mzima.	OK.
6. Q:	Lini umekuja?	When did you come?
7. R:	Wiki sasa.	It's a week now.
8. Q:	Alaa? Nini khabari zaidi?[6]	Yes? What news?
9. R:	Salama.	Peaceful.
10. Q:	Hamjambo jambo? Jamaa wote hawajambo?	Are you fine? Is the family fine?
11. R:	Hawaja|mbo.	They are fine.
12. Q:	|Mama hajambo?	Is mother fine?
13. R:	Hajambo. Na wewe nyumbani hamjambo?	She's fine. And you at home are you fine?

PIs and PRs are recursive in nature and they reoccur after the main topic of a dialogue or following a phatic remark. Turns 6 and 7 of the dialogue in (3) provide a break in the PI/PR sequences which are resumed in turn 8. Obviously, these speakers do not consider five turns of a conversational opening as complete. Therefore, there is a need to continue with more turns. Recycling of PI/PR sequences during the course of a conversation occurred in several other interactions observed, including telephone conversations. After the recycling of PIs and PRs, a new topic may be introduced, or the old one continued.

In official settings, when participants did not know each other well, opening sessions were short. PIs and PRs, in these situations served the function of attention getters. The dialogue in (4) was conducted at a passport office in Zanzibar.

As the data have shown, Kiswahili conversational openings are initiated differently depending on the age of participants. The initial opening sequence may be a PI followed by a PR when participants are of the same age. This PI/PR sequence must be preceded by a respectful greeting sequence when there is an age difference between the interlocutors. The younger participant initiates the opening by using a respectful greeting form. All the above sequences may be preceded by verbal recognition like calling out an interlocutor's name or an expression of joy. And finally, when a person visits the house of another, regardless of age, the visitor uses a unique opening, *Hodi* before anything else, as in (5).

(4) PIs as attention getters (Client T wants to get clerk V's attention. V is talking to another client (reconstructed))

1.	T:	Habari gani bwana?	How are you sir?
2.	V:	Nzuri.	Good.
3.	T:	Salama?	Peaceful?
4.	V:	Salama.	Peaceful.
5.	T:	Nataka maombi ya pasi.	I want application forms.
6.	T:	Haya. Subiri kidogo.	Ok. Wait a moment.

(5) Unique opening *hodi* (A is visiting his friend B; dialogue obtained from Television Zanzibar video play)

1.	A:	Hodi, hodi.	Knock, knock.
2.	B:	Karibu bwana Oho! Nini hali?	Welcome pal. Oho! What condition?

PART TWO: THE PERFORMANCE OF NON-NATIVE SPEAKERS

The second part of the paper examines how non-native speakers of Kiswahili, in this case advanced learners who have had some exposure of the target language environment, open conversations. The results seem to show that learners produce elaborate PIs and PRs but tend not to recycle them. Moreover, they produce PIs and PRs at a slower pace than native speakers. As a result their openings rarely include overlaps, and they never produce successive PIs.

Method

Five American learners of Kiswahili participated in this study. Three learners, LN1, LN2, and LN4 have been to the host environment for a period of at least eight weeks, LN3 for six months, and LN5 for about a week. There are three factors which distinguish these five learners from those who participated in the previous study (Omar, 1991): level of proficiency, exposure to the target language environment, and ability to create learning environments outside of the classroom with their instructors and other available Kiswahili speakers. Unlike the lower proficiency learners from the previous study, these learners appear native-like in the way they initiate and elaborate on greetings. To confirm these informal findings, both elicited and natural data were collected. For elicited data, classroom verbal role plays were recorded. Telephone conversations between the students and their Kiswahili instructors, and between the students themselves, as well as office hour conversations between students and their instructors were part of the natural data.

This section compares in detail the performance of two learners, LN3 who was in the target environment for six months, and LN5 who was there for only a week. Their performance during the office hour conversation, and in the telephone conversation, is compared. Neither LN3 nor LN5 perform native like openings in the office hour conversation with instructor FT. On the phone, LN3 was more native-like than LN5 who used English greeting style in Kiswahili.

Results and Discussion

Role plays. In the verbal role plays, learners were asked to present a play in class in which they adopted different roles in different situations. Four learners participated in this elicitation task. They were given about ten minutes to prepare. The performance was recorded. Example (6) is an opening of one scene in a play about 'marriage'. The learners were comfortable in the roles and the subject they chose. Therefore, they were able to engage in lengthy openings as the dialogue in (6) illustrates.

(6) Role Play (Two male friends; same age)

1.	LN1:	Hodi.	Knock.
2.	LN5:	Karibu.	Welcome in.
3.	LN1:	Hujambo.	How are you?
4.	LN5:	Sijambo. Habari gani?	I'm fine. What news?
5.	LN1:	Nzuri.	Good.
6.	LN5:	Karibu.	Welcome.
7.	LN1:	Asante. Habari yako?	Thanks. Your news?
8.	LN5:	Salama. Na wewe?	Peaceful. And you?
9.	LN1:	Salama tu. Habari ya huku?	Just peaceful. News of here?
10.	LN5:	Nzuri sana. Wewe nyumbani?	Very good. You at home?
11.	LN1:	Salama. Wote nyumbani hawajambo?	Peaceful. All at home are fine?
12.	LN5:	Hawajambo.	They are fine.

The learners' openings in the verbal role plays have the following structure: initiation of the opening session by using features like 'hodi' and 'karibu', the use of PIs and PRs about the participants, the use of PIs and PRs about other people according to shared knowledge, and going to the main topic of the visit. Kiswahili features absent in the learners' openings are the recycling of the PIs and PRs, and the rapid tempo.

The learners' performance was tested further by the use of natural data which was obtained by recording office hour conversations (as in Bardovi-Harlig and Hartford, 1991; Hartford & Bardovi-Harlig, in press), and recording telephone conversations (as in Godard, 1977).

Office Hour Conversations. Learners were asked to come to the instructor's office to talk about a project they were expected to do for the class. They were told in advance that the sessions would be taped, and that they should regard the instructor's office as another place where they could use the language informally. Like a younger NS participant, LN2 in (7) adopted a passive role after having used the respectful greeting form at the beginning of the opening session.

(7) Office hour (LN2, a female student younger than instructor FT,[7] was in the target environment for eight weeks)

1. FT:	Karibu. Hujambo?	Come in. How are you?
2. LN2:	Sijambo. Shikamoo.	I'm fine. Shikamoo.
3. FT:	Marahaba.	Alright
4. LN2:	Samahani, nimechelewa.	Sorry, I'm late.
5. FT:	Eh. Saa ngapi?	OK. What time is it?
6. LN2:	Saa nne na nusu.	Ten thirty.
7. FT:	Si kitu. Habari za nyumbani?	It's nothing. News of home?
8. LN2:	(laughs) Salama. Nimekimbia.	Peaceful. I ran.
9. FT:	Pole. Habari za masomo?	I'm sorry. News of studies?
10. LN2:	Nzuri. Habari za nyumbani?	Good. News of home?
11. FT:	Salama.	Peaceful.

(8) Office hour (LN5, a male student younger than instructor FT, was in the target environment for one week)

1. FT:	Karibu. Habari za masomo?	Welcome. News of studies?
2. LN5:	Nzuri sana.	Very good.
3. FT:	Habari za kazi?	News of work?
4. LN5:	Kazi nyingi sana.	A lot of work.
5. FT:	Kazi nyingi. Unapenda kusoma?	A lot of work. Do you like to study?
6. LN5:	Kidogo sana.	Very little.
7. FT:	Unasomesha pia?	Do you teach as well?
8. LN5:	Hapana.	No.
9. FT:	Umefikiria kitabu ambacho unapenda kusoma?	Have you thought of a book that you would like to read?

(9) **Office hour (LN3, a male student of same age as female instructor FT, was in the target language environment for six months)**

1.	FT:	Habari? Kaa kitako.	News? Sit down.
2.	LN3:	{no reply; gives FT something}	
3.	FT:	Oh, umeleta. Vizuri. Asante.	You brought them. Good. Thanks.
4.	LN3:	Eh.	Yes.
5.	FT:	Ameleta yule rafiki yako? Vizuri. Habari za nyumbani?	Your friend sent them. Good. News of home?
6.	LN3:	Salama.	Peaceful.
7.	FT:	Hawajambo wote?	Is everybody fine?
8.	LN3:	Hawajambo.	They are fine.
9.	FT:	L amekwenda Fort Wayne?	L has gone to Fort Wayne?
10.	LN3:	Amekwenda.	She has.
11.	FT:	Habari za kazi?	News of work?
12.	LN3:	mm Nzuri.	Good.
13.	FT:	Unasomesha?	Do you teach?

I regard the opening in (7) as more successful than those in (8) and (9). LN2 in Example (7) is native-like. She used the respectful form *shikamoo* and like any younger NS participant, she adopted a passive PI role producing only one PI in turn 10. LN5 and LN3, on the other hand, are not native-like. Their passive role in the PI production does not match their performance at the beginnng of the opening; they did not begin the opening with a respectful form. Even though LN3 was in the host environment for six months, and LN5 was there for only a week, they demonstrate little difference in performance in opening conversations in the office setting.

LN3 and LN5 performed elaborate openings in role plays. So we cannot attribute their failure to produce PIs in the office as a lack of knowledge of the required forms. The reason could be the context of conversation. Apparently, the learners did not regard the instructor's office as a place where they could engage in lengthy greetings even though they were prompted by the instructor. Since the instructor did not want to end the opening abruptly, in (8) and (9), by going straight to the main topic, she continued with the PIs and engaged the learners in small talk. The advanced learners have developed the capacity to prolong an opening. It is interesting to note that while the less advanced learners in the previous study adopted the strategy of going straight to the main topic, the learners in the present study did not adopt such a strategy.

Telephone Conversations. Recording telephone conversations yielded more spontaneous data than informal office conversation. Those learners who did not engage in elaborate PIs in the office, did, however, elaborate to some extent on the telephone. In Example (10), for example, LN3 goes to the main reason for his call only after FT has exhausted the greetings and laughs in turn 14.

LN3 was the one who called FT but he did not go straight to the main topic of his call indicating that he knows that typical Kiswahili openings are not abrupt. He is waiting for a cue from FT that she is not going to produce any more PIs so he can go to the reason for the call.

(10) Telephone conversation-waiting for instructor's cue (LN3 calls FT)

1.	FT:	Hello.	Hello.
2.	LN3:	FT! (calls out name)	
3.	FT:	Eh. Habari?	Yes. news?
4.	LN3:	Eh. Nzuri. Habari?	Good. News?
5.	FT:	Hujambo?	How are you?
6.	LN3:	Sijambo.	I'm fine.
7.	FT:	Habari za toka juzi?	News since day before yesterday?
8.	LN3:	Safi kabisa.	Very neat.
9.	FT:	Vipi? /Hawajambo/	What's up? How is
10.	LN3:	/Hamjambo?/	Are you fine?
11.	FT:	wote nyumbani?	everybody at home?
12.	LN3:	Eh.	Yeah.
13.	FT:	K na J hawajambo?	Are K and J fine?
14.	LN3:	Eh.	Yes.
15.	FT:	{laughs}	
16.	LN3:	Tutafanya nini kesho?	What are we going to do in class tomorrow?

The beginning of the conversation between LN5 and FT, in (11) is different from that in (10). LN5 identifies himself in turn 2, and in turn 6, wants to ensure FT is free to talk at this time. While such behavior is expected in the English code, it is unusual in Kiswahili. Native speakers calling each other by telephone would not immediately identify themselves nor would they ask if the person they are calling is available to talk. LN5 is the learner who has been in the target language environment for the shortest time and is unlikely to have had much telephone experience.

In general, telephone conversational openings between the learners are extensive. There is some recycling of PIs and PRs as in turns 8 and 9 in Example (12) below, but the tempo is slow.

Summary of Results

Non-native speakers of Kiswahili -- in this case advanced learners who have had some exposure to the target language environment, are native-like in terms of the length of their openings in some situations. Other aspects of their openings, however, are not native-like. They minimally recycle PIs and PRs, and their openings do not contain overlaps due to their observation of the norms of turn-taking in conversations. The performance of these learners contrasts substantively with lower proficiency learners who did not exhibit any of these behaviors (Omar, 1991).

(11) Telephone conversation-using English greeting style (LN5 calls FT; different age)

1.	FT:	Hello.	Hello.
2.	LN5:	Hujambo mwalimu? Huyu ni MK.	How are you, teacher? This is MK.
3.	FT:	Sijambo. Habari?	I'm fine. News?
4.	LN:	Salama. Habari yako?	Peaceful. Your news?
5.	FT:	Nzuri. Habari ya tangu jana?	Good. News since yesterday?
6.	LN5:	Salama. Unakula sasa?	Peaceful. Are you eating now?
7.	FT:	A a. Nimemaliza.	No. I'm done.
8.	LN5:	Umemaliza. Sawa. Sasa unataka kujua kitabu gani ninataka kusoma?	You are done. Fine. Now do you want to know what book I want to read?

(12) Telephone conversation-long opening; recycling; slow tempo (LN1 calls LN4; same age)

1.	LN1:	Hujambo?	How are you?
2.	LN4:	Sijambo. Habari?	I'm fine. How are you?
3.	LN1:	Nzuri. Habari zako?	Good. Your news?
4.	LN4:	Salama.	Peaceful.
5.	LN1:	Na sasa unafanya nini?	And now what are you doing?
6.	LN4:	Nakula chakula na nasoma gazeti.	I'm eating and reading a newspaper.
7.	LN1:	Aha, vizuri. Sasa ninazungumza nawe.	Good. Now I'm talking to you.
8.	LN4:	Habari za mtoto?	News of the child?
9.	LN1:	Salama.	Peaceful.
10.	LN4:	Amelala?	Is he sleeping?

The data indicates a sequencing in the learning process of Kiswahili conversational openings. The following generalization can be made: the ability to engage in a lengthy conversational opening emerges first. As Table 1 illustrates, beginning and intermediate students sometimes engage in lengthy greetings while advanced learners do so most of the time; recycling of PIs and PRs emerges next -- Beginning and Intermediate learners seldom recycle PIs and PRs while Advanced learners sometimes do; rapid tempo -- resulting in PI/PI overlap, PI/PR overlap, and successive PIs -- is acquired late.

Table 1. Comparing the performance of native and non-native speakers in the production of PIs and PRs.

	NS	ANNS	B/INNS
Length	+	+	o
Recycling	+	o	-
PI overlap	+	o	-
PI/PR overlap	+	-	-
PIs in a row	+	-	-

NS = Native speakers; ANNS = Advanced nonnative speakers;
B/INNS = Beginning and Intermediate non-native speakers
+ occurs most of the time; o sometimes occurs; - never or seldom occurs

CONCLUSION

This paper examines the performance of native speakers and advanced learners of Kiswahili in opening conversations. Age difference plays an important part in the way native speakers perform conversational openings. A younger person is expected to initiate an opening by using a respectful greeting form. Then the older person responds and monopolizes the production of PIs while the younger person has the passive role of responding. Beginning and intermediate learners observed in Omar (1991), and some advanced learners in the present study, also took the passive role of producing PRs which matches the performance of the younger native speaker. These learners, however, did not produce the respectful greeting form at the beginning of the opening. This mismatch is shown in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Comparing openings by younger NS and A/ B/I NNS

	Younger NS	A/B/I NNS
Respectful form	+	-
Passive PI role	+	+

NS = Native speaker; A/B/I NNS = Advanced, Beginning and Intermediate Non-native speaker; PI = Phatic Inquiry.

Native speakers of the same age produce PIs and PRs at a rapid tempo resulting in overlaps and successive production of PIs. Non-native speakers of the same age -- in this case advanced learners (data from telephone and role plays) -- lacked this tempo in their openings. The performance of speakers of the same age, native and non-native, is exemplified in Table 3.

Table 3. Comparing the performance of native and non-native speakers of the same age.

	Same age NS	Same age NNS
Respectful form	-	-
PI competition	+	-

NS = Native Speaker; NNS = Non-native Speaker; PI = Phatic Inquiry.

The advanced learners in this study have visited the target language environment, are proficient in Kiswahili, and are able to create environments outside the classroom to speak the language with each other and with other Kiswahili speakers. When casually observed, the learners appeared native-like in the way they initiated openings and also in the way they produced elaborate PIs and PRs, and recycled them to some extent. The results show that the learners are pragmatically aware of Kiswahili conversational openings but they sometimes lack the host experience in performing certain kinds of openings.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank my professors Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig, Beverly Hartford, and Robert Botne for their valuable comments and discussions. I thank Dorothy Evans for her helpful review. I also wish to thank my colleague Doreen Helen Klassen for her suggestions, and all the speakers of Kiswahili who participated in this study.

THE AUTHOR

Alwiya Omar is a Ph.D. candidate in Linguistics at Indiana University. She is currently investigating the acquisition of Kiswahili pragmatics by American learners. She is on study leave from the University of Dar-es-salaam, Tanzania, where she is employed as a full-time lecturer.

NOTES

[1] Historically, *Shikamoo* used to stand for *Nakushika miguu* -- "I'm holding your legs". It was used by people of lower status greeting those of higher status while holding their legs. This particular meaning is no longer in use.

[2] The notations used in this and other dialogues: / / Total overlaps: | | Partial overlaps. The numbers on the left of the dialogues indicate conversational turns. Single letters such as X, Y, R, are native speakers; LN followed by a number indicate advanced learners of Kiswahili; FT is the Kiswahili instructor.

[3]Irvine (1974) discusses two status strategies adopted by Wolof speakers when they greet each other: self lowering and self elevating. The initiator of a greeting is usually of a lower rank and takes the active role of asking all the questions while a person of a higher rank remains passive responding to only the initiator's questions. A person of a higher rank, however, may choose to adopt the self-lowering status as a strategy for the avoidance of financial or other kind of obligations linked with the higher status.

[4]If there is any ulterior motive for wanting to have the active role of asking PIs, it is not a self lowering one as in the Wolof greeting Irvine (1974). Further analysis of native speaker openings needs to be done to determine the motive for PI competition between participants of the same age in Kiswahili.

[5]Some Zanzibari speakers reduplicate {Is. S has reduplicated the PI in this turn -- *Salima, salama.* More reduplication is found in Example (3) turn 10 -- *Hamjambo jambo.* In Example (5) turn 1, the unique opening is also reduplicated --*Hodi, hodi.*

[6]*khabari* and its variant *habari* -- 'news' is borrowed from Arabic */xabar/.* Many Zanzibari speakers prefer to pronounce the velar fricative */x/.*

[7]The author participated in this study as the instructor FT in the office hour, and in the telephone conversations.

REFERENCES

Bardovi-Harlig, K. & Hartford, B.S. (1991). Saying "No" in English: Native and non-native rejections. in Bouton, L & Kachru, Y. (Eds.), *Pragmatics and Language Learning* volume 2. Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois, 41-57.

Godard, D. (1977). Same settings, different norms: Phone call beginnings in France and the United States. *Language in Society* 6, 209-19.

Goffman, E. (1972). Relations in Public: *Macrostudies of the public order.* Hammondsworth: Penguin.

Hartford, B. S. & Bardovi-Harlig, K. (in press). Closing the conversation: Evidence from the academic advising session. *Discourse Processes.*

Irvine, J. (1974). Strategies of status manipulation in the Wolof greetings. In Bauman, R and Sherzer, J. (Eds.), *Explorations in the ethnography of speaking.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 167-91.

Kasper, G. (1989). Interactive procedures in interlanguage discourse. In Oleksy, W. (Ed.), *Contrastive Pragmatics.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 189-229.

Omar, A. S. (1991). How learners greet in Kiswahili: A cross sectional survey. In Bouton, L & Kachru, Y (Eds). *Pragmatics and language learning,* volume 2. Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois, 59-73.

Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series, Vol. 3, 1992

Experimental and Observational Data in the Study of Interlanguage Pragmatics

Beverly S. Hartford
Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig

This paper compares data on rejections by native and nonnative speakers collected from natural conversation with data collected from a discourse completion task (DCT). It demonstrates that although the use of DCTs has benefits such as availability of large samples and experimental controls, the technique also biases the data in certain ways. In particular, we show that participants used a narrower range of semantic formulas on the DCT, that they used fewer status preserving strategies, and that they lacked extended negotiations found in the natural data. On the other hand, the DCT facilitates the testing of hypotheses derived from instances in the natural conversations where there is insufficient data. We conclude that while there should be an increase in observational data in interlanguage pragmatics research, the DCT may also be utilized as an important tool to complement such data.

This paper compares natural data on rejections collected from natural conversation with data collected from a discourse completion task (DCT). The DCT has been a popular data-gathering instrument in much current work on the speech act, especially the work on interlanguage pragmatics carried out in the Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Project (CCSARP) (Blum-Kulka, House, & Kasper, 1989; Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984), and by Beebe et al. in a series of studies on Japanese ESL pragmatics (Beebe, Takahashi, & Uliss-Weltz, 1990; Beebe & Takahashi, 1989; Takahashi & Beebe, 1987). (For a comprehensive review of research methodology in interlanguage pragmatics, see Kasper & Dahl, 1991.)

Although some studies acknowledge the possible skewedness of results as a product of such a method, they also note that the use of DCTs has many benefits, such as availability of large samples and experimental controls. Few of the studies, however, actually compare DCT data with equivalent data from other methodologies to test such suppositions. One important exception to this is an unpublished paper by Beebe and Cummings (1985). They compare data gathered through a DCT and naturally occurring speech, and find that the DCT does not reflect natural speech with respect to actual wording, range of formulas and strategies, length of response or number of turns, depth of emotion, number of repetitions and elaborations, or rate of occurrence of a speech act (p. 14). However, while their study provides evidence for the assumptions regarding the differences in the two kinds of data sets, it only examines native speaker responses. Furthermore, the natural data is from telephone conversations, which may have their own particular constraints. Thus, it does not provide evidence on the extent to which similar nonnative speaker data might be effected by task. Additionally, the status relations of the subjects in

Beebe and Cummings were those of equals, so that it also offers no evidence of how data of status unequals might be affected.[1] Finally, the subjects performing the DCT were in a role-playing task which did not directly reflect a real-life situation for such subjects.

In the present study we show that a collection technique such as the DCT may indeed bias the data, not only for native speakers, but also for nonnative speakers. However, we also show that the DCT is helpful in testing hypotheses which arise from the analysis of natural data, particularly when those hypotheses address the *absence* of features or content, as in the notable lack of rejections in the native speaker advising sessions.

REJECTIONS

In the present study we compare the data available from elicited and natural conditions by examining rejections of advice. Our interest in rejections comes from our previous work (Bardovi-Harlig and Hartford, 1990, 1991) using natural data from academic advising sessions. We have found that students have two ways of controlling their course schedules: through the use of suggestions which build the schedule and through the use of rejections which block courses from being added. Rejections become obligatory for students who do not make positive suggestions because they have no other way to shape their schedules if they do not agree with their advisors' proposals. If students want to eliminate a suggestion made by the advisor, they must reject the advice.

We have further shown that nonnative speakers make proportionately more rejections than the native speakers (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, 1990, 1991). Native speakers make suggestions more than twice as often as they reject advice (they make 2.36 suggestions for each rejection), whereas nonnative speakers make suggestions and rejections in almost equal numbers (1.20 suggestions for each rejection). Thus, native speakers control the content of their schedules positively, by making suggestions, while nonnative speakers more frequently control their schedules by rejecting their advisor's advice. Native and non-native speakers also differ in the semantic formulas which make up their rejections. Semantic formulas represent the means by which a particular speech act is accomplished in terms of the primary content of an utterance, such as a reason, an explanation, or an alternative. Even in cases of apparent similarity, such as in the use of explanations, the content encoded by the formulas of each group differs.

All of the advising sessions which we have studied to date have a single goal: the students and their advisors determine the student's academic schedule for the coming semester. The sessions generally end when the advisor gives the student a signed registration ticket containing the negotiated schedule. The problem with the natural data, of course, is that while the advising sessions were as similar to each other in terms of goal, content, and length as natural conversations can be, they were not identical.[2] More importantly, since the native English-speaking graduate students actively built their schedules through their own suggestions, they did not reject advice as frequently as the nonnative speakers; thus, we had relatively few examples of native-speaker rejections. We were interested in discovering how native speakers would reject advice if they were in the same situations as the nonnative speakers. Because native speakers did not frequently reject advice, since they used other strategies, they avoided many of the difficult situations in which nonnative speakers found themselves. We thus constructed a DCT to test the generalizations we had made about rejections on the basis of the advising sessions. The DCT provided valuable evidence unavailable in the natural data, but also showed strong task bias. Following the method section which briefly describes the participants and the DCT, the next two sections present the results and compare the natural data with the data from the DCT.

METHOD

Participants

There were two groups of participants whose use of language was analyzed: students who responded to the DCT and students whose advising sessions were taped. A third group of participants was the faculty in the advising sessions. Their use of language is not discussed in this paper.

The students who responded to the DCT were graduate students in linguistics (13 native speakers and 11 nonnative speakers) who had completed advising sessions as required of all graduate students. They were enrolled in two graduate level linguistics courses. The nonnative speakers represented seven languages: there were four speakers of Chinese, and one speaker each of Bambara, Bengali, Chichewa, Japanese, Spanish, Thai, and Yoruba. All nonnative speakers had TOEFL scores of 577 and above. It is important to note that in response to the DCT the student participants always took the role of students -- a role which they know well. We will therefore refer to the student participants as "students" throughout the paper.

The natural data is taken from thirty-nine advising sessions which were audiotaped and analyzed in their entirety (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, 1991). Seven native English speaking faculty members (four males and three females) and thirty-nine graduate students participated in this portion of the study. The student group consists of 18 native speakers and 21 nonnative speakers. Six languages were represented: Arabic (1), Chinese (5), Japanese (5), Korean (4), Malay (1), and Spanish (5). All nonnative students had TOEFL scores of 577 and above. The faculty participants were all experienced advisors who met with approximately the same number of students during the normal departmental advising periods. Since all faculty are required by the department to advise students, each has had several years of experience.

Instrument Design

We constructed a written DCT to test eight situations which commonly occurred in the nonnative speaker conversations, but which were rare in the native speaker conversations. The eight scenarios were designed to test three specific hypotheses regarding semantic formulas and specific content.

I. Native speaker rejections will be shorter than nonnative speaker rejections, containing fewer semantic formulas per rejection.

II. Native speakers will prefer a smaller number of rejection strategies (i.e., Explanation and Alternative) than nonnative speakers.

III. Native speakers will not use "illegal" content in their rejections, but nonnative speakers will.[3]

Two items tested "illegal" explanations -- "too difficult" and "too easy" -- which were frequently offered unsuccessfully by nonnative speakers in the actual advising sessions. Two others tested problematic and possibly "illegal" explanations -- "you don't like the instructor" and "you aren't interested the topic of your advisor's elective course." These explanations were hinted at, but were not common, in the advising sessions. The "illegal" reasons for rejecting a course suggested by the advisor were included to determine whether native speakers ever used such explanations. These types of explanations were absent in the natural data and we attempted to determine whether this was systematic or accidental. Three items tested "legal" and highly acceptable explanations -- "you prefer not to take summer courses," "you have a schedule conflict," and "you have already taken a course." These explanations had also been used successfully by both native and nonnative speakers. Another item tested the rejection of the timing of a course where the student's own action brought about the difficulty. This situation is common when a student drops a course which the advisor previously recommended that the student take at a particular time.

The DCT was introduced by the general direction: "In the following situations, imagine that you are a graduate student who has gone to see an advisor to register for courses for next semester." In each item, the suggestion by the advisor and the reason for the rejection is described as in Example (1).

(1) Your advisor suggests that you take a course during the summer.
You prefer not to take classes during the summer.
You say:

Students were given 50 minutes to complete the DCT. All responses were anonymous.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

An obvious advantage of the DCT is that it permits the testing of large sample sizes in equivalent situations. The DCT also allowed us to specifically test the three hypotheses which were based on observation of the natural corpus. We will present the results and discuss each hypothesis in turn.

Hypothesis I. Native speaker rejections will be shorter than nonnative speaker rejections, containing fewer semantic formulas per rejection.

In the DCT, the nonnative speakers wrote more overall than did the native speakers, supporting Hypothesis I. The nonnative speakers employed a total of 206 semantic formulas, while the native speakers produced 162, 44 fewer that the nonnative speakers (Table 1). The mean number of semantic formulas per individual student was 18.7 for nonnative speakers and for native speakers, 12.5. For each Item on the DCT, the nonnative speakers used an average of 2.3 formulas, while the native speakers used only an average of 1.5. Although the DCT data lacks the features of negotiation and turn taking, the relative number of semantic formulas reflects the trends found in the natural data where nonnative speakers tended to take more turns for a rejection than did native speakers.

Hypothesis II. Native speakers will prefer a smaller number of rejection strategies (i.e., Explanation and Alternative) than nonnative speakers.

Table 1. Number of Semantic Formulas Used in Rejections by NS and NNS on DCT

	NS (N=13)	NNS (N=11)
Total Rejections	162	206
Individual Mean	12.5	18.7
Item Mean	1.5	2.3

Hypothesis II was also supported. On the DCT the native speakers used three major strategies, Explanation, Alternative, and Direct Rejection, in 88% of the cases, while the nonnative speakers used these same three in 74% (Table 2).[4]

On the DCT the semantic formula favored by both groups was Explanation, followed by Alternative, with Direct Rejection third.[5] The relative rankings of these three semantic formulas with respect to one another are the same for both groups on both data sets.

On the DCT the nonnative speakers used a variety of semantic formulas which are seldom or never used by the native speakers, and 26% of their DCT answers are constituted by these other formulas. Also, nonnative speakers have a much lower preference for Alternatives than do native speakers, which fits the natural data. Since Alternatives could be interpreted as a kind of suggestion, which are used less often by the nonnative speakers, it is not surprising to find that the nonnative speakers use fewer of them on the DCT, employing other strategies instead, such as Requesting Advice, Apologizing, and even, in two extreme cases, Accusing the advisor of being responsible for a problem.

Table 2. Relative Frequency of Semantic Formulas in Rejections for DCT and Conversational Data[a]

	DCT		Natural Data	
Most Common Semantic Formulas	NS	NNS	NS	NNS
Explanations	41	45	32	49
Alternatives	33	19	18	7
Rejections	13	10	5	1
Subtotal	87	74	55	57
Less Common Semantic Formulas				
Accept as Reject	---	---	13	3
Condition	---	---	8	2
But/Yeah But	---	---	8	14
Avoidance	1	2	8	15
Empathy	4	4	5	2
Request Adv/Help	---	4	---	---
Indefinite	---	---	3	2
Dissuade	---	---	---	5
Criticize/Accuse	1	1	---	---
Agreement	3	5	---	---
Other	4	10	---	---
Total	100	100	100	100

[a]All values are expressed in percentages

Although the overall use of the three most common semantic formulas was similar for both groups on the DCT, the actual distribution of these responses across the DCT items differed between the native speakers and nonnative speakers. In addition, the content of these responses differed, such that the profiles of the native speakers and nonnative speakers are not as similar as the summary figures might indicate. Hypothesis III addresses the question of content.

Hypothesis III. Native speakers will not use "illegal" content in their rejections, but nonnative speakers will.

To address this hypothesis we selected reasons from the natural data that clearly received a negative response from the advisors during the advising session. We included "too difficult" and "too easy" as reasons for rejections which did not meet with approval in the advising sessions, and two potentially problematic reasons "you don't like the instructor" and "lack of interest in the advisor's course" (Items 2, 6, 10, and 7, respectively). (See Appendix.)

Native speakers do not use these reasons in the natural data, and they do not tend to use these reasons in the DCT, although they were included as the reasons in the prompts. Instead they choose other "legal" content. In response to item 7, "Your advisor suggests that you take an elective class that she's teaching, but you are not interested in the topic," 9 out of 13 native speaker responses (69%) were Alternatives as in Example (2).

(2) Well, I'd kind of thought of taking [L541]. (NS)

Two other students even agreed to take the courses, replying "Sure!" and "OK," and two others requested permission to postpone their decisions. This shows that although a difficult situation may obtain, native speakers do not use illegal content as an explanation. Thus we conclude that the absence of such content in the natural data is purposeful and not accidental.

In contrast, no nonnative speaker used an Alternative in response to Item 7. Many used vague explanations in their rejections such as "I cannot" which we suspect would not satisfy an advisor in an actual session. Only one native speaker expressed a lack of interest in the topic (8%) whereas five (46%) of the nonnative speakers did. An additional two nonnative students rejected the course as "not relevant" and "not necessary." Thus a total of seven nonnative speakers (64%) rejected the course with a negative evaluation. The form of these particular rejections is also quite striking. The native speaker rejection in Example (3) exhibits the downgraders *I'm not sure* and *really* whereas the nonnative speaker rejection in (4) exhibits an upgrader, *at all*, and a statement of preference.

(3) I'm not sure that I'm really interested in the topic. (NS)

(4) I would rather not take this course because the topic doesn't interest me at all. (NNS)

In Item 2, "Your advisor suggests that you take a course which you would rather not take because you think that it will be too difficult for you," the student has to reject a course because of its difficulty. For graduate students to reject explicitly on those grounds may be problematic since this may cast doubt on their academic ability. In the natural data native speakers never used this reason for rejecting a course, but the nonnative speakers sometimes did. We had specifically hypothesized that the absence of native speaker rejections which were based on the difficulty of the course, such as "this course is too difficult for me," were not accidental, but reflected cultural-academic values held by the native speaker graduate students and their advisors. Item 2, then, was included in order to test the generalization that the two groups differ in their responses to this situation.

Figure 1 shows that both groups used Explanation frequently in response to Item 2, native speakers 43% and nonnative speakers 46%. However, the native speakers actually used Alternatives even more frequently, at 57%. Nonnative speakers only used them in 21% of their responses, using Direct Rejections in 11%.

Moreover, although many of the nonnative speakers used explanations similar to those of native speakers, some of them did reject on the grounds that the course was too difficult, as illustrated in Example (5).

(5) This course may be too difficult for me now. Can I take it later on? (NNS)

In addition, some nonnative speakers further directly rejected the course by stating that they did not want to take it, as in Example (6).

(6) Actually, I don't want to take this course because I think it will be too difficult for me and it will effect [sic] my grade point average. Would it be possible that I study other courses instead of this one? (NNS)

Native speakers, on the other hand, did not refer directly to the course difficulty, nor did any of the native speakers directly reject. The example most similar to a Direct Rejection is Example (7), in which the student mentions the risky outcome of enrolling in such a course, but even this student does not actually mention "difficulty."

(7) I'm really not sure I could handle that. I don't want to get in over my head here. (NS)

Figure 1. Distribution of Responses for Item 2 ("too difficult")



Most native and nonnative speaker students referred to their lack of background or preparation for the course, rather than to its difficulty. This was supplemented in the Alternatives by asking about another course or by asking about the possibility of postponing the course in question until a later date, thus showing responsibility for taking the course at some time.

Our first goal in this study was satisfied since the DCT provided valuable information regarding features and content which were absent in the natural data. However, there are certain important differences in the rejections in the natural and elicited conditions. We examine the influence of the task in the next section.

Task Influence

Comparison of Semantic Formulas Used

The top three strategies on the DCT differ from those most frequent in the natural data (Table 3). First, while both groups also favor Explanation in the natural data, they differ in their frequency and relative rankings of use of the other semantic formulas. For both groups the number of Direct Rejections is elevated on the DCT to third place, but is lower and differently ranked for each group in the natural data. The native speaker natural data shows that Alternative, as in their DCT data, is the second most used semantic formula, but the Accept as Reject formula[6] which never shows up at all on the DCT, is third. In fact, several other semantic formulas rank higher than Direct Rejection in the native speaker natural data, and it would tie for second from last place. For the nonnative speakers, in the natural data the semantic formula which ranks second is *But/Yeah But*[7] and the third ranked formula is Avoidance, which does not occur in the DCT. Alternatives would be ranked fourth in the nonnative speaker natural data, and Direct Rejections would be at the bottom.

Second, in the two data sets there are some fairly frequent semantic formulas found in the advising sessions which were not used at all on the DCT: Accept as Reject, Condition, and *But/Yeah But*, as well as some less frequent formulas, with the result that overall, the DCT elicited a smaller range of semantic formulas than did the natural data.

Third, in the natural data the range of semantic formulas is about the same for both groups. On the DCT, however, there was a greater difference between native speakers and nonnative speaker responses. (See Table 2.)

Fourth, there are strategies which appear in one data set and not in the other. On the DCT, for example, both groups use, albeit infrequently, Criticize/Accuse, Guilt Trip, and Indefinite, which never appear in the natural data. Opting Out also appears on the DCT where it does not appear in the natural data. Opting Out occurs when there is no response at all (Bardovi-Harlig and Hartford, 1991). On the DCT this would be represented by leaving the response line blank. The natural data strategies of Accept as Reject, Condition, and *But/Yeah But* do not appear on the DCT.

Last, and less obvious from Table 2, is the status of Avoidance strategies. Although they appear in both data sets, responses in this category are very infrequent in the DCT data, while for the nonnative speakers, at least, it is a frequently used category in the natural data. If we break this category down into its subcategories, different profiles for the two data sets appear. These subcategories are Requesting a Postponement, Responding with Questions, and Delaying the Rejection. The major Avoidance strategy found on the DCT explicitly requested putting off a decision, as in Example (8).

Table 3. Relative Rank of Semantic Formulas in Rejections for DCT and Conversational Data

	DCT		Natural Data	
Most Common Semantic Formulas	NS	NNS	NS	NNS
Explanations	1	1	1	1
Alternatives	2	2	2	4
Rejections	3	3	5	8
Less Common Semantic Formulas				
Accept as Reject	---	---	3	6
Condition	---	---	4	7
But/Yeah but	---	---	4	3
Avoidance	6	7	4	2
Empathy	4	6	5	7
Request Adv/Help	---	5	---	---
Indefinite	---	---	6	7
Dissuade	---	---	---	5
Criticize/Accuse	6	8	---	---
Agreement	5	4	---	---
Other	4	3	---	---

(8) Um -- can I decide if next week? (NNS)

Responding with Questions and Delaying the Rejections were Avoidance strategies which the nonnative speakers used frequently in the natural data but did not appear on the DCT. We find students requesting information and requesting repetition in response to a suggestion which they do not want to accept. When students Request Information, they ask a question whose form is a simple information question, but which pragmatically allows the student to avoid committing to the advisor's suggestion. Example (9) is an example of this type of Avoidance.

(9) Do you know anything about 560, uh, um, who teaches (NNS)

The second, Question Requesting Repetition, occurs sometimes immediately following an advisor's suggestion, sometimes later in the interview. It also allows the student to avoid immediate commitment to the suggestion. Example (10) illustrates the Repetition request.

(10) *Which one was that one? (NNS)*

Both of the preceding strategies are used frequently by the nonnative speakers in the natural data and contribute significantly to the high percentage of Avoidance in those data. They differ from the Delays discussed below in that no actual rejection appears in the data.

Finally, we find that in the natural data nonnative speakers frequently delayed their rejections. In these cases rejections occurred several turns later. No such delays were found in the DCT. Such delays may be accomplished by using a series of questioning strategies as illustrated in Examples (9) and (10). They may also be accomplished in a number of other ways, often by apparently agreeing to the suggestion, only to return to it later in the interview and initiate a rejection. In the natural data the high percentage for nonnatives under Avoidance may be accounted for, at least in part, by this strategy. Although nonnative speakers used other Avoidance strategies on the DCT they did not employ postponement, even though they could have written `no response' or something similar to represent such a strategy. All of these avoidance strategies allow speakers to avoid immediately rejecting the advisor's suggestion, but not necessarily to avoid rejecting entirely.

We suggest that the primary reason that the Avoidance subcategories differ across the data sets lies in the nature of the tasks themselves. Avoidance strategies are primarily interactive and promote negotiation over a number of turns. Their absence on the DCT reflects the nonnegotiative nature of the situation: unless respondents write out a long dialogue they are constrained from employing such strategies. Yet, as we have noted, these constitute a large part of the preferred strategies in the actual interviews where such negotiations are a primary aspect of the advising sessions.

Comparison of Content

Two of the items, Item 9 and Item 3, elicited very different responses on the DCT compared to the natural data. Item 9 "Your advisor suggests that you take a course that you have already taken" was based on an actual advising session with a native speaker in which she responded as in Example (11).

(11) I've already taken that. (NS)

Item 9 more or less forces the student to reject the advisor's advice, although in the natural situation the student has the option of avoiding a response. Even in this forced situation, however, we found that the native speakers and nonnative speakers used different strategies. Of the native speaker responses, 67% were Direct Rejections of the advice, and only 6% included an Explanation. No Alternatives were offered, and the native speakers had an average of 1.4 semantic formulas in their responses. In other words, the native speakers responded directly to this situation and saw no need to embellish their responses with explanations or other discussion. This is illustrated in Figure 2.

The nonnative speakers, on the other hand, only used Direct Rejections 21% of the time, and offered Explanations 58% of the time, with an average of 2.2 semantic formulas for each response. The remainder of the responses included an Apology, a Request for advice, a Directive to the advisor, and even an Accusation or Challenge. As in natural data, it would appear that, overall, nonnative speakers tended to avoid out-of-status moves such as Direct Rejections. However, in spite of the similarity across data sets of their choices of semantic formulas, in the nonnative speaker DCT the content was much more assertive ("illegal"), expressing out-of-status negative opinions and criticisms not found in the natural data. One very extreme response, a direct Challenge to the advisor, is a type which is never used in any of the natural data, whether native speaker or nonnative speaker.

Figure 2. Distribution of Responses for Item 9 (course taken)



In Example (11) from the natural data the student resolves the matter quickly and directly thus minimizing the number of turns (and consequently the amount of time) for which the session is out of status. Whereas many native speakers replied to Item 9 on the DCT with a brief Direct Rejection as in Example (12), some nonnative speakers used replies with questionable content and unnecessary elaboration as in Examples (13) and (14).

(12) I've taken that already. (NS)

(13) I have already taken this course so I don't want to take it. I think it would be a waste of time. (NNS)

(14) I suppose I have gained sufficient knowledge from the course, and I've passed the exam to prove it. I don't think I have to take it a second time. (NNS)

In Example (15) the advisor is challenged.

(15) I don't want to repeat a course that I have already taken. Why do you want me to take it again? (NNS)

We hypothesize that the unusual content of these responses is a direct result of the DCT, where anonymity is maintained, and students feel the freedom to voice feelings that they do not care to risk in the real situation. Thus, although nonnative speakers utilize similar semantic formulas in both types of data, the content differs. It is interesting to note that the native speakers did not show the same discrepancies in content.

The more difficult the situation is to negotiate in real-life the greater the difference between natural and elicited data. Item 3, "During your advising session you find out that a required course which you had dropped from your schedule the previous semester will not be offered until the semester after you had planned to graduate. This is a real financial burden for you," presents a very serious situation, caused by the student's own action which contradicted an agreement from a previous advising session, placing the student in a precarious situation. This item produced some of the most extreme responses in the DCT, and quite different profiles for the two groups.

Figure 3 shows that the most common semantic formula in responses to Item 3 for native speakers was Explanation, making up 53% of their responses, while attempt to gain Empathy was second most common at 29%. Alternatives were third, at 18%. Nonnative speakers, however, used Explanations less often at 22%, using Alternatives and Requests for Advice somewhat more frequently: each constituted about 26% of the responses. Nonnative speakers also employed Empathy, but only at 15%. There were two extreme responses, one from each group in which the advisor and/or the system was accused of causing the situation.

Most of the Explanations offered by both native speakers and nonnative speakers employ an "excuse" and sometimes an indirect criticism of the system such as in Examples (16) and (17).

(16) I wasn't aware that this class is taught so infrequently, especially since it is required. (NS)

(17) I was planning to graduate next semester and I just found out that L532 is not offered until next summer. (NNS)

Figure 3. Distribution of Responses for Item 3 (course dropped)



The Empathy moves were also similar in content for the two groups, as in Example (18).

(18) ...there is simply no way I can afford to stay an extra semester. I don't know how I could do it. (NS)

The Alternatives were usually requests for a substitute course or a waiver, as in Example (19), while the Requests for Advice, used only by nonnative speakers, were more general appeals as in Example (20).

(19) Is there a way that the department can arrange for me to take this course or to waive it? (NNS)

(20) What can I do for this situation? Can you give me some suggestions? (NNS)

These examples were similar to those in the natural data. The responses which did not appear in the natural data are, as in Item 2, Bald-on-Record statements which accuse or blame the institution and its representatives, as in Examples (21) and (22).

(21) This really gets me! It seems to me that if these courses are required, they ought to be offered every semester, or we should at least be warned that they're not going to be offered! (NS)

(22) You should have told me that this course will not be offered until after the semester I planned to graduate. (NNS)

These responses are totally out of status, and, if used in an actual advising session would surely produce strong negative moves from the advisor. The fact that they do not so occur reflects an important difference in the effect of the methods used in obtaining data.[8]

In addition to the difference in content between the two methods, there was a difference in the use of status preserving strategies. Generally there were fewer uses of these in the DCT. In the natural data, native speakers used more such strategies than did nonnative speakers, and that still holds in the DCT. However, the nonnative speakers use even fewer such strategies on the DCT than they do in the advising sessions. Moreover, nonnative speakers employed upgraders on the DCT which were absent in the natural data. Upgraders enhance the illocutionary force of the utterance, and their appearance here may be related to the nature of the content of the DCT responses. A response without downgraders is seen in Example (20) above, and in the Direct Rejections in (13) and (14). In Example (23) the student employs an upgrader by granting the advisor permission to look in the file, a power the student does not actually have.

(23) Do you remember that I have already taken that course? I took it last summer. If you like you can check my file. (NNS)

As with the difference in content, we suggest that the differences in status preserving strategies are reflexes of the data-gathering techniques employed, where the face-to-face session requires the students to utilize face and status saving strategies because of the on-going relationship with advisors, whereas they are not at such a risk in the anonymous DCT.

CONCLUSION

Generally we found that our three hypotheses were supported, and that there were differences in the data elicited by the DCT and the natural data.[9] As Beebe and Cummings (1985) found for their native speakers, the DCT elicits a narrower range of semantic formulas, and we found this true for both the native speakers and nonnative speakers, although the nonnative speakers still use more than do the native speakers. Some frequently used formulas, such as Accept as Reject and delays, do not show up at all on the DCT. The reason, we claim, is because the DCT does not promote the turn-taking and negotiation strategies found in natural conversations. On the DCT, students have no way of knowing the success of a response, and are forced to choose the one which seems most likely to work. This, of course, is useful in that it does tell us what they probably judge to be the best strategy in such a situation. At the same time, the DCT elevates the number of Direct Rejections for both groups to third most frequent, even though in the natural data Direct Rejections are among the most infrequently used formulas.

We also found that the DCT allows us to test hypotheses deriving from natural data. By putting the native speakers in circumstances which forced rejections, we were able to test our generalizations about the type, number, and content of semantic formulas that they would use, compared to the nonnative speakers.

We also discovered, however, that the DCT allows the students to be less polite (i.e., to use fewer status preserving strategies), and to employ more Bald-on-Record statements than does the natural situation. Although Beebe & Cummings (1985) found less politeness for their native speakers on the DCT, it was not clear that this would be the case for the present study, since, in contrast to Beebe & Cummings's study, our participants were status unequals. Because of the anonymity of the DCT, students can say what they really think, and vent feelings that would result in a tremendous loss of face in the actual advising sessions. These differences demonstrate that both native speakers and nonnative speakers have outer boundaries on the form and content of the rejections which they use in natural situations. These boundaries differ, since the nonnative speakers do use "illegal" content more often and fewer status preserving strategies than do native speakers in the natural data; yet, even the nonnative speakers do not cross over to direct accusation or criticism when they are face-to-face with their advisors.

In addition to supporting our three hypotheses, the results of this study also support our 1991 speculations in comparing our natural data to the findings of Beebe et al. (1987, 1990). In that work, we claimed that the data collecting techniques could account for many of the differences between our data and theirs. Moreover, we assumed that the differences in the contexts of the refusals of our studies would further help explain the differences found. For example, we noted that Beebe et al. had found Opting Out as a strategy whereas no such option existed for our students. The fact that we did find Opting Out in our DCT supports our claim that the presence of such a strategy is constrained by the context: students cannot easily walk out of an advising session, but they can leave a blank on a DCT. This may be generalized to the overall infrequency of Avoidance strategies on our DCT, which matches their infrequency in the Beebe et al. study: they are less likely to occur in a task where turn-taking and negotiation are not promoted. The same may also be the reason that for both Beebe et al. and the DCT data in the present study, there is a noticeable lack of Accept as Reject responses.

However, the fact that for both our DCT and natural data, Explanation was the most preferred response, whereas for Beebe et al. Alternatives were preferred, probably reflects the difference in the types of suggestions in the two studies rather than the difference in data collection. As we claimed in 1991, the setting and status of participants, and the resultant types of suggestions, differ for the two studies, and are likely to produce different rejection preferences. Since on our DCT these parameters were the same as for our natural data, we believe the consistently high preference for Explanation is evidence that such factors make a difference in findings.

The DCT, then allows us to not only test our hypotheses, but also can provide data which help explain and interpret the natural data. It cannot, however, show us the whole picture: it disallows certain common negotiation strategies, it eliminates certain semantic formulas, and it influences the politeness and status balancing profiles of the students.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study was supported in part by a grant from the Spencer Foundation.

THE AUTHORS

Beverly S. Hartford is Associate Professor of Linguistics at Indiana University. She has published in the areas of World English, second language acquisition, and pragmatics. Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig is Assistant Professor of Linguistics at Indiana University. She has published in the areas of second language acquisition, pragmatics, and teacher education.

NOTES

[1] Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford (1990) and Wolfson (1989) have shown that status relations affect the codings of speech acts in important ways. Wolfson's Bulge Theory claims that such correlations are not linear, and that politeness formulas are used more often among status equals than among nonequals.

[2] In the present study the advising session data is referred to as "the natural data."

[3] The success, or the legal or illegal status of particular content, was determined in the analysis of the spontaneous conversations by the advisor's response (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, 1991). If the advisor accepts the rejection and withdraws the suggestion, the rejection has been successful. If the advisor overrides or dismisses the rejection out of hand, it has been unsuccessful.

[4] All values which are given in percentages have been rounded off.

[5] Direct Rejections include examples such as *Hm. Not actually, I'm avoiding it.* (NS) and *Well, I've decided not to [laughs] take the, um...[course]* (NS) (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, 1991). These and other types of rejections are discussed more fully in the following section.

[6] Accept as Reject is a case where a student seems to respond positively to a suggestion, but in fact does so with an obvious lack of enthusiasm. Often this is accompanied by a more explicit rejection strategy either offering an alternative, or a "But..." explanation. Thus the advisor will take the response as a rejection in this case rather than an acceptance of advice. An example of Accept as Reject is *That might be a solution* (NS) (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, 1991).

[7] An example of But/Yeah But is *Yeah, but in Spain they don't offer courses...* (NNS) (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, 1991).

[8] It is possible that these strong responses are a result of a reading of the prompt whereby the student assumed that the advisor had somehow agreed to the

dropping of the course from the schedule. It was not intended that way: students sometimes change their schedules after advising sessions without consulting or informing the advisor and this was the intended reading of the prompt. However, even if such a misreading occurred, it does not change the fact that to accuse the advisor so directly is entirely out-of-status, and does not occur in any of the natural data, even though such situations arose.

[9] One possible reason for this difference is that, although the DCT items represent actual situations that occur in the natural data, not all students get themselves into such situations. Thus, there is a "forcing" effect by the DCT, that does not necessarily occur in the advising sessions.

REFERENCES

Bardovi-Harlig, K. & Hartford, B. S. (1990). Congruence in native and nonnative conversations: Status balance in the academic advising session. *Language Learning*, *40*, 467-501.

Bardovi-Harlig, K., & Hartford, B. S. (1991). Saying "No": Native and nonnative rejections in English. In L. Bouton & Y. Kachru (Eds.), *Pragmatics and Language Learning*, Monograph Series, Vol 2 (pp.41-57). Urbana-Champaign, IL: University of Illinois.

Beebe, L. & Cummings, M. C. (1985). Speech act performance: A function of the data collection procedure? Paper presented at the Nineteenth Annual TESOL Conference; New York, NY.

Beebe, L. & Takahashi, T. (1989). Do you have a bag?: Social status and patterned variation in second language acquisition. In S. Gass, C. Madden, D. Preston, & L. Selinker (eds.), *Variation in second language acquisition* (Discourse and Pragmatics, vol. 1) (pp. 103-128). Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters.

Beebe, L. M., Takahashi, T. & Uliss-Weltz, R. (1990). Pragmatic transfer in ESL refusals. In R. Scarcella, E. Andersen, S. D. Krashen (eds.), *On the development of communicative competence in a second language* (pp. 55-73). Cambridge, MA: Newbury House.

Blum-Kulka, S., & Olshtain, E. (1986). Too many words; Length of utterance and pragmatic failure. *Journal of Pragmatics*, *8*, 47-61.

Blum-Kulka, S., House, J., & Kasper, G. (Eds.) (1989). *Cross-cultural pragmatics: Requests and apologies*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Kasper, G. & Dahl, M. (1991). Research methods in interlanguage pragmatics. *Studies in Second Language Acquisition*, *13*, 215-247.

Takahashi, T. & Beebe, L. (1987). The development of pragmatic competence by Japanese learners of English. *JALT*, *8*, 131-155.

Wolfson, N. (1989). *Perspectives: Sociolinguistics and TESOL*. New York: Newbury House.

APPENDIX

Discourse Completion Task (DCT)

[Please note that the lines for the student responses have been removed from all but the first example.]

In the following situations, imagine that you are a graduate student who has gone to see an advisor to register for courses for next semester.

1. Your advisor suggests that you take a required course. You want to try to have the course waived because you don't think it's relevant to your career goals.

You say: ____

____

____

2. Your advisor suggests that you take a course which you would rather not take because you think that it will be too difficult for you.

3. During your advising session you find out that a required course which you had dropped from your schedule the previous semester will not be offered until the semester after you had planned to graduate. This is a real financial burden for you.

4. Your advisor suggests that you take a required course. You want to try to have this course waived because you have already taken a course that you think is similar to the one that's being suggested.

5. Your advisor suggests that you take a course during the summer. You prefer not to take classes during the summer.

6. Your advisor suggests that you take a course which you would rather not take because you think that it will be a waste of your time since it will be too easy for you.

7. Your advisor suggests that you take an elective class that she's teaching, but you are not interested in the topic.

8. Your advisor suggests that you to take a required course (which is offered every semester) which conflicts with a course in another department which you have been wanting to take ever since you started your program.

9. Your advisor suggests that you to take a course that you have already taken.

10. Your advisor suggests that you take a particular required course next semester. You know that the timing is good, but you would prefer not to take the course from the professor who is teaching it. If you wait one more semester you can take it from someone else.

11. Your advisor offers you the choice between two electives that he thinks that you should take. You do not want to commit yourself to either course at this time.

Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series, Vol. 3, 1992

The Interpretation of Implicature in English by NNS: Does it Come Automatically -- Without Being Explicitly Taught?

Lawrence F. Bouton

In 1986, a comparison of the ability of NS and NNS to interpret implicature in English found that the two groups interpreted the same implicature in the same context in the same way only 75% of the time (Bouton, 1988). Since implicature is commonplace in everyday communication (Green, 1989), this failure of the two groups to derive the same message from implicatures they confronted suggested a need to include skills in the interpretation of implicatures in ESL/EFL courses. However, a survey of recent ESL texts and informal conversations with ESL teachers indicated that little attention was paid to the development of such skills at the present.

But perhaps it is not necessary to formally teach NNS how to interpret implicature in English. Perhaps just the experience of living in the United States and communicating in English on a daily basis automatically provides NNS with the knowledge and skills they need to interpret implicatures as NS do. The purpose of this study was to gain some understanding of the extent to which this does in fact happen.

INTRODUCTION

In 1986, a study was conducted to determine the extent to which the message derived from an implicature in English by NNS would be consistent with that derived by NS (Bouton, 1988). The results indicated that the two groups derived the same message from the same implicature in the same context only 75% of the time. Since implicature of one form or another is common place in everyday communication (Green, 1989), this failure of the NS and NNS to interpret these implicatures in the same way suggests a potential source of miscommunication when members of the two groups interact. From this it seems to follow that if the purpose of our ESL/EFL courses is to increase the NNS's ability to communicate effectively in English, then those courses should include work designed to help students handle implicature. However, a survey of recent texts and informal conversations with a number of ESL teachers suggests that very little attention is paid to the interpretation of implicature in most ESL courses (Bouton, 1990). And this led to another question: Would the NNS students at an American university learn to interpret implicature more appropriately even without formal instruction? Or, put differently, is the experience of living in the United States and communicating in English on a daily basis sufficient, largely in and of itself, to lead those students to interpret implicature as NS do? Seeking an answer to this question was the purpose of the study underlying this paper.

METHOD

To implement this study, it was necessary to find a group of students who had come to the University of Illinois from overseas and had lived in the United States long enough to have a chance to increase their skill in the interpretation of implicatures in American English. It was also necessary that the subjects have been tested to determine what the level of that skill was when they arrived in the country, so that we would have a benchmark against which to measure the degree to which their ability to interpret implicature had improved over time. Since we first tested international students for this ability in 1986, we decided to select the subjects for this study from the group that arrived in September of that year.

However, of the 436 who were tested at that time, only 60 were still on campus. All of these were contacted. They were told that by taking the same battery of tests that they had taken when they first arrived, they would help us determine the extent to which they had improved different facets of their English proficiency over the years. As compensation for the 2 1/2 hours that the battery of tests requires, the subjects were paid a small sum of money and promised that they would be sent their test scores so that they could see what progress they had made. Of the 60 contacted in this way, 30 agreed to take part in the study.

The test battery used was exactly the same as the one that had been used in 1986. It was assumed that after 4 1/2 years the fact that they had taken the test before would have little effect on their performance this time.

Four different types of tests were involved. Three of these, a structure test, a cloze test, and a dictation test were used to measure the overall proficiency of NNS students entering the university and to place them in ESL courses as necessary. These collectively comprise what will be referred to as the EPT. The fourth was the test specifically designed to measure the subjects ability to interpret implicatures in English. The reason for testing the subjects' overall proficiency after 4 1/2 years was that we would then be able to compare the growth in those facets of their overall proficiency measured by the EPT with that involving the interpretation of implicature. We wanted to know, in other words, whether the students' skill in interpreting implicature increased at the same rate as their overall proficiency.

The implicature test itself was a multiple choice instrument consisting of 33 items (Bouton, 1988, 1989). Each of these contained a brief description of a situation with a short dialogue in which one of the utterances involved the use of implicature, followed by four possible interpretations of that implicature, from which the subjects were asked to choose the one that most closely approximated what the implicature meant. This format was based upon two assumptions: 1) that for each of the implicatures involved, there was an interpretation that most American NS would tend to accept as its primary meaning in the context in which it occurred, and 2) that test items could be developed in which there was enough contextual information to permit a NS to interpret any implicature found in that dialogue. Prior to actually composing the multiple choice instrument in 1986, these assumptions had been tested by giving 60 NS and 79 NNS a set of dialogues containing implicatures in an open-ended format and asking them to put into their own words what they thought those implicatures meant. When these dialogues were turned into a multiple choice test[1], the dominant NS interpretation for each item became the "expected" response, and the more common NNS responses that differed from those of the NS were used as distracters (Bouton, 1988).

RESULTS

Returning now to the study just completed, the data from each of the 30 subjects consisted of two sets of test scores, one from August, 1986, and one from February, 1991, with each of these two sets consisting of the five scores already mentioned - those for the EPT as a whole in columns (5) and (10), those for each of its three components (structure, cloze, and dictation) in columns (2) through (4) and (7) through (9), and for the implicature test in columns (6) and (11). Sample scores are given in Table (1).

Table 1: Sample Sets of Scores Like Those Assigned Each of the 30 Subjects

	1986					1991				
Subj	Struct	Cloze	Dict	EPT	IMPLC	Struct	Cloze	Dict	EPT	IMPLC
GHI	50	56	38	48	23	62	56	51	56	29

The scores in each of the two sets were subjected to both correlation and regression analyses. The results of these analyses are portrayed in Tables (2) through (5). In addition, the scores attained on the implicature test in 1986 and 1991 were compared to determine whether significant growth had occurred in their interpretation of implicature over the 4 1/2 years. At the same time, both of these implicature test results were compared with the scores of a control group consisting of 28 NS.

Both the correlation and the regression analyses showed that there was only a rather weak relationship between the various components of the EPT and the results of the implicature test. In Table (2), for example, we notice that the correlation between the 1986 scores attained on the implicature test and those on the various components of the EPT range from .03085 for the dictation test to .36832 for the cloze test; furthermore, only one of these correlations - that between the implicature test and the cloze test - has a probability coefficient of less than .05. Table (3) contains the results from regression analysis of the 1986 data and shows much the same loose relationship between the components of the EPT and the Implicature test. For instance, we see that the EPT as a whole would be an effective predictor of a subject's success in the use of implicatures only 16.91 percent of the time; nor are any of the subcomponents of the EPT more closely related here.

Moving on to the analysis of the 1991 results shown in Tables (4) and (5), we find that, for the most part, the lack of correlation between the EPT and the implicature test persists. Again there is only one component of the EPT with which the implicature test correlates at all closely, but this time that component is the structure test rather than the cloze test that is in that position. What's more, the statistical relationship between the cloze test and the implicature test has actually weakened considerably since 1986. And so we can see that there is little, if any, correlation between a person's performance on the structure, cloze or dictation components of the EPT and the ability to interpret implicatures effectively. And from this fact, we can draw one definite conclusion: *we cannot measure a person's ability to interpret implicature by using a general proficiency test like the EPT.*

Table 2: Correlation Analysis: The EPT and the Implicature Test (1986)

Pearson Correlation Coefficients / Prob > R under Ho: Rho=0 / N= 30

	Struct	Cloze	Dictation	Composite	Implic
Structure	1.0000 0.0	0.4344 0.0164	0.1129 0.5525	0.6632 0.0001	0.3159 0.0890
Cloze	0.4344 0.0164	1.0000 0.0	0.2346 0.2119	0.74374 0.0001	0.36832 0.0452
Dictation	0.11290 0.5525	0.23467 0.2119	1.0000 0.0	0.71332 0.0001	0.03085 0.8714
Composite$_{EPT}$	0.66326 0.0001	0.74374 0.0001	0.7133 0.0001	1.0000 0.0	0.31343 0.0917
Implicature	0.31590 0.0890	0.36832 0.0452	0.03085 0.8714	0.31343 0.0917	1.0000 0.0

Table 3: Regression Analysis of Variance (Dependent Variable IMPLC 86)

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F Value	Prob > F
Model	3	91.98898	30.66299	1.764	0.1787
Error	26	451.87769	17.37991		
C Total	29	543.86667			

Root MSE	4.16892	R-square	0.1691
Dep Mean	21.93333	Adj R-sq	0.7333
C. V.	19.00724		

Parameter Estimates

Variable	DF	Estimate	Parameter Standard Error	T for HO: Parameter=0	Prob > T
INTERCEP	1	6.666539	7.70499105	0.865	0.3948
Structure	1	0.129649	0.13334918	0.972	0.3399
Cloze	1	0.192428	0.13065125	1.473	0.1528
Dictation	1	-0.028832	0.08683990	-0.332	0.7425

Table 4: Correlation Analysis: The EPT and the Implicature Test (1991)

Pearson Correlation Coefficients / Prob > R under Ho: Rho=0 / N= 30

	Struct	Cloze	Dictation	Composite	Implc
Structure	1.0000 0.0	0.4495 0.0127	0.1393 0.4628	0.6711 0.0001	0.4616 0.0102
Cloze	0.4495 0.0127	1.000 0.0	0.2653 0.1565	0.7723 0.000	0.2815 0.1318
Dictation	0.1393 0.4628	0.2653 0.1565	1.0000 0.0	0.7145 0.0001	0.0162 0.9320
Composite$_{EPT}$	0.6711 0.0001	0.7723 0.0001	0.7145 0.0001	1.0000 0.0	0.3183 0.0865
Implicature	0.4616 0.0102	0.2815 0.1318	0.0162 0.9320	0.3183 0.0865	1.0000 0.0

Table 5: Regression Analysis of Variance (Dependent Variable IMPLC 91)

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F Value	Prob > F
Model	3	80.73938	26.91313	2.513	0.0806
Error	26	278.46062	10.71002		
C Total	29	359.20000			

Root MSE	3.27262	R-square	0.2248
Dep Mean	25.6000	Adj R-sq	0.1353
C. V.	12.78366		

Parameter Estimates

Variable	DF	Estimate	Parameter Standard Error	T for HO: Parameter=0	Prob > T
INTERCEP	1	11.754472	6.22208191	1.889	0.0701
Structure	1	0.220892	0.10127005	2.181	0.3399
Cloze	1	0.049802	0.89089295	0.559	0.5809
Dictation	1	-0.026945	0.06709027	-0.402	0.6912

To determine whether there had been significant growth in the ability of the NNS to interpret implicature over the 4 1/2 year period since they had first come to Illinois, a T test was used to compare their 1986 implicature test scores with those of 1991 and both of those scores were compared with the scores of the NS control group. What we found was that the 1986 and the 1991 test scores attained by the NNS were different to the .0001 degree of probability, showing that the NNS subjects' ability to derive the expected message from implicatures had improved. But while the NNS interpretations of the implicatures approached those of the NS more closely after the former had been in this country for 4 1/2 years, the messages derived by the two groups still showed a statistically significant difference: in 1986 the probability coefficient was .0001; in 1991, it was only .0018.

So far, we have been able to draw two conclusions from the results of our study of the ability of NNS to become more native-like in their interpretation of English language implicatures over time: first, significant improvement does occur; and second, the skills necessary to derive appropriate implicatures apparently differ considerably from those needed to perform well on structure, cloze, or dictation tests.

But we need to study this growth in ability to use implicature more closely. Neither the NS nor the NNS groups performed uniformly well as they attempted to interpret the different types of implicatures that formed the basis of this study. Among the NS, this variation appeared as a difference in the extent to which the subjects agreed as to what message a particular implicature was meant to convey. The NNS, for their part, differed from one implicature type to another in terms of how close their interpretations came to those of the NS group. Given this variation in the apparent difficulty of different types of implicature, two questions present themselves: 1) What type of implicatures proved especially difficult for the NS and the NNS and were they the same for both groups? And (2), did the types of implicatures that were more difficult for the NNS in 1986 remain so?

The first thing that we should notice as we look at different implicature items is that there are a total of 20 out of the 33 items on the test on which the 1991 performance of the NNS and the NS was essentially the same: when the scores of the NNS and the NS on these 20 items are compared statistically, there is no significant difference between the two groups (prob > 0.3056). In 1986, only 5 of these 20 items showed so little difference between the two groups; The performance by the two groups, NS and NNS, on those five questions is indicated in Table (6).

Table 6: Items on Which NS and NNS Was Essentially the Same

			1986			1991		
Test Item	NS %	Rel[2] index	NNS %	Rel Index	NS - NNS %	NNS %	Rel Index	NS - NNS %
4	100	0.00	93	0.40	7	97	0.56	3
12	100	0.00	90	0.43	10	100	0.00	0
24	100	0.00	93	0.30	7	97	0.19	3
26	100	0.00	93	0.16	7	84	0.08	3
27	86	0.21	77	0.26	9	84	0.02	2

A second subset of the 20 implicature test items are those on which the NNS did not approach the performance of the NS in 1986, but by 1991 had improved to the point that there was no longer any significant difference between the two groups. These were related to Grice's Relevance Maxim. The NS interpretation of the implicatures in these items was remarkably uniform, with an average of 96% of them deriving the same message in each case. But while these items were quite easy for the NS to interpret, they proved somewhat difficult for the NNS in 1986, with only an average of 77% of them - or 19% fewer than the NS - interpreting the items as expected. By 1991, this figure had risen to 93% - essentially the same as that of the NS.

Table 7: Relevance Implicatures on Which NNS and NS Performance Was Similar

Test Item	NS %	Rel Index%	NNS Index	Rel %	NS - NNS %	NNS Index	Rel %	NS - NNS
3	93	0.01	67	0.54	26	84	0.29	9
8	96	0.01	80	0.20	16	88	0.23	8
15	93	0.28	77	0.37	16	94	0.04	-1
18	100	0.00	87	0.54	13	100	0.00	0
20	100	0.00	83	0.41	17	94	0.38	6
21	96	0.01	83	0.03	13	94	0.12	2
22	96	0.19	80	0.05	16	91	0.27	5
29	100	0.00	77	0.57	23	97	0.13	3
32	89	0.09	67	0.38	22	88	0.42	1
33	100	0.00	77	0.41	23	97	0.56	3

Of these 10 relevance-based implicatures, item (32) involved a sequence implicature, in which the fact that two events are described in a particular sequence leads the listener/reader to infer that they actually occurred in that same sequence. The rest of these items, however, were more generally based on the tendency of participants in a conversation to assume that whatever a person says is somehow related to what has gone before and to interpret it in that light. Two examples of these implicatures are found in (1) and (2). In (1), for example, the difference between the NS and the NNS responses depends on their understanding of a rather specific point of American culture - the attitude of most American's toward exercise and injuries resulting from it.

(1) When Abe got home, he found that his wife had to use a cane in order to walk.

Abe: What happened to your leg?
Wife: I went jogging today.

Another way the wife could have said the same thing is...

a. Today I finally got some exercise jogging.
>> b. I hurt it jogging.
c. It's nothing serious. Don't worry about it.
d. I hurt it doing something silly.

In this item, the interpretation in (a) takes the wife's response literally and does not relate it to Abe's question. This interpretation of the response violates Grice's Relevance Maxim, but anyone choosing it draws no implicature from that violation. None of the 30 subjects in this study selected that choice either in 1986 or in 1991. All of them, in other words, drew some sort of inference from the wife's remark; whether they drew the same one as 93% of the NS depended on whether they realized that Americans tend to take exercise like jogging - as well as any injury resulting from it - rather seriously and would not refer to it as "something silly." In 1986, only 55% of the NNS interpreted this item effectively, with 25% choosing (c) and 13% choosing (d). By 1991, the percentage of NNS viewing the incident in the same way as the American NS control group had risen to 84%.

In (2), the cultural orientation of the source of the implicature is perhaps not so obvious.

(2) Lars: Where's Rudy, Tom? Have you seen him lately?
Tom: There's a yellow VW parked over by Sarah's house?

What Tom is saying here is that...

a. he just noticed that Sarah has bought a new yellow VW and is telling Lars about it.
b. he has no idea where Rudy is.
>> c. he thinks Rudy may be at Sarah's house.
d. none of these. He is deliberately changing the subject to avoid having

to admit that he doesn't know.

As in (1), the first choice here disregards Grice's Relevance Maxim. In this case, however, 13% of the subjects did interpret Tom's remark that way in 1986, though none did in 1991. The other three selections are all derived through Grice's maxim. For example, (b) assumes that providing an apparently irrelevant answer to a question can be interpreted as implying that the speaker does not know the answer, while (d) assumes that the same behavior is designed to avoid having to admit ignorance. The choice in (c), on the other hand, does require knowledge of one bit of American culture, i.e., that men can visit women in their homes under apparently casual conditions. When they first took the implicature test in 1986, only 77% of the 30 NNS subjects in this study interpreted this item as the NS did, but by 1991, that percentage had risen to 97%. In both (1) and (2), then, interpreting the implicature in the same way as the NS did required that the NNS understand one or more specific facts about American culture, though this was more obvious in (1) than in (2). Also, in (2), there were some NNS who seemed not to use the relevance maxim at all in arriving at their interpretation. But helping NNS learn to interpret implicatures like these would seem to involve primarily the teaching of specific facets of American culture in the classroom and, perhaps, alerting them to indirect uses of language of this sort. At the same time, given the marked increase in the NNS tendency to interpret the implicatures underlying the items in Table (6) as the NS do, the particular factors involved in these items are apparently the type that will be learned without formal instruction - at least over a 4 1/2 year period.

The last 5 of the 20 items on which the 1991 NNS performance came close to that of the NS control group are what we have labeled *understated Criticism*. As a starting point in discussing these items, we should notice that they were more difficult to recognize and interpret for both the American NS and the NNS. Of the 33 items comprising the test as a whole, 7 saw the American NS choosing the expected interpretation only from 64 to 79% of the time. Of those 7, 5 involve *understated criticism* and are related to Grice's Maxim of Quantity. This type of implicature is used when we are asked what we think of something or someone that we, in fact, do not like, but do not want to criticize directly. Instead, we reply by commenting favorably on some feature of the thing or person that is not central to the requested evaluation. This type of answer does not, of course, provide the information that the question has asked for, and this forces our conversation partner to try to understand why the desired information was not supplied. A common inference drawn from such an utterance is that the speaker did not want to answer the question directly because that could not be done without somehow offending the conversation partner. Hence, an answer that fails to provide information requested in this way is more often than not interpreted as a negative evaluation. An example of this type of utterance as it appears in one of the test items is that in (3) (adapted from Richards, 1980).

(3) Two teachers are talking about a student's term paper.

Mr. Ranger: Have you read Mark's term paper on modern pirates?
Mr. Ryan: Yes, I read it last night.
Mr. Ranger: What did you think of it?
Mr. Ryan: I thought it was well typed.

How did Mr. Ryan like Mark's paper?

(a) He liked the paper; he thought it was good.
(b) He thought it was certainly well typed.
(c) He thought it was a good paper; he did like the form, though not the content.
>> (d) He didn't like it.

Of the American NS responding to this particular test item, only 79% chose the expected response. But if this item was difficult for the NS, it was even more so for the NNS in 1986, when only 53% interpreted the implicature involved as expected. After 4 1/2 years, however, that percentage had risen to 72%, just slightly below that of the American NS. And, as Table 8 demonstrates, this same sharp increase can be found in each of the other four items containing implicatures based on *understated criticism*. In fact, in the case of items #13 and #16, the percentage of NNS choosing the expected interpretation in 1991 was higher than that of the NS control group. What's more, as Table 8 also demonstrates, the test items based on *understated criticism* were highly reliable: on each administration of the implicature test, the reliability of four of the five items was exceptionally high, ranging well above the 0.30 that is considered acceptable, and this lends credibility to this set of items as a measure of the subjects ability to interpret this type of implicature. The NNS in this study have apparently learned to interpret this type of implicature rather well.

Table 8: Understated Negative Evaluation/Criticism

Test Item	NS %	Rel Index	NNS Rel %	NS - NNS Index	NNS %	Rel %	NS - NNS Index	%
5	70	0.60	53	0.53	16	72	0.72	7
11	75	0.38	60	0.60	15	75	0.75	0
13	75	0.22	63	0.63	12	81	0.81	-6
16	64	0.43	23	0.23	41	63	0.53	1
17	71	0.52	47	0.47	24	85	0.26	-14

We have found, then, that there are 20 implicature items on which the NNS performance approached that of the NS control group after 4 1/2 years of attending an American university - but without any formal instruction designed to develop this skill in relation to their use of American English. As we noted, when a T test is used to compare the scores of NNS and NS on these 20 questions in 1986, they were different to the .0001 degree of certainty. By 1991, however, that difference had disappeared and the probability coefficient was a non-significant 0.3056. These 20 items, we have noted, were largely based rather generally on Grice's Relevance Maxim, though 5 of them were what we have termed Understated Criticism.

There was, however, a set of 8 items on which at least 16% fewer NNS than NS chose the expected response in 1991, and on 4 of these, the similarity between the interpretations derived by the two groups actually declined over the 4 1/2 years. It is this set of eight items that is responsible for the statistically significant difference between the performance of the NNS on the implicature test as a whole in 1991 and that of the NS. However, there does not seem to be any obvious rationale that would explain why these particular items proved particularly difficult. No one type of implicature occurs in that set of items more often than any other. Like many of the items that we have already discussed, each of these requires a certain knowledge of the American culture and language that is independent of what is required by the others; sometimes there is also a linguistic pattern associated with the implicature and sometimes there is not. For example, one of the utterances in this set from which an implicature was to be drawn was "just like Mama used to make." Only 66% of the NNS recognized that comment as being positive and a compliment in 1991, while 93% of the NS interpreted it that way. Thirty-one percent of the NNS thought that the remark meant that the pie was "nothing special; just everyday food." This difference in interpretation undoubtedly stems to some extent from the fact that the phrase is almost a cliche in American English, but it also has at least some basis in the fact that in many of the cultures represented in this study (e.g., Chinese, Korean, and Japanese), one does not brag about members of one's own family or the skills they have, since to do so is to brag about oneself and such behavior is unacceptable.

Another implicature that remained difficult for NNS is that in (4).

(4) Bill and Peter have been good friends since they were children. They roomed together in college and travelled Europe together after graduation. Now friends have told Bill that they saw Peter dancing with Bill's wife while Bill was away.

Bill: Peter knows how to be a really good friend.

Which of the following best says what Bill means?

>> a. Peter is not acting the way a good friend should.
b. Peter and Bill's wife are becoming really good friends while Bill is away.
c. Peter is a good friend and so Bill can trust him.
d. Nothing should be allowed to interfere with their friendship.

Only half of the NNS put down the expected answer here in 1991, but that is up from 37% in 1986. In fact, it is interesting to note that of the entire group of 436 subjects who responded to this item in 1986, a majority of every group except the Spanish speakers took Bill's remark literally and selected (c) as the best interpretation of what he said. It's irony escaped them.

But it is not sufficient to note that Bill's remark was ironic; we must also note those cultural understandings that lead 86% NS to recognize it as such, while only 37% of the NNS were able to do so in 1986 and only 50% in 1991. And then, having identified those elements of American culture that lead Americans to understand Bill's remark one way while the NNS interpret it another, we would have to decide how important it is for NNS to become familiar with those elements of American culture and, based on that decision, whether we should teach those elements in the ESL/EFL classroom. And this same process would have to be repeated for each of the other items in this set of 8 that the subjects in this study have not learned to interpret correctly, even after 4 1/2 years of living in the United States.

CONCLUSION

Several things are clear with regard to the interpretation of implicatures in English by NNS. For one thing, even NNS who have achieved a proficiency in English that can be represented by a score in the mid-500's on the TOEFL differed from NS in their interpretation of English implicatures for some 25% of the items used in this study. Furthermore, a comparison of the interpretations assigned to these implicatures by the American NS with those of British and Canadian NS turned up no significant differences in the messages these three groups derived, but all three groups of NS differed significantly from the NNS (Bouton, 1991). Therefore, in the interest of facilitating better communication between these NNS and the NS with whom they will be interacting, classes should help the NNS students develop the knowledge and skills that they need to interpret the implicatures appropriately. At the present, however, these skills are not dealt with systematically by the texts available.

On the other hand, we have also seen that over a period of 4 1/2 years of living in the United States, NNS do become able to interpret most (though not all) of the implicatures covered in this study as American NS do; only 7 of the original items remained problematic for them.

It is obvious that further research is necessary on at least two different fronts. First, we need to broaden our understanding of the different types of implicatures that exist and to learn which are particularly troublesome to learners of English as a second language and why. Until that information is obtained, the decision as to which implicatures to teach and which to ignore will be made on a rather arbitrary basis. Second, we need to discover how quickly the NNS develop the skills that we found they had acquired sometime before the end of their 4 1/2 years here. If NNS develop these skills quickly, then dealing with them in the ESL classroom becomes much less important; to the extent that their development is relatively slow, then anything that we can do to help the NNS to master them more quickly becomes desirable. One of the goals of pragmatics should be to provide ESL teachers with an empirically based, carefully reasoned set of guidelines as to what course, if any, should be followed in the development the NNS ability to interpret implicatures effectively.

THE AUTHOR

Lawrence F. Bouton is an associate professor of English as an International Language and Linguistics at the University of Illinois in Champaign-Urbana. His areas of interest are pragmatics and English grammar and their role in the teaching of English to NNS.

NOTES

[1] For the reasons for choosing a multiple choice format over that of the open ended question, see Bouton (1988, 1989).

[2] The figures in this column represent the reliability index associated with a particular question. Questions with indices ranging between .20 and .29 are marginal; those between .30 and .39 are solid; and those above .40 are especially reliable test items. Items that are easy for everyone usually have low reliability coefficients.

REFERENCES

Bouton, Lawrence F. (1988) A cross-cultural study of the ability to interpret implicatures in English, World Englishes, vol. 7, no. 2. pp. 183-97.

Bouton, Lawrence F. (1989) So they got the message, but how did they get it? IDEAL, vol. 4. pp. 119-49.

Green, Georgia M. (1989) Pragmatics and Natural Language Understanding. Hillsdale, N.J.:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.

◆

Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series, Vol. 3, 1992

Linguistic and Pragmatic Competence: Their Relationship in the Overall Competence of the Language Learner

Sheila Hoffman-Hicks

While linguistic competence has long been the focus of analyses investigating learners' developing language abilities, research on the acquisition of the socio-cultural aspects of language use has emphasized the crucial role pragmatic competence plays in successful communication. This study examines both types of competence -- linguistic and pragmatic -- and aims to shed light on the largely unexamined issue of their relationship within the larger domain of the learner's overall competence.

Fourteen students of French at an American university and a control group of nine native speakers of French participated in the study. Three tests instruments -- a standardized multiple-choice test of French, a role play questionnaire, and a discourse completion test -- were administered in an effort to tease out learners' linguistic and pragmatic abilities. Results strongly suggest that linguistic competence is a necessary prerequisite to pragmatic competence but that it does not itself guarantee pragmatic competence. It appears that a certain level of linguistic ability must be attained before learners are able to convey their message with socio-cultural appropriateness. Nevertheless, the level of linguistic competence needed for adequate communication in given language-use situations does not necessarily assure learners of socio-cultural appropriateness in these contexts.

INTRODUCTION

An abundance of research has addressed the limitations of the Chomskyan concept of *knowing* language by asserting the importance of the socio-cultural aspects of language use (Gumperz, 1971; Hymes, 1972b; Schmidt & Richards, 1980; Fraser et al., 1980). Such research has shown that in addition to linguistic or grammatical competence (a knowledge of the syntax, phonology, and vocabulary of a language), language users must also possess pragmatic competence (a knowledge of how to use the language appropriately) to communicate effectively. The need to attain both types of competence makes the second or foreign language learner's task particularly challenging.

While research in pragmatics such as Varonis & Gass (1985), Beebe & Takahashi (1989a), and Wolfson (1989b) has brought to light the critical role pragmatic competence plays in the overall competence of the language learner, other studies (Eisenstein & Bodman, 1986; Hartford & Bardovi-Harlig, 1989; Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, 1990; Wieland, 1990) have emphasized the difficulty in attaining such competence. Bardovi-Harlig's and Hartford's studies in ESL, for example, have

77

shown that at the advanced level, linguistic competence is not sufficient for pragmatic competence. These studies have shown that even highly proficient learners of English, graduate students enrolled at an American university, are often unable to use the language appropriately in given contexts. Likewise, Wieland's research on the pragmatic skills of women who had been living in France for a period of two to twenty-six years, provided startling evidence suggesting that nonnative speakers may never attain both native-like linguistic and native-like pragmatic competence.

These studies, however, examine only the skills of very advanced learners and, therefore, leave open the development-related question of whether grammatical competence is a necessary prerequisite for pragmatic competence. Moreover, since the subjects who participated in these studies were living in the host environment at the time of data collection, these studies do not focus on the situation of foreign language learning in a formal setting. This study considers these two aspects by investigating the relationship of the linguistic and pragmatic competence of intermediate-level learners in the foreign language setting.

The results of the studies mentioned above provide interesting insights for language acquisition research since they suggest that the acquisition of linguistic and pragmatic competence in the target language setting does not necessarily occur at the same rate, that pragmatic competence appears to lag somehow in the course of development. One might assume that this would also be the case for foreign language learners. In fact, it seems likely that the difference in the development of the two types of competence may be even more apparent for this latter group since, as classroom learners, their exposure to the socio-cultural aspects of language use would be significantly more limited. These are the issues addressed in the present study. More formally, the research questions posed are:

1) Is linguistic competence **necessary** for pragmatic competence?

2) Is linguistic competence **sufficient** for pragmatic competence?

Learners' performance on both linguistic and pragmatic tasks will be compared and analyzed in an effort to answer these questions.

METHOD

Subjects

Subjects for this study included fourteen students of French at Indiana University. Twelve of the subjects were female and two were male. All subjects were pursuing majors or minors in French and were enrolled in third- or fourth- year level courses at the time of the data collection. A control group of nine native speakers of French also participated in the study.

All of the subjects were preparing for participation in an overseas study program in France during the 1990-91 academic year. This particular group was selected for motivational reasons. It was assumed that students who would eventually be living in the target culture would be more concerned with not only their linguistic abilities but also their pragmatic skills than students who did not plan to study abroad. That is to say, they would likely be more attentive to or perhaps more sensitive to learning about all facets of meeting and maintaining relationships with native speakers.

Test Instruments

The research questions posed in this study investigate the relation of linguistic and pragmatic competence within the larger domain of the learner's overall competence[1]. Such a statement implies that these two areas of competence are somehow separable entities. It is clear, however, that competence in a language is not a concrete whole which can be neatly divided into separate linguistic and pragmatic components, and no such claim is made here. Nevertheless, in an effort to gain insight into the intriguing, though slippery, issue of what it means to *know* a language, an attempt was made in this study to isolate these areas of competence. By drawing on the capabilities of various data collection techniques to elicit different types of data, linguistic and pragmatic competence were tapped independently of each other. The data obtained from each task thus offer a relatively distinct focus.

To measure linguistic competence in the target language, a standardized multiple-choice test of French was administered which included grammar, reading comprehension, and listening comprehension components. This test is routinely administered as part of the requirements for application to the overseas study program. Students' scores on the test are generally taken into consideration when determining acceptance into the program.

Two tasks were administered for the measurement of pragmatic competence. The first task, a role play questionnaire, was issued to evaluate the subjects' receptive pragmatic knowledge. This questionnaire is a modified version of one developed by Raffaldini (1987) in a related study. The subjects were instructed to imagine that they were in France and were interacting with native speakers (NSs) of French in various situations. For each of the ten items on this multiple-choice questionnaire, the subjects were provided the *tone* and the *stimulus* for the interaction. The tone was described as an explanation of the subject's attitude toward the other speaker, e.g. polite, reproving, worried, persuasive. The stimulus described the situation and stated where the interaction was taking place (in a cafe, at the subject's apartment, etc.) and with whom the subject was speaking (a classmate, neighbor, professor, etc.). The tone and the stimulus were given in English so that the subjects would fully understand each situation.

Only scenarios in which the subjects might realistically find themselves were included. Moreover, since the subjects were instructed to imagine themselves in each situation, they were not required to play the role of another person who might be of a different age, sex, or social status.

Consider a sample item from this questionnaire in (1) below:

(1) TONE: courteous STIMULUS: The older woman in whose house you are living is out of town and a friend of hers calls you to invite you to

dinner. You don't want to offend her, but you have no desire to go, so you decline the invitation politely. You say:

a) Merci Madame, c'est très gentil, mais je vous prie de m'excuser. Il faudrait que je finisse un devoir pour demain.
Thank you, ma'am. That's very kind, but I must ask you to excuse me. It's necessary for me to finish an assignment for tomorrow.

b) C'est très gentil de votre part de m'inviter, Madame, mais je ne peux pas y aller ce soir. J'ai beaucoup de boulot à faire pour demain, et je dois travailler.
It's really nice of you to invite me, ma'am, but I can't come tonight. I have tons of stuff to do for tomorrow, and I have to work.

c) Merci beaucoup, Madame. Mais je ne peux vraiment pas ce soir. J'ai un devoir à finir pour demain, et je crois qu'il serait plus sage que je travaille ce soir.
Thank you very much, ma'am, but I really can't tonight. I have an assignment to finish for tomorrow, and I think it would be wiser if I worked tonight.

d) Pardon, Madame, j'ai trop de choses à faire pour demain. Je vais travailler toute la nuit.
I'm sorry, ma'am, I have too many things to do for tomorrow. I'm going to work all night.

In this refusal scenario, several clues were provided to help determine the most appropriate way of declining the dinner invitation. For example, the fact that the person with whom the subject is living is an older woman and a friend of the caller suggests something about the status relationship involved. Furthermore, the tone is marked as "courteous", which is supported by the word "politely" in the stimulus. Finally, the phrase "You don't want to offend her" emphasizes the importance of choosing an appropriate response. All items on the questionnaire included clues of this type.

The four responses following each item were in French and were derived from two sources. A native speaker response was created by a team of native French speakers who, in Raffaldini's pilot study, judged it as most appropriate for the given situation. The three distractors were selected from responses provided by the pilot study subjects on an open-ended version of the task. In the present study, the subjects were asked to simply mark the most appropriate response for each situation. The native speaker control group, on the other hand, was instructed to rank the distractors in terms of the most to least appropriate, or native-like.

The second instrument for examining pragmatic competence was a discourse completion test (DCT). The format of the test was identical to that of the questionnaire except that, instead of multiple-choice responses, the items were left open-ended. Subjects and control group participants were asked to write in the most appropriate response to each situation. Although research has shown that speech acts usually are not accomplished in a single utterance or turn (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973; Searle, 1976; Schmidt & Richards, 1980), the subjects were intentionally not asked to produce a complete dialogue for this task in order to be consistent with the responses elicited by the role play questionnaire. The stimuli presented in these items were different from those found in the role play questionnaire so that subjects would not be influenced by related responses.

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Task 1: Linguistic Competence Test

Table 1. Linguistic competence test scores and rank.

RANK	NNS	RAW SCORE	% CORRECT
1	A	65	65
1	B	65	65
3	C	62	62
4	D	60	60
4	E	60	60
6	F	57	57
7	G	52	52
8	H	49	49
8	I	49	49
10	J	48	48
11	K	47	47
12	L	45	45
13	M	40	40
14	N	37	37

n=14

Table 1 presents the fourteen subjects' scores from the test measuring linguistic competence, which had one hundred possible points. The subjects (nonnative speakers (NNS)) are ranked from highest to lowest according to their percentage correct. Note that some of the subjects earned identical scores. The fact that no subjects performed higher than 65% and none performed below 37% on this test reflects the intermediate level of these learners and suggests that the test was of an appropriate level of difficulty for capturing their linguistic competence.

Task 2: Pragmatic Competence Role Play Questionnaire

Several steps were taken to analyze the data from the role play questionnaire used to evaluate pragmatic competence. First, the results provided by the NSs were tabulated. Recall that the NSs were instructed to rank the responses for each item and not to simply mark the single most appropriate response. A mark of one signaled the best response, a four indicated the least appropriate, so that when the marks for each response were totaled, the lowest total score was considered to be the overall best response provided by NSs. The second lowest total score was considered to be second best, and so on.

The results revealed that the NSs were not in agreement on these rankings, particularly in the case of second and third best responses. For all but one item, however, it was clear which single response was overwhelmingly considered the best. That is, there was always one response which clearly received the fewest total points. Similarly, for each item, there was always at least one response which no NS marked as the best choice. Thus it could be safely claimed that one response was clearly *the best* and another clearly *not the best* choice[2].

Table 2. Role play questionnaire scores and rank.

RANK	NNS	RAW SCORE	% CORRECT
1	C	16	80
1	D	16	80
3	K	14	70
4	G	13	65
5	J	12	60
6	A	11	55
6	B	11	55
8	H	10	50
8	I	10	50
8	M	10	50
11	E	9	45
11	F	9	45
13	N	7	35
14	L	6	30

n=14

To determine the subjects' score on this task, their responses were compared to these two rankings: *best* and *not best*. Scoring for each item was carried out according to the following distribution. Subjects were given two points for marking the response judged as *best* by the NSs. They were given zero points for marking the response judged as *not best*[3]. For marking either of the other two possible responses, subjects were given one point since, although they were clearly not the *best* response, they were also not judged to be *not best* and therefore were at least somewhat acceptable to some native speaker judges.

Since there were ten items, the highest possible score on this task was 20 and the lowest possible score was 0, although no subject scored either of these extremes.

These scores are provided in Table 2. Again, the subjects are ranked according to percentage correct.

Comparing the Results

In order to answer the two research questions posed in this study -- that is, whether linguistic competence is (a) necessary and (b) sufficient for pragmatic competence -- subjects' performance in both areas of competence, linguistic and pragmatic, had to be compared. The difficulty of comparing subjects' scores on the linguistic component of the study with their scores on the pragmatic component, however, is illustrated in the cliched expression of comparing apples with oranges. For although we can arrive at numbers and statistics representing the results of each task, these numbers cannot necessarily be compared. They are not absolutes. Quantifying pragmatic abilities is a challenging task in and of itself; and when an attempt is made to correlate these figures with grammatical scores, for example, the difficulties are compounded.

To deal with this problem of comparing two types of data, an attempt was made to discover a possible link or variable common to the two sets of scores. The subjects' rank based on their performance on the two tasks was chosen as the means of comparison. These figures were provided in Tables 1 and 2. The rankings were analyzed as shown in Table 3 in order to gain insights into how subjects ranked relative to each other on the two tasks.

Addressing the Research Questions

Research question 1: Is linguistic competence necessary for pragmatic competence?

In response to the first research question, the results suggest that linguistic competence generally is a necessary prerequisite for pragmatic competence. Eleven of the fourteen subjects -- A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, L, and N -- performed similarly (within three rank positions) or worse on the pragmatic competence task than they did on the linguistic competence task. Or, to approach it from another direction, for only three subjects -- J, K, and M -- did linguistic competence not appear to be necessary for pragmatic competence. These subjects were able to perform relatively well on the pragmatic task despite fairly low scores on the linguistic task.

Some possible explanations for the individual variation exhibited by J, K, and M should be considered. To account for the performance of these subjects, two other variables were investigated: level of coursework and amount of time spent speaking French outside of the classroom. Level of coursework refers to the level of the course(s) in French in which the subject was enrolled at the time of data collection. Subjects who scored higher on the linguistic test (those ranked sixth or better, namely A through F) were all enrolled in fourth-year and upper third-year level courses, while those who scored lower were generally enrolled in lower third-year level courses. Also taken into consideration here was whether the subjects had begun their study of French at the university or prior to it.

Table 3. Comparison of rank[4]



Linguistic Task RANK	Linguistic Task NNS	Pragmatic Task RANK	Pragmatic Task NNS
1	A	1	C
1	B	1	D
3	C	3	K
4	D	4	G
4	E	5	J
6	F	6	A
7	G	6	B
8	H	8	H
8	I	8	I
10	J	8	M
11	K	11	E
12	L	11	F
13	M	13	N
14	N	14	L

n=14

A separate questionnaire was administered to discover how much time subjects spent speaking French outside the classroom with, for example, other participants in the overseas study program, native speakers, and professors. It was assumed that those students who conversed more in French, particularly with native speakers or very advanced speakers such as professors and tutors, might have an advantage over those who rarely or never spoke French outside the classroom. The results of the questionnaire indicated that all of the subjects spoke little to no French in these out-of-class contexts. These results are somewhat surprising in light of the fact that this group of subjects -- students preparing for study abroad -- had been selected on the assumption that they would be more motivated to learn and use French than other learners.

Return now to the three subjects who performed well on the pragmatic task despite relatively low scores on the linguistic task. Information derived from the additional variables discussed above strongly suggests that for both subjects J and K, the score they earned on the linguistic test may not be representative of their actual linguistic ability. That is, these subjects were probably more advanced linguistically than their score on that task indicates. One basis for this assumption is the fact that, like all of the subjects who ranked highest on this section (those ranked sixth or better), both of these subjects were enrolled in fourth-year level courses. In fact, J was enrolled in two advanced French courses that semester and K was enrolled in four. This information is provided on Table 4.

Table 4. Level of French course(s) enrolled in at time of data collection[5]

RANK	NNS	COURSE(S)
1	A	F473
1	B	F474, F425
3	C	F362
4	D	F401
4	E	F401
6	F	F425
7	G	----*
8	H	F313
8	I	F314
10	**J**	**F450, F401**
11	**K**	**F473, F401, F362, F316**
12	L	F313
13	M	----*
14	N	F313

*Course enrollment information unavailable

Furthermore, while most of the subjects began studying French at the high school level, K began learning French at the junior high or middle school level, giving him more years of exposure to the language. Finally, although the results from the questionnaire did not prove to be as useful as anticipated, they did indicate that J and K were two of only four subjects in the group who spent time speaking French with other participants in the program. Interestingly, the other two subjects were B and C, who also scored well on the linguistic task.

It does appear, then, that J and K may have been incorrectly ranked for linguistic ability and that they may not in fact present counter-evidence to the claim that linguistic competence is necessary for pragmatic competence; the discrepancy tween their linguistic and pragmatic scores may be artificial. Since the additional information about course enrollment and time spent speaking French was not available for subject M, a more complete picture of her language abilities cannot be determined. Nevertheless, it is possible to claim that for thirteen out of fourteen, and possibly even fourteen out of fourteen subjects, a certain linguistic competence was necessary for pragmatic competence. The results obtained here provide convincing support for this claim.

Research question 2: Is linguistic competence sufficient for pragmatic competence?

According to the results illustrated in Table 3, it does not appear to be the case that linguistic competence is sufficient for pragmatic competence. This is clear from the results of subjects A, B, E, and F who performed considerably more poorly, relatively speaking, on the pragmatic task than on the linguistic task. If linguistic competence were sufficient for pragmatic competence, these subjects should have performed as well or better on the pragmatic task. This conclusion corresponds with Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford's (1990) and Hartford & Bardovi-Harlig's (1989) findings on advanced learners of ESL and with Wieland's (1990) advanced nonnative speakers of French. Linguistic competence does not guarantee pragmatic competence. The following section will present further evidence for this claim.

Task 3: Discourse Completion Test

The third task administered in this study was the DCT. Recall that the format of this test was identical to that of the role play questionnaire, except that the items were left open-ended. On the DCT, subjects were provided a tone and stimulus in English, and each item concluded with the phrase "You say:". In this paper, one speech act situation, complimenting, was selected for discussion; it will be discussed in light of its implications for the two research questions posed.

In her analysis of American complimenting behavior, Wolfson (1989b, 1983) noted that at the syntactic level, compliments were of a highly patterned nature. She found, for example, that 50% of all compliments given by middle-class speakers of American English were characterized by the formula in (2) below:

(2) NP (is/looks) (really) ADJ
Your house is really beautiful.

Two other common patterns made up another 29% of all compliments. These were:

(3) I really (like/love) NP
I really like your shirt.

(4) PRO is (really) (a) ADJ NP
That was really a great paper.

Wolfson discovered these syntactic patterns in her analysis of over twelve hundred compliments. The corpus of compliments analyzed in the present study was significantly more limited than Wolfson's since the control group included only nine NSs of French. The fact that the number of native speaker subjects was so small, however, made it particularly interesting to observe that a common syntactic pattern had revealed itself among the compliments provided by this group. On the DCT portion of this study, six out of nine NSs wrote a compliment which had the following structure[6]:

(5) PRO1 est (très) ADJ, NP1
Il est très joli, ton pull-over.
(it is very pretty your sweater)

The surface form of this sentence is straightforward, and the pattern should not be difficult for NNSs. A subject pronoun is followed by a form of the verb be, which is followed by an adjective optionally intensified by the equivalent of the English very, and the structure ends with a postposed noun phrase co-referenced with the subject pronoun. Postposing or preposing an element of the sentence in this way is a common way to express emphasis in French, a language which generally does not allow individual word stress.

Since the pattern of this compliment is relatively simple, one would expect that these intermediate-level subjects would have little trouble producing a native-like compliment. This was not the case, however, since, surprisingly, not one of the fourteen subjects produced this form on the DCT.

The compliment structure favored by eleven of the fourteen subjects mirrored the American English pattern in (3) above discovered by Wolfson[7]:

(6) J'aime (beaucoup/bien) NP J'adore NP
J'aime bien ton pull-over.
(I like really your sweater)

Although (3) was not the most common structure in English according to Wolfson's study, the high occurrence of (6), its French counterpart, in the nonnative responses may be due to learning effects. The structure in (6) is generally presented early to students as the simplest way to express likes and dislikes in French. While it is probably not explicitly taught that this structure also pertains to complimenting in French, learners may generalize it to this situation as well.

What is particularly striking about these results is that they have clear implications for the second research question addressed in this study. They lend support to the conclusion reached above that linguistic competence is not sufficient for pragmatic competence. There is virtually no doubt that any of these intermediate-level subjects could have produced the relatively simple, native-like complimenting pattern in (5); that is, the subjects had the linguistic competence to produce it. Yet, none of them did. Even if learners have the linguistic ability to produce the pragmatically appropriate structures employed by NSs in a given context, other factors must come into play.

The results of the complimenting data also had implications for the first research question addressed in the study, since they also support the conclusion that linguistic competence is necessary for pragmatic competence. An analysis of the nonnative speaker responses revealed several linguistic problems which could have an effect on the way in which the compliments would be received by NSs. For example, five of the subjects employed inappropriate vocabulary items, including, for example:

(7) J'aime bien *ta sweater*.
J'aime bien *ton pulli*.

While gestures or other non-verbal cues may clarify for the NS that his or her *pullover* (or *pull*, for short) is being commented on, the improper word choice may cause some initial awkwardness. It is interesting to find that four of the fourteen subjects would have difficulty remembering this particular vocabulary item which is not only a fairly basic term but also a cognate. Difficulties arising from this kind of gap in vocabulary would likely be even more apparent when subjects are actually speaking to NSs as opposed to writing, when real time constraints and perhaps anxiety come into play.

Purely grammatical errors also appeared in the data, such as:

(8) C'est un pull fantastique. Où l'*achetez*-vous?
That's a fantastic sweater. Where do you buy it?

Again, the NS would probably understand the message, since the appropriate verb tense can easily be inferred from the context. However, an error of this type may bother the NS. This may result in some discomfort for both interlocutors, particularly if the NS is unaccustomed to speaking with NNSs of the language.

Although it cannot be stated in absolute terms, it seems likely that the kinds of linguistic errors found in these examples would hinder in some way the NNS's intended message, thereby having an effect on the NS's perception of the compliment. Thus, despite the appropriateness of the intended compliment, linguistic limitations may affect the overall success of the exchange[8].

In sum, the analysis of the complimenting data obtained from the DCT has had interesting implications for this study in that it has provided support for the conclusions reached for both of the research questions addressed. Although the examples presented to illustrate these arguments may appear somewhat oversimplified, they nevertheless provide very clear evidence in support of these conclusions.

CONCLUSION

This paper has investigated the relation between linguistic and pragmatic competence in the overall competence of the intermediate-level foreign language learner. Results from the study have strongly suggested that linguistic competence is necessary for pragmatic competence, but that it is not sufficient for it. That learners need to have a basic control of grammatical structures and vocabulary to make their message understood makes sense intuitively. Furthermore, existing research has already shown that linguistic ability alone does not guarantee the appropriate use of language in real language contexts. Thus, the conclusions reached here may not be surprising.

The obvious difficulty which arises with research of this type lies in the comparison of the two kinds of competence. In order to make hard claims about the relation between a learner's linguistic and pragmatic competence, reliable means of comparing real data must be employed. Comparing learners' rank according to their scores on different types of tasks, the method employed in this study, provided useful insights to the research questions addressed, based on real data. Nevertheless, the results obtained still are not entirely satisfactory since they are highly relative and, as such, cannot represent the learner's system in absolute terms. This study has contributed to the investigation of the role of linguistic and pragmatic competence in the learner's overall competence; in so doing, it has also emphasized the crucial need for the development of new means of measurement and comparison of these disparate types of data. Understanding the complex roles played by both types of competence will enable us to arrive at a more complete picture of what it means to know a language and to better prepare students for this challenging task.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the *Pragmatics and Language Learning* reviewers, who gave useful comments and suggestions for the final draft of the paper. I would also like to thank Harry Gradman for statistical analysis and Beverly Hartford, Deborah Piston-Hatlen, and the participants in the 1991 SLA and Discourse Analysis seminars for much valuable feedback and discussion. Special appreciation goes to Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig for guidance and encouragement throughout the process.

THE AUTHOR

Sheila Hoffman-Hicks is a Ph.D. candidate in French Linguistics at Indiana University. She is currently teaching English in France as a lecturer at the Université de Strasbourg and is conducting research for her dissertation, a longitudinal study of the development of pragmatic competence of American learners of French.

NOTES

[1] While it is clear that there is a great deal of overlap of the notion of *overall competence* with that of *communicative competence*, the term *overall competence* was preferred here since the theoretical framework of this study, Speech Act theory, examines discreet acts. Any conclusions reached, therefore, are restricted to specific speech act situations.

[2] Remember that the word best here always refers to the most appropriate, or *the most native-like*, response.

[3] As mentioned above, there was one item which did not result in a clear single *best response*. That is, two of the responses were nearly equally ranked by NSs. For this item only, the subjects were given two points for marking either of these two choices. Likewise, for several items, there were two responses which no NS marked as the best choice. Subjects earned zero points for marking either of these.

[4] The Spearman Rank Order Correlation is .43.

[5] Courses numbered in the 300s are third-year level courses and those in the 400s are fourth-year level courses. F313 and F314 are both advanced grammar courses. Oral practice is the focus of F316 and F475. F362 is a civilization course, F425 and F450 literature courses, F401 a course in the structure and development of French, and 473 an advanced writing course.

[6] The tone for this item was "friendly" and the stimulus was the following: "You are sitting with some French friends in a cafe. One of them is wearing a great sweater that you really like, and you want to compliment her on it. You say:".

[7] Two NSs produced this pattern; it is, therefore, an acceptable structure in French.

[8] This phenomenon has been termed *pragma-linguistic failure* by Thomas (1983) and contrasts with *socio-pragmatic failure*, which refers to a learner error resulting from either not knowing or not saying the appropriate response to a given social context.

REFERENCES

Bardovi-Harlig, K., & Hartford, B.S. (1990). Congruence in native and nonnative conversations: Status balance in the academic advising session. *Language Learning*, 40, 467-501.

Beebe, L.M. & Takahashi, T. (1989a). Do you have a bag?: Social status and patterned variation in second language acquisition. In S. Gass, C. Madden, D. Preston, & L. Selinker (Eds.), Variation in second language acquisition: Discourse and *pragmatics* (pp. 103-125). Clevedon, U.K.: Multilingual Matters.

Eisenstein, M., & Bodman, J.W. (1986). "I very appreciate": Expressions of gratitude by native and non-native speakers of American English. *Applied Linguistics*, 7, 167-85.

Fraser, B., Rintell, E., & Walters, J. (1980). An approach to conducting research on the acquisition of pragmatic competence in a second language. In D. Larsen-Freeman (Ed.), *Discourse analysis in second language research* (pp. 75-91). Rowley, MA: Newbury House.

Gumperz, J. (1971). Linguistic repertoires, grammars, and second language instruction. In Dil (Ed.), *Language in social groups: Essays by John Gumperz.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Hartford, B.S., & Bardovi-Harlig, K. (1989). *Structuring the interview: An examination of native and nonnative participation.* Paper presented at the ThirdAnnual Conference on Pragmatics and Language Learning, Urbana, IL.

Hymes, D. (1972b). On communicative competence. In J.B. Pride & J. Holmes

(Eds.), *Sociolinguistics*. Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin.

Raffaldini, T. (1987). *Attrition of communicative ability among former year abroad students of French*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.

Schegloff, E., & Sacks, H. (1973). Opening up closings. *Semiotics*, 8, 289-327.

Schmidt, R., & Richards, J. (1980). Speech acts and second language learning. *Applied Linguistics*, 1, 129-157.

Searle, J. (1976). The classification of illocutionary acts. *Language in Society*, 5, 1-24.

Thomas, J. (1983). Cross-cultural pragmatic failure. *Applied Linguistics*, 4, 91-112.

Varonis, E., & Gass, S. (1985). Miscommunication in native/nonnative conversation. *Language and Society*, 14, 327-344.

Wieland, M. (1990). *Politeness-based misunderstandings in conversations between native speakers of French and American advanced learners of French*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.

Wolfson, N. (1983). An empirically based analysis of compliments. In N. Wolfson & E. Judd (Eds.), *Sociolinguistics and language acquisition* (pp. 82-95). Rowley, MA: Newbury House.

Wolfson, N. (1989b). The social dynamics of native and nonnative variation in complimenting behavior. In M. Eisenstein (Ed.), *The dynamic interlanguage* (pp. 219-236). New York: Plenum.

Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series, Vol. 3, 1992

Discourse Domains Revisited: Expertise and Investment in Conversation

Shona Whyte

Selinker and Douglas' discourse domain hypothesis holds that second language acquisition takes place within domains of discourse which are created by and important to the learner. This paper aims to refine the definition of the discourse domain construct by examining the discourse domains developed by one nonnative speaker in conversations with two native interlocutors.

The discourse domain is viewed as an extension of an established model for background knowledge, the schema, and is shown to exhibit greater development than the schema on three parameters: 1) Content elaboration: a discourse domain incorporates more information and is more complex than a schema; 2) Stability: although domains differ from learned routines in their openness to interlocutor input, they are less likely to undergo radical alteration during a single encounter than schemata; and 3) Personal importance: unlike a schema, which may be a temporary expedient for one conversation, a domain is developed over time because of its importance in the speaker's life.

This study highlights the role played by interlocutors in the formation, development, and presentation of a speaker's discourse domain, and suggests that the properties of elaboration, stability, and importance are key variables for a discourse domain model in second language research.

This paper investigates the discourse domain hypothesis advanced by Selinker and Douglas (1985), which holds that a second language is acquired with reference to speaker-specific topic areas rather than as a general, context-independent competence:

> the important SLA processes, such as language transfer, fossilization, and backsliding, as well as avoidance, do not occur globally across ILs, but rather differentially within discourse domains (Selinker and Douglas, 1985, p. 0190).

Although the authors do not provide a precise definition of the discourse domain, they describe domains as "various 'slices of life' that are important and/or necessary for ... learners to talk and/or write about" (Selinker and Douglas, 1985, p. 190), and suggest the topic areas of 'major field,' 'own life,' and 'own culture' as examples of domains created by international students in the US. In later work, they propose the following criteria for domain identification:

> importance to the learner, interactional salience, discontinuous-ness, control of content (in that the learner knows about the topic, but not necessarily the language to express it), and the fact that such domains are highly personal (Selinker and Douglas, 1987, p. 469).

This paper seeks to examine some of these features with a view to refining the definition of the discourse domain.

Given the important claims advanced by Selinker and Douglas in their discourse domain hypothesis, for example the assertion that acquisition processes are triggered by specific contexts, and that performance, including grammatical accuracy, varies according to context, such a clarification of the domain construct is clearly necessary. Very little other work in context-based second language acquisition, however, has investigated the domain hypothesis *per se*, although a number of investigators have used the domain construct indirectly. Woken and Swales (1989) examined the effect of content expertise on non-native performance by having three nonnative computer science majors instruct American peers in the use of a word processing program. The patterns of language behavior they observed contrast sharply with learner performance in typical NS-NNS research situations. Zuengler (1989) also focused on the effect of topic knowledge on speaker performance in a study which compared native-nonnative dyads conversing on 'major field' and 'neutral' topics. A closer investigation of the different variables involved in the development of a discourse domain can shed new light on research findings such as these.

However, since discourse domain research is still at an embryonic stage, with no well-developed definitions to build on, it seems logical to look to existing models of a speaker's background knowledge for a starting point. One model of particular relevance is the **schema**. Schemata have been described variously by cognitive psychologists as "active, developing patterns" and the "active organization of past reactions, or of past experiences" (Bartlett, 1932/67, p. 201); by sociolinguists as "structures of expectation" (Tannen, 1979, p.138); and by discourse analysts as "information from the encountered discourse, together with knowledge from past experience" (Brown and Yule, 1983, p. 249). Clearly a schema is a knowledge framework which influences the processing of new information, and is in turn affected by that new information.

It seems plausible to view the discourse domain as a similar dynamic structure which shapes and is shaped by the speaker's perception of incoming material. Of course domain and schema differ, since schemata are general-purpose structures created to deal with everyday experiences, while domains have special properties such as personal importance to the speaker, interactional salience, and an elaborated content. However, it is also obvious that no domain can suddenly emerge in all its complexity as a *fait accompli*: a discourse domain is created over time, as a result of the speaker's investment in a topic, which in turn increases its interactional salience, leading perhaps to greater content elaboration and thus investing the topic with even more importance for the speaker. A domain must develop, therefore, like a schema, and indeed must develop from a schema.

The present study will take the approach that there is a close connection between schemata and discourse domains; namely, that they are part of a continuum representing the level of development of a speaker's background knowledge for a given topic. This notion is represented in Figure 1. Analysis of the data in this paper will show the discourse domain to be a particularly well-developed, stable, and personally important schema. In so doing, the paper therefore establishes the features of content elaboration, stability, and personal importance as relevant to a definition of the discourse domain and hence important parameters for research within the discourse domain framework.

Figure 1. The Schema-Domain Continuum.



METHODOLOGY

The data for this paper were taken from a larger data set involving 2 native speakers and 8 nonnatives in native-nonnative dyads. The present study involved 3 male graduate students in their twenties at Indiana University, unfamiliar with one another: F, a French mathematics student, with a 2 year-old TOEFL score of 500, who had spent 12 months in the US; B, a British geography student, who had been in the US for 2 months; and A, an American music student. The natives interviewed the nonnative in turn, immediately after one another, and the resulting 25 minute conversations were audiotaped and transcribed.[1]

Table 1 shows the domains activated in each conversation, subdivided into episodes. Although subjects were left free as to the content of their conversations (with the researcher suggesting the NNS' experiences in the States, their studies, and own country as fall-back topics) the range of topics was remarkably similar across conversations, and reflected for the most part the NNS' discourse domains. For this reason, F's knowledge frameworks are referred to as domains and his interlocutors' as schemata in much of the discussion to follow. As far as participation is concerned, A and B tended to play a dominant role in initiating and pursuing topics; domains or episodes initiated by F, the nonnative speaker, are marked with an asterisk. The numbers in brackets indicate the time to the nearest minute.

From this breakdown, three sections were selected for analysis: the domains 'F's life history' and 'F's major field' allow comparison of the same domain on different occasions; while the domain 'Europe versus the US' allows comparison of behavior in a domain which is common to B and F as European students in the United States with other episodes in the conversation where content expertise is less evenly distributed.

Table 1. Conversation Episodes

CONVERSATION 1	B & F	CONVERSATION 2	A & F
1 F'S LIFE HISTORY	**[0-5]**	**1 French people**	**[0-2]**
F's birth place	0-1	Common ground	0-2
Education	1-2		
MILITARY SERVICE	3-5		
2 F'S STUDIES	**[5-11]**	**2 F'S STUDIES**	**[2-14]**
WHY MATH?	5-6	(Common acquaintances)	2-3
APPLICATIONS OF MATH	6-9	Chaos	3-8
Indiana University	9-11	APPLICATIONS OF MATH	8-11
		WHY MATH?	11-14
3 F's plans/reasons for coming to the US	**[11-13]**	**3 F's plans/reasons for coming to the US**	**[14-17]**
Why the US?	11-12	Job prospects	14-15
Graduation	12-13	Why the US?	15-16
		Graduation	16-17
4 Europe vs the US	**[13-21]**	**4 A's studies***	**[17-22]**
Adjusting to the US	13-17	IU Music School	17-18
Students	17-19	French bass players	18-19
Living in the US	19-20	French students at IU Music School	19-21
(Experiences in England /Ireland)	20-21	(French stereotypes)	21-22
5 Bloomington	**[21-26]**	**5 F'S LIFE HISTORY**	**[22-25]**
Friends	21-23	Education	22-23
International Center	23-24	MILITARY SERVICE	23-25
Travel in the US	24-25		
Geography*	25-26		

ANALYSIS

To make a case for a theory of discourse domains, it must be shown that the notion can account for similarities and differences in language behavior on separate occasions. It must also be shown that the domain construct differs from the interlocutor's schema in some important sense, since this framework holds that a discourse domain is more fully developed, more fixed, and more personal than a schema. This analysis treats each of these properties in turn.

Content Elaboration

Beginning with the most obvious defining feature of a discourse domain, the speaker's content expertise, there is clear evidence in the opening of the domain 'F's studies' in each conversation that the creator of the domain has much greater content competence than his interlocutor. We would expect F to have much greater knowledge of his major field than his interlocutors (a geography major and a music major) but there is a particular problem associated with the study of mathematics: it is difficult to talk about in layman's terms and, conversely, to find an informed non-mathematician is rare. This phenomenon surfaces in the data in a certain reluctance on the part of F to engage the topic, and in consequent efforts by A and B to show credentials as worthy interlocutors on the subject, which both do by citing information gleaned from other students of mathematics. A engages the topic as follows:[2]

(1) Conversation 2 [AF: F's studies 2-14; 3]

A So are you in the same, d'you study the same kind, are you in the
 same uh area as Ivan?
F Yeah we're in the same in the same field, yeah, same sort of thing
A Chaos, are you studying chaos?
F Oh, if you wanna, if you like high-tech names, maybe
A [laughs] He just kind of /explain/
F /there/ is|
A |was tryin' to explain something
 to me, some math theory of chaos,
F This is, this is|
A |I have actually no idea what he was talking about|
F |There, there there is a
 connection with mathematical theory of chaos
 [4 min lecture on the theory of chaos]2

A has nominated the topic of F's studies by asking whether F is 'in the same area' as a common acquaintance, but admits he has 'no idea' what the area might be. In response, F launches into a 4 minute lecture on the mathematical theory of chaos. F is thus clearly the knower in this topic area; his domain is more fully developed than the schema of his interlocutor.

However, when we look at the second example, taken from F's conversation with B, we can see that the same domain opens in a very different way. B asks about F's choice of major, and receives a description of F's school career in reply:

(2) Conversation 1 [BF: F's studies 5-11; 5]

B Yeah. So when did you first think [laugh] when did you first think about ever being a mathematician? I mean you must be pretty good to be at IU and to be a mathematician or pretty good compared to most people as far as maths are concerned. So were you a were you a child prodigy /at math/?

F /No/ no no never anything like this uh|

B |Were your parents very pushy or?

F Not that much actually /the thing is/

B /Was/ your dad a mathematician?

F Well maybe that has some influence. My father has nothing to do with mathematics but one of my brothers I mean my brother, I have only one, he is um he is a mathematician, he's doing research. I don't know if that maybe that has an influence. The thing is after high school I did two years you know the French system is like you have to do two years preparation before getting in the School of Engineers and these two years are only mathematics and physics. So that's the first time I've been

B /mhm/

F doing mathematics earnestly and I sort of realized I liked it. And then I got into the School of Engineers, uh, where I didn't do much and where I stayed for a couple of years and then after that school I realized that after all, you know maybe engineering stuff wasn't that interesting and I

How can we account for this difference in F's presentation of his major field to different interlocutors? Clearly the difference lies with the interlocutor. In the second example, B has taken the role of interviewer, asking a very straightforward, task-oriented question: "when did you first think about ever being a mathematician?" Crucially, B has demonstrated no schema for the topic of mathematics. F's answer is therefore a general, non-technical one, falling back on the only shared knowledge they have at this point in the conversation - his life history. In the first example, on the other hand, A does demonstrate some schema, albeit very sketchy. He cites another mathematician, "Ivan," and the name of an area of math, "the theory of chaos." In return, he gets a very different picture of F's major field.

These examples show the greater content elaboration involved in a discourse domain, as well as the role of the interlocutor's schemata in determining the presentation of that domain on a particular occasion. A second pair of extracts, this time from the 'F's life history' domain, show similar contrast and, in particular, highlight the importance of timing within a conversation in shaping the way a domain is presented.

In the 'military service' episode, both native interlocutors demonstrate that they are aware that France has compulsory military service and that most French students find the experience unpleasant. Both have also recently interviewed another French student who is planning to avoid army service by working in the French overseas development network, as a 'coopérant' in a developing country, so they are aware that it is possible to avoid the army. It appears, however, that A has a more fully developed schema than B for the topic of military service in France, since he has a number of French acquaintances who have substituted 'coopération' or overseas study for army service. In addition, this schema has very recently been activated, since immediately previous to his conversation with F, he interviewed a third French subject who was studying at Indiana University instead of doing army service.

The salience of this schema to A manifests itself in the conversation in the form of insistent questions about what exactly F was required to do during his service. These questions continue in spite of a certain reluctance on the part of F to engage this topic, which seems to have unpleasant memories for him:

(3) Conversation 2 [AF: F's life history 22-25; 23]

F I graduated from that school and then I went to the military for one year
A What did you do /in the military?/
F /in Nancy/ I was uh you see where is Nancy it's close to Germany
A No I /don't/
F /it's in/ the /north east/
A /yeah/ in Alsace or something?
F Close /to it./ Very close to Alsace. So I spent a year there
A /yeah/
A What did you have to do?
F Well they put me for the first five month they put me they put me in a in a officer division officer training camp uh I didn't wanna but uh that's where they put me, so after I graduated from this thing after five month I was a sub-lieutenant and they put me in a regiment in Lorraine and I spent seven month there, as a sub-lieutenant
A But what so you were an officer?
F Yeah so uh well basically I was teaching some sort of military science
A Yeah military sci- what really?
F Well it was more like my regiment was doing uh constructions so
A Oh so your engineering was it engineering-related?
F No it was military like explosives and how /to blow/ a building
A /oh/
A Oh structural?
F Mm military
A So do you know about do you know about explosives?
F Yeah that was the thing I was doing I was teaching how to use explosives how to blow a bridge how to blow a house where to put explosives

One explanation for this interest on the part of A is that he has a well-developed schema for the topic, which has recently been activated and indeed updated, and that the topic is therefore at least temporarily salient for him. In addition, a closer examination of the schema outlined above will reveal that there is an obvious gap in A's knowledge: he has no experience talking to Frenchmen who actually did army service. This may account for the rather general nature of his questions, which provide no 'hook' on which F can frame an answer and thus may partially explain the latter's failure to engage the topic immediately.

This episode contrasts with what occurred in Conversation 1, where the 'life history' domain was invoked at the very beginning of the conversation. Timing is important here. It is typically at the beginning of a conversation with an unfamiliar partner that the greatest topic negotiation takes place, since the interlocutors have no way of knowing which schemata, or indeed domains, they share. The situation is further complicated in this case by difficulties F was having in understanding B's British accent. Before the military service topic is initiated, there have been two requests by F for repetition of questions, one false start where B fails to recall a piece of information and has to change topic, and one refusal to engage a topic by F. These considerations, together with the somewhat sketchy background knowledge B has of the topic, lead me to claim that B's interest in engaging the topic of military service is very different from A's in the conversation above. In his role of interviewer, B is quite simply interested in getting his subject talking - the topic itself is of secondary concern.

B's intention is made clear in the conversation by his provision of an easy hook for F to latch onto: "Did you enjoy it?"

(4) Conversation 1 [BF: F's life history 0-5: 3]

F Then I went to the military for one year, I went to Nancy.
B What was that like?
F Mm?
B The military, what was the military like?
F The military like What was it like?
B /mm/
F Uh uhn|
B |Did you enjoy it?
F No noone enjoys noone enjoys it
B They make sure you don't enjoy it?
F Yeah they really made sure I didn't enjoy it Yeah I
B /Really? [laugh]/
F mean the first five month were like they put me in a some sort of
you know what they call ROTC here? Reserve
B /Yeah/
F Officer Training Corps, they put me in something like this for five
month it was like hell I had to get up at, five thirty every
morning and stuff like this uh play at war with the ugly Russians

These examples indicate that even a presumably well-developed and practiced domain like the speaker's life history is not routinized in the least: the information F provides on two occasions in the space of one hour varies. Since the only variable manipulated is that of the interlocutor, it seems logical to conclude that this interlocutor has an effect on the way a domain is activated and developed. This inference is supported at a very superficial level by F's question: "you know what they call ROTC here?", clear evidence that he is checking on his interlocutor's background knowledge of the topic.

Stability

The next examples illustrate another dimension of knowledge organization: stability in the structure of background knowledge. From the definitions given, we would expect a domain to be more fixed and a schema more open to change. This hypothesis is supported by data from the episode 'applications of math,' a subcomponent of F's major field domain, where we find that in both conversations, there is discussion of the relationship between F's major - applied mathematics - and the real world.

In Conversation 2, the 'applications of math' episode is initiated after five minutes' conversation on the mathematical theory of chaos, which A has asked F to explain. A attempts to relate this discussion to F's own research:

(5a) Conversation 2 [AF: F's studies 2-24; 8]

A So are these kind of things I mean I'm just fascinated by studying something math this kind of thing it's not applied mathematics at all right you're just studying something that's
F This is|
A |It's more like an art. Is anything is the kind of thing you do used by industry or

The connection A makes between pure mathematics and art seems to indicate that he views the world of research in a manner that could be represented as below, and that he would place both himself (a musician) and F (a mathematician) on the same side of the scale, as shown in Figure2:

Figure 2. A's Math Schema.



This evidence leads F first to check that this is indeed A's view and then to attempt to alter A's schema:

(5b) Conversation 2 [AF: F's studies 2-24; 8]

F (continuing from above) No. Uh ... because what do you mean by applied /mathematics/?
A /I don't/ know uh well like this Marc is he's working on wire casings you know for Dupont that's great I I'm not a scientist
F / yeah/
A obviously|
F |Yeah OK he's working on something that some day some industry can use for an industrial process that can make you money uh, I don't think that's my case and I don't
A /right, right/
F think that's Ivan's case ... Uh, it's very much (??) some sort of fundamental (??) Now in in, so it's not applied mathematics in this sense you understand the expression applied, but in the sense,
A |Am I right by using the word applied is that applied meaning /that someone would/
F /Yeah this is/ exactly what I'm saying. The thing is that mathematicians say applied mathematics to say, to define something that you would not call applied mathematics. I guess if you say applied mathematics you mean mathematics which can be used by some industry|
A |Like a computer?
F Exactly uh when mathematicians say applied mathematics it's it's less restrictive it means mathematics that is connected to studying a problem which exists in the real world
A /oh OK/
F So in that sense what Ivan is doing and what I'm doing is applied mathematics because you can find examples in fluid mechanics in meteorology in whatever so in that sense it's applied mathematics. But as far as using this in some industrial process or anything like predicting the weather or, no,
A No that's it's you guys that's not what you're doing?
F I wouldn't say it's applied

Thus the schema A presents with "it's not applied mathematics at all right ... It's more like an art" is the hook which allows F to develop his contribution. Note that, once again, a third person (Marc, an organic chemist, thus very much an applied scientist) is invoked by A to support his case. This, together with his question "Am I right by using the word applied?" testifies to A's awareness that his schema for this topic area is somewhat sketchy.

In Conversation 1, the 'applications of mathematics' episode begins after only one minute of discussion of the topic of mathematics, a discussion which involved no detailed theory of mathematics but simply concerned F's decision to study mathematics. Thus B has provided no evidence of his competence in the topic, and F's answer differs greatly from the information he gave A:

(6) Conversation 1 [BF: F's studies 5-11; 6]

B ... I mean I said why are you doing maths PhD I mean it hasn't really got much application for the real world, um
F Mm? The real world?
B The real world, yeah
F Mm I mean doing mathematics is just so vague. Some things have applications, some don't
(...)
F Like the equations I'm working are somehow related to the migration of petroleum in in petroleum deposits so it it is pretty much uh related to a physical situation that exists. Now whether the things I do are relevant about these equations or not
B /OK yeah/
F well that's another story, I mean the motivation
B /yeah/
B Well no no no I think I think that's uh relevant I think it's very very important if you're going to spend a lot of time energy and money on, I think academia for academia's sake is, uh is dubious to say the least.
F ... Oh well I mean this is a matter of taste I guess, but I wouldn't say so|
B |I don't, well, OK all right
F The thing is the following I happen to be working this problem because I was introduced to these problems first as an engineer and then I tried to study them as a mathematician which is
B /mm/
F slightly different but I wouldn't mind I would enjoy I think working on something which has absolutely no connection with the real world. Like what I used to call
B /mm/
F intellectual masturbation

Once again, F has derived a clue to B's schema for mathematics from his comment "it hasn't really got much application for the real world", and takes this as the hook on which to develop an answer. B appears to have a similar division of disciplines as A, but he positions himself (as a geography student) on the opposite end of the spectrum to F, as can be seen in Figure 3:

Figure 3. B's Math Schema.



As in the first conversation, F finds himself in a position where he wants to alter his interlocutor's views on his subject, but this time he is moving in the opposite direction, emphasizing the 'purer' aspect of mathematics over its applications, in response to the implication that only applied science has merit.

This episode provides evidence that the native interlocutor's demonstration of background knowledge (as distinct from simple possession of that knowledge, which we examined in the 'life' domain) influences the speaker's presentation of his domain. In the 'applications of math' episode, it appeared that F reacted to his interlocutor's schema as it developed within the activation of the domain. In Conversation 1, there was little or no chance for F to test his interlocutor's schema, and his contribution was very closely tied to the hook in B's opening question. In Conversation 2, however, the participants spent five minutes developing A's math schema, and as a result, A received a more detailed answer to the same underlying question concerning F's views on the position of math in the overall scheme of things. The crucial point is that not only did A have a more elaborate schema for math, but F was aware of this, having been closely involved in its creation.

It is clear from these examples that the domain F has developed for what he is doing in mathematics, while not routinized, is fairly solid. When presented with one interlocutor who is "fascinated" by the connection he sees between math and art, and another who denounces "academia for academia's sake" in favor of the applied sciences, his own standpoint does not waver. The same cannot be said for B's schema, since B backs down immediately from his position when F disagrees. Thus a domain may be less open to local alteration than a schema.

However, although F does not alter his own standpoint, he does tailor his contribution very clearly to the positions established by his interlocutors, as is shown in Figure 4. He argues in Conversation 1 for the virtues of pure science and in Conversation 2 for some connection between mathematics and "the real world" (with the fact that he carries this term across from the first conversation indicating that he is taking his interlocutors' views into account). In each case, he is bringing his interlocutor from a different point on the scale towards his own position in the center by invoking the opposite extreme. On both occasions, he is careful to situate his own studies somewhere between the two extremes of pure and applied science, which in itself indicates a more elaborate schema than either A or B demonstrate.

From these two episodes, a composite picture of F's mathematics domain might be arrived at as represented in the central portion of Figure 4. If this post hoc reconstruction of F's math discourse domain from the evidence of two conversations seems to account for certain features of these conversations, then it may also provide a model for how this discourse domain really was created by the speaker. In other words, domains may simply be created by repeated activation of a salient topic area in interaction with different interlocutors. So much is in line with Selinker and Douglas' claims. Yet such a reconstruction also implies a decisive role played by these interlocutors - after all, it seems that the above representation is at least as much a product of their schema as of F's organization of knowledge.

All this points to a hypothesis where a speaker's discourse domain is distinguished from the schema built by his interlocutor in its stability - it is open to elabo-

Figure 4. F's Math Domain Presentation

A'S SCHEMA (5)



A it's not applied math at all right, (...)
it's more like an art
(...)
F when mathematicians say applied mathematics (...) it means mathematics that is connected to studying a problem which exists in the real world
[AF: F's studies 2-14; 11]

F'S DOMAIN



B why are you doing math PhD I mean it hasn't really got too much application for the real world
(...)
F I would enjoy I think working on something which has absolutely no connection with the real world
[BF: F's studies 5-11; 5]

B'S SCHEMA (6)



ration though not to radical alteration; its degree of elaboration - it is much more detailed than the interlocutors' schemata; and -- as a consequence of these properties -- its incorporation of elements of the schemata of different interlocutors encountered by the speaker during the creation of his domain.

Moving on to the next episode, concerning F's choice of major, we can see further evidence of the development of background knowledge within the course of an encounter. In Conversation 2, the discussion of the domain F's studies takes up the whole of the first half of the conversation: A introduces the topic, F explains the theory of chaos, they discuss the applications of math, then proceed to F's reasons for choosing to study math, as shown in (7).

(7) Conversation 2 [AF: F's studies 2-14; 11]

A What kind of people end up as mathematicians I mean were you
always just math was just very easy for you or why why
F /no/
A because you would think if you're very good I mean the people I
knew that were good in math in high school or even in college they
they would go and become engineers or something but who, you
really have to love math to stay in math as an academic discipline
right?
F Yeah, I guess it's a matter of taste yeah. Uh, I guess the main
problem with math is that uh, noone makes a lot of money from
doing applied mathematics, but anyone that is able to do
mathematics is also able to do!
A !Make a lot of /money/ /yeah/
F /be an engineer/ therefore to
make a lot of money so maybe it requires both being able, but, not
being too concerned about making money

In A's formulation of his question, we can see he includes material which must have already been in his schema before the conversation. Yet I would also argue that the question reflects the ten minutes of conversation immediately preceding, since it is during that time that A's schema has been developing, largely due to input from F. The question imputes a certain altruism - or at least lack of materialism - to the decision to study math as an academic discipline, and F's answer confirms this suggestion.

This contrasts quite sharply with the same episode in Conversation 1, shown in (2), which is framed "Were you a child prodigy at maths?" Here, the question is similar, asking about F's decision to study math, but its form, and F's response are quite different. One reason for this difference could be the timing, which reflects the participants *awareness of each others* domains and schemata. In (2), the question opens discussion of the domain 'F's studies,' and comes only 5 minutes into the conversation as a whole. Thus no schema-building has occurred as in (7). It seems, therefore, that a schema can be developed throughout an interaction, and that this development can affect the way in which the creator of a domain will present his views.

Personal Importance

So far we have seen differences between domains and schemata in terms of level of development and stability, and have looked at the interaction of the two types of knowledge organization in discourse. A third element in the framework is personal importance, and this is of particular interest since Selinker and Douglas consider it a defining feature of the discourse domain. The importance of a particular topic to a speaker is not always easy to see in a conversation, for although we have already seen one case of a clash between one speaker's domain and his interlocutor's schema in (6), the rules of normal interaction usually forestall such overt disagreement between participants. Thus the interaction of domain and schema is not a particularly fruitful area for the investigation of domain importance. A better opportunity is afforded in an episode where both interlocutors have a domain for the topic, since their behavior in this instance can be compared with the rest of the interaction to examine the effect of personal importance on interaction.

Extracts (8) through (11) are taken from the second half of Conversation 1 where B and F share a domain for 'Europe versus the US.' This was the longest topic engaged, taking 8 out of 26 minutes. It showed other features, too, which lead me to claim that the domain holds greater personal importance for both speakers than has been evident in the rest of the conversation.

One such feature concerns turn-taking patterns: in this domain, turns are more evenly shared and less frequently interrupted than in other parts of the conversation. This suggests a departure from the interviewer-interviewee role relationship seen elsewhere, with the topic taking precedence over other situational considerations. B's style in particular changes from the fairly standard interview-type question we have seen so far, to a less neutral form, and F immediately picks up on the implications:

(8) Conversation 1 [BF: Europe vs the US 13-21; 13]

B You've just been to Corsica? Did you when you came back here did you I mean what did you think of the States I mean for me if I went back to England I mean having just being in the middle of adjusting now uh to the American way of life which is very distinctly different from the European way of life uh I would I don't know I think it would cause some, some major changes in my my attitude towards the States

F Well I guess, uh, the first thing I could say is maybe it's different because I've been here for a year and you've been here like a month or what? I'll tell you what

B /yeah/

F when I first came here I stayed for something like nine months without going home and then I went back to France and that was a sufficiently long period of time so that I could have two different modes of feeling, thinking, speaking working whatever, the French mode and the American or the semi-American

B /mm/
F mode so it's it's kind of funny because the first time I went to France I thought jeez what a difference and blah blah blah and, and now the second time I went to France I came back here I thought well it's like I have really two different modes of thinking not of thinking I would say of behaving there's the French one and the American and I feel quite OK in both

Thus instead of the interviewer using a schema to get the interviewee to discuss his domain, we have the participants establishing a common domain. There is no information gap as between schema and domain, hence no need for clarification and verification of each others' contributions and knowledge. The resultant pattern of contributions is smoother than in episodes from F's discourse domains.

A second point concerns the difference in maturity of the domains each speaker has developed. B has only been in the country for two months, and his discourse domain appears to be in the process of developing, as he admits in a later episode in this domain:

(9) Conversation 1 [BF: Europe vs the US 13-21; 17]

F I still think there is some sort of common culture common to all Europeans. Uh
/mm/
B Yeah I mean I probably would have disagreed had you said that to me in England. I mean having seen the difference having seen the alternative I think you're probably right

He is also experiencing unanticipated culture shock. A recurring feature of his conversations with other international students has been his concern about assimilation and acculturation, for which he uses the term 'naturalization.' Perhaps because of the very novelty of this domain to him, he tends to forget that this may also be a sensitive issue for his interlocutor. The following example is not unique in the data:

(10) Conversation 2 [BF: Europe vs the US 13-21; 14]

B I mean would you consider yourself fairly naturalized American I mean I can I can notice from some the way you say some things

B like 'excuse me' that sort of thing sort of American rising intonation
F Yes but you know I mean I'm not a native speaker and so whatever I say of course it has to sound American and
B /sure/
F not English because I didn't stay much in England I spent six weeks in my entire life so you know so I guess this
B /mm/ /mm/
F thing that I am doing in terms of taking American intonations of course the British guy wouldn't do that

B No sure but what I'm saying my point is that do you consider yourself that you are fairly nat- that you are fairly accustomed and naturalized to America? You say you have two ways of thinking, two ways of feeling uh

F is clearly resistant to the implication that he may be becoming Americanized, particularly an implication based on his speech patterns, over which he feels he has little control. B is obliged to defend his position by quoting F's own words back to him.

It may be that the process of domain-building is associated with a particularly high level of involvement with the topic, rather than with the conversational process. B's behavior in this segment contrasts sharply with his contribution at the beginning of the conversation, when he initiated talk about F's life domain purely in order to get the conversation going, as shown in (4).

It seems that this episode where two domains meet is characterized by a higher level of involvement on the part of both interlocutors. From the opening question and answer in (8), there appears to be a large amount of overlap between their domains, with both speakers viewing themselves primarily as Europeans who happen to be living in the US. When B suggests, in extract (10), that F might be becoming Americanized, F immediately perceives a mismatch between their domains, and therefore sets about correcting this impression by making his views of the 'American way of life' more explicit:

(11) Conversation 2 [BF: Europe vs the US 13-21; 14]

F No I think two ways of thinking is exaggerating because there are some kind of basic philosophies in America in the American situation whatever which I don't think I will ever you know totally accept
B Like?
F Oh like uh what is the first thing in life, of course it's money and you know things like this
B And what what would a Frenchman say? Sex?
F Yeah I guess so
B [laugh] And then? [laugh]
F /oh/
F I don't know, food or, any kind of, nice things you know? This kind of obsession about efficiency and
B /yeah, yeah/
F production you know, I feel quite quite different about these things

The speakers have once more reached a point of agreement, and in doing so have crucially elaborated their domains by making value judgements about the relative desirability of American and European ways of life.

This discussion of 'Europe vs the United States' is easily the most expansive and least guarded in either of the two conversations investigated. The participants' behavior may well be influenced by the emotive nature of the topic itself and its peculiar relevance to both of their lives, and both of these factors play a part in the creation of a domain. It would seem that when both speakers have a domain for a particular topic area, they have greater motivation to engage and develop the topic, and to reach some kind of agreement in their views of that topic. This interest is consistent with the domain hypothesis, which holds that domains are created in areas of personal importance to the learner - personal importance implying perhaps a need to gain outside approval for strongly-held beliefs.

Examination of this episode has indicated, however, that it is not only the learner's domain, but the interaction of two domains which produces particularly lively conversation. There seems no reason to distinguish the background knowledge accumulated by the native speaker from that of the nonnative by the labels 'schema' and 'domain', since in this episode at least, there is no transfer of knowledge from NNS to NS in the way we observed in discussion of 'F's life' and 'F's major field' domains. Instead, the conversation revolves around the presentation and comparison of the speakers' domains, with the main concern being to reach some form of agreement which will allow each partner to continue discussion of the topic fairly freely. As this episode unfolds, both participants agree on differences between Europe and the US, and situate themselves firmly on the European side of the Atlantic. The discussion shows greater emotional involvement and correspondingly less neutral opinions than are evident in the rest of the interaction.

CONCLUSION

What, then, has been revealed about the nature of discourse domains from this investigation? This paper set out to examine some of the implications of the domain hypothesis, looking in particular at the level of elaboration of the discourse domain, in comparison with the less developed schema model; its stability or resistance to new knowledge arising in an encounter, with the discourse domain appearing less open to change than the schema; and its personal importance, again in comparison with the more general schema. While the conclusions that may be drawn from the findings reported in this case study are necessarily limited, key questions and pointers to further research have been highlighted.

It was hypothesized that a domain would differ from a schema in terms of the content expertise of the speaker. Though possibly discontinuous, a domain would be developed over a period of time and would therefore be both more elaborate and more deeply rooted that a schema. Schemata seem to be more sketchy and temporary in nature, since they may be created on the spot as a local expedient to facilitate interaction. This investigation seems to support this hypothesis, although it indicates that there may be differences both between speakers' domains and their schemata in terms of longevity. It was shown that a schema could contain no more than the most basic general world knowledge (e.g. B's math schema), or might be developed over time (A's French military schema) or in the course of one interaction (A's math schema). A difference was also found in the level of maturity of domains, with F's 12 month experience as a European student in the US resulting in a more developed domain than B's, a product of some 2 months. It was suggested that the level of development of a domain might be manifested in the level of involvement with content shown by the speaker, with new domains proving more absorbing than older ones.

The level of stability shown in participants' domains and schemata seems more a function of the level of development of the speaker's knowledge rather than a property of either domains or schemata. A new domain seemed to be open to alteration in the same way as a tentative schema, while a well-developed schema, though less common than an elaborate domain, seemed to share with the domain a certain solidity. This finding fits with the continuum model of background knowledge shown in Figure 1, where the domain and the schema are seen as similar structures which differ only in the degree to which certain features are exhibited.

As far as the personal nature of the domain is concerned, this paper has shown that one consequence of Selinker and Douglas' hypothesis that domains have "interactional salience" is that the interaction and the interlocutors must be taken into consideration. The nonnative speaker in this study had not developed routines for his domains, but rather adapted the form of his presentation to his perception of his interlocutor's schema for this topic area. The more personal nature of a domain as compared to a schema was illustrated by the higher level of involvement and more emotive nature of the 'Europe vs United States' episode, where both interlocutors had domains. In contrast, even highly developed schemata, such as A's 'French military' one, which was developed over several years and reactivated shortly before the conversation in question, cannot produce the same level of intensity. It would seem, therefore, that the personal experience element of a domain is crucial to its creation and subsequent activation.

One way of relating the three parameters examined in this paper to the notions of domain and schema is shown in Figure 5 on the following page.

In this representation, the schema is shown as a broad, loose structure. The outer ring represents the most sketchy schema, where knowledge is severely limited, tentatively controlled, and of little import to the speaker. However, as the schema-domain continuum shown in Figure 1 implies, any schema can, with application, become a domain; any topic is a potential domain topic. The concentric rings in Figure 5 represent increasingly developed schemata, and the domain is shown as a more tightly constructed, complex, and important core of information. This representation also captures the individual features discussed in this paper as factors which are involved in domain creation and which continue to characterize the fully-developed structure: elaboration, stability, and importance.

This study has revealed important differences in terms of the activation of the same domains for the same speaker across different conversations. It has shown that these differences are related to the interlocutor's knowledge, to the speaker's assess-

Figure 5. Domain Formation.



ment of that knowledge, and to the level of personal investment the interlocutor manifests in the topic area. And it has demonstrated that there are a number of variables involved in the notion of discourse domain -- three features were investigated in this paper, but other parameters may well be relevant to a useful definition of the domain construct. Clarification of the different factors involved in this complex area of discourse is therefore necessary before progress in the area of discourse domain theory can be made.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks are due to Professors Beverly Hartford and Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig, and to the students of the Fall 1990 L700 seminar on Discourse Analysis in the Department of Linguistics at Indiana University.

THE AUTHOR

The author is a graduate student in linguistics at Indiana University with research interests within second language acquisition in interlanguage pragmatics and discourse analysis.

NOTES

[1] The burden of carrying the conversation was placed on the NSs. Since the original research focus was interlanguage modification (following Pica, 1988), A and B were further instructed to provide opportunities for the NNSs to adjust their English towards more target-like production. They were urged not to be uncooperative, but to interject when they did not understand what their interlocutor was saying. Both A and B reported that they had little opportunity for this kind of intervention with the subject of this study.

[2] Transcription conventions:

|	latching: no break between utterances
/ /	backchanneling without attempting to take turn
/ /	overlapping speech
/ /	
,	phrase final intonation (pause)
.	sentence final falling intonation
...	longer pause
(6 secs)	anything above 5 secs' pause timed
[laugh]	any action or gesture in square brackets
(??)	unintelligible speech

(based on Bardovi-Harlig and Hartford 1990,Tannen 1979)

REFERENCES

Bardovi-Harlig, K., & Hartford, B. (1990). Congruence in native and nonnative conversations: Status balance in the academic advising session. *Language Learning*, 40, 467-501.

Bartlett, F.C. (1967). *Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published in 1932)

Brown, G., & Yule, G. (1983). *Discourse analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Pica, T. (1988). Interlanguage adjustments as an outcome of NS-NNS negotiated interaction. *Language Learning, 38*, 45-73.

Selinker, L., & Douglas, D. (1985). Wrestling with context in interlanguage theory. *Applied Linguistics, 6, 190-204.*

Selinker, L., & Douglas, D. (1987). The Problem of comparing episodes in discourse domains in interlanguage studies. In F. Marshall (Ed.), *Third Eastern States Conference on Linguistics.* (pp. 467-478) Ohio: Ohio State University.

Tannen, D. (1979). What's in a frame? Surface evidence for underlying expectations. In R. Freedle (Ed.), *New Directions in discourse processing.* (pp. 137-181) Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Woken, M., & Swales, J. (1989). Expertise and authority in native/nonnative conversations: the need for a variable account. In S. Gass, C. Madden, D.

Preston & L. Selinker (Eds.), *Variation in second language acquisition* (pp. 211-22) Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Zuengler, J. (1989). Performance variation in NS-NNS interaction: ethnolinguistic difference or discourse domain? In S. Gass, C. Madden, D. Preston & L. Selinker (Eds.), *Variation in second language acquisition* (pp. 37-59) Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

◆

Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series, Vol. 3, 1992

POLITENESS PHENOMENA IN SOUTH AFRICAN BLACK ENGLISH

Elizabeth de Kadt

This paper investigates requests as speech acts in "Zulu English", the English of Zulu first language speakers. In the context of recent discussions in the field of cross-cultural pragmatics, it seeks to contribute to the explanation of miscommunication in interactions between Zulu-and English-speakers by pointing to pragmatic transfer as one possible cause of such miscommunication. Data collected by means of a series of discourse completion tests in Zulu, Zulu English and South African English are analysed according to the methodology of the CCSARP project, which allows the Head Acts of requests to be graded on a scale of indirectness; requests in Zulu and Zulu English are shown to be significantly more direct in formulation than requests in SAE. Possible implications of these findings for Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness are discussed; and it is suggested that the -- often unsuccessful -- strategies of politeness used in Zulu English result in part from the cross-cultural nature and positioning of this language, being influenced in their verbal dimensions largely by Zulu strategies, and in their non-verbal dimensions largely by those of SAE.

Politeness phenomena have to date been scarcely researched in South Africa. Hence, rather than give answers, I will here be attempting to raise a series of questions for future investigation.

South Africa is a multilingual country. Official documents such as the 1980 census list the following languages as spoken by the population of some 40 million: the two official languages, English and Afrikaans, 10 indigenous (Black) languages, 5 Indian languages and at least six immigrant languages (Lanham/Prinsloo, 1978, p. 30). But the actual situation is much more diverse, in that the indigenous languages in particular tend to lack the degree of uniformity suggested by such a list and rather form a dialect continuum. Given this situation, a high degree of multilingualism is to be expected. In the urban areas, Whites tend to be bilingual in English and Afrikaans; Blacks tend to be multilingual, in that they will often speak two or even three Black languages, and in many cases, also have some command of English or Afrikaans; whereas Whites who have a working knowledge of a Black language are still unusual enough to raise comment. During the last 15 years, the former dominance of Afrikaans as the language of officialdom has clearly shifted in favour of English as dominant lingua franca;[1] and this tendency is being further strengthened during the present democratization of the country.

Yet in spite of the frequent interaction between speakers of different languages and from different cultural backgrounds, there has to date been relatively little investigation of these communicative processes in South Africa. The main exception are various papers by Chick, who has raised a number of important issues concerning interaction between speakers of indigenous languages and "European" languages from the viewpoint of interactional sociolinguistics (Chick, 1985; Chick, 1986). However, the problems inherent to this interaction have in recent years been forced upon the attention of academics by the reintegration of the previously segregated "White" universities. The English-medium liberal universities now register a large number of students with English as a second or third language. For the large majority of these students, entering one of these universities brings them for the first time into an environment where they are expected to negotiate large portions of their life in English. It is not surprising that attempts at communication often result in miscommunication or communicative failure. This paper will discuss insights gained during a first attempt to investigate some aspects of the pragmatics of intercultural communication among students at the University of Natal in Durban.

Encounters between native- and non-native speakers of English should clearly be viewed in the context of the discussion around cross-cultural communication. As Thomas (1983) has pointed out, this concept applies generally to "communication between two people who, in any particular domain, do not share a common linguistic or cultural background" (Thomas, 1983, p. 91). It is now widely recognized that pragmatic interference is a significant source of cross-cultural miscommunication, for, as Thomas continues, "Regional, ethnic, political, and class differences are undoubtedly reflected as much by a diversity of pragmatic norms as they are by linguistic variations" (ebd.). This will be even more the case when speakers from two completely different linguistic and cultural backgrounds are involved. The multiplicity of pragmatic factors involved has been summarised by Tannen (1984), who distinguishes "eight levels of differences in signalling how speakers mean what they say" (p. 189): "when to talk; what to say; pacing and pausing; listenership; intonation and prosody; formulaicity; indirectness; and cohesion and coherence" (p. 194). Fluency in a second language ideally includes a sensitivity to the pragmatic habits of that language; but, as Blum-Kulka (1989) points out, a number of case studies have demonstrated that "even fairly advanced language learners' communicative acts regularly contain pragmatic errors, or deficits, in that they fail to convey or comprehend the intended illocutionary force or politeness value" (Blum-Kulka et al, 1989, p. 10). Thomas sees pragmatic failure as a "very important and much neglected source of cross-cultural miscommunication. 'Important', because unlike linguistic error, which tends at worst to reflect upon the speaker as a less than adequate user of the language, pragmatic failure may reflect badly upon the speaker as a person. 'Neglected', because, again unlike linguistic error, pragmatic failure is rarely apparent in the surface structure of an utterance and even when it is diagnosed, it is not simple to treat" (Thomas, 1984, p. 227). Hence the two main types of pragmatic failure, as distinguished by Thomas: "*sociopragmatic failure* in which learners assess the relevant situational factors on the basis of their native sociopragmatic norms, and *pragmalinguistic transfer*, in which native procedures and linguistic means of speech act performance are transferred to interlanguage communication" (Blum-Kulka et al, 1989, p. 10).

These two types of pragmatic failure doubtless underpin much of the unease experienced in cross-cultural communication in South Africa; but it is the long-term consequences of such failed interactions which are cause for particular concern. As Gumperz points out when discussing British-English and Indian-English interaction in England: "Rather than being understood as clashes between cultural styles, the frustrating encounters were usually interpreted in light of racial prejudices or attributed to personality traits" (Blum-Kulka et al, 1989, p. 6); and this is doubtless still more the case where cross-cultural communication takes place largely in the context of a society formed and informed by 40 years of apartheid. In the South African context, Chick (1985) too speaks of the "negative cultural stereotypes generated by repeated intercultural communication failures" and concludes: "Once generated. these stereotypes are passed on from generation to generation without the need for the reinforcement of repeated communicative failure. Moreover, by providing a justification or rationalization for discrimination, they contribute to forces which maintain the social barriers and power differential among the different groups.." (Chick, 1985, p. 317). These factors are spelled out in greater detail in Chick, 1986, where it is argued that "the consequences of asynchronous intercultural encounters... combine with larger, historically-given and structural forces to create and sustain a negative cycle of socially created discrimination" (Chick, 1986, p. 34). Clearly, the analysis of cross-cultural communication is by no means solely of academic interest to South Africans.

The title of my paper reads "Politeness Phenomena in South African Black English"; but, in reporting on data obtained from native Zulu-speakers, I will be dealing with one large segment of South African Black English (SABE) which I will term Zulu English. These two terms, SABE and Zulu English, require some comment. It is a matter of some debate as to whether one can legitimately speak of SABE as one recognizable variety of South African English (SAE). On the basis of research into typical features of accent and stress, lexicon and syntax which are found to persist even with fluent speakers, Buthelezi (1989) concludes that such a dialect is emerging, at least among the students she has studied; her data is drawn from students at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg with a wide variety of indigenous languages as first languages. She attributes the emergence of such a dialect to the following factors: a cultural lifestyle which encourages code-mixing; high enclosure which leads to group cohesiveness; religious affiliations; overall political experience in South Africa; and a highly disadvantaged educational experience, in that the racially segregated "Black" schools generally lack basic facilities such as text-books, and language teachers are almost never native speakers of English (Buthelezi, 1989, p. 39-44). Although competence in English is a precondition for registration at the University of Natal, first-year students tend to experience serious problems with comprehension, note-taking, etc. Even with those who succeed in overcoming such difficulties, however, problems of communication persist, although Black students make a conscious effort to adapt to the norms of SAE speakers. Given this situation, Buthelezi is doubtless correct in pointing to variability as the main constraint affecting any definition of SABE (and equally Zulu English) (Buthelezi, 1989, p. 57). Our term Zulu English, if interpreted as "the English spoken by Zulu-speakers", will firstly cover the whole continuum of language ranging from learners' early attempts at communication to close approximations to SAE; and secondly for the individual speaker it may well not be a fixed variety but an interlanguage which will be subject to modification over time.

There are, of course, substantial differences between the cultural background of English- and Zulu-speakers. The traditional Zulu social system has been well documented by Krige (1936) (compiling mainly from the older sources available); there is a major study by Raum (1973) of the *hlonipha* or avoidance customs of the Zulus; and a study of Zulu symbols and thought patterns by Berglund (1976). Krige notes the "strictly patrilineal tendency" and the "hierarchy of age" (Krige, 1936, p. 27). According to Raum, "Hlonipha conduct reveals that Zulu society is built upon a complex hierarchy of authority positions" (Raum, 1973, p. 509). He further concludes: "Hlonipha ... are the pyramid of respect upon which the Zulu ethos is raised. They link in each instance an inferior to superior status in traditional forms of expressing deference, the link not being without some reciprocity" (ebd., p. 1.) The words "respect" and "deference" are of course central to any study of politeness; Raum details the multitude of *hlonipha* of action which express this respect: the social variables involved are principally kinship, sex, age and power. This respect is also reflected through language, in which context we may properly refer to it as politeness; and here too a whole series of phenomena is involved. To my knowledge no systematic investigation of this field has been conducted; but at least the following aspects seem to be involved: posture (subordinates should be seated), the avoidance of eye contact by subordinates, gesture (especially rubbing one's hands together when asking for something), pauses, the order of speaking, address terms, conversational strategies (the role of hints, to which we will refer later), and vocabulary (*hlonipha* of language). Hence it would seem, that in investigating politeness in Zulu, only an ethnographic approach would be truly appropriate.

Yet the situation is still further complicated by the now far advanced processes of industrialisation and urbanisation, which have seen an ever-increasing destruction of traditional Zulu society, to the extent that the work of Krige, Raum and Berglund is rapidly becoming more of historical validity. There has been little systematic research of the new norms and ethos which are in the process of developing. My research assistants are able to detail the non-verbal and verbal means by which politeness is traditionally indicated in Zulu; but constantly differentiate between "deep Zululand", where they are still more or less valid, and life in the townships around Durban, where they are rapidly disappearing. Clearly, it will be impossible to generalise research results obtained in one particular location.

Let us conclude this introductory section by attempting to draw together the factors which will impinge upon politeness in Zulu English. Speakers of Zulu English are by definition Blacks who will most likely be speaking English to Whites.[2] Blacks will be speaking a second (or third) language, and one acquired under considerable disadvantages; given their powerlessness it will be very much in their interests to appear polite, and yet their traditional modes of expressing politeness are almost certain to be misunderstood.

It was against this background that it was decided to investigate aspects of cross-cultural communication in English between speakers of Zulu and speakers of SAE. This paper will report on the pilot study of our first investigation into requests in Zulu, Zulu English and SAE. After consideration of the various models available in the literature for the analysis of requests, it was decided to use the theoretical framework of the Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Patterns (CCSARP) project initiated by Blum-Kulka et al. (1989), seeing that this was devised specifically to compare requests across a number of languages and, also, interlanguages. However, given the specifities of the South African situation and the complete lack of previous research in the field of Zulu speech acts, it was felt that rather than adopt the elicitation instrument of this project piecemeal, we should first identify situations which were considered by native speakers to be typical for Zulu -- and for the South African situation. On the other hand, the detailed coding scheme of this project would facilitate the further testing of the claim that primary features of requests are universal, and the identification of culture-specific interactional features in a language of a type not previously considered.

Preliminary data was obtained for all three languages by means of discourse completion tests. The starting point was the Zulu test, compiled with two native-speakers on the basis of requests as they occurred in spontaneous settings; this contained 12 scripted dialogues. On the basis of the results obtained here, the other two tests were set up in somewhat shorter form. The primary intention at this stage was to collect data located in situations in which each language would naturally be spoken and which involved a wide range of social variables. Clearly, comparability across the three languages would be desirable, but as the Zulu-speaker's use of English tends to be restricted to certain domains, involving certain interlocutors, it was found difficult to achieve comparability across all three tests: limiting the choice to situations which were directly comparable would for example have meant excluding the whole domestic domain, in which it is assumed that Zulu English is spoken only under very specific circumstances. Hence, for the data thus far obtained, the Zulu English and English tests cover much the same situations and are to a large extent directly comparable; but half the Zulu test reflects the domestic domain which has no pendant in the other two tests.

The Zulu English and English tests contained the following scripted dialogues:

A. "Lecture notes": a student has missed a lecture and wants to borrow lecture notes from a friend.
B. "Extension": a student is late with an assignment and has to approach his professor for an extension.
C. "Raise": an employee approaches his employer to ask for a raise.
D. "Staff meeting": a headmistress wants a colleague to notify school staff of a staff meeting.
E. "Policeman": a policeman wants an illegally parked car removed.
F. "Lift": a student would like a ride to a party from another student.
G. "Early submission": a professor would like a student to submit an assignment earlier than scheduled.

H. "Doctor": a doctor wants a patient with an infected throat to open his mouth.

Certainly, before proceeding with this research on a large scale, a refinement of these elicitation techniques will be necessary: it was found that in part they are still not sufficiently delimited as to reliably elicit requests; and an attempt must be made, perhaps through the social variables involved, to increase their overall comparability.

Respondents (20 for Zulu, 25 for Zulu English) and 10 for English) were chosen largely, but not exclusively from the student population at the University of Natal; for the Zulu and Zulu English tests, some data were also obtained from domestic and other workers in the vicinity. In each case the test was administered on an individual basis by a native-speaker of the language of the participant.

Further data were obtained from in-depth interviews with two Zulu-speaking student assistants, who identified very closely with the project and provided many valuable insights. These two assistants are also responsible for the ongoing collection of further data from naturally occurring conversations; however, it was not possible to utilise these data at this stage of the project.

It will be clear that my present data will be subject to the limitations of any data obtained through discourse completion tests. As Wolfson has pointed out, this method may allow a considerable quantity of data to be collected speedily, but it does have serious drawbacks: "It must always be recognized that responses elicited within a written frame are, by their very nature, not the same as spontaneous speech" (Wolfson, 1989, p. 70). This will be all the more important in the present case, in that although Zulu has been written for over a hundred years, it is still located in a primarily oral culture, and discourse patterns still seem to point strongly to former orally-based habits. This will render data obtained by means of writing of necessity somewhat suspect. Wolfson makes a further point: through this method it is also "impossible to collect the kind of elaborated (and often negotiated) behaviour which we typically find in naturally occurring interactions" (Wolfson, 1989, p. 70). We will return to this problem in due course.

The data collected were analysed by means of the CCSARP project coding scheme, as detailed in Blum-Kulka et al (1989, p. 273-294). This scheme pays particular attention to the Head Act of the request, "the minimal unit which can realize a request" (ebd., p. 275), and identifies nine possible Request Strategies; these are listed according to decreasing level or directness of "degree to which the speaker's illocutionary intent is apparent from the locution" (ebd., p. 278). They are the following:

1. mood derivable "Open the door"
2. performatives "I'm asking you to open the door"
3. hedged performatives "I would like to ask you to..."
4. obligation statements "You'll have to ..."
5. want statements "I want you to ..."
6. suggestory formulae "How about ...?"

7. query preparatory "Can you/Could you/Would you mind .."
8. strong hints "Why is the door closed?"
9. mild hints "It's very hot in here." (ebd., p. 278-281).

Blum-Kulka subsequently groups these nine strategies into three major levels of directness: the most direct, explicit level (1-5). the conventionally indirect level (6-7) and the nonconventionally indirect level or hints (7-8) (ebd., p. 46-47). Further sources of variation of these Head Acts are possible through changes in perspective,

Table 1. Request strategies in Zulu English and South African English.

Dial. Sett.s.		Lect. nts.	Ext.-sion	Raise	Staff meet.	Pol.	Lift	Early Subm.	Doc.			
			ZULU ENGLISH							Total	%	
Total resp.		24	20	25	18	22	24	21	17	171	100	
Request Strategies	1	6		2	13	13	1	7	13	55	32.1	43.8%
	2					1				1		
	3		2							2		
	4							4		4		
	5	1	1	6		1	4			13		
	6							3		3		37.4%
	7	16	8	6	4	3	13	7	4	61	35.6	
	8		9	8		4	5			26	15.2	18.7%
	9	1		3	1		1			6		
		SOUTH AFRICAN ENGLISH								Total	%	
Total resp.		7	10	9	8	10	10	10	8	72	100	
Request Strategies	1				1	6			6	13	18.0	25%
	2											
	3			2						2		
	4					1				1		
	5			2						2		
	6											65.3%
	7	6	7	4	7	3	8	10	2	47	65.3	
	8	1	3	1			2			7	9.7	9.7%
	9											

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

and through internal modifications (downgraders and upgraders); however, in a paper of this limited scope, not much attention will be paid to these.

Table 1 shows the distribution of requests over the nine request strategies in Zulu English and English. (Given the limitations of my data, I would, of course, by no means wish to claim the validity of this distribution for each language by itself; but a comparison of the two languages does enable certain interesting differences in distribution to be pinpointed.)

Table 2 shows the results of the comparable investigation into Zulu request strategies, based, as explained above, to a certain extent on different conversational situations. In my discussion I will, however, concentrate on the English and Zulu English data, only referring on occasion to the Zulu data.

Table 2. Request strategies in Zulu

Dial. Sett.s:		Lect. nts.	Ext.	Raise	Staff	Pol.	Toy	Tidy up	Elec.	Black board	Gran	Church	Total	%	
Total resp.		19	-*	19	12	19	20	20	18	16	18	19	180	100	
Request Strategies	1	5			3	8		8	1	9	18	3	55	30.5	68.7%
	2	10		4	6	1	16	1	8	4		8	58	32.2	
	3												-	-	
	4				1	1		1				4	7	3.8	
	5					1				2		1	4	2.2	
	6														6.6%
	7	3		2	2		1	1	1	1		1	12	6.6	
	8	1		7		7	3	9	5			2	34	18.8	24.3%
	9			6		1			3				10	5.5	

*The results for "Extension" were excluded, as the test did not reliably produce requests.

Using Blum-Kulka's three major levels of directness, English-speakers favour the conventionally indirect forms (65%), with direct requests lagging considerably (25%) and hints coming in a poor third (10%). Speakers of Zulu English, on the other hand, favour direct forms (44% -- the bulk of these being imperatives 32%), followed closely by conventionally indirect requests (37%), with hints considerably more in evidence than in English (19%). This marked tendency in Zulu English to greater directness is further underlined by the very frequent use of "can" rather than "could" in conventionally indirect requests, as opposed to the almost standard "could" of the English-speakers. When comparing request strategies for particular situations, Zulu English uses a larger number of imperatives for "Lecture notes", "Early submission' and "Staff meeting". Could this perhaps point to a somewhat differing view of role relationships? In both "Early submission" and "Staff meeting" there is a combination of social distance and power on the part of the speaker. As regards "Early submission", the speaker is asking a considerable favour of a subordinate, and it is noticeable that English-speakers go to great lengths to mitigate the imposition on the student; this feature is almost completely lacking in the Zulu English data. Is this a reflex of the authoritarian nature of traditional Zulu society, which seems to be persisting even today? Or is it simply a lack of linguistic subtlety available in Zulu English as a perhaps somewhat reduced version of the target language? "Staff meeting", too, seems to point to a rather more authoritarian view of the role-relationship headmistress -- teacher, although in many cases the straight imperative is mitigated by the upgrader "please".

On the one hand Zulu English requests are noticeably more direct than those of English-speakers; but on the other hand, hints, which must rank as the most indirect of requests, are nearly twice as frequent as in English. This is a point stressed time and time again in discussion with my research assistants: traditionally, the deference due to interlocutors of greater age and higher social status, is largely expressed by a very indirect approach to a request, via a number of other topics; and even when the required topic has been reached, it is "rough" to put the request oneself: rather one should describe the problem and wait for one's partner to propose the hoped-for solution. This is noticeable in "Extension on essay" and particularly in "Raise", where the typical conversational structure seems to be that one details the circumstances of one's poor financial situation and hopes that an offer will be forthcoming; if not, one finally puts in the request oneself.

What reasons can be proffered for this marked tendency towards the use of direct forms in Zulu English? Firstly there is the possibility that the relatively high rating for imperatives both in Zulu English and English is in part a function of the artificial nature of the discourse completion test. Our English data, for example, are somewhat higher than the results obtained for other varieties of English by the CCSARP project. (Compare the data for Australian English elicited by Blum-Kulka et al, 1989, p. 47.) On the other hand, Hodge, when comparing requests in Tasmanian and (White) South African English, notes that South Africans use more imperatives overall than Tasmanians (Hodge, 1990, p. 125).

Secondly, there is the likelihood of pragmalinguistic transfer from Zulu into Zulu English, in that the data for Zulu show an even higher percentage of direct requests in Zulu, 62%, with 30% being imperatives and 32% performatives. This last surprising figure is explained by the fact that it is a performative which is the standard polite form in our local Zulu: *ngicęla uvale umnyango* -- I request that you close the door. However, in a total of 224 requests collected in Zulu English, only once was this form translated directly,: "I am asking you..."; and after considerable thought, my assistant gave as the English equivalent of "Ngicela" "Can you..." -- a conventionally indirect form. The "ngicela" form raises an important question: does the usual link between politeness and indirectness not hold for Zulu (and Zulu English)?

Since Brown and Levinson's analysis of politeness in terms of face, an analysis which postulated a link between degree of politeness and degree of indirectness as a linguistic universal, a considerable quantity of evidence concerning cross-cultural realization of face-threatening acts such as requests has become available, some of which is intended to test various aspects of this theory of politeness critically. In the reissue of their book, Brown and Levinson review recent work and mention some research which shows "the relative absence of mitigating or face-redressive features associated with... requests in some communities" (Brown/Levinson, 1985, p. 27); however, they contend that "the exceptions are the kind allowed for by the specific socio-cultural variables" introduced by their theory (ebd.). The Zulu (and Zulu English) data obtained from the discourse completion tests seem to point in a similar direction, especially when one considers the standard polite request in Zulu mentioned above. In Blum-Kulka's terms this is a performative, level 2, and hence with a high directness rating -- which native-speakers are in agreement with. I have great difficulties in dealing with this form according to Brown and Levinson's criteria: closest would appear to be "negative politeness", strategy 10, "go on record as incurring a debt" -- but the Zulu completely lacks the deference inherent to "I'd be eternally grateful if you would...", and can furthermore be used towards both social superiors and inferiors. On the other hand, there would be major problems in grouping this form together with the other Zulu "bald on record" forms such as the imperative or even the subjunctive, all of which rate very low as far as politeness is concerned. Even though "ngicela" seems to be becoming to a certain extent conventionalised, we do seem here to have frequently used direct requests with a high politeness rating.

In our data for Zulu English we have also noted a large number of direct requests; yet a number of considerations point against an interpretation in terms of "low politeness". Quite apart from the general considerations of face as developed by Brown and Levinson, it is clearly in the interests of these disadvantaged speakers to be polite; a generally deferential attitude towards superiors can be observed; and there seems to be a Black perception of Whites as "not very polite". The tentative conclusion I would wish to draw is that for Zulu -- and hence also for Zulu English -- one cannot adequately analyse politeness in terms of single requests, abstracted from the context of the conversation. Rather politeness seems to be negotiated primarily by means of the non-verbal dimensions of the interaction, as detailed earlier in my paper, which create a context of politeness within which a direct request may well lose the implication of low politeness it could have according to a theory of politeness based on individual utterances.

This would then allow an explanation of some aspects of the miscommunication between Blacks and Whites on campus. Speakers of Zulu English seem to become aware, during their first six months or so on campus, of the differing interactional styles between Zulu and English and make a conscious effort to modify their discourse style accordingly. Frequently mentioned are non-verbal factors: one must meet superiors' gaze, one should not sit down until requested, one should avoid rubbing one's hands; and students also become aware of the need to "come straight to the point". However, in avoiding the main non-verbal politeness mechanisms of Zulu, there seems to be a tendency to transfer the verbal dimensions of Zulu requests, and hence to fail to adopt adequately the verbal politeness markers of English; with resulting miscommunication of the politeness intended.

Could these conclusions be seen to invalidate Brown and Levinson's general theory of politeness, were they to be substantiated by a fuller investigation? I would rather see them as pointing to the necessity of expanding the theory in two directions. Firstly, non-verbal components of communication need to be included. Brown and Levinson do, in fact, mention that this would ideally be necessary, but point to the lack of suitable data (Brown/Levinson, 1987, p. 91-92). I would argue that it is necessary to include non-verbal components not only for "exotic" languages such as Zulu, but equally so for the standard languages of the linguistic repertoire like English, where non-verbal components are so familiar as to pass unnoticed. I would further point to the necessity of expanding the data to include a larger number of complete conversations, in order to facilitate the demonstration of how politeness is mutually negotiated throughout an interaction. These two extensions of the present theory would be necessary to construct an adequate theory of politeness for Zulu English. On such a basis, it would then be possible to ask to what extent the strategies identified can be accommodated within the considerations of face postulated by Brown and Levinson, or whether these would need modification.

One further point is raised by Brown and Levinson's differentiation between the (more direct) positive politeness and the (less direct) negative politeness, both of which can be used to compensate any threat to face. Wolfson draws out the possible social implications of this distinction as follows: "Negative politeness is seen as a strategy of those who are in some way less powerful than the addressee, while positive politeness is a sign of social closeness" (Wolfson, 1989, p. 68). (Such an interpretation could, of course, tie in closely with the situation of Blacks in contact with Whites under apartheid.) Brown and Levinson suggest the possibility of extending their work beyond the level of the speech act, and this suggestion is taken up by Scollon and Scollon (1983), who first encompass all of Brown and Levinson's five politeness strategies in the basic distinction between deference and solidarity, and subsequently attempt to characterize overall systems of interaction as solidarity or deference politeness systems. They describe these two postulated systems in the following way: "A solidarity politeness system ... would favour low numbered strategies (bald on record and positive politeness) while a deference politeness system would favour higher numbered strategies (negative politeness, off record, or avoiding the face-threatening act). The internal dynamics of a solidarity politeness system would favour the emphasis on sameness, on group membership, and the general good of the group. Deference politeness systems would favour deference, indirectness or even avoidance in making impositions on others at all" (Scollon/Scollon, 1983, p. 175). They agree with Brown and Levinson as to the three basic ways in which these two possibilities can be realized in society, depending on the variables Power and Distance. The first possibility is an asymmetrical system, due to high Power differentials between members of the society: the more powerful interlocutors will tend to use lower numbered strategies, and the less powerful higher numbered strategies; i.e. both solidarity and deference politeness will be represented. On the other hand, if the power differential is generally low, then the variable Distance, "the social distance between S and H" (Brown/Levinson, 1987, p. 76), becomes decisive. If there is a high Distance rating in the given society, it will tend to a deference politeness system; low Distance will tend to a solidarity politeness system. In suggesting these categories, however, Scollon and Scollon caution against the dangers of oversimplification. They point out that "even at the level of the speech act a single act may incorporate multiple strategies ... Our emphasis in this discussion is on the discourse and even the whole communicative system. We assume any communication at that level to consist of a complex structure of many different interactional strategies encoded as speech acts" (Scollon/ Scollon, 1983, p. 171).

It would be of great interest to be able to apply these categories to the three languages under consideration here. Do our data suggest any possible preliminary conclusions? We should, however, note that any discourse completion test will tend, through its structure, to reflect mainly instances of negative politeness; for, as Scollon has pointed out, "negative politeness... is specific for the particular FTA (Face Threatening Act) in hand", whereas "positive politeness ... is relevant to *all* aspects of a person's positive face." (Brown/Levinson, 1987, p. 18). Questions of this type, even more than a consideration of the politeness level of individual speech acts, presuppose a body of naturally occurring data.

It is unclear whether SAE tends more to positive politeness (as does American English) or to negative politeness (as, seemingly, does British English); possibly the British English tradition is, on the whole, somewhat stronger. This question could only be decided on the basis of an extended empirical study. As regards Zulu, however, the evidence seems somewhat contradictory. The enormous role of deference in traditional Zulu society, and especially towards older people, suggests a deference politeness system. On the other hand, several factors in Brown and Levinson's list of positive politeness strategies suggest a tendency towards positive politeness: the frequent use of names, attending to H's wants and needs before a request may be broached, jokes, the tendency to include both S and H in the activity in hand, giving reasons for requests, etc.

The data for two of the situations examined here has some bearing on this question: the particularly face-threatening "Extension' and "Raise". It is interesting that, for "Extension", 25 responses in Zulu English produced a total of 9 reasons and 4 promises; whereas English produced 3 reasons but no promises out of 10 responses. Reasons and Offers/Promises are both listed as positive politeness strategies. This tendency is even more marked in "Raise": English produced one reason out of 10 responses, Zulu English 11 out of 25, and Zulu 13 out of 20. It may well be that in particularly face-threatening situations, transfer of pragmatic habits takes place more readily; and it is interesting that here positive politeness strategies are transferred from Zulu to Zulu English. But as a general tendency, the high Power differentials of Zulu English (being almost exclusively interaction between Blacks and Whites) would seem to point very strongly in the direction of the asymmetrical politeness system outlined above. Clearly the question as to the interactional styles of these languages cannot be decided here; but it would be of great interest for future research.

The pilot study discussed here has provided few firm answers, but has raised a number of issues which would well bear further investigation. Most importantly it underlines the urgent need for research in pragmatics based on the languages of Africa, and the contribution these languages still have to make to linguistic theory.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my two Zulu-speaking student assistants, Andy Madonsela and Fidel Xaba, without whose enthusiastic help this research could not have been undertaken.

THE AUTHOR

Elizabeth de Kadt is Senior Lecturer in the German Section of the Department of Europe Studies, University of Natal, Durban, South Africa. Her special interest is the comparison of African and European languages.

NOTES

[1] Dirven (1990, p. 26) stresses that both English and Afrikaans, in spite of the present dominance of the former, are still only *relative* lingua francas, with only 44% (in 1980) claiming to be able to speak English.

[2] We will disregard cases in which English is used as lingua franca between speakers of different indigenous languages, for which no reliable data are available.

REFERENCES

Berglund, A.-I. (1976). *Zulu Thought-Patterns and Symbolism*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press.

Blum-Kulka, S., House, J., & Kasper, G. (1989). *Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: Requests and Apologies*. Norwood: Ablex.

Brown, P., & Levinson, S.C. (1987). *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*. Cambridge: C.U.P.

Buthelezi, Q. (1989). South African Black English: a myth or reality? In J. van der Walt (Ed.), *South African Studies in Applied Linguistics* (pp. 38-61). Potchefstroom: SAALA.

Chick, J.K. (1985). The interactional accomplishment of discrimination in South Africa. *Language in Society*, 14/3, 299-326.

Chick, J.K. (1986). Intercultural Miscommunication as a Source of Friction in the Workplace and in Educational Settings. In

G.Kendall (Ed.), *Education and the Diversity of Cultures* (pp. 25-36). Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press.

Dirven, R. (1990). Contact and Conflict Linguistics in Southern Africa. In K.Chick (Ed.), *Searching for Relevance* (pp. 16-51). Durban: SAALA.

Hodge, F.K. (1990). Cross-cultural study of request realization patterns across two groups of native speakers of English. *South African Journal of Linguistics*, 8/3, 121-128.

Krige, E. (1936). *The Social System of the Zulus.* Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter.

Lanham, L.W., & Prinsloo, K.P. (Eds.) (1978). *Language and Communication Studies in South Africa.* Cape Town:O.U.P.

Raum, O.F. (1973). *The social functions of avoidance and taboos among the Zulu.* Berlin: de Gruyter.

Scollon, R., & Scollon, S.B.K. (1983). *Narrative, Literacy and Face in Interethnic Communication.* Norwood: Ablex.

Wolfson, N. (1989). *Perspectives: Sociolinguistics and TESOL.* Cambridge etc.: Newbury House.

○

Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series, Vol. 3, 1992

Gender and Function of Language Use: Quantitative and Qualitative Evidence from Japanese

Sachiko Ide

INTRODUCTION

One of the general characteristics of gender differences in language use is, as is well known, women's politer speech. In this paper I will first substantiate and argue the reasons for this phenomenon with quantitative and qualitative data in Japanese. In the process of investigating gender differences in politeness in language use I will attempt to show how the same linguistic signs perform duplex functions of politeness: i.e. deference and demeanor.

BACKGROUND

In discussing politeness in language use one is obliged to review what is currently at issue in the field of linguistic politeness. The theories of linguistic politeness proposed in the field of pragmatics in the last fifteen years by Lakoff, Brown and Levinson, and Leech are assumed to have universal application. If any of these theories were applicable to the use of honorifics, the kernel notion of linguistic politeness in Japanese, we could use it as the framework for the explanation of women's politer speech. However, none of those theories in fact agree with the intrinsic use of honorifics for politeness.

Linguistic politeness for Japanese, and perhaps for speakers of other honorific languages, is mainly a matter of conforming to the social conventions for the choice of linguistic forms. Hill et al. (1986:348) call this *wakimae*, ('discernment'). It should be categorized as one of two general strategies of linguistic politeness, the other dealt with by Lakoff and Brown and Levinson being called 'volition'. *Wakimae* is observed according to the speaker's reading of socially agreed-upon relative social distance toward the referent and the addressee, which is performed as linguistic etiquette, while 'volition' is the speaker's strategy to save the faces of the interactants, which is performed according to the speaker's intention. The former is a passive and automatic choice imposed on the speaker by social norms while the latter is the speaker's active and intentional choice.

The linguistic etiquette called *wakimae* can be achieved by keeping proper distance with interactants according to prescribed social norms of behavior. The determining factors of distance between interactants are differences of social status, age, power, familiarity or solidarity, and the formality of occasion and topic (Ide 1982:366-77). In verbal behavior this distance is expressed by the choice of higher/formal linguistic forms. The choice of formal linguistic forms in pronouns, address terms, honorifics and other lexical items according to these interactional and situational factors is essential for achieving the *wakimae* kind of linguistic politeness in Japanese and other honorific languages.

A survey was conducted that focused on this specific type of linguistic politeness, and quantitative data on gender difference of language use were obtained. It is with these quantitative data concerning gender differences of language use that I will discuss duplex variables and duplex indexical functions.

In explaining the nature of these duplex variables and duplex functions involved in women's politer speech, Goffman's idea on rules of conduct will be introduced, i.e. complementary concept of deference and demeanor (Goffman 1968).

The following discussion of the phenomenon of women's politer speech will follow quantitative as well as qualitative approaches: the first based on the survey and the second on observation and introspection.

QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE

The survey results

The survey was conducted by asking 256 men and 271 women (parents of the students of a college in Tokyo) about their use of polite linguistic forms. The subjects represent the typical middle-class middle-aged population in contemporary Japanese society, the men being mostly businessmen and the women mostly housewives, a situation where sex differences are particularly prominent.

Three questions were asked of the subjects.

Question 1: The subjects' assessment of the politeness level of linguistic forms.[1] The linguistic form in question were variants of 'go' in the context of 'when do you go?'

Question 2: The subjects' assessment of appropriate politeness level due to types of addressee. The types of addressee were such people as the subjects interact with in their every day lives.

Question 3: The choice of linguistic form subjects would use for types of addressees mentioned in Q2.

The data obtained in the form of numbers showing politeness levels and frequencies were analyzed according to gender.

First, let us read Table 1 which shows the degree of politeness level of linguistic forms used for types of addressees. This is the result of Q3. The scores were obtained as follows: for each linguistic form obtained in Q3, we apply the scores of average level of linguistic politeness of individual linguistic form obtained from the results of Q1. Thus, the scores of politeness level of linguistic form used for each type of addressee were obtained. In this table the average politeness levels of the linguistic forms which subjects reported that they would use for each type of addressee are shown according to the gender of the subject responding. When comparing them, we find that for 9 types of addressees out of 12, women would use politer linguistic forms than men. This is numerical evidence to show that women tend to

Table 1. Degree of politeness level of linguistic forms used for different types of addressee (Numbers represent average scores of politeness, 1 being least polite and 5 being most polite.)

Types of addressee	Men	Women
a. Child	1.39	1.15
b. Spouse	1.41	1.85
c. Delivery person	2.19	2.39
d. Friend	2.15	2.55
e. Workplace inferior	1.91	2.39
f. Same status colleague	2.41	2.45
g. Neighbor	3.72	3.25
h. Spouse's friend	3.53	3.99
i. Parent at P.T.A. meeting	3.83	3.50
j. Instructor of hobby group	3.99	4.31
k. Daughter's or son's professor	4.19	4.40
l. Workplace superior	4.31	4.39

use politer linguistic forms is greater than men.

Now, let us seek the reasons for women's politer speech. First, *Women's lower assessment of the politeness level of the linguistic form.* We often hear "He speaks politely, for a man." "She should have talked more politely because she is a woman." The folk linguistics suggests that there is a belief in different norms of politeness for men and women.

Table 2. Degree of politeness level of linguistic forms.

Linguistic forms	Men	Women	Linguistic forms	Men	Women
iku( )	1.23	1.03	*irassyaru* n *desu* ka	4.06	4.20
iku no ( )	1.37	1.13	*irassyai masu* ka ( )	4.49	4.41
irassyaru	2.70	2.64	*o*-ide-*ni-nari-masu*-ka( )	4.50	4.29
iki *masu* ( )	2.86	2.33	*o*-dekake-*ni-nari masu* ka	4.78	4.64
iku n *desu ka*	2.95	2.53			
iki *masu* ka	3.08	2.78	*o*-dekake-*ni-nar-are masu* ka	4.95	4.89
ik-*are*-ru n desu ka	3.94	3.72			
ik-*are masu* ka	3.94	3.51	*o*-dekake de *irassyai masu* ka	4.98	4.96
irassyaru no ( )	3.34	2.85			

Table 2 is the result of Q 1 showing the average scores for the politeness levels of linguistic forms as assessed by men and,women. Comparing the numbers of politeness levels we find that women have a lower assessment of politeness levels for 14 out of 15 linguistic forms. Thus, to express the same level of politeness, a woman has to use a politer linguistic form than a man would. Conversely, if a woman and a man use identical linguistic forms, the women will sound less polite. Where does this difference of politeness level come from? It will be clarified along with the data in Table 4.

The second reason for women's speech being more polite can be found in *their higher assessment of the politeness level appropriate for a particular addressee.*

Table 3. Degree of politeness level of types of addressee.

Types of people	Men	Women
a. Child	1.08	1.06
b. Spouse	1.11	1.37
c. Delivery person	1.89	1.96
d. Friend	2.00	2.12
e. workplace inferior	2.15	3.07
f. Same-status colleague	2.41	2.73
g. Neighbor	3.03	2.54
h. Spouse's friend	3.38	3.44
i. Parent at P.T.A. meeting	3.58	2.84
j. Instructor of hobby group	3.89	3.84
k. Daughter's or son's professor	4.14	4.35
l. Workplace superior	4.66	4.74

Table 3 is the result of Q2, showing the men's and women's average assessments of politeness levels to be used toward the types of addressee they deal with in their everyday lives. Comparing the differences in numbers, we find that, for 8 types of addressee out of 12, women assign a higher level of politeness than do men. This tells us that the reason that women are perceived to deal with interactants more politely than men do can be ascribed to two factors: (1) women assess individual expressions as being lower on the politeness scale than do men, and must therefore choose an expression higher up in the scale in order to achieve the same politeness effect. And (2) women assign a higher politeness due level to the same interactants; therefore they must go still further up the scale to be perceived as sufficiently polite users of the language.

The third reason for the relative politeness of women's speech is *the greater frequency with which they take part in the kinds of interactional pattern which calls for higher linguistic forms*. This reason for women's politer speech is not as straightforward as the previous two and was revealed in the process of examining a discrepancy between the politeness levels of Q2 and Q3XQ1.

Previous studies of the use of linguistic politeness (Kokuritu Kokugo Kenkyuujo 1982, 1983, Ogino 1981, 1983) have not attempted to view the politeness level assigned to the addressees's status separately from the politeness level of language actually used toward the addressee. Therefore, the politeness level used toward the addressee was taken to be identical with the politeness level assigned to the addressee. However, this survey obtained not only politeness levels assigned to the addressee's status (Q2) but also the politeness levels of language actually used toward the addressee (Q3XQ1). This was done based on the working hypothesis that the choice of linguistic forms according to politeness is based on the two autonomous rules of politeness: linguistic and social rules of politeness. As a result we found an unexpected lack of parallelism of the two politeness levels. At this point, we began to wonder about the mechanism for this lack of parallelism. To investigate this mechanism, we should compare the result of Q2 and Q3XQ1 more closely. We have therefore drawn Figure 1.

Figure 1. Comparison of politeness level associated with addressees and of linguistic forms used toward addressees.



a. Child
b. Spouse
c. Delivery person
d. Friend
e. Workplace inferior
f. Same-status colleague
g. Neighbor
h. Spouse's friend
i. Parent at P.T.A. meeting
j. Instructor of hobby group
k. Daughter's or son's professor
l. Workplace superior

Figure 2. Grouping of types of addressee according to patterns of language use.

Group 1. More polite
Men and women: b. spouse,
c. delivery person,
d. friend,
g. neighbor,
h. spouse's friend,
i. parent at P.T.A. meeting,
j. instructor of hobby group,
k. daughter's or son's professor,
Men only: a. child

Group 2. Less (or equally) polite
Men and women: e. workplace inferior,
f. same status colleague,
l. workplace superior,
Women only: a. child

The horizontal lines represent scales of politeness, with politeness increasing toward the right. On the upper lines politeness levels assigned to types of addressee are plotted and on the lower lines politeness levels of linguistic forms used for types of addressee are plotted. Since the types of addressees are the same it was useful to combine and compare the two politeness levels to observe the patterns of language use. We group this right-angled pattern of language use as group 1. In this group (indicated by dotted lines) we find the types of addressee in the domain of neighborhood, hobbies and home with whom it is required to be sociable/civil. The rest, i.e. the left-angled or vertical lines show the use of linguistic forms with politeness level equal to or lower than the associated politeness level of the types of addressee. We group this pattern of language use as group 2. In group 2 (indicated by solid lines) we

Table 4. Frequencies of interaction with types of addressee.

Types of addressee	Men	Women
a. Child	13.5	14.5
b. Spouse	9.4	8.1
c. Delivery person	1.6	4.1
d. Friend	7.2	9.2
e. Workplace inferior	11.7	0.6
f. Same-status colleague	7.7	1.1
g. Neighbor	3.4	6.5
h. Spouse's friend	2.6	2.8
i. Parent at P.T.A	0.8	5.4
j. Instructor of hobby group	0.9	5.7
k. Daughter's or son's professor	3.6	9.0
l. Workplace superior	14.0	1.4

find types of people in the domain of the workplace with whom rapport/solidarity are sought.

Figure 2 shows the grouping of the pattern of language use. What strikes one in this grouping is the amazing similarity between men and women. With the exception of language use toward a child, both men and women use language according to the same pattern. How does this difference in the pattern of language use arise? With Figure 1 we may hypothesize on the mechanism of the choice of linguistic forms as follows: when interaction takes place, the speaker first assesses the politeness level associated with the specific type of the addressee. and secondly, he chooses a linguistic form appropriate for the politeness level for the kinds of interaction with the addressee. As is shown in the diagram, the appropriate forms are not chosen to exactly match the assessed politeness level of the addressee. It is the kinds of interaction, i.e. sociable/civil or rapport/solidarity seeking interaction, that decide the second stage politeness level. Thus, the quantitative analysis of the survey results led us to find two levels of variables as controlling factors for the choice of politeness level of linguistic forms: (1) politeness level associated to the addressee (2) kinds of interactional patterns. How does this phenomenon lead to women's politer speech? To discuss this, let us notice the frequencies of interaction in Table 4.

We find higher frequencies of men's interaction with those people in group 1 where rapport/solidarity is required (i.e. workplace inferior, same status colleague and workplace superior. Women in our study have higher frequencies of interaction with people in group 1. In other words, women are more frequently engaged in interaction which calls for linguistic forms higher than the politeness level toward interactants. Therefore, women end up using politer linguistic forms even though the kind of interactional pattern, the second level variable, is the same between men and women. This is another reason why women appear to speak more politely in Japanese.[2]

This result can be accounted as the reason for the difference of degree of politeness level of linguistic forms that we saw in Table 2. Since women are more frequently engaged in interactions which call for higher linguistic forms, they end up using higher linguistic forms frequently. It is a general tendency that the frequent use of some linguistic forms will gradually exhaust their politeness value. Women's lower assessment of politeness level can be considered to be such a case.

Two variables and two functions, i.e., deference and demeanor

We may explain the differences in the functions of two variables, using Goffman's idea concerning rules of conduct which bind the speaker and the addressee together. In his essay "The nature of deference and demeanor" he used these two terms, *deference* and *demeanor*, to label two complimentary behaviors in explaining the rule of conduct which are the kernel elements of politeness.

According to Goffman (Goffman 1968: 56-77), the ceremonial component of concrete behavior has two basic elements: deference and demeanor. Deference is defined as the appreciation a person shows of the recipient through avoidance rituals or presentational rituals. Avoidance rituals refer to forms of deference which lead the actor to keep distance from the recipient. and presentational rituals take forms such as salutations, invitations, compliments and such minor services. Demeanor, on the other hand, is the element of a person's ceremonial behavior typically conveyed through deportment, dress and bearing which serves to express his/her personal quality of desirability. Deference shows the speaker's regard for the recipient, while demeanor involves the speaker's desire to present himself/herself in a way that shows how well-demeaned a person he/she is.

The first stage variable, determined by the distance between the speaker and the type of addressee, is regulated according to the degree of deference. The second stage variable, determined by the speaker's choice of linguistic forms which treat the addressee as higher or lower or equal to the speaker himself/herself, is regulated not according to the regard associated with the addressee, but for the display of the speaker's good demeanor. In the former, the sentiment of regard is directed toward the addressee and in the latter it is directed toward the speaker.

As was mentioned in the previous part of this paper, politeness in Japanese is a matter of using high/formal linguistic forms according to the relative status of type of addressee and situation. For this reason, we may wonder why higher/more formal linguistic forms function as deference and demeanor.

Two interpretations are possible for that deference which a person shows toward a recipient through avoidance or presentational rituals. The more formal the linguistic forms, the more elaborated they are. First, the use of elaborated forms can be assumed to obscure the core part of the meaning of words. Besides this, the etymological function of honorifics is circumlocution one way or other. By obscuring the core meaning of words, we can express things indirectly. Indirect expressions function to be the speaker create distance toward the addressee. Thus, the speaker's deference toward the addressee is expressed by keeping distance, which works as an avoidance ritual. This is in accord with negative politeness in B&L' framework. Second, the use of formal forms requires carefulness and attention more than when the speaker uses informal or casual forms. The cost to the speaker paid to the addressee by speaking elaborated forms is an expression of second type of deference, because it makes the speaker do the service to the addressee, which functions as representational ritual. This is in accord with positive politeness in B&L framework.

As for demeanor,we may recall the association of formal and correct forms with speakers of higher social class. the subtlety of formal and elaborated forms in verbal and nonverbal behavior creates an atmosphere where paradoxical feeling of distance and empathy is hared by interactants. Formal forms function to maintain distance and at the same time function to create empathy because of the formality shared by interactants. This paradoxically complex feeling is often observed on occasions of ceremony and interactions of people of high or prestigious class that reinforces the use of formal forms as the expression of demeanor.

Let's look at the case of the delivery person in Figure 1 for example. We observe the use of higher linguistic forms than the assessed politeness levels toward delivery person. We see that low levels of politeness are assigned toward delivery persons, but the second level variable calls for linguistic forms higher than those levels. This strategy should be interpreted not as deference expressed toward the addressee but as a display of the speaker's demeanor to express the speaker's identity as a demeaned person.

QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE

Women's politer speech is also characterized by some features of a categorical nature. We will examine four of these features in terms of Goffman's deference and demeanor:

Personal pronouns

Personal pronouns, the avoidance of vulgar expressions, *beautification* (or hypercorrected honorifics), and sentence final particles. The repertoires of personal pronouns of men and women differ as follows:

Speech Level	Men's Speech	Women's Speech
First person		
formal	*watakusi*	*watakusi*
	watasi	*atakusi**
plain	*boku*	*watasi*
		*atasi**
deprecatory	*ore*	*O*
Second person		
formal	*anata*	*anata*
plain	*kimi*	*anata*
	*anta**	*anta**
deprecatory	*omae*	
	kisama	*O*

(* marks variants of a social dialect.)

Two kinds of differences can be noted here. First, a difference in levels of formality can be observed. The level of formality of *watasi* is formal for men but plain for women and that of *anata* is formal for men but plain or formal for women. This means that women are required to use more formal forms. This reminds us of one of the three reasons for women's politer speech shown in the quantitative data, i.e., women's lower assessment of the politeness levels of individual linguistic forms. As a second kind of difference between the language of women and men, we notice that there are the deprecatory level pronouns of *ore*, *omae* and *kisama*, in men's speech but none in women's speech.

The use of more formal forms functions as the display of a deferent attitude, as mentioned above. The avoidance of the deprecatory level functions as the display of good demeanor. Thus, categorical differences in the repertoire of personal pronouns lead to women's automatic expression of deference and demeanor. This makes women's speech sound politer.

Avoidance of vulgar expressions

Women's speech lacks expressions of profanity/obscenity. The deprecatory suffix *yagaru* (e.g. utai-yagaru 'sing') is used only by men. Sentence final particles, *zo* and *ze* and phonological reduction forms, such as *dekee* (< dekai 'big') having a derogatory connotation, are also men's vocabulary. They have the value of 'covert' prestige'(Trudgill 1975: 102) among male speakers, as these vulgar forms are the display of masculinity because of their uninhibited quality. It is with this positive value that these vulgar expressions are favorably used by men. On the other hand, vulgar expressions are not allowed in women's repertoire of morphemes and lexical items. Therefore, women, having no access to those vulgar expressions automatically sound like persons with better demeanor. We suggest that this display of the desirable quality, demeanor, makes women's speech sound politer.

Beautification/Hypercorrected honorifics

Beside ordinary honorifics, women tend to use honorifics illegitimately; that is, they are used beyond the appropriate level. This practice takes two forms: one is what may be called beautification honorifics, and the other is the hypercorrected use of honorifics.

The honorific prefix ***o***- is used for goods or actions of referents that are to be treated with deference. But when it is used indiscriminately, for example ***o***-*biiru* 'beer' and ***o***-*yasai* 'vegetable', it only functions to beautify them: thus, we call such usages *beautification honorifics*. Women's speech is characterized by an abundance of such beautification honorifics.

Honorifics, which are to be used for the addressee and the referent where the expected deference is to be expressed, are sometimes used indiscriminately. For example, we find *Haha ga **o**-kaeri-**ni*** **narimasita**. ('My mother returned.' Bold letters mark honorifics.) In this sentence the deference is expressed for the speaker's mother against the rule of use of honorifics in Japanese society, as it is incorrect to use referent honorifics to one's own mother who is one's in-group member. Therefore, this use is considered as a hypercorrect use of honorifics. Women tend to use it in order to achieve a high level of formality of linguistic forms.

Both beautification and hypercorrect honorifics used by women must be intended to be a display of demeanor because of the formal quality of these forms. Thus, women's speech appears to sound polite.

How can we explain this phenomenon of women's display of demeanor? Women, especially housewives, whose activities are mainly in the domain of home and sociable settings, live outside the stratified structure of institutionalized human relationships. In institutions, which are men's society, speakers are expected to make distinctions of status as well as of in-group/out-group. Thus, it is in women's society, where less distinction of status and in-group/out-group is required, that indiscriminate use of hypercorrected honorifics is likely to be observed. Besides, women have no label to mark their social position. High and prestigious linguistic forms are generally associated with high social class. Thus, women tend to be interested in the expression of demeanor, a sentiment of regard toward the speaker herself by the use of higher forms, in order to show a higher social class than that to which they actually belong.[3]

Sentence final particles

There are sentence final particles exclusively used by women. Let us consider- how these make women's speech polite. Ide (1982) discusses *wa* and *kasira*, and McGloin (1986) discusses *wa* and *no*. The former argues that they make women's speech polite because of a 'softening' function of these particles, resulting from the tone of uncertainty created by them. The latter argues "By using *wa* and *no*, the speaker -- women -- seek to establish an atmosphere of sharedness. . . . The strategy of creating an empathic atmosphere/space of conversation, which *wa* and *no* certainly contribute, is a very important aspect of women's language in Japanese." (McGloin, 1986)

To make the argument clear, let us focus on *wa* and discuss the seemingly contradictory arguments. Ide's interpretation of *wa* is 'option giving' or 'don't impose' strategy which functions to create distance or *deference*.[4] In Lakoff's framework of rules of politeness, it would fall in the 'rule of optionality' and in Brown/Levinson's framework it would fall into the *don't presume/assume* strategy of negative politeness. McGloin, on the other hand, interprets *wa* as an 'empathy creating strategy,' which functions to shorten distance between interactants by engendering common ground. It is close to Lakoff's 'rule of equality showing camaraderie/rapport' and it is a strategy of 'claiming common ground' of positive politeness, in Brown/Levinson's framework.

How can the sentence particle *wa* be a strategy of both negative and positive politeness?

The solution to these seemingly opposed interpretations of *wa* should be found in the duplex nature of the function of the single non-referential sign *wa*. We may look at it as follows: it is the softening function of the particle *wa* (the effect of negative politeness strategy) that makes it possible to create an atmosphere of relaxation because of its function of non-imposition and respect for the other, which in turn create an atmosphere of the sharedness (the effect of positive politeness strategy). Thus, these opposing strategies can be interpreted as two sides of the same coin.[5]

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In conclusion, I shall summarize the features of quantitative and qualitative evidence of women's politer speech in terms of functions of politeness: deference and demeanor.

Features of women's politer speech

Deference (1) Use of higher linguistic forms owing to higher assessment of politeness level toward the addressee (first stage variable)
(2) More formal forms of second person pronouns
(3) Use of sentence final particle *wa*, *no*, and *kasira*

Demeanor (1) Use of linguistic forms of higher politeness level than the associated politeness level of the addressee in the interactional domain of sociable/civil activity (second stage variable)
(2) Women's lower assessment politeness level
(3) More formal forms of first person pronouns
(4) Absence of deprecatory level of first and second person pronouns
(5) Avoidance of vulgar expressions
(6) Beautification/Hypercorrect honorifics

The above discussion and summary should have made it clear that gender differences in language use are the result of the duplex indexing functions of deference and demeanor. It should be emphasized that there is no straightforward correlation between linguistic features and gender per se of the speakers involved, as has been assumed in much of the previous literature on this subject. There has been substantial work which interprets women's language as the language of a powerless class. In this respect we have seen that, as far as we have examined Japanese women's politer speech, the function of demeanor certainly outweighs the function of deference, and demeanor is inevitably associated with the speaker's prestigious status.

*This is a slightly revised version of the paper titled "How and why do women speak more politely in Japanese?" in *Aspects of Japanese Women's Language*. S. Ide and N. McGloin (eds.) Kurosio Publishers 1990.

THE AUTHOR

Sachiko Ide is a professor of linguistics at English Department, Japan Women's University, Tokyo, Japan. Her field is sociolinguistics and pragmatics, and has been working on the topics of linguistic politeness and women's language.

NOTES

[1] In Japanese we can easily list a few dozens of variants of a word, say *go*, which show some difference of politeness level.

[2] In Table 2 we have seen women's lower assessment of the politeness level of linguistic forms. We may speculate a cause for this discrepancy in the frequencies of interaction. Women's more frequent engagement with people which call for high linguistic forms (with the exception of workplace superiors) lowered their relative assessment of the politeness level of linguistic forms.

[3] We find a similar phenomenon in the use of phonological variants in urban British English. Trudgill (1975:91) speculates and explains women's preference for high, prestigious phonological variants as the results of (1) women's status consciousness owing to their insecure status and lack of occupation, and (2) women's preference for refinement and sophistication.

[4] Kitagawa (1977) also argues that *wa* with rising intonation is an 'option-giving strategy' like English tag-question.

[5] Full discussion of the interpretation of *wa* should account for the varieties of *wa* used by various speakers in various contexts. We will have to have empirical data of the use of *wa*..

REFERENCES

Brown, P. (1980). How and why are women more polite: some evidence from a Mayan community. In S.

McConnell-Ginet, R. Boker, and N. Furman (Eds.), *Women and Language in Literature and Society* (pp. 111-139). New York:Praeger.

_____ and Levinson, S. (1978). Universals in language usage: politeness phenomena. In E. Goody (Ed.), *Questions and Politeness* (pp. 56-324). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goffman, E. (1968). *Interaction Ritual*. New York: Doubleday and Company.

Hill, B., Ide, S., Ikuta, S., Kawasaki, A., and Ogino, T. (1986). Universals of linguistic politeness: quantitative evidence from Japanese and American English. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 10, 347-371.

Ide, S. (1982). Japanese sociolinguistics: politeness and women's language. *Lingua, 57*, 357-385.

Ide, S., Hori, M., Kawasaki, A., Ikuta, S., and Haga, H. (1986). Sex difference and politeness in Japanese. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 58*, 25-36.

Kokuritu Kokugo Kenkyuujo. (1982). *Kigyoo no Naka no Keigo*. (Linguistic politeness in Cooperation.) Tokyo;Sanseidou.

_____. (1983) *Keigo to Keigoisiki: Okazaki ni okeru 20 nen Mae tono Hikaku*. (Linguistic Politeness and Politeness Attitude: A Comparison Study with the Survey of 20 Years Ago.) Tokyo: Sanseidou.

Lakoff, R. (1974). What you can do with words; politeness, pragmatics and performatives. BS 3, XVI-1-XVI-55.

_____. (1975). *Language and Woman's Place*. New York: Harper and Row.

Leech, G. (1983). *Principles of Pragmatics*. London: Longman.

McGloin, N. (1986). Feminine sentence particles: why do women use them? ms.

Ogino, T. (1981). Keigo ni okeru tukaiwake no taikei to sono kouzouteki kankei.

(system of the use of linguistic politeness and its structural relationship.) *Kokugogaku, 125*, 28-38.

_____. (1984). Yamanote to sitamati ni okeru keigosiyou no tigai. (Differences of the use of linguistic politeness in uptown and downtown.) *Gengokenkyuu, 84*. 45-76.

Trudgill, P. (1975). Sex, covert prestige and linguistic change in the urban British English of Norwich. In B.

Thorne and N. Henley (Eds.) *Language and Sex: difference and dominance* (pp. 88-104). Rowley: Newbury House.

Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series, Vol. 3, 1992

Seeking a Pedagogically Useful Understanding of Given-New: An Analysis of Native-Speaker Errors in Written Discourse

Asha Tickoo

This paper will demonstrate that at a micro-level of analysis the inexperienced writer's failure to achieve the `decontextualization' and `autonomy' (cf.Kay 1977) characteristic of literate prose manifests itself as clearly identifiable violations of the principles of information organization into given and new. To properly explain these violations, however, it is necessary to add to and amend the existing theory of given-new.

INTRODUCTION

Studies that have sought to identify the differences in information organization between spoken and written discourse[1] have referred to such broad distinctions as the context dependence and `nonautonomy' of speech versus the `decontextualization' and `autonomy' of writing (Kay 1977). Writing is said to be decontextualized and autonomous because whatever is needed for its comprehension is included in the words of the text; speech, on the other hand, relies on a `simultaneous transmission over other channels, such as paralinguistic, postural and gestural'. Because of its heavy dependence on interlocutor feedback, speech has also been described as `involved' and often `fragmented', whereas writing is typically both `detached' from audience and context and `integrated' rather than fragmented (Chafe 1982). This means that writers must "learn to initiate, sustain, and develop a written `utterance' without depending on signals of agreement, disagreement, or confusion from an addressee. And, since they cannot see the addressee to judge if they share a common background...they try to make the premises of their reasoning and the logical connections explicit so they can communicate with those who do not share their basic assumptions." (Rader, 1982:187) Referring to approximately the same typical features, Scollon & Scollon (1984) coin the term `focal situation' "for any communicative situation in which there are strong limitations on negotiation between participants" (p. 183), not merely writing per se, to contrast with an unfocused situation, which depends on active participant negotiation. And Michaels & Collins (1984), describing teacher expectations of students' in-class interaction, identify a literate prose style, as something quite distinct from "conversationally embedded narrative accounts that depend upon context and nonverbal cues for much of their cohesion.":

1. objects were to be named and described, even when they were in plain sight;
2. talk was to be explicitly grounded temporally and spatially;
3. minimal shared knowledge or context was to be assumed on the part of the audience;

4. thematic ties needed to be lexicalized if topic shifts were to be seen as motivated and relevant" (pp. 234-224)

In this study, I want to carry out a fine grained analysis of two student attempts at literate prose, paragraphs 1 and 2, both of which fail to achieve the decontextualization and autonomy, and hence the focused situation typical of a literate prose style. They are the opening paragraphs of two freshman essays commenting on the central idea of passage A, given below. Both students are white, middle class males.

A. The new sciences of sociology, psychology and psychiatry have cast aside such concepts as will, willpower, badness and laziness and replaced them with political and psychological repression, poor conditioning, diseased family interaction and bad genes. One by one, human failings have been redesignated as diseases. Remember when drugs or alcohol abuse was a product of some combination of hedonism and foolishness? Now you're an addict. You have no will, so you are not to blame; the disease got you. The fusion of capitalism and science has resulted in thousands of new experts setting up treatment programs certifying each other, publishing books and flitting from talk show to talk show. It is time to rehabilitate the concept of will and restore it to its proper place in our lives. Ultimately, we must assume responsibility for our action, and stop the promotion and exploitation of human frailties and imperfections. (Adapted from an essay by Rex Julian Beaber)

Paragraph 1. Rex Julian Beaber makes many key points[2] in his essay. Beaber states that people in today's society believe that **almost all the human race's imperfections (1)** are due to disease. He suggests that the concept of will and willpower have disappeared. These concepts have been replaced by excuses that are thought up **by an expert (2)** in the new `sciences' of sociology, psychology and psychiatry. These experts devise **ways (3)** such as treatments programs designed to make money and also try to persuade society to accept the faulty fact that people should not be held accountable for their own actions. **This, of course, is not true as Beaber agrees (4)**. (From an essay by Sean F.)

Paragraph 2. Rex Julian Beaber claimed **in an essay (1)** that the concepts of willpower and responsibility for one's actions have disappeared from our society. **Instead of being blamed for our faults, Beaber feels that these faults, including drug and alcohol abuse, have been transformed into a long list of fake diseases by the mental health field. (2)** The mental health field then treats these so-called diseases to gain money and fame. (From an essay by Keith R.)

Each of the errors in paragraphs 1 and 2 is the result of a failure to treat the written utterance as an autonomous and decontextualized unit. But to properly understand the nature of these individual violations, it is necessary to appreciate the consequences of autonomy and decontextualization on the coherence constraints on sub-units of a piece of discourse. I will demonstrate that at the micro-level of discourse analysis the failure to decontextualize is apparent as clearly identifiable violations of the constraints on the organization of given-new information. The current conception of the organization of given-new, however, is not adequate to a proper identification and explanation of these violations. Therefore, before carrying out this analysis, I will first add two basic constructs to the existing theory of given-new.

TWO UNRECOGNIZED DISCOURSE ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES

The most fundamental information organizing principle states that given information precedes new information. I will show that information is constrained by two additional organizing principles:

3a: All new information must be to some extent given,

3b: and the more$_3$ given information is the more felicitous information.

4. All discourse constituents, however, are not constrained by equally stringent givenness conditions: Certain types of constructions and NPs are required to be more given than others.

These three constraints -- the given precedes new constraint together with 3 and 4 defined above -- are necessary though perhaps not sufficient for a proper explanation of the types of errors in 1 and 2.

The givenness of the new

Principle 3 is not recognized by traditional conceptions of information structure. Traditionally, constituents of discourse, at every level, were gauged for their informational status by using the dichotomous concept of given versus new. (cf. Chafe 1976, Clark 1977, Halliday 1974 & 1976, Horn 1978, Kuno 1972, 1974, 1978, 1979). This perception of constituents as either given or new is a simplification that is both inaccurate and misleading. Careful analysis shows that discourse internally both entities and propositions must be to some degree shared knowledge between speaker and interlocutor.[4] The examples of 5 illustrate the shared knowledge constraints on discourse entities.

5a: There was once an old man who lived deep inside a wood.

5b: His wife lived with him.

5c: A woman lived with him.
He lived with a woman.

5d: A man lived with him.

In the context of 5a, b is the most felicitous of b, c, and d, because 'his wife' relates back to 'an old man' with the shared knowledge that men may have wives. In order for the utterance of c to be felicitous in the context of 5a, one would have to assume that the speaker was attempting to create suspense. People generally live together when they are in some way related and it is the speaker's failure to explicitly refer to this relationship that is responsible for creating suspense.

This suspense, however, only arises when the two referents are ordered so that one appears in the discourse after the other. If both the woman and the old man were introduced into the discourse in the same initial utterance, as in `An old man and a woman lived inside the woods.', there would be no suspense, which implies that the suspense is not in fact the result of the simple fact that cohabiting men and women are related by some shared knowledge relationship which has not been explicitly stated.

When the referents are both new and their appearance in the discourse is ordered, a concomitant of this ordering is that there must be a shared knowledge relationship between them such that the second referent becomes to some degree given in the discourse as a result of the relationship it bears to the preceding one. The motivation for placing one new entity after another new entity, as opposed to introducing them in the discourse in the same initial utterance, is that the speaker is able to make the second less new by defining it in terms of its shared knowledge relationship to the preceding entity. The interlocutor, therefore, interprets ordering of new entities as being indicative of a shared knowledge relationship between them, and if this relationship is neither self-evident, nor explicitly referred to, he assumes that it is forthcoming at some later point in the discourse.

It is necessary, however, to determine when it is feasible to assume that the shared knowledge relationship is being intentionally withheld, as in 5c, with respect to 5a, rather than assuming that the ordering is, in the absence of the shared knowledge relationship, simply infelicitous, as is the case in d with respect to 5a. Example 6 is useful in arriving at an understanding of this:

6a: There was once a dog who lived deep inside a wood.
6b: A dog lived with him.

The oddness of 6b in the context of 6a shows that women living with men, which is the case in 5a and 5c, differentiating it from men living with men of 5a and 5d, is not responsible for the difference in acceptability of 5c and 5d with respect to 5a. What is relevant is whether it is entities belonging to the same set or entities belonging to different sets that are ordered in the discourse. When they are members of the same set, as in 5a and 5d, they ought to be introduced together in the same initial utterance, because there is no possibility of the existence of a relationship of dependence between them through which one entity can become less new by being defined in terms of a shared knowledge relationship to the other. So that the most natural expression of 6a and b is `Two dogs lived inside the woods.', and that of 5a and 5d `Two men lived inside the woods.' When the referents are not members of the same set, but are related through shared knowledge, their appearance in the discourse can be ordered such that the dependent referent -- one which is defined in terms of its shared knowledge relationship to the other -- appears after the defining referent -- the one to which the shared knowledge relationhip is made.

The shared knowledge conditions on new entities are further exemplified in the clauses of 7:

7a: I am going to Philip's wedding tomorrow.
7b: Tom is coming with me.
7c: My date/boy friend is coming with me.
7d: A man is coming with me.
7e: A man I know is coming with me.

7b after 7a is felicitous if the referent of the subject noun is known to both speaker and interlocutor. Here the ordering is not a concomitant of a shared knowledge relationship of dependence of `Tom' of 7b to the `I' of 7a. `Tom' is known to both speaker and interlocutor but is newly introduced into the discourse. The new entity of 7c, however, bears a relationship of dependence to the known entity of 7a, since it is shared knowledge that women may have boy friends/dates. 7d after 7a is less natural than 7c after 7a because there is no shared knowledge about the referent of the subject noun: It is not definable in terms of a relationship of dependence to the known entity of 7a, nor is it shared knowledge but newly introduced into the discourse. But 7e, in which the same indefinite reference is what Prince refers to as `anchored' (Prince 1981:236), is by this means, made felicitous. Anchoring makes explicit the relationship of dependence to the preceding, already given entity. This is done in 7e by the speaker relating `the man' to the preceding known entity, the speaker herself.

Like discourse internal NPs, all discourse internal propositions are also required to be to some degree given, and as with NPs the more given proposition is also the more felicitous proposition. This is demonstrated by the clauses in 8:

8a: We got home at five.
8b: Then we took the children to the moon.
8c: Then we took the children to the pub.
8d: Then we took the children to the park.

The less shared knowledge there is to support the sequencing of each of the acts of 8b, 8c, and 8d, individually, to the act of 8a, the less felicitous this sequencing is. Therefore, while b is bizarre, and c unlikely, d is perfectly felicitous, simply because it is shared knowledge that after coming home one may take the children to the park, would not take them to the pub, and could not take them to the moon.

The shared knowledge constraints on new propositions are illustrated in 9:

9a: She was fine until then.
9b: She had a splitting head ache.
9c: She was eating heartily and chatting away.

It is the failure to match our shared knowledge of the state of people in good health that makes b infelicitous as a statement in support of 9a; while c, which conforms to these shared assumptions is, for this reason, felicitous.

Canonical order, marked order and coherent propositions

Thus far, we have shown that principle 3 holds both for NPs and clausal propositions: Discourse internally both NPs and clausal propositions must be to some extent given and the more given NP or proposition is the more felicitous NP or proposition. While it is

clear, therefore, that there is a restriction on how new *new* information can be; it is also possible to show that there is an upper limit on how given it can be, and it is within the constraints set by this upper limit that more given information is more felicitous information. Violation of this maximal level of givenness will make a proposition that is highly given, relative to its preceding discourse, nevertheless incoherent in the context of this discourse. There is therefore what amounts to a bidirectional control on the givenness of new information, constraining it to be neither too given nor too new, and ruling out clauses such as 10b and 10c as incoherent in the context of 10a; 10b because all propositions must be somewhat given, and 10c because they must not be so given as to repeat from the preceding discourse or state what is presupposed by it:

10a: I like all nuts
10b: # and I'm going around the world.
10c: # and I like cashews.

There is, that is, a condition of coherent givenness, constraining new information to be more rather than less given, but at the same time not so given as to repeat the preceding discourse or state what is presupposed by it.

Governed by this broad constraint to be coherently given, the propositions of canonically ordered clauses can add to the preceding discourse in any of a number of ways, but any marked construction is constrained to code a proper subset of the total set of given relationships. In what follows, I will briefly describe four clausal relationships that canonical order can bear to its preceding discourse, and also demonstrate that unlike canonical order, a marked construction which can bear any one of these four relationships is constrained to bearing just that one and no other.

To assess the nature of these four clausal relationships, it is necessary to recognize that a significant part of the information that clauses convey about the event or state they denote is communicated through the clausal propositional content and the clausal aspect. The different clausal relationships to the preceding discourse are then determined by gauging at one and the same time both the givenness of the propositional content and the givenness of the aspect of the clause, at the time of its utterance and in the context of its preceding discourse.

Prince (1981) defines three levels of givenness, namely,

1. **predictable/recoverable given**: "The speaker assumes that the hearer can predict or could have predicted that a particular item will or would have occurred in a particular position within a sentence" (Prince 1981:226),
2. **salient given** (I have sometimes used the term 'presupposed' with meaning equivalent to salient given): "The speaker assumes that the hearer has or

could appropriately have some particular thing/entity ... in his/her consciousness at the time of hearing the utterance" (Prince 1981:228), and

3. **shared knowledge given**: "The speaker assumes, or can infer a particular thing (but is not necessarily thinking about it)." (Prince 1981:230)

Using these levels of givenness to evaluate clausal propositional and aspectual givenness, I have identified the following four types of clausal relationship to the preceding discourse:

Category 1, exemplified by 11b, is a relationship in which both the propositional content and the aspect of the clause are shared knowledge given at the time of the utterance of the clause.

11a: Until about five o'clock Mary was fine.
11b: She had eaten heartily.
11c: Shared knowledge to 11a: Mary had been doing things that people do when they are in good health.

It is shared knowledge at the time of the utterance of 11b that Mary had been doing things that people do when they are in good health. 11b is an instance of this shared knowledge, and is constrained both by its propositional content and its aspect. The aspectual constraint is concomitant with the constraint on the proposition, and this is evident in the fact that, `She will eat heartily', for example, cannot be an instance of 11c.

A second clausal relationship is exemplified in 12b, in which the aspect is shared knowledge, while the propositional content is new.

12a: Mary got home at five(.)
12b: (Then/At 5:30 she took the children to the park.)/
She took the children to the park at 5:30.
12c: and took the children to the park.

In the third clausal relationship, exemplified in 13b, both the aspect and the propositional content are salient given.

13a: The Johnsons had a baby.
13b: (Tom they called him.)/ They called him Tom.
13c: # Then they called him Tom.
13d: # They gave him a name.

It is salient given at the time of the utterance of 13b both that people name their new born infants and that the naming follows the event of having the baby. 13b is, therefore, salient given both for propositional content and for aspect.

And finally in the last clausal relationship, exemplified in 14b, the aspect is salient given, while the propositional content is new.

14a: I left for class at 9:30(.)
14b: (and arrived in the nick of time.)/ I arrived in the nick of time.
14c: # and then I arrived in the nick of time.

At the time of the utterance of 14b it is salient given that one of a set of actions that can occur after 14a will do so. That is, the aspect of 14b is salient given.

We have demonstrated in the above discussion that clauses in canonical order can relate to the preceding discourse in any one of the above-described four ways. By doing this we have also shown that canonical order does not code any of these relationships.[5]

The propositions of marked constructions while they are, of course, also constrained to be coherently given, differ from clauses in canonical order in two ways: 1) They select a proper subset of the total number of coherent ways to be given. And 2) they formally code this selection so that the construction cannot be used to felicitously make any other type of relationship to the preceding discourse. For example, the clause with an initial temporal adverb in 12b marks the relationship which has shared knowledge aspect and new propositional content, the direct object preposing of 13b codes the relationship with salient propositional content and salient aspect, and the VP conjunction of 14b codes the relationship with salient aspect and new propositional content. Because these constructions code the relationships they bear to their preceding discourse, it is not possible to replace any one of them with any other of comparable meaning. For example, one cannot replace the clause of 12b, with initial adverb, with a clause of comparable meaning that is VP conjoined as in 12c and retain the pragmatic force of 12b. The temporal relationship of 12b implies that it was possible at the time of the utterance of 12b that Mary would do something after she got home and that this possible following act was felicitously instanced by her taking the children to the park. If we remove the initial temporal adverb from 12b, however, it is suggested not that it was possible that she would do something after she got home, but that it was inevitable. And `taking the children to the park' rather than being a felicitous instance of a plausible following act, becomes a felicitous instance of an act that inevitably follows.

The constraints on the givenness on all constructions are therefore not the same. Neither are the constraints on the givenness on all NPs the same. For example, objects of prepositions are required to be more given than other discourse internal NPs. This is demonstrated by the clauses of 15 and 16:

15a: There is a **table** against the door.
15b: I pushed a **table** up against the door.
15c: I put a bottle of wine **on a table**.
15d: I put a bottle of wine **on a table against the door**.
15e: I put a bottle of wine **on her table**.

16a: Aunt Sally has a **dog**.
16b: I saw aunt Sally **with a dog**.
16c: I saw aunt Sally **with a dog I sometimes walk in the park**.
16d: I saw aunt Sally **with her dog**.

15a and b and 16a demonstrate that NPs can be new when they are not objects of prepositions. 15c, d and e, and 16b, c, and d demonstrate that NPs which can otherwise be new must be `anchored' when they are objects of a preposition, and further that objects of prepositions become more felicitous the more anchored they are.

VIOLATING THE PRINCIPLES OF GIVEN-NEW ORGANIZATION

The above discussion has been an attempt to show that, in addition to the fundamental information organizing constraint that given precedes new, there exist two other organizing principles: 3a) All new information is to some extent given and 3b) more given information is more felicitous as long as it does not repeat, or state what is presupposed by, the preceding discourse. Further, 4) certain constructions and NPs are required to be both more given than others and given in highly specified ways. I will now attempt to explain the errors in paragraphs 1 and 2 in terms of violations of these principles.

Teachers usually suggest that the denotational ability of a referential phrase such as `almost all the human race's imperfections' in 1, in paragraph 1, can be improved by making it more descriptively specific. The question for most students then is how does one arrive at a more specific form of reference. My suggestion is that 1 is a violation of principle 1. The NP the human race's imperfections' is not a sufficiently given form of reference to problems such as drug and alcohol abuse, discussed in passage A, to effectively denote them. The more given it is made, the more successful it is as denotation. This is demonstrated in 1a.

1a. R. J. Beaber states that people in today's society believe that all moral failings and character flaws are due to disease.

In 2, the NP `an expert' refers to a particular expert, whereas it is clear that Sean intends its reference to be generic. Its inability to denote the generic class of experts is, of course, not because indefinite reference has to be nongeneric, as is evident in 2a, where the NP `an expert' need be no particular expert, but can represent the generic class. It is as NP of a by phrase, in 2, that it is constrained to refer to a specific expert. As NP of a by phrase, the referent is interpreted as given information, and as such points to a particular expert. The requirement that NPs of a by phrase, and more generally of any prepositional phrase, are constrained to be more rather than less given is a consequence of principle 2, and is illustrated in 2b, 2c and 2d. In 2b the clause is felicitous when Mary is shared knowledge between speaker and interlocutor. 2c is odd because the NP of the by phrase is not given information. The same NP becomes more felicitous when it is anchored as in 2d. As a result of the constraint that it be interpreted as given information after a by phrase, indefinite reference can only be interpreted nongenerically. To avoid this happening, it is necessary to use the plural form of the noun `experts' as in 2e.

2a. An expert in the new sciences of sociology, psychology and psychiatry says addiction is not a consequence of irresponsible behaviour but of

disease, and people no longer feel that they need to exercise will power, discipline and self control to overcome their problems.
2b. The cake was baked by Mary.
2c. The cake was baked by a woman.
2d. The cake was baked by a woman I know and admire.
2e. These concepts have been replaced by excuses that are thought up by experts in the new sciences of Sociology, Psychology and Psychiatry.

In 3, the use of the word `ways' is infelicitous because it is used as though it has definite reference, whereas words like `way', `method' and `strategy' cannot have definite reference. As a consequence, they cannot stand on their own when they are newly introduced into the discourse, i.e., it is necessary to make the referent explicit in phrases such as `a way to do x', or `a method by which x is done'. The word `strategy' can stand on its own when it refers to something given in the preceding discourse, as in 3a:

3a: Sean thought up the perfect way of handling the problem and adopted this strategy/# way whenever occasion called for it.

But `way' doesn't seem to be able to do this. (This is also demonstrated in 3a). Sean is unfamiliar with the constraints on the referentiality of the word `way'. This is a word which cannot have definite reference and also cannot refer to something given in the preceding discourse.

Finally in 4, egocentric Sean is assuming that his own views rather than Beaber's are given information between Sean and the reader, and he therefore refers to Beaber as being in agreement with him, whereas it is Beaber's views that are in fact given information, and it would be appropriate for Sean to indicate that he agrees with Beaber. Again, there is a failure, at a very basic level, to properly gauge givenness and conform to accepted principles of given-new organization.

There are several problems with 1 of paragraph 2. First the indefinite reference implies that, contrary to fact, the reader is not familiar with the essay in question. If we assume that this is a deliberate stylistic tactic that Keith has chosen to adopt, we are still left with two problems both of which are addressed by rephrasing this first sentence as in 1a:

1a: In an essay written by R. J. Beaber, the author ...

In 1, the object of the preposition is anchored by the accompanying participial phrase and is therefore more given than its counterpart in 1. By principle 4, objects of prepositions are required to be more given than other types of NPs.

1b: He read an essay./He wrote an essay.
1c: He read an essay by Rex Julian Beaber.
1d: I read in an essay by some 18 novelists that ...
1e: ? I read in an essay that ....

As we have already shown more than once, NPs which can otherwise be new (1b) must be anchored when they are objects of a preposition, as is demonstrated by the felicity of 1d and the infelicity of 1e. So it is the anchoring by the participial phrase that accounts for the greater felicity of the object of preposition in 1a. 1a is also an improvement on Keith's first sentence because it has appropriate left to right distribution of given and new information, while Keith's sentence fails to conform to the given precedes new constraint.

The adverbial clause in 2, sets two constraints on the following matrix clause: 1) the arguments (of the verb of the adverbial clause) must be maintained in the matrix clause with the same semantic roles that they possess in the adverbial clause. 2) The proposition of the matrix clause must bear a salient relationship of alternation to the proposition of the adverb clause. Because of these two constraints the reader anticipates a matrix clause which is informationally packaged as in 2a and 2b, in which the arguments of the adverbial construction are in fact maintained in the matrix construction with the semantic role they possess in the adverb clause and the proposition bears a salient relationship of alternation to the proposition of the adverbial clause.

2. Instead of being blamed for our faults,
2a. we are praised for them.
2b. we are encouraged to cultivate them.

To represent the information that Keith intends to communicate in the matrix clause of 2 so that it conforms to constraints 1) and 2) set by the preceding adverbial clause, it would have to take the form of 2c or 2d, in which, as in 2a and 2b, the arguments (of the verb) of the adverbial clause are maintained in the matrix clause with the semantic role they possess in the adverbial clause, and the proposition bears a salient relationship of alternation to the proposition of the adverbial clause:

2c. we have been told that these faults (- our addiction to drugs and alcohol) are the result of disease.
2d. doctors have told us that these faults (- our addiction to drugs and alcohol) are the result of disease.

The matrix clause of 2 violates constraints 1) and 2) and therefore reader expectations by changing the semantic roles of the arguments relative to those they possess in the adverbial clause. In Keith's passive construction `drugs' becomes subject of the passive. In addition, although one can, as we have done above, construct a salient relationship of alternation from the propositional content of the matrix clause of 2, given our knowledge of passage A, the proposition of 2, namely, `transforming our faults into a list of diseases' does not as it stands readily lend itself to interpretation as a relationship of alternation to the proposition of the adverbial construction, namely `blaming us for our faults'.

In the context of the adverbial clause of 2, the matrix clause is required to be both highly given and given in a very specific way. And this context is appropriate for the use of the passive construction. As we have demonstrated in our discussion of principle 4, the contexts in which it is appropriate to use marked constructions call for information that is highly given and set strict constriants on the manner in which this information must be given. It is in contexts where a marked construction could felicitously occur that students most often violate the informational constraints on whole constructions, very likely because the givenness constraints are so highly specific in such contexts.

CONCLUSION

I have tried to show that student errors in discursive prose, which previous scholars have referred to in such broad terms as a failure to decontextualize, can be identified as violations of specific principles of given-new organization, and have attempted to add to the descriptive adequacy of the existing theory of given-new to better account for these violations.

THE AUTHOR

A recent graduate of the Department of Linguistics, University of Pennsylvania. Research interests: functional study of word order, written and spoken discourse, the applications of pragmatics to language teaching. Currently teaching English for academic purposes at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

NOTES

[1] This is a differentiation which has recently been reinterpreted as more rightly distinguishing formal from informal discourse, rather than speech and writing per se (cf. Beaman 1984).

[2] There seems to be a collocation problem with `many' and `key' in the NP `many key points', which becomes more apparent if we substitute `central' or `main' for `key', as in `many central points' and `many main points'. This is because the words `key', `central' and `main' refer to a unique referent or set of referents, whereas `many' appears to imply nonuniqueness. The problem is solved by substituting, for example, `the following' for `many', as in `the following key points', since this preserves the uniqueness implicit in `key'. This particular error is not insightfully explained in terms of the organization of given-new information.

[3] 3b is an extension of Prince's 1981 claim that discourse internally the more given NP is the more felicitous NP. She sees this as a condition on NPs alone, whereas there is reason to believe that it is a general constraint applying to all units of discourse.

[4] Only in discourse initial utterances is the constraint on new discourse less apparent, though there are constraints on the type of new that can be discourse initial. One is unlikely to start a conversation with something which, while it may be the crux of what one wishes to say, is nevertheless startlingly new when unprefaced with some more anticipated and conventional opening. For example, one is unlikely to open a conversation with the utterance `A man got run over by a bus.'

[5] Further evidence for this is independently provided by the fact that a clause internal temporal adverb cannot be deictic, although it can be interpreted as being deictic in the discourse context in which it occurs when it is not inherently deictic. This is because an inherently deictic temporal adverb, as in 1b below, codes a clausal relationship to the preceding clause, while canonical order does not do this:

1a. We got home at five.
1b. # We took the children to the zoo then.
1c. Then we took the children to the zoo.
1d. We took the children to the zoo at five thirty.
1e. At five thirty we took the children to the zoo.

In clause initial position in c, the deictic temporal adverb is felicitous in correlation with the fact that preposing word order-wise marks the structure as bonded to/looking back to the preceding discourse. In 1d, the clause final adverb is felicitous because it is not inherently deictic, but can be interpreted as being deictic in an appropriate context; and this correlates with the fact that canonical order, though it does not code any coherent relationship to the preceding discourse, can be interpreted as relating back.

REFERENCES

Beaman, Karen. 1984. Coordination and subordination revisited: Syntactic complexity in spoken and written discourse. In Deborah Tannen (E.d.), Coherence in spoken and written discourse (pp. 45-80). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Chafe, W. 1976. Givenness, contrastiveness, definiteness, subjects and topics, and points of view. In Charles Li (Ed.), Subjects and topics (pp. 25-55). New York: Academic Press.

Chafe, W. 1982. Integration and involvement in speaking, writing, and oral literature. In Deborah Tannen (Ed.), Spoken and written language: Exploring orality and literacy (pp. 35-53). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Clark, H. and Haviland, S. 1977. Comprehension and the given-new contract. In R. Freedle (Ed.), Discourse production and comprehension (pp. 1-40). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Halliday, M.A.K. 1974. What's new? Acquiring new information as a process in comprehension. Journal of Verbal Behaviour 13 (pp. 512-21).

Halliday, M.A.K. 1976. Notes on transitivity and theme in English. Part 2. Journal of Linguistics 3 (pp. 199-244).

Horn, L. 1978. Presupposition, theme et variations. (ms.)

Kay, Paul. 1977. Language evolution and speech style. In Ben G. Blount and Mary Sanches (Eds.), Sociolinguistic dimension of language change (pp. 21-33). New York: Academic Press.

Kuno, S. 1972. Functional sentence perspective: A case study. Linguistic Inquiry 3:3 (pp. 269-320).

Kuno, S. 1974. Lexical and contextual meaning. Linguistic Inquiry 5 (pp. 469-477).

Kuno, S. 1978. Generative discourse analysis in America. In W. Dressler (Ed.), Current Trends in Text Linguistics (pp. 275-294). Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.

Kuno, S. 1979. On the interaction between syntactic rules and discourse principles (ms.).

Michaels, Sarah, and James Collins. 1984. Oral discourse styles: Classroom interaction and the acquisition of literacy. In Deborah Tannen (Ed.) Coherence in spoken and written discourse (pp. 219-243). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Prince, E. F. 1981. Toward a taxonomy of given-new information. In P. Cole (Ed.), Radical pragmatics (pp.223-255). New York: Academic Press.

Rader, Margaret. 1982. Context in written language: The case of imaginative fiction. In Deborah Tannen (Ed.), Exploring orality and literacy (pp. 189-98). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Scollon, Ron, and Suzanne B. K. Scollon. 1984. Cooking it up and boiling it down: Abstracts in Athabaskan children's story retellings. In Deborah Tannen (Ed.), Coherence in spoken and written discourse (pp. 173-197). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series, Vol. 3, 1992

The Telling of a Tale: Discourse Structure and Tense Use in Learners' Narratives

Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig

This paper demonstrates that the use of tense by learners of English as a second language can best be understood from the perspective of narrative structure. Sixteen intermediate learners produced an oral and a written narrative by means of a story-retell task. Tense use in each narrative was evaluated by means of the occurrence in obligatory contexts in the narrative as a whole and separately for the background and the foreground of the narrative. The analysis of tense use and discourse structure showed that the majority of the learners used tense to distinguish the foreground from the background, employing simple past tense in the foreground and present and base forms in the background. This study suggests that learners use their somewhat limited linguistic resources to construct narratives to their best advantage by marking the main story line.

Narratives have been used in second language acquisition research as vehicles for the study of tense and aspect. In a narrative discourse "the speaker relates a series of real or fictive events in the order in which they took place" (Dahl, 1984, p. 116). The temporal point of reference of any one event in a narrative context is understood as following the event preceding it. So important is the concept of sequentiality that narrative clauses may be defined by the interpretation of their order: "If a change in the order of the two clauses results in a change in the interpretation of what actually happened, then those two clauses are narrative clauses" (Schiffrin, 1981, p. 47; see also Labov, 1972 and Labov & Valetzky, 1967). The sequential character of narratives provides a context in which it is possible to observe how second language learners use verbal morphology to report chains of events. This paper argues that the narrative is more than a carrier for tense. Understanding the structure of the narrative itself is the key to understanding the use of tense by language learners.

The time reference of every clause in a narrative discourse is not always sequentially ordered, as many linguists have observed. Narrative discourse is comprised of two parts: the foreground and the background. The foreground relates events belonging to the skeletal structure of the discourse (Hopper, 1979) and consists of clauses which move time forward (Dry, 1983). The background does not itself narrate main events, but provides supportive material which elaborates on or evaluates the events in the foreground (Hopper, 1979). The purpose of this paper is to show that the development of tense use in interlanguage cannot be understood apart from the structure of the narrative. Moreover, this study suggests that learners use their somewhat limited linguistic resources to construct their narratives to their best advantage in the same way that Hopper observes that competent (native) users of a language "mark out a main route through the narrative and divert in some way those parts of the narrative which are not strictly relevant to this route" (1979, p.239). For some learners in this study, this is accomplished by marking the majority of the foreground actions with past tense and the majority of the background clauses in nonpast as in the following example from the narrative of an adult intermediate learner of English as a second language.[1]

(1)

Foreground	Background
Punia shouted again.	
"If you take me to the rock, I can live. and If you take me the sandy beach, I'll die forever."	
	He isn't king, he was stupid
He took Punia to the beech, so Punia was saved.	
	After all, that Hawaiian people can eat every fish food they want. (L1 Korean, Written Narrative)

After a brief review of previous work, we will return to a detailed analysis of tense marking in narratives told by adult learners of English.

PREVIOUS WORK

Crosslinguistic investigations suggest that the distinction between background and foreground may be a universal of narrative discourse (Hopper, 1979). Events reported in foreground clauses are understood to be sequential, but background events are often out of sequence with respect to the foreground and to other background events. For example, a background clause may provide information necessary to the interpretation of an event by revealing a prior event (located before the narrated event on the time line), make a prediction about the outcome of an event (located after the event on the time line), or evaluate an action reported in the foreground (not located on the time line). Hopper observes that "one typically finds an aspect marker specialized for foregrounding, or one specialized for backgrounding, or both functions indicated" (1979, p.239). Tense markers may occur with aspectual markers. Because of its function, the background may exhibit a variety of tenses such as pluperfect, remote past, future-perfect, and future which do not occur in the foreground. In the foreground, Hopper observes, successive events may be marked in the preterite or simple past (1979, p.239). Dahl observes that verbs in the foreground may also carry no marking: "it appears fairly natural that a large number of languages...[Eskimo, Indonesian, Javanese, Sudanese, Kammu, Thai, Wolof, and Yoruba] use completely unmarked forms in narrative contexts" (1984, p.117).

In her examination of foreground and background in contemporary English literary narratives, Dry (1981, 1983) reported that foreground clauses are usually in the simple past or historical present. As in the foreground, the simple past is also the most prevalent verb form in the background clauses. Tokens of past perfect and progressive aspect also occur in the background. English does not rely primarily on tense or aspect markers to distinguish foreground from background.

Wolfson (1979) and Schiffrin (1981) describe the use of the conversational historical present in spontaneous oral narratives. Schiffrin's detailed analysis of the use of conversational historical present in narratives indicates that native speakers of English switch tense only in the foreground, where Dahl (1984) and Hopper (1979) agree time reference is determined more by the narrative context than by tense itself. Schiffrin's analysis shows that even when tense switching occurs, the simple past seems to be the dominant form (69% of the verbs in the foreground were in the past).

Studies in second language acquisition have also begun to investigate tense-aspect marking in the narratives of adult learners of English, although they are limited by the number of learners and offer apparently contradictory results (Kumpf, 1984; Flashner, 1989). Kumpf and Flashner found the division of narrative discourse into background and foreground revealing for an analysis of tense usage in interlanguage. Kumpf found that a Japanese learner of English used the base form of the verb to express completed action in the foreground. None of the foreground verbs carried tense marking. In the background, many morphologically marked verbs occurred. Stative verbs showed tense while active verbs were marked for habitual and continuous aspect, but were marked irregularly for tense. Kumpf's findings are similar to what Givón (1982) reports for Hawaiian Creole. In contrast, Flashner found that three Russian learners of English marked foreground actions and left background portions unmarked. The foreground verbs occurred predominantly in simple past with the background verbs being in predominantly base forms.

The contradictory findings of these two studies concerning second language acquisition cannot be reconciled on the basis of narratives from four learners. This study builds on the previous studies by increasing the number of learners, including written as well as oral narratives, having the learners tell the same story to ensure comparability of content, and examining the narratives of classroom learners.

METHOD

Sixteen adult learners of English as a second language and twenty-four native speakers participated in this study. The learners were all intermediate level learners (eight low and eight high intermediate) as determined by the placement examination of the Intensive English Program at Indiana University. In each of the low and high intermediate groups there were four speakers of Arabic and one speaker of Spanish. The remaining six were native speakers of Korean, Chinese, and Japanese.[2]

The participants attended an oral telling of "Punia and the King of the Sharks," a Hawaiian trickster tale from *Twenty Tellable Tales* by Margaret MacDonald. Learners were given a brief introduction to the story with pictures for the key words *shark*, *lobster*, and *bay*. Proper names and place names were written on the blackboard. The presentation was taped for playback. Participants heard the story twice: once live and once on tape. Learners retold the story individually to one member of the interview team and then wrote the stories later in their writing classes thereby producing both an oral and a written narrative. This same procedure was followed for the native speakers, but they produced only written narratives.

In the story the hero, a boy named Punia, rids the bay of Kohala of the King of the Sharks and his followers by tricking them. As a result, he restores the use of the bay to the villagers. The tale has two major episodes: the elimination of the sharks from the bay and the final killing of the King of the Sharks. In the first part of the story, Punia tricks the sharks into eliminating one of their group. The story of this trick is told three times in detail and then a summary is given to cover the elimination of the other six sharks. In the second half of the story, Punia takes on, and ultimately kills, the King of the Sharks. Learners were instructed to listen to the story carefully in order to discover how Punia tricked the sharks and saved his village.

The foreground of the narrative was told exclusively in past tense with the exception of the direct speech used to announce the tricks. The background of the story was also told in past tense with three instances of past perfect.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

This section describes the use of tense in the narratives in two ways: first by describing the distribution of tense and second, by examining tense use in context.

Tense Use: Overview

In order to determine whether the categories of foreground and background are relevant to interlanguage narratives with respect to tense use, it is necessary to first have a profile of the learners' overall tense use. Then tense use in the foreground and background can be analyzed to determine whether the profiles of the learners change when discourse organization is taken into account.

Each verb in the narratives was coded for its verbal morphology and its context. Only verbs in past-time contexts were included in this analysis. This eliminated comments such as "Now, I'll write this story," and infinitive clauses which carry no tense. Many learners included direct speech in their narratives following the original telling of the story, but only the verbs which introduce the speech such as *say*, *told*, and *shouted*, were considered to be in a past context. (See also Schiffrin 1981 which codes the tense of the verbs of saying, but not the quotations themselves.)

Verbal morphology was divided into two broad categories, "past" and "non-past." Tokens of "past" forms consist essentially of simple past forms, but also include a few instances of past progressive, past perfect, and the "past" modal *could* + verb.[3] The nonpast forms which are represented include base forms such *as go* and *come*, present tense forms, the "present" modal can + verb, and present perfect. We may interpret the use of past morphology in the context of the narrative to be appropriate because both the performed narrative and the native-speaker written versions were exclusively in past tense.[4,5]

Rates of appropriate use

The use of past tense by intermediate learners shows different levels of development in tense use among the individual learners. The use of past tense by the low intermediate group ranges from 31.8% to 60.6% of the finite verbs in oral production and from 30.4% to 89.5% in written production. The range of the past tense use for the high intermediate group is from 15.0% to 90.7% in the oral narratives and from 63.6% to 97.8% in the written narratives. We see the most consistent use of past tense in the written narratives of the high intermediate group. A general profile of tense use for each learner is given in Table 1 for the oral and written narratives.

In Table 1 the learners are arranged by their rates of appropriate use in the oral narratives. The low intermediate learners are identified by subject numbers 1-8. The letter following the subject number indicates the learner's first language, A(rabic), C(hinese), J(apanese), K(orean), and S(panish). Subject 1S in the low intermediate group shows the highest rate of appropriate use in her group for the oral narratives and Subject 8K shows the lowest. The high intermediate learners are identified by subject numbers 9-16 with Subject 9S showing the highest rate of appropriate use in the oral narratives in her level and 16C the lowest.

Table 1. Appropriate Use of Past Morphology In Past Time Contexts (in Percentages)

Low Intermediate			High Intermediate		
Learner	Oral	Written	Learner	Oral	Written
1S	60.6	89.5	9S	90.7	96.3
2C	55.6	87.1	10J	66.7	63.6
3K	54.6	45.8	11A	62.4	97.8
4A	52.1	30.4	12A	53.6	74.4
5A	46.9	88.9	13A	52.1	87.2
6A	42.1	44.8	14A	44.8	79.4
7A	32.7	80.0	15K	22.6	86.7
8K	31.8	53.3	16C	15.0	87.5

The main purpose for collecting oral and written versions of the narrative was to provide two means to test the learners' developing knowledge of tense use. We see from Table 1 that many learners showed improved rates of appropriate use of past tense in the written mode. Some learners, like 7A, 15K, and 16C show very low rates of appropriate use (below 35% accuracy) in the oral mode and rates at or above 80% accuracy in the written mode.[6] Other learners show very similar rates in both conditions, and two learners, 3K and 4A, show somewhat lower rates of appropriate use in the written narratives compared to their oral ones.

Discourse-sensitive and discourse-neutral tense use

The collected narratives were next divided into foreground, the actual story line, and background, the supportive material which does not itself narrate the main events. Rates of use of past and nonpast forms were calculated separately for the background and foreground of each learner narrative. Recall the nonpast forms include base as well as present forms. Verbs were coded using the procedure outlined above. When tense use in the foreground and background is examined separately, an interesting pattern of tense use for more than half of the learners is revealed: nine of the learners appear to be particularly sensitive to discourse organization in their use of tense. To simplify the description in this and the remaining sections, the low and high intermediate learners will be treated as a single group. An effort will be made to note differences between the groups where they exist.

Table 2 presents the percentage of the use of past and nonpast forms in the background and foreground of the narratives. Oral and written versions are presented separately. The learners have been divided into two groups according to the distribution of tense marking in the narratives.[7] The group whose tense usage seems to be sensitive to the background-foreground distinction is found under the heading "Discourse-Sensitive Tense Use" and the group whose tense use does not is found under the heading "Discourse-Neutral Tense Use." The division is made on the basis of the oral narrative because the other comparable learner narratives in previous second language studies have been oral (Kumpf 1984; Flashner 1989). The numbers in parentheses give the number of finite verbs used by the learners in the foreground and the background.

There are seven learners for whom discourse organization seems to make little difference in tense use in oral narratives. They are learners 2C, 4A, 7A, 9S, 14A, 15K, and 16C, i.e, three Arabic learners, one Chinese, one Korean, and one Spanish speaking learner. These learners show relatively consistent rates of appropriate use of past tense across foreground and background. Learner 2C, for example, shows 57.1% appropriate use of past in the foreground and 54.5% appropriate use in the background. This discourse-neutral use of tense seems to be possible at all levels of development. 9S shows consistent control of the past tense with an overall oral use of 90.7% and written use of 96.3%.[8] Learner 15K shows relatively little control of tense in the oral narrative with 22.6% appropriate use overall. Learners like 2C and 4A show mid-level development.

Nine learners show sensitivity to discourse organization in their use of tense. Learners in this group show a dramatic increase in the use of past or decrease in the

Table 2. Orientation of Tense Use

	ORAL						WRITTEN					
	Foreground			Background			Foreground			Background		
	Past	Non-past		Past	Non-past		Past	Non-past		Past	Non-past	
Discourse-Sensitive Use of Tense												
6A	77.8	22.2	(9)	10.0	90.0	(10)	37.5	62.5	(14)	50.0	50.0	(14)
1S	72.7	27.3	(22)	36.4	63.6	(11)	*92.6	7.4	(27)	81.8	18.2	(11)
12A	68.3	31.7	(41)	13.3	86.7	(15)	*83.3	16.7	(36)	28.6	71.4	(7)
10J	66.7	33.3	(6)	33.3	66.7	(3)	*100.0	---	(4)	42.9	57.1	(7)
3K	66.7	33.3	(9)	46.2	53.8	(13)	*77.8	22.2	(9)	26.7	73.3	(15)
11A	65.7	34.3	(70)	46.7	53.3	(15)	100.0	---	(39)	85.7	14.3	(7)
13A	60.0	40.0	(40)	20.0	80.0	(10)	*91.4	8.6	(35)	50.0	50.0	(4)
5A	56.4	43.6	(39)	10.0	90.0	(10)	*81.8	18.2	(22)	---	100.0	(14)
8K	46.7	53.3	(15)	---	100.0	(7)	*62.5	37.5	(16)	42.9	57.1	(14)
Discourse-Neutral Use of Tense												
9S	90.9	9.1	(33)	90.0	10.0	(10)	100.0	---	(42)	83.3	16.7	(12)
2C	57.1	42.9	(7)	54.5	45.5	(11)	78.9	21.1	(19)	100.0	---	(12)
4A	48.4	51.6	(31)	52.9	47.1	(17)	28.6	71.4	(14)	33.3	66.7	(9)
14A	44.4	55.6	(18)	45.5	54.5	(11)	90.9	9.1	(22)	58.3	41.7	(12)
7A	34.8	65.1	(43)	22.2	77.8	(9)	90.9	9.1	(22)	61.5	38.5	(13)
15K	28.6	71.4	(21)	11.1	88.9	(10)	*93.8	6.2	(32)	53.8	46.2	(13)
16C	27.3	72.7	(11)	6.7	93.3	(15)	82.4	17.6	(17)	100.0	---	(7)

use of nonpast in the foreground compared to the background. A 50% increase or decrease was chosen arbitrarily as the cut off point for inclusion in the discourse-sensitive group. As an illustration, consider the distribution of tense forms in the oral narrative of learner 1S. In this narrative, the past tense is used in 72.7% of the foreground clauses, but in only 36.4% of the background clauses, a drop of one-half. Nonpast is used in 27.3% of all foreground clauses, but increases to 63.6% in the background, an increase of over 50%. Four of the learners in this group, 6A, 10J, 12A, and 13A, show near mirror-image rates of usage in tense across foreground and background in the oral narratives. By "mirror image" I mean that the rates of use for the past tense in the foreground are nearly the same as the rates of nonpast in the background and the rates of use of nonpast in the foreground is similar to the rate of use of past in the background. In these narratives the dominance of one verb form is reversed in the foreground and background: past is the dominant form in the foreground and nonpast is the dominant form in the background. Learners 5A and 11A show the same pattern, but less dramatically. The oral narrative of learner 8K shows higher use of past in the foreground (46.7%) than in the background (no occurrence at all), but despite the increase in appropriate use, both foreground and background exhibit higher use of nonpast than past. All of these learners show discourse-sensitive use of tense, but the variation among learners suggests that a continuum of discourse sensitivity rather than a dichotomy might better describe learner tense use.

Learners whose tense use seems to be sensitive to discourse organization in their oral narratives do not necessarily show the same distribution in the written narratives. There were nine learners who showed discourse-sensitive use of tense in the oral narratives. Seven of these learners, 1S, 3K, 5A, 8K, 10J, 12A, and 13A, show the same organization in the written mode. The remaining two learners are less sensitive to discourse organization in the written mode than in the oral mode. An additional learner (15K) who used past tense in only 28.6% of the foreground clauses in the oral narrative shows a strong preference for marking foreground verbs with past in the written narratives, with 93.8% of the foreground but only 53.8% of the background verbs in the past tense. The written narratives which show discourse-sensitive use of tense are indicated with an asterisk in Table 2.

To summarize, seven learners show discourse-sensitive use of tense in both oral and written modes, two learners are sensitive to discourse in only the oral mode, and another learner only in the written mode. Six learners show discourse-neutral use of tense in both modes.

Distribution of tenses

While the foreground can be characterized by higher rates of appropriate use of past tense as was shown in the previous section, the background is characterized by greater diversity of forms. This section examines the distribution of tense and aspect forms for all learners across foreground and background. Each verb in a past time context was coded for tense-aspect forms. In both oral and written conditions, verb forms in the foreground are essentially limited to past and base forms. In con-

Table 3. Distribution of Verbal Morphology in Foreground and Background

ORAL

Foreground			**Background**		
Total Finite Verbs		**415**	**Total Finite Verbs**		**177**
Past	**243**	**58.6%**	**Past**	**59**	**33.3%**
Simple	232	55.9%	Simple	44	24.9%
could + verb	5	1.2%	*could* + Verb	6	3.4%
Past Prog	1	.2%	Passive	6	3.4%
was + Verb	4	1.0%	Past Prog	1	.6%
was be kill	1	.2%	*was* + Verb	2	1.1%
Base	**150**	**36.1%**	**Base**	**48**	**27.1%**
Present	**22**	**5.3%**	**Present**	**67**	**37.9%**
Simple	17	4.1%	Simple	49	27.7%
can + Verb	4	1.0%	*can* + verb	16	9.0%
Pres Prog	1	.2%	Passive	2	1.1%
			Present Perfect	**3**	**1.7%**

WRITTEN

Total Finite Verbs		**372**	**Total Finite Verbs**		**171**
Past	**317**	**85.2%**	**Past**	**108**	**63.2%**
Simple	295	79.3%	Simple	84	49.1%
could + Verb	7	1.9%	*could* + Verb	8	4.7%
Past Prog	8	2.2%	Past Prog	6	3.5%
Passive	4	1.1%	Passive	7	4.1%
Past Perfect	2	.5%	Past Perfect	1	.6%
was + Verb	1	.3%	Perfect Prog	1	.6%
			was + Verb	1	.6%
Base	**50**	**13.4%**	**Base**	**17**	**9.9%**
Present	**5**	**1.4%**	**Present**	**46**	**26.9%**
Simple	4	1.1%	Simple	39	22.8%
can + Verb	1	.3%	*can* + Verb	7	4.1%

trast, the background exhibits the use of present tense in addition to past and base forms. In fact, the use of present tense exceeds the use of the base form. In the oral narratives the present tense is used as frequently as the past.

Each major category is listed in bold face with the number of verbs in each category and the percentage of use of the form relative to the total number of verbs. Included under the heading of "Past" are simple past forms which constitute the majority of verbs in this category, the use of *could* + verb, past passive, past progressive, past perfect, and misformations which are interpretable as carrying past morphology such as *was kill* or *was do*. Base forms show no alternation. Present forms are generally simple present, but also include the use of *can* + verb, and present passive. The verbs *put*, which occurred five times, and *cut* which occurred once, were eliminated from the corpus since they are ambiguous between base and past forms. A second ambiguity arose with nonpast verbs with third person plural subjects. Because only the third person singular in the present tense is overtly marked in English, all occurrences of third person plural forms are ambiguous between base forms and present forms. Of the 1,153 verbs in the corpus, 16 or 1.4% fell into this category. They were all coded as base forms.

Background clauses include active and stative verbs. Stative verbs make up 34.9% of the verbs in the background. Of the 122 stative verbs, 44.3% appear in the past and 55.7% in the present. Although statives are not predominantly present, present verbs are predominantly stative, with 73.9% of the 88 present tense verbs being stative.

In summary, the foreground is characterized by the relative higher rates of appropriate use of the past tense while the background shows lower rates of appropriate use of past and greater diversity of forms. The present tense, which is virtually absent in the foreground, appears in the background clauses of both the oral and written narratives. The previous sections have examined the distribution of tenses in the narratives and have shown that tense distribution is best understood in terms of discourse structure. The following section examines how tense is employed in the context of the unfolding narrative.

Tense Use in the Narrative Context

The effect of marking the foreground in past and the background in nonpast seems to be a heightened distinction of the narrative line. This section illustrate how learners use tense to structure their narratives.

Background

To better illustrate how tense is used at various points in the texts we adopt the five background categories used by Schiffrin (1981): orientation, embedded orientation, abstract, external evaluation, and coda.

Orientation: setting the scene. The introduction is the one background device that all learners employed in the oral and written narratives. The first orientation of the narrative sets the scene for the story. Among the nine learners who show discourse-sensitive use of tense in their oral narratives, four (5A, 6A, 8K, and 10J) show exclusive use of nonpast forms in the introductory orientation as shown in Examples (2) and (3). In the passages below, the learners employ the present perfect to provide background in the background itself.

(2) Uh there are uh, a boy, uh, living uh with uh his mother. His father have been killed, uh, by uh the King of the Sharks. And uh villager, villagers in uh his uh village cannot uh take uh lobster from the bay because there is, there are sharks living in the in the bay. And uh, the boy this boy he wants to, he get uh borink from the sweet potato and [???] to eat because he wants to [ti] to eat uh lobster,

And he decided to take a lobster from the bay [first foreground event]
(Learner 5A; oral)

(3) Punias live live in [llvl], mother? Uh, uh [hl] his father has been killed by sharks because uh, they, Punia's country country is in the bays, in their ocean has many ten sharks,

One day his mother wanted to eat lobster [first foreground event]
(Learner 8K; oral)

These introductions are immediately followed by a past tense verb in the first complicating action clause as seen in the examples. The remaining five learners showed mixed use of tense in the introductions of the oral narratives as shown in Example (4). Four out of five of these orientations are immediately followed by a past tense verb in the first complicating action clause.

(4) OK. In Kohala there were ten, ah, ten, ah, ten arks? Sharks. And then nobody can go to the beach. So they just, uh, eat potato and uh, some, uh, some food. But, uh, the the lobster the lobster uh, lobsters were in the water and nobody can reach it. (Learner 13A; oral)

In the nine written narratives which show discourse-sensitive use of tense, seven show mixed tense use and two show exclusive use of past.

Embedded orientation. A second type of scene setting is the embedded orientation which occurs in the body of the narrative. Six of the oral narratives exhibit embedded orientation clauses. Embedded orientation clauses are predominately nonpast with 83.3% (10/12 verbs) occurring in nonpast forms.

(5)

And he told him...	complicating action
he has a bag with him	embedded orientation
when he dived in the sea..	complicating action

(Learner 11A; oral)

(6) And uh, every day he did that. The, uh, last day, King of the Shark, complicating action
his name is Qualaiku embedded orientation
uh, he uh, Punia's, uh Punia's uh tell him uh ... complicating action
(Learner 8K; oral)

Six of the written narratives employ embedded orientation clauses, and they are evenly split between past forms and nonpast forms.

Abstracts. Abstracts, clauses which announce and summarize upcoming events, seem to have no particular tense preference. Four learners employed abstracts in their oral narratives. Of the five verbs used, three were in nonpast, one in past, and one, *put* in Example (7), was ambiguous. Four learners used abstracts in their written narrative. (Only two learners used abstracts in both oral and written modes.) Of the four verbs used, three were in past tense. All abstracts were added by the learners; the original narrative had no examples of abstracts.

(7) *and he, he put a trick for the sarks.*
He get a big he got a big rock and ... (Learner 1S; oral)

(8) The boy used two decives for the king of the shark
(Learner 5A; written)

(9) Punia had a good idea.
He tricks for sharks (Learner 15K; written)

External evaluation. An external evaluation "comments on and interprets events for the audience from a perspective outside the narrative action" (Schiffrin, 1981, p. 49). Like abstracts, external evaluations show no tense preference. Of the eight verbs used in all the evaluations, four were nonpast and four were past. Abstracts were not common in the oral narratives with only one token shown in (10) where the narrator indicates that what Punia has said is not true.

(10) Then he said, ah,complicating action
"Karara. I trapped you. Eh, one of your,
ah sharks told me that was the ninth one...
but but no is, ah, no is.external evaluation
(Learner 13A; oral)

There were five external evaluations in three of the eight written narratives which showed discourse-sensitive use of tense. Like Example (), Example () comments on the tricks which are a particularly difficult part of the narrative. In order to trick the sharks, the boy says one thing and does another. The storytellers have marked some of the tricks explicitly.

(11) He was liaer (Learner 5A; written)
(12) He isn't king, he was stupid. (Learner 8K; written)

The evaluation in (12) also refers to a trick, but this time to the king's reaction to it. The storyteller tells us that the king is stupid, and perhaps that he is not worthy to be king. As in the case of the abstracts, outside evaluations were added by the learners.

Codas. Narratives are "optionally closed with a coda which ends the story and returns the listener to the present" (Schiffrin 1981, p. 49). Codas end the majority of the discourse-sensitive oral narratives (eight of the nine retellings have codas) and almost half of the written narratives (four of the nine). As shown in Examples (13) - (15), nonpast forms appear to dominate the codas. In the codas of oral narratives, 75% of the verbs are nonpast and 71.4% of the coda verbs in the written narratives are in nonpast.

(13) then after, then uh their countries uh his countries people uh can make fishfood. (Learner 8K; oral)

(14) The people go back to the beach and do anything (Learner 6A; oral)

(15) so all sharks are gone and all animals and people thank for Punia. Hawaii was very peaceful place. (Learner 15K; written)

Among the background sections, the opening segments (the introductory orientation) and the closing segments (the codas) are frequently in nonpast. Embedded orientations, external evaluations, and abstracts occur about evenly in past and nonpast verb forms.

Foreground.

The foreground appears to be more homogeneous than the background with respect to tense use. There is one point where there is expected tense change, however, and that is in the reports of direct speech.

Direct speech. Direct speech occurs frequently throughout the original Punia narrative and the learners' narratives. The use of direct speech is quite common in narratives in general (Schiffrin, 1981; Wolfson, 1978; Tannen, 1990). In the Punia narrative, direct speech is the device by which the tricks are announced and much of the speech is in the nonpast. "Direct thought" is included with direct speech because it serves the same function of announcing the tricks. The report of direct speech presents a potential challenge to the learners because it necessitates a purposeful tense change from the past tense which dominates the narrative line to nonpast forms as in the following examples.

(16) and he told the king of the sark, "If you bite me, my mother come to see, and come to save, but if you, em, swallow me whole, I'm gonna die for forever." And the King of the the Sarks, swallow, mm the boy.
(Learner 1S; oral)

(17) Punia said, "I will go to bring some [blta] to my mother's dinner." He *went* there he swim the beach... (Learner 11A; oral)

(18) Punia called Ka-ale-ale and he *told* the shark, "I go to the sea and I get a lobster. If you swallow me and you bite me, I will die." Ka-ale-ale *thought* and the shark decide didn't bite him but swallowed him
(Learner 15K; written)

The use of past tense in the clauses before direct speech is higher than the total use of past tense throughout the oral narratives. This holds true for all learners, not just those who show discourse-sensitive use of tense. The use of past tense following direct speech is higher than the use of past overall in the oral narratives, and about the same in the written narratives. In the oral narratives, 91.8% of the direct speech is introduced by a past tense verb. The overall use of past in the oral narratives is 51.0%. Direct speech is followed by a past tense verb in 78.1% of all cases. In the texts which show discourse-sensitive use of tense, the same pattern emerges: past tense is used to set off direct speech. A comparison of the use of past tense preceding and following direct speech to the learners' use of past tense in the foreground shows that the use of past tense introducing direct speech is 93.8%, following direct speech is 78.1%, and in the foreground overall is 58.3%. In the written narratives, the use of past tense is higher so there is no difference in the overall rate of use between the narrative or narrative foreground and the use of past following direct speech. The use of the past to introduce direct speech is still higher than the use of past in general. For the entire group in the written narratives, 88.4% of the instances of direct speech are introduced by past tense compared to 78.3% of the clauses in past time contexts in the narrative overall. For the discourse-sensitive group, 100% of the instances of direct speech were introduced by the use of past tense, and 86.2% of the foreground clauses exhibited past tense.

Summary

Within the background, nonpast is particularly common in the introductions and in the codas, the portions of the narrative which form the boundaries of the story. The scene of the story is set in nonpast, base or present, seemingly apart from the time of the action of the narrative. The codas, whose purpose it is to bring the audience back to the present, do so by using nonpast forms. Native speakers seem to do this by using the past with adverbials such as *forever* and *from that time on*. Just as the use of past and nonpast forms distinguishes the foreground from the background, the high concentration of past forms before direct speech functions to mark a change in voice from the narrator to one of the characters.

DISCUSSION

In his crosslinguistic study, Hopper claimed that "from a discourse viewpoint tense-aspect becomes intelligible" (1979, p.239). It is no surprise that the use of verbal morphology by learners of English can also best be understood from the perspective of discourse structure. The rates of appropriate use of past tense in past time contexts in the foreground are often higher than the rates of appropriate use in the narrative overall, and in the background. The use of tense to distinguish the narrative line from the background is more pronounced for some learners than others. But all learners showed a greater variety of tenses in the background than in the foreground, with the notable addition of the present in the background. Although the original story was told with only past tense forms and all but one of the native-speaker narratives used exclusively past forms, learners may respond to the non-sequential nature of the background by using non-past forms.

Discourse-sensitive use of tense seems to be common to classroom learners examined here and the non-classroom learners reported on in previous studies. Such use of tense is also common to both the oral and written mode. The eleven learners in this study who showed discourse-sensitive use of tense seem to show similar use to the three Russian speakers reported on in Flashner (1989): the use of past forms in the foreground, and nonpast in the background. Flashner concluded that the pattern of usage in the native speakers of Russian represented an instance of transfer from the Russian aspectual system to the developing interlanguage. Although transfer may be a contributing factor in the case of the Russian learners of English, in this study we see that speakers of a particular language do not necessarily pattern alike with respect to discourse-sensitive tense use: no single language group was exclusively discourse-sensitive or discourse-neutral.

These learners' use of past tense to mark foreground clauses and nonpast to mark background clauses contrasts with the use of verbal morphology found by Kumpf for one Japanese learner of English and by Givón for Hawaiian Creole in which speakers morphologically marked verbs in the background, but did not mark verbs in the foreground. Both systems seem to be consistent with Hopper's observation that languages may have specialized markers for either foreground or background or both.

The use of tense to mark foreground and background may reflect a learner's level of development. The learners in this study are all intermediate learners, but we may extrapolate to beginning and advanced levels. Schumann (1987) reported that basilang learners (very low level learners) do not use tense forms systematically to make semantic distinctions in tense or aspect. Schumann rejects the possibility that foreground or background information is distinguished in the narratives he examined. On the other end of development is native-speaker English, which does not rely primarily on tense or aspect markers to distinguish foreground from background. This means that intermediate learners of English will have to abandon an apparently functional and systematic use of tense in order to achieve native-like competence in the language. Consider the most advanced learner in the study, 9S, who shows consistently high use of past tense in foreground and background (at least 90% in foreground and background of the oral narrative, and 100% in the foreground and 83.3% in background of the written narrative). This high rate of usage of past tense in foreground and background is necessary to achieve target-like use of tense in English narratives of the type in this study. We may hypothesize that after a period of unsystematic use of verbal morphology, discourse-sensitive learners may first use past tense in foreground clauses and subsequently generalize it to background clauses. Cross-sectional or longitudinal data are necessary to test this hypothesis.

An additional question for future research is whether the verbal morphology which ostensibly appears to be tense marking is in fact tense, or aspect, or a transitional form. Andersen (1991), Robison (1990), Kumpf (1984), and Flashner (1989) argue that early use of what is tense morphology in the target language may be an aspectual marker in interlanguage. Analysis of the aspectual class of the verbs in the foreground and background would help to determine whether the learners use target tense morphology to mark aspectual classes. Cross-sectional or longitudinal narrative data would help to determine whether learners are in a transitional stage from using tense as an aspectual marker to using tense as a tense marker in a target-like manner.

In summary, we have shown that the use of tense by adult intermediate-level learners of English can be best understood through the discourse structure of the narrative. Although the interlanguage narratives examined do not exhibit elaborate tense systems, some learners do seem to use verbal morphology systematically. Learners employ newly developing, and thus limited, linguistic resources to delimit the main story line and the background information, guiding the listener or reader through the narrative as they tell their tales.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank Dudley Reynolds for his assistance in collecting and transcribing the data, and for his helpful discussion; Laurie Knox and Dan Reed for their help with collecting the narratives; and Mark Garton and Kate Ivester for transcribing the oral narratives. This study was supported by National Science Foundation Grant BNS-8919616.

THE AUTHOR

Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig is Assistant Professor of Linguistics at Indiana University. She has published in the areas of second language acquisition, pragmatics, and teacher education. She investigates the acquisition of grammatical systems by adult second language learners and the development of pragmatic competence.

NOTES

[1] The original spelling and punctuation from the learner texts are presented in the examples.

[2] There is some evidence that the retelling of the story may have been difficult for some learners. Twenty-two learners, thirteen low intermediate and nine high intermediate, heard the story. Of those, 16 completed the oral re-tell. Five low intermediate students (four native speakers of Japanese and one native speaker of Chinese) and one high intermediate native speaker of Chinese did not produce an oral narrative when interviewed. This changed the balance of the L1s represented in the sample.

[3] There were no conditional uses of could. These were strictly instances of could meaning `was/were able to.'

[4] The one exception was one NS narrative written almost entirely in historical present: 82.6% (29/35 verbs) were in the present. Schiffrin observes that narratives entirely in historical present are relatively rare (1981, p. 51).

[5] Native speaker narratives were collected to determine what tense native speakers would use in this task. Further comparisons between native-speaker and learner narratives are beyond the scope of this paper.

[6] It is unlikely that the pronunciation of the past tense alone causes the difference in past tense use in the oral and written narratives of these three learners because 72.0% of the foreground verbs have irregular past tense target forms which do not have word-final consonant clusters.

[7] It is likely that two groups is a simplification. Future work may show that there is a continuum of sensitivity to discourse organization with respect to tense.

[8] Based on the written narratives of the 24 native speakers which show consistent se of past forms throughout, we may say that learner 9S, with the lowest use of nonpast forms of any learner in the study, exhibits the most target-like production.

REFERENCES

Andersen, R. (1991). Developmental sequences: The emergence of aspect marking in second language acquisition. In C. A. Ferguson & T. Huebner (eds.) *Second Language Acquisition and Linguistic Theories* (pp. 305-324). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Dahl, Ö. (1984). Temporal distance: Remoteness distinctions in tense-aspect systems. In B. Butterworth, B.

Comrie, & Ö. Dahl (Eds.), *Explanations for language universals* (pp. 105-22). Berlin: Mouton.

Dry, H. (1981). Sentence aspect and the movement of narrative time. Text, 1, 233-40.

Dry, H. (1983). The movement of narrative time. *Journal of Literary Semantics*, 12, 19-53.

Flashner, V. E. (1989). Transfer of Aspect in the English oral narratives of native Russian Speakers. In H. Dechert & M. Raupauch (Eds.), *Transfer in language production* (pp. 71-97). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Givón, T. (1982). Tense-aspect-modality: The Creole prototype and beyond. In P. J. Hopper (Ed.), T*ense and aspect: Between semantics and pragmatics* (pp. 115-63). Typological studies in languages 1. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Hopper, P. J. (1979). Aspect and foregrounding in discourse. In T. Givón (Ed.), *Discourse and syntax* (pp. 213-41). Syntax and Semantics, 12. New York: Academic Press.

Kumpf, L. (1984). Temporal systems and universality in interlanguage: A case study. In F. Eckman, L. Bell, & D. Nelson (Eds.), *Universals of second language acquisition* (pp. 132-43). Rowley, MA: Newbury House.

Labov, W. (1972). The transformation of experience in narrative syntax. In W. Labov (Ed.), *Language in the inner city* (pp. 354-96). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Labov, W., & Waletzky, J. (1967). Narrative analysis: Oral versions of personal experience. In J. Helm (Ed.), *Essays on the verbal and visual arts* (pp. 12-44). Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Robison, R. E. (1990). The primacy of aspect: Aspectual marking in English Interlanguage. *Studies in Second Language Acquisition*, 12, 315-30.

Schiffrin, D. (1981). Tense variation in narrative. *Language*, 57, 45-62.

Schumann, J. (1987). The expression of temporality in basilang speech. *Studies in Second Language Acquisition*, 9, 21-41.

Tannen, D. (1989). *Talking voices: Repetition, dialogue, and imagery in conversational discourse*. Studies in interactional sociolinguistics 6. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wolfson, N. (1979). The conversational historical present alternation. *Language*, 55, 168-82.

◆

Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series, Vol. 3, 1992

Pragmatics of Elusive Languages

Salikoko S. Mufwene

The term "pragmatics" is used in this paper insofar as it may subsume the ethnography of communication, especially in discussing factors such as identity of the code qua language variety[1] and of the speakers. This position is suggested particularly by the characterization of the field's subject matter as the "relation of signs to (their) interpreters" and "the psychological, biological, and sociological phenomena which occur in the functioning of signs" (Morris 1938: 6 & 108, cited by, e.g., Levinson 1983: 1-2 and Horn 1988: 116). I am concerned primarily with the sociological aspect of the discipline, focusing on the identity of the "code."

Since I do not discuss aspects of what has been commonly characterized as "language use" relative either to context[2] or to the psychological disposition of the speaker (e.g., Levinson 1983, Green 1989), this paper may be perceived as dealing with the periphery of pragmatics.[3] Such a position is justified only if it is assumed that the identity of the code is generally unequivocal. One of the points of this paper is that there are several cases where the code is not clearly identifiable. Unless some assumptions about language are abandoned, for instance, that it is a monolithic system (cf. Mufwene 1991a), pragmatics as the study of signs relative to their interpreters is hard to apply to such cases.

My discussion focuses on the African American English vernacular (AAEV) and Gullah (the American creole spoken on the coast of Georgia and South Carolina). Attempting sometimes to generalize, I refer in passing to particularly Jamaican and Guyanese Creoles. All these language varieties have been defined typically by their basilects, i.e., those varieties projected by creolists to contain the maximum number of morphosyntactic and semantic features that distinguish them from their lexifiers. However, the reality that the field investigator is usually confronted with is that of variable, nonmonolithic systems safely characterized by creolists as "mesolectal."[4] They show variable morphosyntactic and semantic kinship to the lexifier and display a lot of structural heterogeneity and formal alternatives for the same functions, with some of the alternatives being like those found in the lexifier and others the same as in the putative basilect. For the investigator who assumes the basilect to have ever existed and associates the mesolectal reality with decreolization (as claimed by, e.g., DeCamp 1971 and Bickerton 1973 but disputed by, e.g., Mufwene 1987, 1991b, 1991d and Lalla and D'Costa 1990), there are definitely cases where it cannot be decided whether or not AAEV or Gullah, as opposed to English, is being spoken. It is on account of such uncertainties, too numerous to be ignored, that the adjective "elusive" is predicated of these language varieties in this paper. I argue at the end that the adjective can also be predicated of other language varieties.

The question addressed here does not boil down to a simple matter of boundary indeterminacy. It is not really that of where AAEV or Gullah ends and its lexifier or acrolect begins.[5] It is rather that of whether the absence of some basilectal features, or their alternation with some features of the lexifier suggests code-mixing (i.e., discourse-contained dilution of the creole or AAEV with the acrolect or lexifier) or simply decreolization (i.e., an ongoing systematic departure from the basilect toward the acrolect). This question dates back from the time DeCamp (1971) presented the Jamaican Creole variation data in Table 1, explained below in his own words:

> As a demonstration, Table 1 presents a `continuum' consisting of seven speakers, each of which differs from the other six by one or more of six features. This mini-continuum is not hypothetical. The seven informants are selected from those interviewed in my survey of 142 Jamaican communities, and the six features are among the many which define the continuum of Jamaican English. The feature [+A] indicates habitual use of the word *child*; [-A] indicates use of *pikni* or *pikini* in equivalent contexts. [+D] indicates a phonological contrast in such pairs as *den/then*; [-D] indicates a lack of this contrast. [+F] indicates the use of *didn't* in negative past-tense constructions, [-F] the use of various alternatives such as *no ben, no did* (DeCamp 1973: 355).[6]

TABLE 1

Features		Speakers						
+A *child*	-A *pikni*	1.	+A	+B	+C	-D	+E	+F
+B *eat*	-B *nyam*	2.	-A	+B	-C	-D	+E	+F
+C /θ ~ t/	-C /t/	3.	-A	+B	-C	-D	-E	-F
+D /ð ~ d/	-D /d/	4.	-A	-B	-C	-D	-E	-F
+E *granny*	-E *nana*	5.	+A	+B	+C	+D	+E	+F[7]
+F *didn't*	-F *no ben*	6.	+A	+B	-C	-D	+E	+F
		7.	-A	+B	-C	-D	+E	-F

DeCamp interpreted this continuum as suggesting decreolization. This approach was later on applied to Guyanese Creole by Bickerton (1973), focusing on the complementizer, on the copula and copula-like items, and on the third person singular pronominal forms as grammatical variables. He reached the same conclusion as DeCamp, proposing an implicational scale that has been questioned by Romaine (1982), Le Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985), and recently by Winford (1990).[8] Applied to Gullah's variation data such as below, one might also assume (mistakenly as far as I am concerned -- see below) that this language is decreolizing:

(1)a. *haʷ yi/yu də du?* 'How are you doing?'
how you DURATIVE do
b. *haʷ yi/yu də duɪn?*
c. ha: yi duɪn

(2)a. *wɛ yu dəz wək?* 'Where do you work?'
where you HABIT work
b. *wɛ yu də wək?* [extension of the durative for habits]
c. *wɛ yu wəkɪn?* [same as (2b)]
d. *wɛ yu wək?*

(3)a. *ʌ tɛl ʌm (fə) dõ kʌm* 'I told him/her not to come.'
b. *ʌ tɛl ši (fə) dõ kʌm* 'I told her not to come.

Since DeCamp (1971) it has generally been assumed that decreolization has been facilitated by the coexistence of the creole with its lexifier and by socioeconomic mobility (due in part to mass education), which has given creole speakers more and more exposure to the acrolect and more and more motivation and opportunity to acquire it in an apparently replacive manner. However, while the hypothesis has found support in inter-individual variation (one interpretation of the continuum), its weakest part, based on the mistaken assumption of a monolithic system, has lain in intra-individual variation. The same speaker may alternate freely between two or more forms or constructions in the same speech event, talking to the same addressee and about the same topic. For instance, the subjective pronoun *ši* may be coindexed in the same utterance with the possessive *hi*, as in *ši gɔn fə si hibʌbə* `she went/has gone to see her brother'.

To further illustrate intra-individual variation, two examples from my early field work may be cited here. In the first, an informant identified here only as MI reacted to somebody's comment with *βɛrɪ βɛl* `very well.'[9] About a minute later MI was saying /vɛrɪ wɛl/ , suggesting either that both productions are free variants <u>or</u> that the former alternative is a salient feature (as used by Trudgill 1986) that she may not have wanted to be stigmatized with in my presence. However, regarding the second interpretation, one must ask why she did not try to conceal so many other features in her speech that are equally salient.[10]

The second example is that of a ninety-year-old man who was recounting to me his frustration about getting his paycheck from one of his foremen when he used to work and his persistence in waiting for his pay. In the same speech event he said (4a) first and later (4b), which suggests that he was not trying to sound more English-like. I have added alternative (4c) also because it is a common construction problem, even though he did not use it.

(4)a. *ʌ wɜ̃n ʌm fə pɛʸ mi mi mʌnɪ* (MG)
I want him to pay me my money.
b. *ʌ wɜ̃ fə hi pɛʸ mi mi mʌnɪ* (MG)
c. *ʌ wɜ̃ hi pɛʸ mi mi mʌnɪ*

There is in fact another alternative, presented separately in (5) simply because it is less common; I obtained it only by elicitation:

(5) *ʌ wɜ̃ fə hi fə pɛʸ mi mi mʌnɪ*

It is disputable whether some of the alternatives in examples (1-4) suggest decreolization at all. Nonetheless, these instances of intra-individual variation have been interpreted in the same way as inter-individual variation, i.e., as reflecting change in progress. The hypothesis remains questionable in the absence of diachronic evidence. It is more questionable when one realizes that even standard varieties of languages such as English offer a certain amount of stable variation that suggests no change in progress. A case in point is relative clauses, which, since the Old English days, have been introduced alternatively with relative pronouns or a complementizer. Although it might be argued that relative clauses starting with relative pronouns are somewhat restricted to written style, there is in this style a certain amount of inter-individual variation regarding restrictive relative clauses with *which* and alternatives with *that*. There are speakers who use *that* only in those cases where *which* may be used and there others for whom such a constraint does not apply; they use it even when the head noun refers to a human, as in *the lady <u>that</u> we just met.*[11]

Another example may be cited from delimiting nouns in number and countability. Some American traffic signs vary in this respect from state to state. For instance, it is more typical to read *Watch for falling <u>rock</u>* in West Virginia than in Pennsylvania, where the typical sign is *Watch for falling <u>rocks</u>. <u>Truck</u> crossing* is how the sign reads in South Carolina, whereas in Georgia it is *<u>Trucks</u> entering highway.* Georgia is somewhat inconsistent because it also has a sign that says *<u>Car</u> entering road.* Louisiana and Mississippi have a sign that reads *<u>Bridge</u> may ice in cold weather* (more or less like Georgia with one that reads *<u>Bridge</u> may ice in winter*), while North Carolina's sign says *<u>Bridges</u> may be icy.*

The alternation between individuated indefinite plural delimitation for generic reference and nonindividuated delimitation for reference to mass may also be observed in colloquial English in constructions such as *Jane likes <u>fruit/fruits</u>* and *she eats <u>cake/cakes</u>* and *<u>admission/admissions</u> office*, with the slight semantic distinctions between the alternates often overlooked by the relevant speakers.

The point of invoking these English examples is primarily to show that free variation exists everywhere which need not be associated with change. The hasty association of variation with decreolization in creole studies simply begs the question most of the time. Few creolists have seen in such creole variation something other than change. Particularly worth citing in connection with this are Le Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985). Capitalizing on individual speakers, they interpret their variable linguistic choices as "a series of *acts of identity* in which people reveal both their personal identity and their search for social roles" (14). They argue that

> To the extent that it does not derive from factors inherent in the linguistic systems -- such as the assimilation of sounds to one another in certain environments -- such variability may be ascribed to us fluctuating in imitating the usage of the group or groups with which we wish to identify; it is not necessarily a symptom of change in the `language' (199).

Language itself is presented in the book as an elusive, a not "clearly-definable external object" (247). To the extent that speakers command a range of variable features, the selections are indicative of the identities they wish to assume based on presumably their stereotypes of linguistic behavior in the community.

For those that had done field research on stigmatized language varieties, Le Page and Tabouret-Keller's interpretation has some appeal, especially since some will not speak AAEV or Gullah (naturally) before outsiders to their communities. I can testify to this with one of my guides on Johns and Wadmalaw Islands in South Carolina. The longer we worked together (over several months) the more comfortable she felt about speaking Gullah and the more basilectal forms she used in her speech not with me but with the informants.

In a way, my guide's linguistic adjustment is true even of informants who have not learned much English and may be characterized as speaking only creole: talking to the outsider, either they talk less or their speech becomes somewhat distant from the putative basilect. In the case of speech modification, the following question must certainly be addressed: is the speech adjustment simply a matter of "acts of identity" or is it rather, or also, a matter of accommodating the outsider, making sure that they can understand?

Here too, analogies are not lacking in English. In comparison to my guide and other Gullah or AAEV speakers, one might cite, for instance, educated Southerners in the USA who conceal their salient southern features when interacting with non-Southerners (especially outside the South). One might also invoke cases where native speakers of any language naturally accommodate foreigners in omitting from their speech some forms and idioms not necessarily because they are not standard but simply because they want conversation to be more successful. In the latter case, it is implausible to invoke "act of identity," rather than simple accommodation to the addressee, to account for speech variation. That is, though "act of identity" is undoubtedly a valid explanation in many cases where speakers adjust their speech, it does not apply universally and probably not to all instances where the language varieties claimed to be elusive here vary in the direction of the acrolect.

Given that most native speakers vary their speech, the following questions arise: Does the fact that African Americans who are stereotypically associated with AAEV or Gullah communicate among themselves necessarily predetermine their discourse chunks as AAEV or Gullah? Does the fact of using forms and constructions that are English-like necessarily make one's speech acts less AAEV or Gullah? When are linguists justified in ruling out some texts as non-AAEV or non-Gullah?

Theoretically the answer to the first question is negative, as a variety of circumstances may preclude the option of using the native variety. However, if we focus on AAEV or Gullah in the American ethnographic setting, it may become clear why the answer to the other two questions is not clearcut. The lexical sources of both language varieties, which are held in low status, are overwhelmingly English. The vast majority of their native speakers think they speak English, except that they sound different from other Americans.[12] To fully grasp the significance of these observations, one must break with the tradition (shared by many creolists) in which AAEV and Gullah have been compared typically and misguidedly with standard English, instead of their nonstandard counterparts. A close comparison of grammatical features will reveal that several and possibly the majority of them can be traced at least in form to some nonstandard variety of English under conditions of selection discussed in Mufwene (1989, 1990a, 1990b, 1991c) against Bickerton (1981, 1984, 1989) and in partial support of proponents of both the superstrate and substrate hypotheses.[13]

Given what native speakers think of their language varieties in relation to their lexifier, or more accurately, the American varieties that AAEV and Gullah developed concomitantly with, what particular proportion of the features will make a discourse chunk by an African American Gullah or AAEV? Or should we go by the intention of the speaker, especially in dealing with the educated speakers, in order to determine whether or not Gullah or AAEV is being spoken? For instance, take the case of my guide EL in the texts below, which varies from setting to setting.[14] The reader should keep in mind that the norm, and probably what AAEV, Gullah, and their Caribbean kin really consist of, is what creolists have characterized as mesolectal.[15]

Text A (13 July 1986)

EL Sali?
SM Yeah!
EL I know you gonna have a little bit with me, aren't you, or you aint?
SM Well, actually, I ate before coming, and...
EL You did?
SM and I'm afraid that if I eat some more, I'm going to sleep.
EL You gonna fall asleep?
SM Yeah.
EL What time you got?
SM It's two forty-five.
EL Oh God, I got to go pick up my little girl instead of bring her over here. My mother-in-law got them.
GB Oh, you have to go git dem chirrin?
EL And bring um over here, cause she suppose to be, we suppose to be going back to church at four, but I need to go on and git um.
GB Well, you ga go on en bring um̩ back over here?
EL I'm gonna bing [`bring'] um over here.
GB When?
EL Right now, I going pick um up right now.
GB Well, wha' time you going to church?
EL At four-thirty.
GB Oh, you ga bring them here now.
EL Huhn [hλ̃]! I gwine get um, my mother-in-law might got suppin ['something'] to do.
GB You don't wear out e patient.
EL Then I'm coming back. Yeah, then I'm coming back.

GB De macaroni aint done yet?

EL No, uhn uhn [λ̃ʔλ̃]! The macaroni aint done. So by d' time I come back, it should be done, I got it on real low. Man, it was too hot, I would a done been finish, but it's just too hot.

GB You go ahead if dem other things burnin, den I'll chat with you. I can't talk da [d ə] name now, uhn, because dese things here bother me.

EL Why not? You scared dat thing [`tape recorder']?

GB E in my name, but dem people might LAUGHTER!

EL Huhn?

GB Hold it, I say cause you bring one dem thing back fuh [f ə] me in a minute en I'll chat with you.

EL One a wha? Wha? Bring one back fuh you?

GB Yeah.

EL You done drink dat one I gee [`gave'] you?

GB Dat soda, I done drink dat soda so long till e aint funny. I been a.

EL LAUGHTER!

GB You laugh right dey, I aint laughin with you

Text B (20 December 1986)

FR ...sixteen head now... en everyone livin...

PR yeah

EL Sixteen!

FR Sixteen...

EL En all livin!?

FR Yes, ma'am.

PR Das da secon' one deh.

EL I know some of your sister... one o' your sister en me went to college together... You got a sister name uhn [λ̃]... J___M___?

PR Yes-sir... nuff of em

GUEST: SPEECH OVERLAP/CANNOT TELL

FR Yeah... das righ'...

EL We went to Tennessee... to college together...

FR Ohoh, OK, yeah

PR SPEECH OVERLAP

GUEST: think she home now, Uh think.

EL She home now?

PR She nice... she ha' nine in school one time...

EL Waay! Hear da' Salikoko! He mama en daddy had nine head o'children in school one time!

FR Margaret mus' ha' more chirun en da' in school one time, aini?

EL Greaaat Gosh!

PR Had nine in school one time... yeah...

EL How you `member all dem children name?... I got three... en I can hardly remember deh name sometime LAUGHTER

FR Bu… de mother might but de daddy say he can't remember… he kehn [kɛ̃:]keep with de names, either [aila]

PR He kehn… he kehn keep up people's names… say, Shu'! I kehn 'member all dem drat chillen name.

EL Is your mother still alive?

FR Yeah, e mother is Sarah sister… Patty mother-in-law sister…

EL For real?

FR Yes, ma'am.

EL I didn know deh were da' close…

PR Yeah, yeah, see, ain but two o'dem: S___ en Margaret [ma:gri]…

FR That's righ'…S___ en Margaret.

PR da's raigh'… dat…da's Margaret daughter deh… en Sandy… Sandy mama is de nex' sister to her…

EL Well, sir!

FR & GUEST: Dat's right.

PR Da's righ', yes, ma'am.

EL I did not know… I sure learn somet'n ere, didn I? But I know all your sister en brother…

FR Hmmhm

PR Yes, SPEECH OVERLAP

EL not all, but you know… at 1… some o'dem… I know at least'… L___ Mack is your brother, too, aini'?

FR Yeah.

PR Hmhm, yeah.

EL en O___?…

GUEST: Hm

PR Huhnuhn [hʌ̃hʌ̃:]

EL en H___?…

PR Yeah

GUEST: All o' dem

EL en we all… see deh?…

PR all o' dem… all o' dem, yeah.

EL we ain no stranger… we ain no stranger.

FR Small world!

PR Sixteen head o' dem… honey.., Reveren J___ M___ he been apreachin when he sixteen years ol'… 'fore he finish school… yeah… 'fore he finish high school he been a preach

GUEST: Ten sisters en six bon [bʌ̃]… six broders…

EL Six…

PR Hmhm, six broders en ten sister…

EL Greaaat Gosh!

FR Yes, ma'am.

PR Hmhm, only one dead… yes-sir… growin strong…

EL en all living!

PR Yeah, huhnhuhn… yeah.

FR everyone...

EL That's a blessin...

FR so far so good...

Text C (28 November 1987)

JR And I been deh tell e two [`they both'], come talk bout water, huh... dem berry [`bury'] da boy in water.

EL Deh bury [`buried'] him in water? I surprise ['I'm surprised'] deh do [`did'] that because deh ain suppose to do that you know! If that thing can come right back up, up of the water... out the ground.

JR INAUDIBLE but a vault [wɔlt] don' rise.

EL Oh.

JR But a ordinary box e rise.

EL Oh, e had a vault... had um in a vault.

JR Richard body berry in a vault.

EL For real?

JR Ah huhn.

EL Well Dillon put em down good then, inni?

JR Yeah.

EL Cause Lilly bury [`was buried'] in a vault too.

JR Yeah, e berry long side um.

EL Oh.

JR INAUDIBLE in the yahd deday [`today'] was over right by da pump and da [də] damn bucket.

EL Uhn huhn.

JR Now da... now da... ching [`thing'] weh I see... the ching duh [də] change.

EL Uhn huhn.

JR They like if you belong to the church, then I don't belong to the church and I die, the preacher put you right in the church too.

EL That's right. Long time ago e ain did dat.

JR No.

EL E ain... e ain couldn't do dat.

JR E wouldn do it.

EL But now e put you right in the church too.

JR Right.

EL Right in the church too, so now you ain got to belong, long as your family go and your family pay...

JR that's it

EL ...go in right deh.

JR Well, I pay my duty.

EL I know dat.

JR Buster duh mah leader.

EL Hm hm

JR You know im, inni?
EL Oh yeah... Buster _____?
JR Yeah.
EL I know Buster good... I ain know [`didn't know'] Buster bin [`was'] your leader, you know... I thought Neen bin your leader.
JR Mm mm. Laura en... en.. en Lilly was Neen leader.
EL Hm hm.
JR But... Buster duh mah leader.
EL Oh, oh, I didn't know dat. I always... cause uhn... Lilly _____ always.. Neen always come and check on you and see bout you... bring you thing [`things']
JR Yeah, I bin ou' deh yestehdeh.
EL Hm hm
JR I all time care bou' Neen.
EL Hm hm
JR En den when my cousin dead... bury deh... deh... but Uh couldn't duh deh...
EL Who?
HR ...in Walterboro.
EL Oh! in Walterboro?
JR Yeah. You ain know Harry, inni?
EL No, no.
JR Harry _____, dat duh Neen cousin.
EL Yeah, dat's right cause all dem NAME is Neen cousin.

In these recordings EL adjusts her phonology only slightly, making it little different from that of the informants. The question of what role phonological evidence plays in the distinction of language varieties that are closely related morphosyntactically remains open. EL's adjustment seems more evident in the selection of grammatical constructions than in the phonology. Based on the above texts, should speech such as hers whose quality varies in a gradient be treated sometimes as English and at other times as Gullah? Should the identity of the code be cased on the speaker's intention and/or the identity of the addressee?

Labov (1980: 379) makes an important distinction between the linguistic and symbolic definitions of language variety. The former corresponds to the academic stereotype of the variety whereas the latter amounts to what some readers might take EL's speech to be, i.e., the attempt to speak a particular variety without really meeting the linguistic definition of the variety. Note that according to this distinction a great deal of (semi-)creole speech would be symbolic, since it is mesolectal and thus diverges from the basilect that constitutes the stereotype (assuming that the basilect allows horizontal variation). The point is that, while it may be useful, the proposed distinction does not preempt the question of whether or not the linguistic definition of a language variety is an accurate one.

I have dwelt on the question of code identity because "act of identity" or any macro-pragmatic aspects of Gullah, of AAEV, or of any other creole cannot be discussed without first of all being able to tell one code from the other, particularly in those ethnographic settings where a (semi-)creole coexists with its lexifier and shares several formal features with it.

The question of code identity is relevant also for a number of reasons and from a variety of perspectives. To begin with, if standard English is primarily a written variety, very few people communicate in it. Implicit comparison for determining whether or not a speaker is using AAEV, Gullah, or any creole must thus be with some variety of spoken English. If these (semi-)creole varieties have been lexified by nonstandard varieties, rather than with standard or educated colloquial varieties, as done in a great deal of the literature. If, as these observations suggest, there must be a gradient of relatedness from educated spoken English, through nonstandard English, to AAEV and Gullah, the question of boundary or critical features is a serious one, especially if mesolectal speech is the norm rather than the exception.

It must be recalled in connection with the above that the basilect is a theoretical construct projected on the basis of the maximum number of features not attested in the lexifier; no pure basilectal text has ever been cited to date in the literature (Mufwene 1987). According to the state of the art of creole genesis, the first diverging speech patterns to develop were those characterized to date as mesolectal; the (near-)basilectal ones developed later (Chaudenson 1979, 1988, Bickerton 1988, Baker 1990). As the colonial communities in which the (semi-) creoles developed were highly stratified and it seems to have been rewarding since the beginning of the colonial societies to be able to communicate in a lect close to the lexifier, speakers of the mesolect had no reason to abandon it in favor of the putative basilect. This is not to suggest that they could not learn (near-) basilectal speech. The best diachronic studies available (Rickford 1987, Lalla and D'Costa 1990) show that variation has always been characteristic of the speech communities using AAEV, Gullah, and other creoles. Given what has been observed about the putative basilect and given these other considerations, one of the questions that may be raised is whether it is not too arbitrary to base the identity of AAEV, Gullah, or any other creole on (almost) only those features that are not attested in the lexifier.

It has been suggested, recently by DeBose (1991), that code-switching or mixing may be involved in what is otherwise called mesolect. Speaking of AAEV and what he characterizes as "standard English," DeBose argues that "when marked features of the both systems co-occur in the same chunk of speech, it is usually possible to make a plausible case for one system being the matrix system with elements of the other system embedded in it" (2).[16] Determining which system functions as the matrix is presumably determined by whether features of English or AAEV predominate in the discourse.[17]

However, the question is whether or not any similarities obtain between African-American mesolectal speech and code-mixing. It is perhaps justified to assume that the analogy between the two kinds of speech is a tenuous one. There are indeed some differences. To begin with, the distinction between the codes involved is generally clearcut in the cases of code-mixing commonly discussed in the literature. Regarding both Zaire and Tanzania, for instance, the distinction is clear between, on the one hand, French and Lingala (Bokamba 1989; Bokamba and Kamwangamalu 1987) and, on the other, English and Swahili (Myers-Scotton 1989a, 1989b, 1990). The languages have different lexical stocks and there are significant grammatical and phonological differences in their formal systems. The identification of the "matrix language" is consequently obvious. Such is not the case with Gullah and AAEV compared not with standard English but with the nonstandard varieties of English that they developed concomitantly with, especially in the southern part of the USA.

In both the cases of English/Swahili and French/Lingala code-mixing, the process usually presupposes a certain amount of command of English or French, as may be determined by the segment of the population that is more prone to the acrolect or High variety. Usually, the educated are the ones who code-mix the most. However, the "depth" of one's Gullah or AAEV (i.e., its closeness to the putative basilect) is not necessarily a correlate of one's level of education (despite DeCamp's 1971 conjecture for Jamaican Creole).[18]

As noted above, language in (semi-)creole settings has always been variable since the beginning. The new colonial speech varieties that developed first were close to the non-standard varieties of the lexifiers brought by the Europeans. Formal education is only one of the factors affecting variation in creole speech continua and its significance relative to other factors such as (ideological) pride in, or lack of shame with, the variety as well as the nature of the variety normally spoken at home. Lalla and D'Costa (1990) observe that even some people in higher strata of Jamaican plantation communities of the eighteenth century spoke varieties close to the putative basilect. To date, we may still notice near-basilectal varieties spoken by members of the Gullah community considered relatively affluent and by some youth, and upper mesolectal varieties (i.e., close to other varieties of English) spoken by the less educated. Similar sociolinguistic variation may be observed among speakers of AAEV. A case in point may be cited here: A week before the Conference at which this paper was presented, listening to a Baptist minister in Athens, Georgia, at an informal gathering with his congregation, I was surprised by his profuse use of multiple negation and constructions such as *many people that doedn' know...* Before this event, I had hardly heard such nonstandard features in his sermons, though several African American ministers often slip back to less standard speech when they get deeply involved in their sermons.

A third reason for not analogizing variation in African American speech with code-mixing lies in one of the pragmatic reasons for code-mixing. Very often speakers will code-mix only because they cannot retrieve the right terms or phrases in the "matrix language," due either to poor command or infrequent use of it. However, speech variation in Gullah or AAEV (with the range varying from speaker to speaker) is generally free and part of the norm, though in several cases it may also be interpreted as part of the process of accommodation to the outsider, as an attempt to prove one's dexterity in the stereotypical variety, or as an attempt to conceal the salient features.

On the other hand, these differences between speech variation in Gullah and AAEV and code-mixing in African are only part of the story. We might learn a few things by considering other pragmatic reasons for code-mixing. Based on my experience with code-mixing in Zaire, languages are mixed sometimes by people who are not fluent in the "embedded language," when this is French, but resort to it only to pass as educated persons and thus impress the intended audience. There is a certain similarity between this ethnographic behavior and the attempts by some Gullah and AAEV speakers to conceal salient features of their varieties, even though it is debatable whether or not code-mixing in involved in the latter case.

There are also some ethnographic reasons why some people will use a "matrix language" that they may not command well: they may simply wish to express solidarity or be integrated. A similar reason may be attributed to those who speak Gullah or AAEV in public, even though they do not use it (regularly) at home. The depth of Gullah or AAEV may be compared with the amount of code-mixing in the African situations mentioned above. In both those cases where the proportion of items from the "embedded language" exceeds that of the items from the "matrix language"[19] and those where the intended Gullah, AAEV, or creole variety is hard to distinguish from varieties of its lexifier, the intention of the speaker appears to be an important factor. What Labov (1980: 379) calls "social construct" of a language variety may be an appropriate way of defining AAEV, Gullah, or any creole used like them. So we may conclude this part of the paper by observing that although code-mixing does not seem to be an adequate analogy to the variable mesolectal speech typical of Gullah and AAEV, the exercise of comparing the phenomena suggests a less stereotypical definition of these language varieties. This conclusion certainly applies also to Caribbean creoles that coexist with their lexifiers and have been claimed to be decreolizing.

If the above observations and conclusions are correct, we must treat the mesolect as the normal case and, following Fasold (1969: 773), reject the analogy to code-mixing, at least as involving separate codes. That is, rather than assuming competing systems, we may assume just one non-monolithic system with several competing rules and lexical items such that acts of identity may be determined by whether the selections made by a speaker on a particular occasion suggests of them a competence close to, or distant from, the lexifier. In other words, instead of defining Gullah, AAEV, and related creoles by their basilects, we may consider the alternative that their systems are so mixed, perhaps with more alternatives than is normally the case in non-creole situations, that it is misguided to define them mostly by features not attested in their lexifiers. The elusiveness of these varieties consists in determining with precision where they end and the next related variety starts.

I will conclude the paper by addressing two questions: 1) Why is identifying the code(s) in a speech relevant to pragmatics qua study of use of language? And, 2) Does what was discussed above apply to other languages? In response to the first question, the vast majority of pragmatic studies focus on specific construction types or forms in individual languages, regarding especially interpretations which they invite, implicate, or suggest. It is taken for granted that the constructions or items discussed belong to a well-defined language variety. In this paper, I have wished to show that the identity of the code is not always clear. In speech communities where variation is the norm, notions such as language variety X or Y are elusive.

The notion of "elusive code" discussed here might also apply to non-creole languages if linguists decided to make more specific the particular varieties which they discuss. For instance, the notion of standard English does not seem to be clearly defined. In studies of AAEV in particular, the notion is generally difficult to distinguish from the variety spoken by the white middle class. Sometimes, it has also been equated with network English, another elusive term. If we take it to be the kind of English used in the network news, we will be inaccurate in not admitting that we hear in the news several features that English 101 teachers discourage their students from using. In any case, the reality is that standard English does not amount just to written English and the boundary between it and educated colloquial English is not clearcut.

Another example is notions such as American Southern English, which may be an easy stereotype until one lives in the American South and is confronted with the heterogeneity of the dialect. The question is just compounded once notions such as British and American English are considered. Ultimately all language varieties are elusive if we consider them in relation to other varieties that are akin to them, especially those with which they coexist.

As stated at the outset, the relevance of this paper to a volume on pragmatics and language learning depends on whether or not the ethnography of communication is considered part of the field. I am wearing my creolist hat in this paper and I thought that my contribution to this volume should highlight what creole studies ought to be doing more of: exposing those neglected aspects of the study of language that deserve (more) attention. The elusiveness of the notion `language variety X' is just one such aspect.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to Lawrence Bouton and Yamuna Kachru for inviting me to present this paper at the Fifth Annual International Conference on Pragamtics and Language Learning and to Charles DeBose for feedback on the Conference version. I am solely responsible for all the shortcomings.

THE AUTHOR

Salikoko S. Mufwene has just moved from the University of Georgia to the University of Chicago as Professor of linguistics. His recent work has been mostly on the semantics and morphosyntax of Gullah and Black English and on creole genesis.

NOTES

[1] Like "code," the term "language variety" is used in this paper to avoid taking a position about whether the African American English vernacular (also known as "Black English"), Gullah, and other "Atlantic creoles"discussed below are new languages or new dialects of their lexifiers. The term "code" is used here as neutrally as in the phrases "code-switching" and "code-mixing" rather than in the other

more restrictive sense proposed, rather inconsistently, by Hymes (1974: 59) for cases where "mutual intelligibility is in question."

[2] "Context" remains a vague term used to refer either to the non-linguistic setting of a speech event, or to what McCawley (1979) identifies as "contextual domain" (i.e., the context is being built by the discourse itself as it develops), or to the overall system of a language in terms of the options it makes available to a speaker (e.g., the choice between the verb *kill* and its paraphrase *cause to die* in English). For explicit discussions of context, see, e.g., Levinson (1983: x, 5, 10, 23, etc.).

[3] Considering the topics of several papers presented at the Conference (April 1991) and probably published in these proceedings, my uneasiness about whether or not this paper is suitable for a volume on pragmatics may seem unjustified to some readers. However, pragmatics was originally concerned with the interpretation of utterances regarding, e.g., their presuppositions and implicatures, and with the appropriateness of forms relative to their context of use. As a complement of semantics (see one of the alternative and apparently preferred definitions in Levinson 1983, e.g., p. 12), pragmatics may be assumed to exclude topics such as sexism in some languages and discourse structure, except where appropriateness is the primary concern. It is certainly safe to assert that there is no consensus among students of pragmatics regarding its subject matter(s). There are several surveys of pragmatics that do not cover much of what was discussed at the Conference. I am unable to cite a single reference book on pragmatics that addresses the question of code, even though Levinson (1983: 23) suggests that this may be a legitimiate concern of pragmatics. These considerations justify the caveat with which this paper begins. I assume that prior to associating code with some intended speaker-messages, it is necessary to address the question of code identity.

[4] A similar observation was made earlier by Beryl Bailey (1966) and endorsed by DeCamp (1971: 351). Rickford (1990: 160) rightly characterizes it as the norm rather than the exception.

[5] In creole studies, the term "acrolect" is normally used for the local standard variety of the lexifier. However, over the last two decades, the French creolist school, represented particularly by Chaudenson (1973, 1979, 1988), and defenders of the English-dialect origin of AAEV, e.g., D'Eloia (1973) and Schneider (1982, 1983, to appear), have argued more and more convincingly that the lexifiers of these new language varieties were metropolitan and colonial non-standard varieties and are not the acrolect. For some reason, it has usually been assumed that AAEV and its creole kin have been moving toward the acrolect, even when studies such as Labov (1972), Wolfram and Fasold (1974), and more recently Bailey and Maynor (1985) show similarities with White non-standard varieties, instead.

[6] DeCamp was mistaken in equating *didn't* with *no ben* and *no did*. The first is part of PAST/NONPAST absolute-relative tense system, whereas the basilectal ones are part of an ANTERIOR/NONANTERIOR relative tense system in which a NONANTERIOR form, the unmarked verb form, may also refer to the past. See, e.g., Bickerton (1975) and Mufwene (1983) for accounts of time reference in Guyanese and Jamaican Creoles.

[7] Mufwene (1987: 99) contends that "no pure basilectal speaker has yet been produced, [and] the pure basilect may never be shown to have existed" at any time in the history of the relevant creoles. This position is not necessariliy invalidated by DeCamp's analysis since it does not include a total inventory of the basilectal features of Jamaican Creole. As a matter of fact, Rickford (1980: 169-72) and Romaine (1988: 186-7) observe that actual creole speech data are not perfectly scalable. Rickford notes that, according to Bickerson (1973), "there was not any significant correlation between his [i.e., Bickerton's] scales for the copula and the pronominal subsystems of the Guyanese continuum" (169).

[8] Bickerson (1988) has now reversed his position, assuming like Chaudsenson (1979, 1988), that creolization did not start with basilectal varieties, but rather with mesolectal ones.

[9] Some creolists such as Jones-Jackson (1978, 1984) have given the impression that in basilectal Gullah / β / has substituted for /w/ and /v/. From what I have been able to determine to date, / β / has often alternated rather randomly with the other two, but it has never replaced them as a phoneme.

[10] Rickford (1980: 173) observes about one of his informants, Reefer, that his competence extended to almost the entire spectrum of singular pronoun variants. So much so, in fact, that the discontinuities in production on which implicational scaling depends were seriously called into question. He observes later that "with respect to ["the appropriate conditions for the use of these varieties in everyday life"], virtually *all* the respondents zeroed in on *nature of the addressee*..."

[11] One may also wish to mention, in connection with the alternation in relative clauses, variation between subordinate clauses introduced by *that* and those introduced by the null complementizer. Although their distribution may not be identical, it is hard to see any pattern of change or, I may add, any correlation with any pragmatic difference in the alternation.

[12] In the case of Gullah, some of its speakers are even shocked when one refers to their language variety as Gullah, suggesting it is not considered English. Several African American students are offended to hear the variety they grew up speaking called "Black English."

[13] Mufwene's alternative reduces the role of Universal Grammar to a body of constraints guaranteeing that this outcome of language contact does not violate any of its parametric specifications. It also determines which of the competing formal alternatives will find their way into the new language.

[14] For typographical convenience and easy reading for most readers, the text is presented in "eye dialect," following a common practice among American dialectologists. Only forms that are clearly different from mainstream varieties of English are written with typical distortions of the normal spelling. Forms between square brackets indicate the pronunciations of some of the distortions, unless they are also enclosed between single quotes, which indicate meaning. A side effect of this particular presentation is that it does not exaggerate the morphosyntactic distance between Gullah and English, though one must deplore the absence of prosodic features of all phonological ones. In the texts, the underlinings identify morphosyntactic peculiarities that I particularly wish to draw attention to.

[15] The stratification of speech in (semi)-creole communities into basilect, mesolect, and acrolect is indeed a concomitant of the decreolization hypothesis, with the term "mesolect" typically suggesting change toward the acrolect. However, I use the term here without reference to decreolization.

[16] In the oral version of the paper, DeBose attributes the model to Myers-Scotton, who also uses the terms "matrix" and "embedded language" (1989a, 1989b, 1990). Myers-Scotton has taken them from Joshi (1985). Competing with these terms are the alternatives "host" and "guest language" used by, e.g., Sridhar and Sridhar (1980), Bokamba (1989), and Bokamba and Kawangamalu (1987). I use "matrix" and "embedded" simply to remain consistent with DeBose.

[17] Fasold (1969: 773, n. 13) dismisses the alternative of code-switching, arguing that speakers of varieties similar to those discussed by DeBose use "language on the basis of a single grammar which shares many rules with Standard English, lacks others, and has still others which the standard dialect lacks."

[18] Interestingly, Lalla and D'Costa (1990) observe that even in the early days of Jamaican Creole, the linguistic continuum was not necessarily paralleled by the social stratification. What may be characterized for convenience as basilectal speech was heard among both the plantation aristocracy and the field slaves. The situation must have hardly been different for Gullah and AAEV.

[19] Bokamba (1989) observes that there are really no syntactic constraints on code-mixing.

REFERENCES

Bailey, Beryl Loftman (1966) *Jamaican Creole Syntax: A Transformational Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bailey, Guy and Nathalie Maynor (1985) The present tense of *be* in Southern Black folk speech. *American Speech*, 60, 195-213.

Baker, Philip (1990) Off target? Column. *Journal of Pidgin and Creole Languages*, 5, 107-19.

Bickerton, Derek (1973) On the nature of a creole continuum. *Language*, 49, 640-69.

Bickerton, Derek (1975) *Dynamics of a Creole System*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bickerton, Derek (1981) *Roots of Language*. Ann Arbor: Karoma.

Bickerton, Derek (1984) The language bioprogram hypothesis. *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 7, 173-221.

Bickerton, Derek (1988) Creole languages and the bioprogram. In *Linguistics: The Cambridge Survey. Volume II. Linguistic Theory: Extensions and Implications*. Edited by Frederick J. Newmeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.268-84.

Bickerton, Derek (1989) The lexical learning hypotheis and the pidgin-creole cycle. In *Wheels within Wheels: Papers of the Duisburg Symposium on Pidgin and Creole Languages*. Edited by Martin Pütz & René Dirven. Frnakfurt am Main: Verlag Peter Lang. pp. 11-31.

Bokamba, Eyamba G. (1989) Are there syntactic constraints on code-mixing? *World Englishes*, 8, 277-92.

Bokamba, Eyamba G. and Nkonko M. Kamwangamalu (1987) The significance of code-mixing to linguistic theory: Evidence from Bantu languages. *Studies in the Linguistic Sciences*, 17, 21-43.

Chaudenson, Robert (1973) Pour une étude comparée des creolés et parlers francais d'outre-mer: survivance et innovation. *Revue de Linguistique Romane*, 37, 342-371.

Chaudenson, Robert (1979) *Les créoles francais*. Fernand Nathan.

Chaudenson, Robert (1988) *Créoles et enseignement du francais*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

DeBose, Charles (1991) Systemic convergence in the African-American linguistic repertoire. Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Pidgin and Linguistics, Chicago.

DeCamp, David (1971) Toward a generative analysis of a post-creole speech continuum. In *Pidginization and Creolization of Languages*. Edited by Dell Hymes. Cambridge University Press. pp. 349-70.

D'Eloia, Sarah G. (1973) Issues in the analysis of Negro nonstandard English: A review of J.L. Dillard's Black English: Its History and Usage in the United States. *Journal of English Linguistics*, 7, 87-106.

Fasold, Ralph (1969) Tense and the form be in Black English. *Language*, 45, 763-76.

Green, Georgia (1989) *Pragmatics and Natural Language Understanding*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Horn, Lawrence (1988) Pragmatic theory. In *Linguistics: The Cambridge Survey. Vol. 1: Linguistic Theory: Foundations*. Edited by Frederick J. Newmeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 113-45.

Hymes, Dell (1974) *Foundations in Sociolinguistics: An Ethnographic Approach*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Jones-Jackson, Patricia (1978) The Status of Gullah: An Investigation of Convergent Processes. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan.

Jones-Jackson, Patricia (1984) On decreolization and language death in Gullah. *Language* in Society 13.351-62.

Joshi, Aravind (1985) Processing of sentences with intra-sentential code-switching. In *Natural Language Parsing*. Edited by David Dowty, Lauri Karttunen, and Arnold Zwicky. New York: Academic Press. pp. 190-205.

Labov, William (1972) *Language in the Inner City: Studies in Black English Vernacular*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Labov, William (1980) Is there a creole speech community? In *Theoretical Orientations in Creole Studies*, ed. by Albert Valdman and Arnold Highfield, 369-88. New York: Academic Press.

Lalla, Barbara and Jean D'Costa (1990) *Language in Exile: Three Hundred Years of Jamaican Creole*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

Le Page, Robert B. and Andrée Tabouret-Keller (1985) *Acts of identity: Creole-Based Approaches to Language and Ethnicity*. Cambridge University Press.

Levinson, Stephen (1983) *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McCawley, James D. (1979) Presupposition and discourse. In *Pragmatics (Syntax and Semantics 11)*. Edited by C.K. Oh & D. Dinneen. New York: Academic Press. pp. 371-88.

Morris, Charles (1938) Foundations of the theory of signs. In *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*. Edited by O. Neurath, R. Carnap, and C. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 77-138.

Mufwene, Salikoko S. (1982) Review of Pieter Muysken's *Generative studies on creole languages*. The American Anthropologist, 84, 186-8.

Mufwene, Salikoko S. (1983) Observations on time reference in Jamaican and Guyanese creoles. *English World-Wide*, 4, 199-229.

Mufwene, Salikoko S. (1987) Review article on Michael Montgomery and Guy Bailey's *Language Variety in the South: Perspectives in Black and White*. *Journal of Pidgin and Creole Languages*, 2, 93-110.

Mufwene, Salikoko S. (1989) Some explanations that strike me as incomplete. Column. Journal of Pidgin and Creole Languages, 4, 117-28.

Mufwene, Salikoko S. (1990a) Transfer and the substrate hypothesis in creolistics. *Studies in Second Language Acquisition*, 12, 1-23.

Mufwene, Salikoko S. (1990b) Creoles and Universal Grammar. In *Issues in Creole Linguistics. Linguistics 28*. Edited by Pieter Seuren and Salikoko Mufwene. Mouton de Gruyter. pp. 783-807.

Mufwene, Salikoko S. (1991a) Why grammars are monolithic. In *The Joy of Grammar: A Festschrift for James D. McCawley*. Edited by Gary Larson, Diane Brentari, and Lynn MacLeod. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Mufwene, Salikoko S. (1991b) Is Gullah decreolizing? A comparison of a speech sample of the 1930's with a speech sample of the 1980's. In *The Emergence of Black English: Texts and Commentaries*. Edited by Guy Bailey, Nathalie Maynor, and Patricia Cukor-Avila. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. pp. 213-30.

Mufwene, Salikoko S. (1991c) Pidgins, creoles, typology, and markedness. In *Development and Structures of Creole Languages: Essays in Honor of Derek Bickerton*. Edited by Francis Byrne & Thom Huebner. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. pp. 123-43.

Mufwene, Salikoko S. (1991d) Some reasons why Gullah is not dying yet. *English World-Wide*, 12.

Myers-Scotton, Carol (1989a) *Code-switching with English: Types of switching, types of communities*. World Englishes, 8, 333-46.

Myers-Scotton, Carol (1989b) A look at processing: Code-switching and borrowings. Paper presented at 20th Annual Conference on African Linguistics. Urbana: University of Illinois.

Myers-Scotton, Carol (1990) Building the frame in code-switching. Paper presented at 21st Annual Conference on African Linguistics. Athens, University of Georgia.

Rickford, John R. (1980) Analyzing variation in creole languages. In *Theoretical Orientations in Creole Studies*. Edited by Albert Valdman and Arnold

Highfield. New York: Academic Press. pp. 165-84.

Rickford, John R. (1987) *Dimensions of a Creole Continuum: History, Texts, & Linguistic Analysis of Guyanese Creole*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Rickford, John R. (1990) Number delimitation in Gullah: A response to Mufwene. *American Speech*, 65, 148-63.

Romaine, Suzanne (1982) *Socio-Historical Linguistics: Its status and Methodology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Romaine, Suzanne (1988) *Pidgin and Creole Languages*. London: Longman.

Schneider, Edgar Werner (1982) On the history of Black English in the USA: Some new evidence. *English World-Wide*, 3, 18-46.

Schneider, Edgar Werner (1983) The diachronic development of the Black English in the USA: Some new evidence. *Journal of English Linguistics*, 16, 55-64.

Schneider, Edgar Werner (to appear) Africanisms in the grammar of Afro-American English. In *Africanisms in Afro-American Language Varieties*. Edited. by Salikoko S. Mufwene.

Sridhar, S.N. and Kamal K. Sridhar (1980) The syntax and psycholinguistics of bilingual code-mixing. *Canadian Journal of Psychology*, 34, 407-16.

Trudgill, Peter (1986) *Dialects in Contact*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Winford, Donald (1990) The copula variability, accountability and the concept of "polylectal" grammars. *Journal of Pidgin and Creole Languages*, 5, 223-52.

Wolfram, Walter and Ralph Fasold (1974) *The Study of Social Dialects in American English*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series, Vol. 3, 1992

The Pragmatics of Codeswitching in Mexican Political, Literary and News Magazines

Erica McClure

Since the 1970's numerous articles have been published on English-Spanish oral code-switching in Chicano communities. However little attention has been paid to the use of English in Mexico except at the level of borrowings. The present study offers a brief discussion of some of the syntactic properties of codeswitching in Mexican political, literary and news magazines, as well as a more extensive analysis of its functions. Differences between oral codeswitching in Chicano communities and written codeswitching in the Mexican press are noted and an explanation of these dissimilarities is proposed based both on factors associated with the channel difference -- oral versus written -- and on the difference in the relationship that the Chicano and Mexican speech communities have with the American anglophone speech community.

Since the 1970's numerous studies have been published on codeswitching in Chicano communities in the United States, most focussing on oral codeswitching. In contrast, the present study focuses on codeswitching in Mexico, about which little has been written. Furthermore, the present study examines codeswitching in the press, specifically in political and literary magazines, rather than oral codeswitching. Although the focus of the present study is the pragmatics of codeswitching; in order to establish what linguistic expressions will be considered, it is necessary to address first a recurrent problem in research on codeswitching: identification of codeswitches.

CODESWITCHING DEFINED

What constitutes a minimal codeswitch is an issue which continues to create dissention. At one extreme there is the position of Schaffer who states:

> ... it has been argued that the language of elements surrounding a head word, including proper concord and agreement as marked by structure words and affixes within the phrase is a more accurate indicator of switching as opposed to borrowing. Switching would therefore seem to involve entire phrases rather than single words. It is not without good reason that Clyne (1967, p. 19) referred to switching as "multiple transference." (Schaffer, 1978, p. 268)

At the other extreme, Pfaff (1975, p. 17) concludes that rather than segregating language contact phenomena, it may be advantageous to study their interplay. Thus in her tri-partite classification of styles of codeswitching, she notes that in the third type, "Spanish street talk," "switching to English is mainly for *single* nouns, verbs, adjectives and set phrases." Somewhere in the middle is a position which does not exclude the possibility of single word switches, but which seeks to distinguish them from borrowings. Generally the distinction rests on two grounds: borrowings are phonologically and morphologically integrated into the borrowing language and within the speech community they are accepted as bona fide elements of and are in general use in the borrowing language. Both of these criteria are, however, slippery. With respect to phonology, Schaffer points out that

> As noted by Diebold (1963) and Hasselmo (1970) among others, the phonology of switches may spill across lexemes, especially where the switches are in close proximity rather than having been separated by a pause. Thus, some instances which researchers still wanted to classify as switches exhibited some measure of overlap. Phonology was not a totally consistent guide to identifying switches. (1978, p. 268)

In the case of written text, phonology is obviously no guide at all, but print offers a different means of marking codeswitches. Authors can indicate what they believe to be the status of lexical items by setting off codeswitches with italics, bold face type, quotation marks or underlining. However this means of identifying codeswitches may be somewhat dubious. In the corpus considered here, some words were set off in print; although they appear in monolingual Spanish dictionaries. Examples are: *beatnik*, *cash flow*, *dumping*, *hobby*, *jeans*, *mass media* and *striptease*. Conversely others such as *cash*, *clóset*, *hit*, *hot*, *shopping* and *script* appeared with no graphic marker indicating that they were not accepted Spanish words, although, they do not appear in monolingual Spanish dictionaries.

However, the attempt to ascertain the status of a word as borrowing or codeswitch by investigating norms of usage is also hazardous. One may in questioning members of the same speech community about the status of a lexeme receive responses ranging from an indication of no awareness that it was ever not part of the language, through claims that it is a well integrated borrowing, to statements that it is not part of the language at all, the response depending on the linguistic sophistication and attitude of the informant. (See McClure 1972 and McClure and McClure 1977).

Clearly there is no neat algorithm for determining the status of a word or even occasionally a phrase as codeswitch or borrowing. Indeed it seems quite possible that for different people the same form has a different status. In this paper I have included as codeswitches all forms set off by the authors with italics, boldface type, underlining or quotation marks as well as all forms found neither in the large *Larousse* or *Porrúa* dictionaries. The data analyzed are derived from the 1989 and 1990 issues of the political, literary and news magazines *Proceso*, *Vuelta*, *Nexos*, *Siempre* and *Contenido*.

SYNTACTIC STRUCTURE OF MEXICAN JOURNALISTIC CODESWITCHES

Let us now take a brief look at the syntactic structure of the codeswitches in this corpus. Excluding names and titles, a total of 535 codeswitches were found. Of these, as can be seen by looking at table I, the vast majority were single nouns (69%), a finding in accord with other codeswitching studies where such switches were not excluded by definition. The next most frequent category consisted of adjective plus noun, but it accounted for only 13% of the switches. Full sentence switches accounted for 7% of the data, while adjectives and prepositional phrases accounted for 5% and 2% respectively. Collectively the above mentioned categories accounted for 95% of all switches. These data differ from those reported in studies of codeswitching in Chicano communities in the U.S. in the lack of major constituent switches. There are no VP or full clause switches and very few full NP switches. Perhaps this paucity is due to the fact that Spanish is clearly the language of general discourse in this corpus, whereas in Chicano communities in the U.S., English plays a much larger role.

Table 1.

1.	Noun	370	(69%)
2.	Adjective + Noun	69	(13%)
3.	Sentence	37	(7%)
4.	Adjective	24	(5%)
5.	Prepositional Phrase	11	(2%)
6.	other	24	(5%)

*percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding

As Valdés (1990) has noted, in the U.S. Chicano environment, bilingualism is a community phenomenon in which English, the language of the majority, is the prestige language, Spanish, the language of a subordinated minority. To participate in the world outside the barrio, to succeed academically, to get ahead, a Chicano must speak English. However in Mexico, Spanish-English bilingualism is not a community phenomenon geographically delimited. Instead we find individual bilingualism. Furthermore, the bilingualism of Mexico is not minority bilingualism. Spanish is both the language of the majority and the language of prestige. There is no context other than tourism in which English is necessary. Indeed, Valdés points out that on occasions Mexicans may take pride in not having learned English. But, on the other hand, being bilingual may also be a source of pride. However, the Mexican tends to avoid mixing the two languages, stigmatizing such usage as characteristic of the "Pocho" or Mexican-American. In fact, in 1981 a National Commission for the Defense of the Spanish Language was established in Mexico to standardize the Spanish spoken there and to protect it, particularly in border regions. Such a defense was seen as important in maintaining the culture of Mexico, "a particular manner of understanding reality and a characteristic form of thinking and of being" (Valdés, 1990 p. 43). Despite such attitudes, however, English loan words continue to penetrate Mexican Spanish and limited codeswitching exists.

MEXICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES

The ambivalence that exists in Mexican attitudes to the use of English reflects their ambivalent feelings towards the U.S. in general. These feelings are a logical outcome of the political, economic, and cultural hegemony that the U.S. has exercised with respect to Latin America as a whole and nowhere more strongly than in Mexico. In his book *Tiempo Nublado*, the Mexican Nobel laureate Octavio Paz states that:

> The idea that the people of Mexico have of the United States is contradictory, passionate and impervious to criticism, more than an idea it is a mythic image. The same thing can be said of the vision held by our intellectuals and writers (1985, p. 140, my translation).

Alan Riding, a correspondent who has worked in Latin America since 1971 and who was the head of the Mexico City office of The New York Times for six years, explains this attitude in his book, *Distant Neighbors. A Portrait of the Mexicans* (1985). In a chapter whose title is taken from a statement often attributed to Porfirio Díaz (Pobre México, tan lejos de Diós y tan cerca de los Estados Unidos "Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States"), Riding states:

> The asymmetry of power determines how Mexico and the United States view each other. Differences of history, religion, race and language serve to complicate their relationship, to contrast their ways of doing things, to widen the gulf of understanding that separates them. But all these variables are overshadowed by the inescapable and unique fact that a vulnerable developing country shares a 2,000-mile border with the world's richest and strongest power. When confronting its northern neighbor, history has taught Mexico that it has few defenses.
>
> Contiguity with the United States has proved a permanent psychological trauma. Mexico cannot come to terms with having lost half of its territory to the United States, with Washington's frequent meddling in its political affairs, with the U.S. hold on its economy and with growing cultural penetration by the American way of life. It is also powerless to prevent these interventions from taking place, and is even occasionally hurt by measures adopted in Washington that did not have Mexico in mind. And it has failed to persuade Washington to give it special attention. Intentionally or not, Mexico has been the target of American disdain and neglect and, above all, a victim of the pervasive inequality of the relationship.
>
> The emotional prism of defeat and resentment through which Mexico views every bilateral problem is not simply the legacy of unpardoned injustices from the past. Contemporary problems -- migration, trade, energy and credits -- also involve

the clash of conflicting national interests, with Mexico approaching the bargaining table deeply sensitive to its enormous dependence on American credit, American investment, American tourists and even American food. Good faith alone could not eliminate these contradictions, but underlying tensions are kept alive by Mexico's expectation that it will be treated unfairly. Its worst fears are confirmed with sufficient regularity for relations to remain clouded by suspicion and distrust. As the local saying goes: "What would we do without the gringos? But we must never give them thanks." Mexico must depend -- but cannot rely -- on its neighbor (1985, pp. 316-317).

However, despite resentment of America, as Riding points out, few Mexicans express resentment of Americans as individuals (although in jest one hears "Que vengan las gringas y que se queden los gringos." "Let the American women come and the American men stay home.") Many express admiration of Americans for qualities they attribute to them: honesty in government, democracy, efficiency, diligence, technological superiority. American consumer patterns have also had a major influence on Mexican consumption patterns, but that in turn has provoked attacks on these patterns. As Riding notes "There is no consensus: no single image captures how Mexicans see the United States." This fact is reflected in the range of ways English is used in the Mexican press.

THE FUNCTIONS OF MEXICAN JOURNALISTIC CODESWITCHES

Researchers (see for example Elías Olivares, 1976; Gumperz and Hernández-Chavez, 1972; McClure, 1977 and 1981; Valdés-Fallis, 1976 and Valdés, 1981) examining oral codeswitching in Chicano communities in the U.S. have noted that it is used for a wide variety of purposes. Among them are the following: quotation, repetition, interjection, addressee specification, emphasis, clarification, elaboration, focus, attention attraction or retention, personalization versus objectivization, topic shift, and role shift. While the functions of the written codeswitching examined here overlap with those mentioned above, there are differences. Some are simply the result of a difference in channel -- written rather than oral. Addressee specification, role shift and attention attraction are irrelevant in the written mode. Others however, relate to the difference between the social and political contexts in which Chicanos in the U.S. and Mexican journalists codeswitch. An examination of the Mexican corpus reveals the following reasons for switching: (A) lack of a good Spanish translation, (B) lack of a set Spanish word or phrase, (C) greater explicitness of the English form, (D) desire to play with well-known English phrases, (E) emphasis through repetition, (F) simple quotation, (G) quotation to reproduce a style of speech, (H) creation of a sarcastic, satirical or ironic tone, (I) creation of a sophisticated tone, and (J) creation of an erudite tone. Each of these uses is illustrated below.

A. Lack of a good Spanish translation

1. No me precipitaré en el famoso name-dropping, el bombardeo de nombres que, se supone, construyen por aluvión personalidades y famas [Nexos. April, 1989. C. Monsiváis]

I will not throw myself headlong into the famous practice of *name-dropping*, the bombardment of names that, it is supposed, construct personalities and reputations by flood.

2. No fue eso lo que sucedió en los países asiáticos que empezaron como sweat shops. [Contenido. July, 1990. J. Acosta]
It was not that which took place in the Asian countries which began like *sweatshops*.

B. Lack of a set Spanish word or phrase

3. Una grieta se abrió entre ambos, como si el dirigente negro convocara a los odiados demonios que el *american way of life* repudia porque representan la más dura carga de la consciencia. [Siempre. July 11, 1990. S. Del Río]

A crack opened between both, as if the Black director convoked the hated demons that the *American way of life* repudiates because they represent the hardest burden of conscience.

4. La operación, ..., constituye la primera "persecución en caliente" (*hot pursuit*), que desde hace tiempo habían exigido las agencias antidrogas norteamericanas. [Proceso. April 16, 1990. Carlos Puig]

The operation, ..., constitutes the first "pursuit while hot" (*hot pursuit*) that the North American antidrug agencies had demanded in a long time.

C. Greater explicitness of the English form.

5. Casi nadie habla del encuentro sexual fugaz (*one night stand*). [Nexos. June, 1990. Mexico City. A. Román]

Almost no one speaks of the fleeting sexual encounter (*one night stand*).

6. Documentar ese optimismo equivale a enumerar a los protagonistas secretos de la historia, equivale a recuperar para la historia las fiestas efímeras de una sociedad en nacimiento: la prosa como *happening* del *happening*. [Vuelta. June, 1990. C. Monsiváis]

Documenting that optimism is equivalent to enumerating the secret protagonists of history, is equivalent to recovering for history the ephemeral festivities of a society in birth: prose as *happening* of the *happening*.

D. Play with well-known English phrases

7. También a la moderna civilización porfiriana debemos el *american way of drinking*: "las cantinas o bares a la manera americana", escribió Artemio de Valle-Arizpe, "no proceden en México sino en la era en que

gobernaba el general Porfirio Díaz, antes de esos pacíficos años, no eran conocidos tales establecimientos para la bebienda, ..." [Nexos. June, 1990. Joaquín Blanco]

We also owe to the modern Porfirian civilization the *American way of drinking*: "the taverns or bars of American type," wrote Artemio de Valle-Arizpe, "only originate in Mexico in the era in which general Porfirio Díaz governed; before those peaceful years such establishments for drinking were unknown.

8. ... y todo *peace-and-love*, vámonos [Nexos. June, 1990. Joaquín Blanco]

   ... and all *peace-and-love*, let's go.

9. Traje clásico, corbata clásica, ademanes sobrios, Pedro Aspe sube a la tribuna con un cierto "*Touch of class*." [Proceso. February 27, 1989. A. M. Mergier]

   Classic suit, classic tie, sober gestures, Pedro Aspe climbs to the rostrum with a certain "*Touch of class*."

10. ¿Entonces a quién se le va a quitar...? -- *That is the question*. -- ¿A los canadienses? [Proceso. March 27, 1989. A. M. Mergier]

    Then from whom is it going to be taken...? -- *That is the question*. -- From the Canadians?

11. Pero prevalece la tradición adulta del baile como noche reventada, y el verdadero bailongo -- *the real thing*. [Nexos. June, 1990. Joaquín Blanco]

    But the adult tradition of the dance as a blow-out night and the true bailongo [poor but entertaining dance] -- *the real thing* -- prevails.

12. Al final de la jornada, frente a un interminable café, pensamos que la onda, que la meta de ir de *shopping* a Perisur es una experiencia que tiene poco que ver con las compras y mucho con el sentimiento cuasirreligioso de la preposmodernidad mexicana: el chiste es estar ahí, *being there*. [Nexos. June, 1990. F. Báez Rodríguez]

    At the end of the day, facing an unending coffee, we think that the point, that the purpose of going *shopping* at Perisur is an experience that has little to do with purchases and much to do with the quasireligious sentiment of the Mexican prepostmodernity: the point is to be there, *being there*.

13. Los amos del espectáculo -- pues *the show must go on* siempre, pase lo que pase -- han dado la pauta desde hace tiempo. [Proceso. March 27, 1989. F. Ponce]

    The directors of the show -- since *the show must go on* always, whatever happens -- have set the standard already.

E. Emphasis through repetition

14. Ya no es escoger entre un mundo o varios -- *one world or several* -- sino por "un mundo o ninguno" -- *one world or none*. [Nexos. June, 1990. L. Arizpe]

    Already it is not a question of choosing between one world or several -- *one world or several* -- but rather for "one world or none" -- *one world or none*.

F. Simple quotation

15. -- Nada. No pasa nada. Están filmando una pelicula ... *It's a picture*! -- intentaban tranquilizarlos los encargados del Princess [hotel]. [Proceso. April 9, 1990. A. Campuzano]

    -- Nothing. Nothing is happening. They are filming a movie ... *It's a picture*! -- the people in charge of the Princess were trying to calm them.

16. En ese momento creímos que la agitación pronto pasaría, pero no, al contrario, cadá vez son más los norteamericanos que los viernes por las noches se reúnen en la línea divisoria entre San Isidro y Tijuana, estacionan sus automóviles con las luces encendidas a lo largo de la frontera y con pancartas en mano que dicen "ésta es nuestra frontera y no está suficientemente vigilada" o "mexicanos *go home*," gritan slogans como "éste es nuestro país," "mexicano, no te necesitamos más," etc. [Siempre. July 11, 1990. L. Singer]In that moment we believed that the agitation would soon pass, but no, to the contrary, each time there are more North Americans who on Friday nights get together on the dividing line between San Isidro and Tijuana, park their cars with their lights turned on along the border and with placards in hand which say, "This is our border and it is not watched closely enough" or "Mexicans *go home*," shout slogans like "This is our country," "Mexican, we don't need you anymore," etc.

17. Se pregunta el embajador mexicano ante la OEA, Antonio de Icaza" ¿Vamos a admitir que los extranjeros vengan a decirnos cómo mod-

ernizar nuestros procesos electorales? Y se responde: "*Over my death* [their error] *body*" (sobre mi cadáver). [Proceso. April 9, 1990. C. Puig]

The Mexican ambassador to the OAS, Antonio de Icaza, asks himself "Are we going to allow foreigners to come and tell us how to modernize our electoral processes?" And he answers himself: "*Over my death* [their error] *body*" (over my cadaver).

G. Quotation to reproduce a style of speech

18. La señora la contempló con frialdad, le espetó un "*Don't be silly*," que todavía le duele, y le explicó: "Mira, con mi *shopping* no te metas, si quiero enterarme de Dallas me compro un video. *And that's it.*" [Nexos. June, 1990. C. Monsiváis]

The lady contemplated her coldly, spit out a "*Don't be silly*," that still hurts her, and explained to her: "Look, don't mix into my *shopping*, if I want to find out about Dallas I'll buy myself a video. *And that's it.*

19. Encuentro a un mesero que vio perder en medio minuto un millón de dólares a "*dat* gordo *gai*, *di* petrolero Baragán, *gut* gordo, *gud old taims*. en toda noche, *gerit*? en toda noche más *of ten milions*! *Di* gordo... [Proceso. September 15, 1989. R. Garibay]

I find a waiter who saw a million dollars lost in half a minute by *that* fat *guy*, *the* oilman Baragán, *good* fat *guy*, *good old times*. The whole night, *hear it*? In the whole night more *of ten millions*! *The* fat *guy*...

H. Creation of a sarcastic, satirical or ironic tone

20. Just crowned like miss Universe 1989, Angela Visser, 22, from Holland, was congratuleted by Tourism former secretary, teacher Carlos Hank González, given her a cheek kiss. The representative of mexican government, formal gown dress, seemingly very pleasure enjoing the show. [The orthographic and grammatical errors are those of the article]

...

Así fue -- más o menos -- el *happy end* del certamen mundial de la belleza. Así: en inglés y con el entusiasta aval del *teacher* Hank González, diligente promotor de "la industria de la paz y la amistad."

...

So it went -- more or less -- the *happy end* of the world beauty contest. So: in English and with the enthusiastic backing of the *teacher* Hank González, diligent promoter of "the industry of peace and friendship."

Ni modo. *The dream is over*. [Proceso. June 1, 1989. F. Ortiz]
That's how it is. *The dream is over*.

21. La transmisión del show, *of course*, será en inglés. [Proceso. May 22, 1989. F. Ortiz]

The transmission of the show will, *of course*, be in English.

22. La hipocresía norteamericana no estriba tanto en los lamentos exagerados por la muerte de un agente de la DEA, y en la indiferencia o incluso el desprecio ante la muerte de decenas de agentes mexicanos (o, *by the way*, de miles de civiles panameños). [Proceso. January 15, 1990. J. Castañeda]

The North American hypocrisy does not rest so much in the exaggerated laments over the death of an agent of the DEA and in the indifference or even the scorn with respect to the death of tens of Mexican agents (or, *by the way*, of thousands of Panamanian civilians).

23. Cuando leí mi ponencia, el Doctor Lightbridge me hizo el siguiente honroso comentario: "*you don't understand Mexico*!" ...

When I read my paper, Doctor Lightbridge made the following honorable comment to me: "*You don't understand Mexico*!" ...

Pero uno se resigna a estas cosas a cambio del paseo. Y hasta se halla patéticamente dispuesto a inventar una abuela que platicaba con una iguana, hacía sopa de palmeras o tocaba el harpsicordio en un palafito en los manglares de Nayarit. Esto con tal de que el mexicanista que platica con uno (romántico, izquierdista, morbosamente nacionalista) se sienta reconfortado y declare a México *a land of fascinating contrasts*. [Vuelta. June, 1990. G. Sheridan]

But one resigns oneself to these things in exchange for the trip. And one even finds himself pathetically willing to invent a grandmother who talked with an iguana, made soup from palm trees or played the harpsichord in a lake dwelling in the mangrove swamps of Nayarit. This is so that the Mexicanist who talks with one (romantic, leftist, pathologically nationalistic) feels comforted and declares Mexico to be *a land of fascinating contrasts*.

I. Creation of a sophisticated tone

24. (ya se sabe: refacciones para electrodomésticos en Artículo 123, aparatos para audio y video en República de El Salvador, materiales ortopédicos en Motolinía, *and so on*) ... [Nexos. June, 1990. F. Báez Rodríguez]

(it's already known: parts for home appliances in Artículo 123, audio and video players in República de El Salvador, orthopedic materials in Motolinía, *and so on*).

25. Orientado por los dudosos consejos de un lejano familiar hipocondriaco, llegué un jueves por la mañana al Hospital General Dr. Manuel Gea González, de la Secretaría de Salud, a las puertas del *deep south* de la capital. [Nexos. June, 1990. M. Ortiz]

Oriented by the doubtful councils of a hypochondriacal distant relative, I arrived one Thursday in the morning at the general hospital Dr. Manuel Gea González, of the Department of Health, at the doors of the *deep south* of the capital.

J. Creation of an erudite tone

26. For native Spanish she had no great care,
At least her conversation was obscure.
Lord Byron, *Don Juan* [introduction to article]
[Vuelta. June, 1990. Carlos Monsiváis]

27. No creo que haya quien pueda decirle *Here and here did México help me*. [Nexos. June, 1990. A. Ruiz Abreu]

I do not believe that there is anyone who can tell him *Here and here did Mexico help me*.

Examples 1 through 13 all involve the use of English to express ideas associated more commonly with an Anglo rather than a Hispanic context. In examples 1 and 2, the English words *name-dropping* and *sweatshops* have been used. Neither has a short Spanish translation. In examples 3 and 4, the phrases *American way of life* and *hot pursuit* appear. Although all can be translated easily, the translations are not set phrases in Spanish as they are in English. In examples 5 and 6, we find the expressions *one night stand* and *happening*. In these cases, although there are short Spanish equivalents for the English forms, the English expressions are more explicit. A happening is a particular type of event while an *acontecimiento* is any type of event. A one night stand is a particular type of *encuentro sexual fugaz* (fleeting sexual encounter). Thus the English forms evoke much richer images than would their Spanish translations. In examples 7 through 13, the journalists play with well-known English phrases which carry strong cultural overtones. In 7 the phrase *American way of life* is changed to *American way of drinking*, perhaps with sarcastic overtones. In 8 the writer turns a well-known hippie phrase, *peace and love*, into a single word with hyphens. In 9, by using the phrase *touch of class*, the writer paints a graphic picture of Mexico's finance secretary and perhaps also refers with light irony to Aspe's U.S. academic training and to his social background. In 10 the same writer evokes one of the English classics, Hamlet, with the sentence *That is the question*. In 11 we find the use of a phrase, *the real thing*, from American advertising, while 12 evokes images from American popular psychology. In 13 we find a cliché from American show business.

In example 14 the repetition in English of a preceding Spanish phrase emphasizes a point in a manner quite similar to that of a paraphrase in a monolingual text. Exact repetition is inappropriate in written text, but a monolingual author may underline a point by restating it in different words. A bilingual author has an additional resource. Instead of paraphrasing he may switch languages to underscore his point.

In examples 15 through 17 we see a use of codeswitching that is quite common in bilingual communities, exact quotation. In 15 the journalist is reproducing the speech of hotel personnel trying to calm foreign guests during a civil disturbance. In 16 the exact words on a sign are reproduced and in 17 the strong language of a diplomat.

In examples 18 and 19 we see a different use of quotation, the reproduction of a style of speech to evoke a clearer picture of the individuals discussed. In 18 both the content of the conversation and the type of codeswitching used create the image of a certain type of woman from upper or upper middle class Mexican society. In 19 we see a Mexican intellectual's stereotype of the language and culture of the Chicano. The article from which these passages are taken is a broad parody not only of the manner in which Chicanos codeswitch [note the use of Spanish orthography in English utterances and highly unlikely codeswitches such as *en toda noche más of ten milions* "In the whole night more than ten million"] but also of the celebration of one of the most important events in Mexican history in the tasteless atmosphere of Las Vegas.

In examples 20 through 23 we again see the use of codeswitching to create a sarcastic or ironic tone. Here we see the reflection of three tendencies in the Mexican press, leftist criticism of the U.S., resentment of perceived US ascription of subordinate status to Mexico and Mexicans, and resentment of the stereotyping of Mexico as an exotic third world country. All are often associated with the satirical use of English. Examples 20 and 21 contain excerpts from articles on the 1989 Miss Universe Contest held in Cancún, Mexico. By beginning one of his articles with the long fractured English introduction reproduced in 20 and interspersing English throughout both articles, the journalist Ortiz reinforces the sarcastic tone in which he criticizes not only the *teacher* Hank Gonzalez's decision to promote tourism through subsidizing the Miss Universe contest but also the arrogance of the American organizers of the contest who excluded Mexican journalists from many of the events of a contest being held in their own country. Resentment of their casual assumption that broadcasting would be in English is shown in 21. "La transmisión del show, *of course*, será en inglés." [The broadcast of the show...will be in English.] In 20 the use of the phrase *happy end* contributes to the satirical tone established by the phrase "diligent promoter of the industry of peace and friendship" and the juxtaposition of the Mexican cliché *Ni modo* (that's how it is, nothing can be done) with the English cliché, *The dream is over*.

In example 22 the journalist Castañeda complains about American hypocrisy in the Camarena case. It is only the American dead who count. The use of the English phrase *by the way* which suggests an afterthought to refer to the thousands of civilian dead in Panama is strongly ironic. In 23 Guillermo Sheridan highlights the irony of an Anglo criticizing a Mexican for not understanding Mexico by indicating that he did so in English not in Spanish thereby suggesting that the critic's Spanish was not fluent. Additionally, Sheridan complains of the "necessity" felt by the Mexican scholar to invent a colorful background so that an Anglo specialist in Mexico can satisfy his desire to find in Mexico "a land of fascinating contrasts." .

In examples 24 and 25, we see the use of codeswitching simply to create a tone of sophistication. In these passages, which specific words are in English does not seem to be important. What is important is that English is used. On the other hand, in examples 26 and 27, literary quotations in English appear to have been used to create an erudite tone.

CONCLUSION

Codeswitching in Mexican political, literary and news magazines differs from oral codeswitching in Chicano communities in the U.S. both syntactically and pragmatically. Codeswitching in the Mexican press is far more syntactically restricted than is Chicano oral codeswitching. Although nouns constitute the largest category of switches in both types of codeswitching, phrasal, clausal and sentential codeswitching is much more common in oral Chicano codeswitching than in codeswitching in the Mexican press. Spanish is always clearly the matrix language in codeswitching in the Mexican press. In fact it often seems that English sentences and phrases are simply treated as if they were words. On the other hand, in Chicano codeswitching in the U.S., it is often difficult to decide what the matrix language is. In fact, some sentences seem not to have a matrix language. Several factors may account for these syntactic differences. In the first place, there is a channel difference. Oral codeswitching in the Chicano community is generally a relatively unmonitored process whereas codeswitching in the Mexican press is highly monitored. Second, in Mexico the type of oral codeswitching which exists in Chicano communities is negatively stereotyped. Often it is considered to be the result of imperfect mastery of both languages. Third, English in Mexico has an ambivalent status. On the one hand it is a language of prestige. However, on the other, it is the language of an intrusive neighbor, a language against which Spanish should be defended. Fourth, bilingual Chicanos in the U.S. in general constitute a subordinated minority in a society whose mainstream speaks English. As a result they may in fact use English in many contexts: in school, in the workplace, in stores, in healthcare centers, even at home and with friends. But Spanish may also be used in these contexts, the result being frequent codeswitching. In contrast, in Mexico there are few contexts in which the use of English occurs naturally. As a result codeswitching may be inhibited.

The above mentioned factors also affect the pragmatics of codeswitching in the two contexts. The fact that codeswitching in the Mexican press involves a written channel and is addressed to an anonymous audience limits its functions. Unlike oral codeswitching in the Chicano community, it cannot be used to mark a shift in addressee nor to indicate the activation of a particular role relationship between interlocutors.

The functions of codeswitching in the Mexican press are also constrained by the negative Mexican attitude towards the type of frequent codeswitching found in the Chicano community in the U.S. Thus although oral codeswitching in the Chicano community may sometimes simply signal membership in the Chicano speech community, being devoid of other pragmatic significance, such usage does not occur in the Mexican press. Indeed, although Spanish-English bilingualism is a community phenomenon in many parts of the U.S; in Mexico it exists only at the level of the individual.

A final factor circumscribing the functions of codeswitching in the Mexican press is the status of the two languages in question. In Mexico, Spanish is the majority language and a symbol of national identity. English, like the United States, has an ambivalent status. It is at the same time a language of prestige and a language against which Spanish needs to be defended. This ambivalence towards both the U.S. and its language is reflected in its use in the Mexican press. Not only is it employed to evoke a more precise image than a Spanish word or phrase, but also to create a sophisticated or erudite tone. However it is also used in satirical, ironic or sarcastic attacks on American politics and American values, whether found in the U.S. or in Mexico.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A previous version of this paper was presented at the Fifth Annual International Conference on Pragmatics and Language Learning.

THE AUTHOR

Dr. Erica McClure is Associate Professor of Sociolinguistics and Education at the University of Illinois. She obtained her Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley in Linguistic Anthropology. Her research interests include discourse analysis, codeswitching and second language acquisition.

REFERENCES

Clyne, M. (1967). *Transference and Triggering*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.Diebold, A. R. (1963). Code-switching in Greek-English bilingual speech. *Georgetown Monograph Series on Languages and Linguistics*, 15, 53-62.

Elías Olivares, L. (1976). Ways of Speaking in a Mexican American Community: A Sociolinguistic Approach. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Texas.

García-Pelayo y Gross, R. (1972). *Pequeño Larousse en Color*. Mexico, D. F.: Ediciones Larousse.

Gumperz, J. and Hernández-Chavez, E. (1972). Bilingualism, bidialectalism and classroom interaction. In C. Cazden, V. John and D. Hymes (Eds.), *Functions of Language in the Classroom*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Hasselmo, N. (1970). Code-switching and modes of speaking. In G. G. Gilbert (Ed.) *Texas Studies in Bilingualism*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

McClure, E. (1972). *Ethnoanatomy in a Multilingual Community*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California at Berkeley.

McClure, E. (1977). Aspects of code-switching in the discourse of bilingual Mexican-American children. In M. Saville-Troike (ed.) *Linguistics and Anthropology*. (Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics). Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University.

McClure, E. (1981). Formal and functional aspects of the code-switched discourse of bilingual children. In R. Durán (Ed.), *Latino Language and Communicative Behavior*. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex.

McClure, E. and McClure, M. (1977). Ethnoreconstruction. *Anthropological Linguistics*, 19, 104-110.

Paz, O. (1985). *Tiempo Nublado*. Mexico, D. F.: Editorial Artemisa.

Pfaff, C. (1975). Syntactic constraints on code-switching: a quantitative study of Spanish/English. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Linguistic Society of America, 1975.

Raluy, Poudevida, A. and Monterde, F. (1982). *Diccionario Porrúa de la Lengua Española*. Mexico, D. F.: Editorial Porrua.

Riding, A. (1985). *Distant Neighbors, A Portrait of the Mexicans*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Schaffer, D. (1978). The place of code-switching in linguistic contacts. In M. Paradis (Ed.), *Aspects of Bilingualism*, Columbia, S. C.: Hornbeam Press, pp. 265-274.

Valdés, G. (1981). Code-switching as a deliberate verbal strategy: a microanalysis of direct and indirect requests. In R. Durán (Ed.), *Latino Language and Communicative Behavior*. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex.

Valdés, G. (1990). Consideraciones teórico-metodológicas para el estudio del bilingüalismo inglés-español en el lado mexicano de la frontera. *Mexican Studies. Estudios Mexicanos* 6(1):43-66.

Valdés-Fallis, G. (1976). Social interaction and code-switching patterns: a case study of Spanish/English alternation. In G. Keller, R. Teschner and S. Viera (Eds.), *Bilingualism in the Bicentennial and Beyond*. New York: The Bilingual Press.

Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series, Vol. 3, 1992

Modality as a Strategy in Interaction: Epistemic Modality in the Language of Native and Non-Native Speakers of English

Elise Kärkkäinen

This paper forms part of a larger study (Kärkkäinen 1991) which focused not so much on second-language learners and language learning but, rather, on examining the semantic system of modality from the point of view of discourse analysis and pragmatics, and for the most part in a cross-cultural body of data. I outlined the functions of primarily epistemic modality in conversational interaction between native speakers of English and advanced Finnish university students of English. Thus, the inspiration for the study came from linguistics, "if only from difficulties within linguistics", as Stubbs (1983, p. 67) puts it, as it seems very obvious that modality is an aspect of language that has not been adequately captured by syntactic or semantic theories. However, due to the nature of the corpus data, I also acquired a great deal of information on the problems that Finnish learners of English encounter in this area of language use, and I will here concentrate on that aspect of my study.

THE DATA

I analyzed epistemic modality in a body of data collected in the Department of English, University of Oulu, during 1985-1988 in the Contrastive (Finnish/ English) Discourse Analysis Project carried out under the guidance of Professor Heikki Nyyssönen.

The empirical design followed in broad outline the approach by Edmondson et al (1984). Our corpus consisted of 48 simulated task-oriented conversations between a Finnish student of English (NNS) and a native speaker of English (NS) (approx. 7 hours and some 75,000 words). The conversations involved a problem or a delicate issue that had to be brought up by one of the participants, and it was hoped that some kind of agreement would be reached on it in the course of the interaction. A number of Finnish-Finnish and English-English recordings were also made for comparison.

Despite the fact that they were simulations, we were very happy with the resulting conversations, since the participants themselves rated them as fairly natural or natural in almost all cases. This may have been mainly due to the fact that, besides carefully preparing the participants and trying to make the situation as relaxed as possible, the test persons were left on their own in the room during the actual recording (Kärkkäinen and Raudaskoski 1988).

EPISTEMIC MODALITY -- FROM SEMANTICS TO PRAGMATICS

Epistemic modality refers to modal expressions that convey the speaker's commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed by him/her. This may refer to how certain the speaker feels about the content of his/her utterance or how likely he/ she thinks it is, but also in some cases to a process of inference made by the speaker (Palmer 1986, p. 51, Lyons 1977, p. 797, Westney 1986, p. 311 etc.). In spoken interaction linguistic categories expressing epistemic modality include modal auxiliaries, modal adverbs, modal lexical verbs, parenthetical clauses and, to a lesser extent, modal adjectives and nouns.

When it comes to semantic accounts of the linguistic items that serve to express modality in English, it has been surprisingly common to concentrate on modality only as it is signalled by the English modal verbs or modals (this has been done by Twaddell 1965, Ehrman 1966, Boyd and Thorne 1969, Bouma 1975, Hermerén 1978, Palmer 1979, and Coates 1983, for example). This is understandable in view of the fact that, because the modals are more integrated within the structure of the clause than other modal expressions, they are considered to be more central in the system (Perkins 1983, p. 104).

The **ambiguity** of modal expressions has become apparent in many of the semantic studies named above: modal items, especially modal verbs, may express a multitude of meanings. In addition to being capable of expressing both subjective and objective types of meaning, a single modal verb may have both an epistemic meaning and a non-epistemic (or root) meaning, or even several non-epistemic meanings. What is more, it may have these meanings simultaneously, inside one and the same utterance, that is, it may be **indeterminate** between two meanings. The latter phenomenon has not usually been accounted for in semantic analyses, even though Palmer draws attention briefly to the difficulty of distinguishing discrete and clear categories (Palmer 1979, pp. 172-178). Coates (1983), however, proposes a fuzzy set theory to account for the indeterminacy of modal verb meanings. (Hers, incidentally, is one of the few semantic approaches that is actually based on corpus data, including also spoken English.) She claims that a modal verb may, for one thing, be ambiguous, that is, it may not be possible to decide which of two meanings is intended; a modal may be ambiguous even between an epistemic and a non-epistemic meaning, as in the following:

> He *must* understand that we mean business. (= (Epistemic) 'Surely he understands that we mean business' or (Root) 'It is essential that he understand that we mean business') (p. 16)

It is, however, very likely that in many (if by no means all) cases the examination of an utterance in context would enable the hearer to exclude one of the interpretations. But what is more significant in Coates's model is that it allows a modal also to be indeterminate (in Coates's terms, a merger), so that even the context may fail to exclude one of two possible meanings. Yet, it is not necessary to decide which meaning is intended before the example can be understood, as follows:

A: Newcastle Brown is a jolly good beer.
B: Is it?
A: Well it ought to be at that price.

> ("Here it is not clear whether the speaker is referring to the maker's obligation to provide good beer (Root OUGHT), or whether he is making a logical assumption -- 'it costs a lot, therefore it is good' (Epistemic OUGHT)." (p. 17)

Preisler (1986) claims along similar lines that examples with modal verbs are often ambiguous and that "if the ambiguity is not resolved by the context, the reason is perhaps that it is not intended to" (p. 91). Here, then, we are taking the step from semantic to pragmatic. Thomas (1988) draws attention to so-called complex illocutionary acts and the communicative advantages that speakers may obtain from exploiting these. She distinguishes between **ambiguity** and **ambivalence**: with ambiguity, which is (indeed) a semantic/ grammatical term, it is normally the case that only one meaning is intended by the speaker, while with ambivalence, which operates at the pragmatic level, both speaker and addressee understand that more than one interpretation is possible. We may conclude, then, that Coates's term indeterminacy and Thomas's term ambivalence refer to the same phenomenon, which can be considered at least to some extent intentional on the part of the speaker (whereas ambiguity is unintentional).

Preisler (1986) further observes that the basic meanings of modal forms are in themselves extremely general or **context-indifferent** (emphasis added). He states that the modal verbs, for example, are semantically inexplicit and are "prone to take on overtones of interpersonal meaning which derive from the particular context in which they are used" (pp. 91, 96).

Perkins (1983) is among the first to relate modality to the functions of the utterances that are being modalized. He points out that the unified conceptual system of semantic modality interacts with contextual and pragmatic factors, so that of the utterance functions or illocutionary acts distinguished by Searle (1976), assertives appear to have a close relationship to epistemic modality and directives to deontic modality (Perkins 1983, p. 14, cf. also Palmer 1986, p. 13). However, he emphasizes that this is not a one-to-one relationship and that it is not the (semantics of a) modal auxiliary, for example, that determines the illocutionary force of an utterance. The force is entirely due to the context of utterance, as in the following example:

You may go. - can be uttered as a command
You may smoke. - can be uttered as the giving of permission

and yet in both cases the modal verb *may* would in most semantic treatments be analyzed as deontic 'permissive' *may*. Implicitly, Perkins thus draws attention to the fact that the modal verbs, for example, comparatively seldom act as illocutionary force indicating devices (or IFIDs, such as performative verbs). It is only in the case of deontic (root) meaning that this kind of fairly straightforward form-function relationship is at all common. In most other cases, and certainly in the case of epistemic modality, this relationship is of a more complex kind.

Perkins (1983) claims that few linguists have an adequate working definition of modality at the semantic level. So far, there is also no unified definition of what might constitute modality at the level of interaction. In general terms, at the pragmatic level we are dealing with **illocutionary commitment**, i.e. with various ways of subscribing to a speech act (Lyons 1981). Notions such as **commitment/detachment** (Stubbs 1986), **modification of illocutionary force** (Holmes 1984) and **hedging** (Hübler 1983) have been used to account for the functions of a large number of surface structure categories in language, including and often focusing on expressions of epistemic modality.

In my study, I hypothesized that epistemic modality has a bearing on what Leech (1983) calls the rhetorical force of the utterance, "i.e. the meaning it conveys regarding s's adherence to rhetorical principles (e.g. how far s is being truthful, polite, ironic)" (p. 17). Epistemic modality was thus examined as a strategic device in **the Interpersonal and the Textual Rhetoric** of Leech (1983). It became apparent that rather than completely determining the illocutionary force of utterances, epistemic modality is more likely to first of all modify it in various ways, and secondly to completely ambiguate it. In this way, epistemic items may have a **strategic function** in discourse.

A systematic description of the functions of epistemic items in connected discourse is both a difficult and a time-consuming task. First of all, the very identification of epistemic items is not unproblematic, because, as we have seen, an item may be ambivalent or indeterminate even in its context of use. Furthermore, to tackle the actual functions of epistemic items, there is no suitable model of spoken discourse that could be applied on the huge number of occurrences of epistemic modality in the data. Therefore, a modified speech act approach was used as a starting-point for analysis, i.e. Searle's five basic speech act categories were applied to the data (Searle 1976). This was done in order to see whether there are any restrictions on the occurrence of epistemic modality in Searle's five act types, but also to find out whether the act categories of speech act theory are at all applicable to the analysis of epistemic expressions in continuing discourse. As will be seen, these questions are interconnected: even though when trying to decide on the speech act status of a given utterance I looked at both what preceded in the discourse and how the hearer interpreted it; that is, I looked at the utterance as part of connected discourse, it was frequently impossible to say whether I was dealing with an assertive or a directive, for example. Very often the utterance could have been either or, or in fact both. This is not very surprising if we take into account that speech act theory did not develop these act categories for the purpose of analyzing connected discourse (cf. Stubbs 1983a; 1986, pp. 8, 12 and his criticism on speech act theory). It is even less surprising in view of the fact that natural language by its very nature is often vague and indeterminate; speech acts can be deliberately or genuinely vague, and speakers cannot "really" be held accountable for what they said (Stubbs 1983a, pp. 485-486, Edmondson and House 1981, pp. 95-97).

It therefore became obvious that the speech act approach could only act as a negative frame of reference: the division into assertives, directives and commissives (these being the main types of speech acts that involved epistemic modality) was relatively unilluminating in itself and also difficult to carry out in practice. But, when going deeper into the reason why a speech act taxonomy was difficult to apply, two important functions of epistemic modality emerged that have not been commented on in earlier studies: the use of epistemic modality for saving one's own face in interaction, and, further, for manipulating and persuading one's addressee.

In a subsequent closer analysis of the data, the unit of analysis was extended into a longer stretch or sequence of discourse where a particularly threatening issue, a face-threatening act (following Brown and Levinson 1978), was brought up and discussed, and where at least a preliminary agreement was reached. I examined the occurrences and co-occurrence patterns of epistemic items in these sequences, as speakers appeared to use them in a very systematic and purposeful way to achieve various conversational goals and to produce a particular effect in the minds of their addressees. Thus, more evidence was obtained for the different types of strategic functions that epistemic modality appeared to have in interaction.

However, there are several things worth noting here. In the same way as it was difficult to assign one single speech act label to an utterance containing one or more epistemic items, it was by no means possible to assign one single function to a given occurrence of epistemic modality. Often more than one thing was achieved simultaneously. It is also a commonplace in pragmatics and discourse analysis that making judgments about the speaker's intentions can be both impossible and futile, and yet one cannot altogether avoid that when describing the functions of epistemic modality. One can make distinctions at a theoretical level into epistemic modality used to indicate genuine uncertainty and epistemic modality used as a conversation-interactional strategy, but in a given instance of use it is only possible to distinguish varying degrees to which one function is more prominent than the other. And finally, in so far as epistemic devices are used as a conversational strategy, they often function together with other strategic elements in interaction (cf. other modality markers below) and are only one strategic device among many.

EPISTEMIC MODALITY AS A STRATEGY IN INTERACTION

It is possible to distinguish three types of strategic functions that epistemic modality may have in spoken interaction: a politeness strategy, a face-saving strategy and a persuasion and manipulation strategy. Before going into these functions, however, some quantitative results from the corpus study are presented.

The first immediately obvious finding was that Finnish students used fewer tokens of epistemic modality than did native speakers of English (507 vs. 899). With both groups of subjects, epistemic items were clearly most common in assertive speech acts, the total numbers being 767 for native speakers and 451 for students. It is therefore understandable that earlier pragmatic research has concentrated almost exclusively on the use of epistemic modality in assertions (cf. Hübler 1983 for example). Correspondingly, the total numbers of epistemic devices in directives were 132 for native speakers and 56 for students. By contrast, epistemic expressions were rare in commissive and expressive speech acts; deontic modality is indeed more typical in commissives and evaluative modality in expressives (Palmer 1986, pp. 13-14).

The most common type of epistemic devices used by native speakers of English in assertives were (in absolute numbers) the sentential adverbs, while modal auxiliaries and parentheticals/ lexical verbs were somewhat less common, but equally often used compared to each other (see Table 1).

A comparison of the findings across the two subject groups yielded certain interesting results that pointed towards epistemic modality as a truly pragmatic device, whose semantic content has perhaps been overemphasized. Table 1 shows the frequencies of representatives of epistemic modality in both subject groups, as related to the total amount of speech in each group (NSs 44,053 words, NNSs 30,961 words) to make comparison possible:

Table 1. The most frequent types of epistemic modality in NS and NNS speech (number of tokens per words spoken by subjects in each group).

Native speakers of English:		Finnish students of English:	
adverbs	0.71 %	parentheticals	0.60 %
parentheticals	0.45 %	adverbs	0.46 %
modal verbs	0.45 %	modal verbs	0.28 %
adjectives	0.13 %	adjectives	0.13 %

As can be seen in the table, the order of the two most frequent types of expressions is reversed for students, and also the relative frequencies of modal adverbs and modal verbs are smaller than those for native speakers. It is striking that the students as a whole tended to use speaker-oriented parenthetical expressions of the type *I think* and *I know* more often (relatively speaking) than native speakers. To find even clearer tendencies in the students' interlanguage, the 48 students were divided into three groups according to their linguistic competence. Table 2 shows the differences between the linguistically most competent students (Group A) and the least competent students in the corpus (Group C) as to their use of different types of epistemic devices.

Table 3 shows the relative frequencies of epistemic devices in the speech of three groups (again in relation to the total amount of speech in each group): among native speakers of English, in Group A and in Group C.

It is clear that the Finnish students of English **use fewer epistemic expressions** in their speech than do native speakers of English. They also seem to favour **different types** of epistemic devices from those used by native speakers. Even Group A uses relatively **fewer modal auxiliaries** than native speakers (0.38% vs. 0.45%), and resorts to parentheticals instead. Also, the students in this group use relatively **fewer adverbs** than native speakers (0.59% vs. 0.71%). Group C appears

Table 2. Use of epistemic devices in two student subject groups: Group A (linguistically most competent) and Group C (linguistically least competent).

Parentheticals + lexical verbs		Adverbs		Modals		Adjectives	
GROUP A (14 students):							
I think	36	really	25	might	15	sure	6
I know	11	of course	18	could	7	I'm sure	5
I suppose	4	maybe	11	'll	7	possible	3
seems	4	probably	6	won't	5	I'm not sure	1
sounds	4	perhaps	4	may	2	sure thing	1
I don't		definitely	1	wouldn't	2		
think	3	surely	1	going to	1		
I guess	1	certainly	1	gonna	1		
tend	1	possibly	1	will	1		
it seems				must	1		
to be	1			should	1		
				would	1		
total	65		68		44		16
GROUP C (10 students):							
I think	21	of course	3	'll	3	sure	7
I don't		maybe	3	must	2	I'm sure	2
think	3	really	2	wouldn't	2		
I suppose	3	probably	2	going to	1		
I guess	2	surely	2	might	1		
seem	1	perhaps	1	should	1		
I know	1	possibly	1				
		definitely	1				
total	31		15		10		9

to use parentheticals as a kind of compensatory strategy for both modal verbs and adverbs (0.74% vs. native speaker 0.45%). It is indeed a common observation in linguistic research that the English modal auxiliaries are difficult for foreign students to learn (Holmes (1982) makes this observation about French and Dutch students). That the Finnish students had difficulties with epistemic adverbs as well seems significant.

Table 3. Relative frequency of epistemic devices in NS, Group A and Group C speech.

NSs:			
adverbs 0.71%	parenth. 0.45%	modals 0.45%	adj. 0.13%
Group A:			
adverbs 0.59%	parenth. 0.56%	modals 0.38%	adj. 0.14%
Group C:			
parenth. 0.74%	adverbs 0.36%	modals 0.24%	adj. 0.22%

On-the-Record and Conventionalized Modality: A Politeness Strategy

In recent pragmatic research, several scholars have offered frameworks of politeness to account for violations of the Cooperative Principle and for indirection in language (cf. Leech 1983, Brown & Levinson 1978, Scollon & Scollon 1983, R.Lakoff 1975, Tannen 1984, Arndt & Janney 1985 and Östman 1986). What is common to these is that they deal with the modification, i.e. strengthening or weakening, of the illocutionary force of utterances. The role of epistemic modality as a politeness strategy is already fairly well established (cf. Holmes 1982, Coates 1983, Hübler 1983, Markkanen 1985, Westney 1986). My use of the term *politeness* comprises the positive and negative types of politeness in Brown and Levinson's taxonomy only.

In the present study, eight conversations were chosen for closer examination, involving complaints and possibly offers or suggestions for further measures by both native (four situations) and Finnish speakers (four situations). In the data, epistemic modality appeared to be employed by native speakers of English mainly to express on-the-record negative (or deference) politeness, or concern that the speaker shows for the hearer's right to be free from imposition. This can be seen in Example 1, where NS protests against NNS's behaviour; the Finn has again forgotten that they had had an appointment to play tennis the day before.

Possibly because NNS already hastened to apologize, NS presents not a direct but a very elaborately qualified complaint (lines 3-18) and an even more qualified suggestion (lines 18-22) to deal with the situation. There are a number of modality markers or softeners: gambits like *actually* and *you know*, vague hedges like *or something*, and fumbles like *I don't know* and *I'm just wondering*. These items are in most contexts considered to be expressive of negative or deference politeness. In addition, NS uses the epistemic expressions *might*, *really* and *maybe*. By virtue of the fact that these are low-intensity modal items, they serve to mitigate the effect of

Example 1:

(NNS has himself brought up the issue first)

NNS: (…) This is again the second time ■ er ■ already a
second time er I [forgot, I'm really - I'm really sorry.
NS: Yes ■ yes that's what] I was thinking actually, [erm…
NNS: Ahh…]
NS: … ■ I - I waited you know, half an hour or something
and ■ I thought you **might** turn up. ■ [Of course I -…
NNS: And maybe…]
NS: … I paid anyway the sixty marks for actually getting
in there…
NNS: Yeah.
NS: … so I thought I **might** as well wait for you and I -
I spent half an hour and just ■ doing nothing **really**,
erm ■ ((clicks tongue)) I don't [know er ■ …
NNS: Er] ■■ you - you should be angry.
NS: Well, yes, [well…
NNS: Er…]
NS: … I be- ((creaky voice)) ((clicks tongue)), it was
irritating **obviously** at the time. I'm just wondering ■
maybe, you know, we should drop the idea of actually
playing tennis, erm ■ if you're particularly busy er at
this time and, I don't know, **maybe** start [again in
a few months' time, or something.
NNS: Well these few weeks I am] but otherwise I - I like
tennis and I like to pay it er - play it, I don't know
how regularly but er I'm not sure ■ er. (…)

■ = pause
[ ] = overlapping speech
underlining = contrastive stress or emphasis

the complaint and the suggestion, and in this context indicate negative politeness. Later in the conversation NS repeats the suggestion in a slightly different form, but again qualified by a number of low-intensity epistemic items:

Example 2:

NS: Well, this is what I mean,] I think we should probably,
you know, sort of give it a rest until you've finished
whatever project you're [working on...
NNS: Oh...]
NS: ... and er...
NNS: Erm...
NS: ... maybe pick it up again...

I think, *probably* and *maybe* in this context are on-the-record and fairly conventionalized indications of politeness behaviour. These, as well as *might*, *perhaps* and *of course* are among the high-frequency items in native-speaker talk.

As for Finnish students, the numbers of types and tokens of epistemic expressions that they used for making complaints and suggestions were much lower. It is significant, however, that there were no great differences in frequencies between students and native speakers in our project corpus as regards the use of other than epistemic markers or hedges, namely those forms that are directed only at some part of the proposition, i.e. some lexical item in it. These include expressions like *a little*, *sort of*, *just*, *and things like that*, etc., which were used extensively by the students. The students were also able to use items that we labelled gambits relatively well: these refer to conversational lubricants such as *well*, *I mean*, *you know*, *as a matter of fact* etc. (The term *gambit* is understood as defined by Edmondson and House 1981: 61-65). Since these two strategic devices of conversation also have a clear politeness function, the fact that students were fairly good at using them would seem to indicate that they were aware of the politeness aspects of interaction.

Finnish students were also able to use certain types of epistemic expressions to achieve a politeness effect. Firstly, they made extensive use of the parentheticals *I think* and *I know*.[1] In the whole corpus, the former parenthetical was used more, even in absolute terms, by the students than by native speakers (NNS 101 vs. NS 91). It can be argued that the predominance of *I think* may be due to interference from the Finnish *musta (tuntuu)* 'in my opinion' or *luulen/ luulisin* 'I think/ I would think', which in turn may explain why *I think* is often used slightly unidiomatically. The Finnish equivalents are a much weightier means for expressing opinion than *I think* seems to be; *I think* seldom has full semantic content in conversational discourse (those instances where it clearly indicated thinking were left outside consideration completely). However, students may be making use of the fact that it is quite transparent semantically, i.e. it expresses an explicitly subjective view of the speaker. The link between the semantic content and the function of mitigation is thus not difficult even for a non-native speaker to infer. Also the fact that it is clause-external rather than clause-internal can perhaps make it easier to use; it does not have to be integrated into the sentence structure and it may therefore be easier to process and give the non-native speaker more thinking time. This may be one of the reasons why students use as many as 12 different types of explicitly subjective parenthetical clauses, whereas native speakers only use 9. Secondly, the students also know how to make use of *maybe* and *perhaps* for the politeness function. These adverbs are already a very conventionalized, on-the-record strategy for attenuating the force of indirect requests and suggestions, to the point that they have been called modal particles by Lyons (1981, p. 238). It might even be argued that there is no longer anything truly strategic about them. This is then reflected in their frequency of occurrence, so that they are also part of the students' active competence.

The conclusion can perhaps be made, then, that the students are able to use epistemic items, along with other types of hedging devices, for the affective or interpersonal function when these items are either very explicit in semantic content or when they are of a relatively conventionalized or routinized kind. In any case, it appears that epistemic modality is perhaps primarily used, by native and non-native speakers alike, for the function of paying respect to the hearer's negative or personal face, or his/her need for autonomy, rather than for taking notice of the hearer's positive or interpersonal face, or his/her need for acceptance.

Off-the-Record (or On-the-Record) Modality: A Face-Saving Strategy

By *face-saving*, more narrowly than Brown and Levinson, I refer solely to the concern that the speaker feels for himself/herself and the extent to which he/she is preoccupied with and wants to pursue his/her own interests in conversation, rather than acting in a more hearer-supportive way. Another way of naming this function might be to call it something like *a leeway strategy*. It largely involves ambiguating utterances, so that it becomes very difficult to work out what their illocutionary forces are. Speakers choose to be evasive and to beat about the bush, in order to leave themselves an 'out'. They may want to go off record, or resort to hints of various types, so that the illocutionary status of the utterance remains vague and indeterminate. According to Brown and Levinson, it is not possible to attribute only one clear communicative intention to the act, but the speaker provides himself with a number of defensible interpretations (1978, p. 216). Thus, the speaker leaves it up to the addressee how to interpret the message, and the addressee must make some inference to be able to do this. In a lot of cases the link between the literal force and the illocutionary force of an utterance that contains a number of modal items can be almost impossible to retrieve. At the same time there may be cases where off-record strategies are used in contexts where they are unambiguously on record, i.e. the context contains so many clues that only one interpretation is in fact viable (cf. Brown and Levinson 1978, pp. 139, 217 and Leech 1983, pp. 97-99). Thus, it is the context that determines whether we are dealing with on-the-record or off-the-record language.

The occurrences of epistemic items were studied in admissions of guilt and responsibility, again in eight conversations, where speakers were likely to pay a certain amount of attention to preserving their own faces. Not surprisingly, it was

Example 3:

NS: So ■ about - about the car, about the scratch. It's - [it's very bad.
NNS: ((inaudible))] Well ...
NS: It needs to be rep - it does need to be repaired, **I don't know.**
[I looked at it ...
NNS: Yeah ((inaudible)).]
NS: ... and it didn't **seem** to be too serious, I mean **maybe** (well) ...
NNS: Yeah, well, that's the thing about cars. You make a
little scratch and you have to paint the whole car ha ha.
NS: Aah no, [**not really.**
NNS: Of course] we can er ... Perhaps we could arrange it
so that just a smaller portion of the car is painted.
NS: Small (what)? [Noo, you can only do ...
NNS: Some parts.]
NS: ... er ■ in my experience uhm (you have scratches on
cars) maybe it goes to a garage and then they ■ they
er ((inhales)) - they make the surface smooth again
and then they paint it and it's - it's not such a
big job, **I don't think.**
NNS: Yeah, [yeah ...
NS: It] **shouldn't** be so [expensive.
NNS: ... yeah], yeah. ■ But perhaps you - perhaps we
could find some - some small ■ small little place
where they - they [do these cheaply, you know.
NS: Uhuh.] ■ Well **I think** - (I was about) to say before
we go on that I **will have to** er - er pay for the
damage **maybe.** It was my fault.
NNS: Mhm.

the native speakers of English who had mastered this kind of linguistic behaviour.[2] In their speech, epistemic items tended to cluster into utterances and utterance sequences in ways that were not in line with their actual semantic content. In the following FTA sequence, the NS is putting out a great number of feelers to explore the situation.

In a very roundabout way, the NS tries to establish what the NNS's views are on the seriousness of the scratch that he has caused to his car (lines 1, 3-4, 6). This is a seemingly illogical sequence that does not really make sense if we give each (not necessarily epistemic) item its full meaning: see e.g. *It does need to be repaired, I don't know*. NS maybe expects NNS to say that he does not regard the scratch as too serious, but NNS is not very compliant. There is an even clearer example at the end of the extract (lines 24-26): NS apparently admits that he is responsible for scratching the car, and offers to pay for the damage. But the offer, *I will have to pay for the* *damage maybe*, is expressed in such a qualified way in which it is difficult to say whether it is in fact an offer (and a commissive speech act) or just a speculation about future arrangements (in which case it is an assertive), even though we take into account the preceding discourse. *Will have to* and *maybe* ambiguate the illocutionary force of the utterance, so that the illocutionary point becomes vague and indeterminate.

This kind of strategic play is intentional to some extent, inviting the hearer to validate or at least to react in some way before a commitment is made. It also makes it possible for the NS later to actually withdraw his offer without losing face.

Here epistemic expressions are truly pragmatic in that their exact semantic meaning does not seem to carry all that much weight: it is possible to use two epistemic expressions with meanings directly opposite to each other inside one and the same utterance, such as *will have to* and *maybe* (one expressing certainty and the other lack of certainty). This is actually a long-established phenomenon at sentence level semantics, where, it seems to me, it has not been possible to give a good enough explanation for this phenomenon. Such co-occurrence patterns were not found in the on-the-record politeness use in my data.

Compare how a NNS, a Finnish student of English, admits that she has broken the TV set in the lounge of a student dormitory:

Example 4:

NS: [...] well, I'm kind of er in charge of it now and
I found out that it's broken.
NNS: Yes, and I think I'm responsible for that.
...
NS: [...] I'm in a funny position, because I don't
wanna have to pay for it myself to have it repaired.
NNS: Yes, yes. Well, it's quite clear that I have to pay,
but...
NS: Uhum.
NNS: ... will it be a very big...?

There is no doubt about it: she admits straight away that she has broken the TV. The student, admittedly, uses *I think*, but this parenthetical is not a very efficient way of saving face, especially if the very next word, *I* (in *I'm responsible for that)*, is stressed and conveys unconditional surrender. When accepting that she has to pay for the damage, the student even stresses her commitment by *it's quite clear*, which is rather more explicit in content than, for example, *of course* and does not leave much room for the NNS to move (apparently she is only worried whether it will be a very big bill).

Other admissions of guilt or responsibility by the students included the following (the student did not actually offer to pay for the damage in any of the cases, but only agreed to what the NS suggested):

Example 5:

NNS2: Well, yeah, oh dear ■ I actually - I ■ tried to be
a bit too mechanically and so I broke it
I th - I'm afraid.

NNS3: And er ■ I was wondering er ■ have you grown any
familiar with the er television set here because I
seem to have broken it or something?

NNS4: And so I came down here last night and I putted the
telly on and ■ all of a sudden it - it got stuck ■ and only the channel
number one is - is ■ playing.

With NNS2, there is again no doubt about it: he is guilty, even though he uses a few modality markers or gambits to play down the effect a little (such as *actually*, *a bit* and *well*). It is striking that the student chooses a marker of emotional attitude, *I'm afraid*, which presupposes that what it refers to is true and is therefore strictly speaking not epistemic -- he clearly intended to say *I think*, which would indeed have left a little more room for him. NNS3, rarely enough, uses an epistemic device, *seem*, which together with the non-epistemic hedge *or something* takes back some of the force of the actual admission (which is nevertheless there). With NNS4, finally, we have a clever example of an off-the-record admission of guilt, where the illocutionary point of the utterance is left ambiguous -- but even here there are no epistemic devices used to achieve this effect.

The **implicitness** of epistemic modality becomes obvious in contexts like the above, where speakers are stalling with the help of these expressions. Epistemic items are capable of expressing the speaker's views and ideas implicitly and unobtrusively, so that speakers cannot be held to have committed to just one communicative intent. In line with Östman (1986), implicitness could indeed be considered an essential criterion for pragmatics (as opposed to semantics): "An implicit choice is defined as a linguistic choice that the speaker in principle can deny that s/he has made" (pp. 23-26).

The numbers of epistemic expressions used for face-saving by the students are much smaller than those used by native speakers, and the types of expressions chosen follow the same pattern as was established for the politeness use. *I think* again figures highest in the students' speech, whereas modal auxiliaries do not appear to be used much: in admissions of guilt and responsibility, a total of 9 modals was used by the students as opposed to the 66 modals used by native speakers! Similarly, there is a great gap in the frequencies of epistemic adverbs in these situations: 23 NNS instances vs. 114 NS instances.

On the basis of some recent studies on modality, it seems that it is especially epistemic modal verbs and adverbs that may convey implicit attitudes of the speaker, either subjective or objective ones (Halliday 1985, p. 333, Preisler 1986, p. 95).

Their implicitness seems to be based on the following properties. Firstly, they are quite integrated into the sentence/ utterance structure. Epistemic adverbs are more integrated into the sentence structure than are parenthetical clauses, while the modal verbs are the most highly integrated items of all. Secondly, as we have seen, especially the modal auxiliaries are frequently ambiguous at the semantic level between an epistemic and a non-epistemic (root) meaning, so that it is almost impossible to say even in context whether a certain occurrence is epistemic or not.

A conclusion may thus be drawn from the above examples that Finnish students do not seem to master the more implicit use of epistemic modality in their less conventionalized context of use. It appears that something that is conveyed as extra information, that is deniable and vague, can indeed be difficult for a learner to perceive, let alone use actively. It is not surprising, then, that students resort to a device that is explicit (in this case explicitly subjective) in nature, namely to parentheticals and especially to *I think*.

Off-the-Record Modality: A Persuasion and Manipulation Strategy

In the following, a tentative account of the use of epistemic modality to manipulate one's addressee, in order to achieve one's own conversational goals, will be presented. This type of use, already quite clearly off-the-record, relates directly to the rhetorical as opposed to the illocutionary force of an utterance. It cuts across the Textual Rhetoric and the Interpersonal Rhetoric of Leech: to some extent the rhetorical devices of written language, such as the maxims of End-weight and End-focus, or different ways of giving prominence to an item, can be used in spoken language, too. In addition, irony is a powerful device used in the service of this strategy.

Not even the very fluent students of English, or Group A in our corpus, seemed capable of using epistemic devices for the expression of irony, and what is more they had difficulty in recognizing ironic meaning. An instance of this can perhaps be seen in the following example, where NS and NNS have just had a fairly heated discussion about the tennis appointment and have decided to change their regular day for tennis:

Example 6:

NS: You're quite sure you are free ((inaudible))?
There's nothing ■ that you might have forgotten,
that's happening next Friday, the week after it?
NNS: Right.
NS: Uhm...

The NNS, who is linguistically highly competent, does not appear to recognize that the NS is being ironic, by way of being overpolite (cf. the Irony Principle, Leech 1983, p.82), when he is checking that the NNS has not forgotten any previous arrangements for Friday. It is of course also possible that the student did not miss the irony but chose to ignore it deliberately. In the case of non-native speakers it is sometimes quite difficult to judge what is going on because of the slight unidiomaticity of their English. Here the linguistic device that the student uses to reply, *right*, would seem to indicate that he treats the NS's question as an assertion that does not require an answer but rather an acknowledgement or an indication of agreement. Where *no* would in fact be required to show agreement with a negative statement, Finnish students commonly used *yes*, and moreover they tended to overuse *right* as a kind of generalized backchannel and responding gambit. Even though it is not quite clear how the student interpreted the NS's directive, it is nevertheless obvious that directives "disguised" in the form of declarative sentences and containing one or more epistemic elements (in this case *might*) can make their force or speech act status more difficult to recognize. They are thus directives done off-the-record, and may be, lent themselves, for manipulative as well as politeness and face-saving purposes.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SECOND LANGUAGE TEACHING

Why are epistemic devices so difficult for Finnish (and possibly also for other) foreign language learners to use?

It is indeed a wide-spread view that the use of the English modal verbs provides difficulties for learners. The acquisition of some of their meanings is difficult even for native speakers: Gibbs (1990, p. 297), among others, claims that 'Hypothetical and Epistemic Possibility' of the modals *can*, *could*, *may* and *might* is acquired much later than other meanings of these modals. It has been argued that a 'modality reduction' in language learners' use of English is to some extent 'teaching induced' (Holmes 1988, p. 40 quoting Kasper); most textbooks cover epistemic modality only very sporadically, if at all (Holmes 1988, p. 38). Indeed, one important reason for the lack of these expressions in the Finnish students' speech is lack of explicit teaching, which in turn is due to lack of research on their functions.

Several other reasons have been suggested. Holmes (1982) suggests that the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic modality (at the semantic level) is difficult to make in practice. Secondly, according to her, it is difficult to define the precise point on the scale of certainty expressed by a particular item. Thirdly, these linguistic forms may simultaneously convey a variety of meanings -- Holmes is here referring to the intrapersonal meaning, i.e. when the speaker is genuinely uncertain about something, and the more interpersonal meaning, i.e. of taking your hearer into consideration.

My counter-arguments to Holmes's claims are as follows. As is actually reflected by her first two comments, the teaching of epistemic modality has so far been restricted to the level of semantic meaning. It seems obvious that the interactive use of epistemic modality is in fact not so tightly connected with the semantic meaning of these items as Holmes seems to imply, and that these items can be scattered throughout an utterance and over a longer stretch of discourse according to some other principle than on the basis of their exact semantic meaning. Furthermore, it may not even be necessary, or indeed possible, to tell an epistemic use from a non-epistemic one; this distinction is an arbitrary and a theoretical one anyway, and it is more important to learn to exploit these devices strategically. It may also not be necessary to know their exact degree of certainty, but, by contrast, students should learn that the degree of certainty that a given item may express in theory should not be taken too literally in actual interaction (cf. *will have to* and *maybe* next to each other in one and the same utterance in Example 3). Finally, it is perhaps worthwhile to point out, while teaching the use of these devices, that even though they may operate at both intrapersonal and interpersonal levels, in practice they often do so simultaneously and that these uses cannot be separated in any rigid way.

In the light of the present study it may in fact be that some types of epistemic devices are difficult to acquire because they are more implicit markers of speaker-attitude, which may make their pragmatic functions more difficult to define. They can be used effectively to modify, and, as we have seen above, especially to ambiguate, any speech act, and it is here that their truly strategic nature comes out. It is especially these properties, **implicitness** and their potential for **off-the-recordness**, that are difficult to pin down and describe, or that have not been adequately described so far.

Also, these functions have not been introduced into second language teaching in any systematic way. Unless being pointed out specifically, something that is conveyed as extra information and that is deniable and vague is likely to be missed by a language learner completely. The student may then not be able to recognize that more than one interpretation is possible in the case of an utterance loaded with epistemic expressions. When speaking the language, the student may find it best to play safe and resort to devices that are quite explicit and predictable as to their interactive effect: explicitly subjective parentheticals, such as *I think*, and also other types of modality markers than epistemic ones.

How, then, could the various functions of epistemic modality in English be integrated into second language teaching?

It is perhaps inevitable that we should begin at the level of the sentence, and teach the semantics of these items first, because of the fairly distinct core meanings that they may have. We should also teach the syntactic patterns related to these meanings. But once we come to the level of discourse, and to the discourse strategies available to speakers, we should no longer aim at an atomistic description of the possible uses of one individual item, but, as Stubbs (1986) puts it:

> ... I think it is possible to show that many features of surface syntax have the function of presenting speakers' attitudes to propositions, illocutions, and words. Individual cases are, of course, widely discussed, but they are seldom if ever brought together into a unified description, in what could be called a **modal grammar** of English. (p. 20; emphasis added)

We should therefore see the manifestations of epistemic modality as one functional device among many, and as part of a large apparatus for generally making adjustments to what we are about to say, for intrapersonal as well as interpersonal purposes. Thus, the idea of a modal grammar is certainly very plausible, as long as we do not expand the range of possible items endlessly. Stubbs himself tends to include almost every conceivable linguistic device in his treatment. However, certain devices are more central than others, depending on the type of discourse that we are talking about; it became evident in my study that epistemic devices are among the most common in spoken discourse, and, moreover, among the most strategic.

Once the students, at university level at the latest, are made aware of the whole range of functions that epistemic devices may have, they can, if they choose, express themselves more "fully" and subtly, at the same time allowing themselves more room to manoeuvre. But it is debatable whether these functions can actually be taught, since by definition they are so implicit and off-the-record (and context-dependent) that they almost escape description, let alone explicit teaching.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Parts of this paper were first presented in the Second Finnish Seminar on Discourse Analysis, September 1988. Since a lot of my research has actually been done since, the present is a much larger version and contains my research framework in its entirety.

THE AUTHOR

Elise Kärkkäinen is currently a Research Associate of the Finnish Academy and a Ph.D. student in the Department of Linguistics, University of California, Santa Barbara. Her research interests include pragmatics, discourse analysis, second-language acquisition and semantics.

NOTES

[1] Besides mitigation, *I think* is used quite extensively as a turn-taking gambit at the beginning of utterances, but these occurrences were not included in the present study.

[2] It might actually be argued that this strategy is more necessary in the simulated conversations of the present corpus than they would be in real conversations, because the participants have to establish some kind of common ground in a not too obvious way. This does not, however, invalidate the claim that a face-saving strategy exists and is made use of by (at least) native speakers, as long as I do not make claims about its relative frequency in a certain type of discourse.

REFERENCES

Arndt, H. and Janney, R.W. (1985). Politeness revisited: cross-modal supportive strategies, *IRAL* XXIII, 4. 281-300.

Bouma, L. (1975). On contrasting the semantics of the modal auxiliaries of German and English. *Lingua* 37, 4, 313-339.

Boyd, J and Thorne, J.P. (1969). The semantics of modal verbs, *Journal of Linguistics* V. 57-74.

Brown, P. and Levinson, S. (1978). Universals in Language Usage: Politeness Phenomena. In: Goody, E. (ed.), *Questions and Politeness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 56-289.

Coates, J. (1983). *The Semantics of the Modal Auxiliaries*. London: Croom Helm.

Edmondson, W. and House, J. (1981). *Let's Talk and Talk about it*. München-Wien-Baltimore: Urban and Schwarzenberg.

Edmondson, W., House, J., Kasper, G. and Stemmer, B. (1984). Learning the pragmatics of discourse: a project report. *Applied Linguistics* 5:2, 113-127.

Ehrman, M. (1966). *The meanings of the modals in present-day American English*. The Hague & Paris: Mouton.

Gibbs, D. (1990). Second language acquisition of the English modal auxiliaries can, *could, may,* and *might*. In *Applied Linguistics* 11:3, 297-314.

Hakulinen, A. (ed.,1989). *Suomalaisen keskustelun keinoja I*. Kieli 4. Department of Finnish, University of Helsinki. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino.

Halliday, M.A.K. 1985. *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*. London: Edward Arnold.

Hermerèn, L. (1978). *On Modality in English: A Study of the Semantics of the Modals*. Lund: Gleerup.

Holmes, J. (1982). Expressing doubt and certainty in English. *RELC Journal* 13:2, 9-28.

Holmes, J. (1984). Modifying illocutionary force. *Journal of Pragmatics* 8, 345-365.

Holmes, J. (1988). Doubt and certainty in ESL textbooks. *Applied Linguistics* 9:1, 21-44.

Hübler, A. (1983). *Understatements and Hedges in English*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Kangasniemi, H. (1987). *Suomen kielen modaaliasteikot*. Unpublished licentiate thesis, Department of Finnish and Lappish, University of Oulu.

Kärkkäinen, E. (1991). *Modality as a Strategy in Spoken Interaction. A Discourse Analytical and Pragmatic Approach with a Particular Focus on the English Language*. Unpublished licentiate thesis, Department of English, University of Oulu.

Kärkkäinen, E. and Raudaskoski, P. (1988). Social language skills of Finnish speakers of English. In Laurinen, L. and Kauppinen, A. (eds.) *Problems in language use and comprehension*. AFinLA Yearbook 1988. Helsinki 1988 105-124.

Lakoff, R. (1975). *Language and woman's place*. New York: Harper Colophon.

Leech, G. (1983). *Principles of Pragmatics*. London: Longman.

Lyons, J. (1977). *Semantics*. Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lyons, J. (1981). *Language, meaning, and context*. London: Fontana.

Markkanen, R. (1985). *Cross-Language Studies in Pragmatics*. Jyväskylä Cross-Language Studies No 11. Department of English, University of Jyväskylä.

Palmer, F.R. (1979). *Modality and the English modals*. London: Longman.

Palmer, F.R. (1986). *Mood and modality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Perkins, M.R. (1983). *Modal expressions in English*. London: Frances Pinter.

Preisler, Bent (1986). *Linguistic Sex Roles in Conversation: Social Variation in the Expression of Tentativeness in English*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Östman, J. (1986). Pragmatics as implicitness. An analysis of question particles in Solf Swedish, with implications for the study of passive clauses and the language of persuasion. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.

Scollon, R. and Scollon, S.B.K. (1983). Face in Interethnic Communication. In Richards, J. and Schmidt, R. (eds.) *Language and Communication*. London: Longman, 156-188.

Searle, J. (1976). A classification of illocutionary acts. *Language in Society* 5, 1-23.

Stubbs, M. (1983a). Can I have that in writing, please? Some neglected topics in speech act theory. *Journal of Pragmatics* 7:5, 479-494.

Stubbs, M. (1983b). *Discourse Analysis: The Sociolinguistic Analysis of Natural Language*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Stubbs, M. (1986). A matter of prolonged field work: notes towards a modal grammar of English. *Applied Linguistics* 7:1, 1-25.

Tannen, D. (1984). *Conversational style: analysing talk among friends*. Norwood: Ablex Publishing Corporation.

Thomas, J. (1988). *Complex Illocutionary Acts and the Analysis of Discourse*. Paper given at the Second Finnish Seminar on Discourse Analysis, Oulu September 1988.

Twaddell, W.E. (1965). *The English verb auxiliaries*. Providence: Brown University Press.

Westney, P. (1986). How to be more or less certain in English: scalarity in epistemic modality. *IRAL* XXIV, 4, 311-320.

Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series, Vol. 3, 1992

Pragmatics of the Use of Nominals in Academic and Professional Genres

Vijay K. Bhatia

The use of complex noun phrases, (complex) nominals and other nominalized expressions has been known to be one of the most controversial characteristics of academic and professional writing. To the specialist community this is an indispensable linguistic device which brings in precision, clarity and unambiguity by promoting text cohesion, facilitating reference to (associated) technical concepts already mentioned and so on; however, to the non-specialist outsider this is a mere ploy to promote solidarity between the members of the specialist community and to keep non-specialists at a respectable distance and is hence regarded by them as nothing more than pure linguistic non-sense bringing in pomposity, verbosity, flabbiness and circumlocution in academic and professional writing, particularly in public documents. The truth, however, lies somewhere in between. This paper examines a number of texts from a wide range of academic and professional discourse in an attempt to unravel the importance of `motive' as a clue to the use of complex nominals and nominalizations in specialist discourse. The paper also discusses some of the tactics specialists use to create (complex) nominals and nominalizations in order to make accessible complex technical concepts in specialist genres.

INTRODUCTION

Complex nominal expressions of various kinds are typically associated with academic and professional genres and have gained a certain degree of notoriety in recent years. To the specialist community this is an indispensable linguistic device which brings in precision, clarity and unambiguity by promoting text cohesion, facilitating reference to (associated) technical concepts already mentioned and so on; however, to the non-specialist outsider this is nothing but one of the common strategies to promote solidarity between the members of the specialist community and to keep non-specialists at a respectable distance and is hence regarded by them as nothing more than pure linguistic non-sense bringing in pomposity and verbosity in academic and professional writing, particularly in public documents. In this paper I wish to consider three areas of academic and professional writing and look at the use of various types of nominal expressions in them in order to study why the academic and professional writers use nominal expressions the way they do. The areas of professional activities I would like to concentrate on are advertisements, scientific and more generally academic and research writing, and legislative provisions.

I would like to look at three major types of nominal expressions. The first type are the complex nominal phrases (Quirk et al., 1982), which are significantly used in advertisements of a particular type. The second type are variously known either as nominal compounds (Williams, 1984) or compound nominal phrases (Salager, 1984), and are typically associated with scientific writing. The third one are conventionally called nominalizations, which are overwhelmingly used in legislative provisions (Bhatia, 1983). Although all three types of nominals are generally grouped together under the broad category of complex noun phrases (see Quirk et al., 1982), it is more appropriate to consider them as distinct for two reasons. First, although they perform more or less similar grammatical functions in the language, they have different grammatical realizations, and secondly, they seem to textualize different aspects of the three genres they have traditionally been associated with. In other words, they have different grammatical as well as discoursal functions in the three genres. Let me give examples from the three genres, first from advertising.

1.

> **The world's first packless, cordless,**
> **lightweight, compact, integrated video light.**
> **The CV-300 from Sunpak.**
>
> Sunpak's advanced video light technology combines the halogen dichronic light and a ni-cad power all in one stylized, compact unit. The CV-300 gives you brilliant light and natural color while shooting remains easy and maneuverable. It tilts down 15 degrees for close-up lighting and up to 45 degrees for soft bounce-lighting effects. All with no separate battery pack to carry or cords to get in your way or come loose.
>
> The CV-300's special 20 minute Battery Cluster Module can be changed in seconds, so you can continue to shoot during long scenes. Charging time is almost twice as fast as conventional units --just 8 hours. And, additional Battery Cluster Modules are available.
>
> The Sunpak CV-300 Integrated Video Light. It lets there be light...anywhere. [From *Popular Photography*, July 1988, p.41]

The headlines illustrate precisely the true character of the noun phrase in advertising.

The world's first packless, cordless, lightweight, compact, integrated video light

The most striking characteristic of this type of complex nominal phrase is the degree and to a lesser extent the complexity of modification of the noun head. A series of adjectives, linearly arranged in the pre-modifying position in such complex nominal phrases is rarely matched elsewhere in English. In the body of the text we have many more examples of this kind:

> *Sunpak's advanced video light technology, brilliant light and natural color, The CV-300's special 20 minute Battery Cluster Module*

and a number of others of lesser complexity abound in the text. The typical syntactic structure of such a complex nominal phrase is

(M) H (Q)

where (M) is realized primarily in terms of a series of linearly arranged attributes as follows:

(Det) (adj) (adj) (adj) (adj)... H (Q)

Although scientific English displays a wide range of nominals, we shall take up only one of them here. Williams (1984) calls them nominal compounds and we shall call them **compound nominal phrases**. Typical examples include:

> *pulmonary artery mean pressure electrocardiogram V1 lead, airport building roof truss failures, nozzle gas ejection space ship attitude control, etc.*

The common structure underlying these compound nominal phrases is the following :

(M) (M) (M) (M) (M)... H (Q)

where (M) is realized primarily in terms of a series of linearly arranged nouns, occasionally incorporating adjectives as well:

(N) (N) (N) (N) (N) (N) ...

The final example comes from legislative provisions, which are notorious for being nominal in character and display an above-average use of nominalization.

2. The power to make regulations under this section shall be exercisable by statutory instrument which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament. [Ch. 25/78: Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance Act) 1978, U.K.]

In any other genre, as Swales and Bhatia (1983) point out, it will probably be in its more typical verbal version.

3. A statutory instrument can be used to make regulations under this section and such a statutory instrument can be annulled if either House of Parliament passes a resolution to that effect.

Nominalizations of this kind are also very common in all kinds of academic, particularly scientific research writing but we shall look at that later on. For the time being, we will focus on these three types of nominals and consider why they are typically associated with the three genres referred to above. The questions we would like to ask ourselves would be of the following kind:

> Why do the specialist writers of these genres use *nominal compounds the way they do?*
> To what extent do these nominals serve *genre-specific functions?*
> What aspects of generic meaning do they *textualize in individual genres?*

In order to answer some or all of these questions, we need to look at these texts, taking a genre-perspective as defined in Swales (1981, 1986, 1990) and Bhatia (1988, in preparation).

Taking **genre** after Swales (1981, 1986, 1990) as a recognizable communicative event characterized by a set of communicative purpose(s), it is identified and mutually understood by the members of the professional or academic community in which it regularly occurs. Generally, it is highly structured and conventionalized with constraints on allowable contributions in terms of their intent, positioning, form and functional value. These constraints are often exploited by the expert members of the discourse community to achieve private intentions within the framework of socially recognized purpose(s). [Bhatia, forthcoming]

Each genre thus is an instance of a successful achievement of a specific communicative purpose using conventionalized knowledge of linguistic and discoursal resources. Since each genre in certain important respects is a typical way of structuring the narrow world of experience or reality, it implies that the same experience or reality will require a different way of structuring, if one were to operate in a different genre. Although it is true that many professional writers do manage to exploit genre constraints to achieve effectiveness and originality in their writing, most of them still operate well within a broad range of generic rules and conventions. In the context of this definition of a genre, let us consider examples of the three genres in question and see what sort of answers we get to the questions we addressed ourselves to in the preceding sections.

THE ADVERTISING GENRE

First, the case of advertising. The main communicative purpose of advertising is to promote a particular product or service to a specific group of potential users of the product or service. In one of the major types of advertisement, this is done by an adequately attractive description of the product or service, which is positive and convincing (see Bhatia and Tay, 1987). Some form of product detailing is necessary if the consumer is to be persuaded to buy the product or use the service. The following is a good example of such a product description. In fact, the most striking linguistic feature of the text is its use of complex nominal phrases.

4.

Mitsubishi Introduces the Shape of Things to Come
THE CORDIA
Shaped by the Wind : Born for the Road

Mitsubishi's Cordia space coupe is the FWD hatchback for the 80s. For two reasons: superb aerodynamics and sophisticated road mechanics.

The Cordia's 0.34 CD aerodynamic efficiency rating, the best in its class and one of the best on the road, helps give the Cordia superb fuel economy.

The Cordia's slippery body shape also works with front-wheel drive to create an exceptionally spacious, comfortable cabin. The Cordia's length, the best in its class, provides room for five.

A 1597 cc engine mated with super shift - Mitsubishi's exclusive set of eight gear ratios - four for fast, hard driving, four for economical cruising - further boosts the Cordia's excellent fuel economy.

The Cordia's stylish cockpit and lively road manners confirm its sporting character. There's a Macpherson strut front, trailing links with Mitsubishi's U-arm rear, rack and pinion steering with negative offset, separate anti-roll bars, vacuum-boosted front disc brakes and steel-belted radial tyres.

Beautiful flowing body lines show the Cordia's breeding. Sophisticated braking, handling and road holding show the Cordia's advanced automotive technology. Together they show two reasons behind the generation of fuel-efficient performance cars to come.

Built by Mitsubishi for You. For the 80s.
MITSUBISHI

Mitsubishi's Cordia space coupe
two reasons : superb aerodynamics and sophisticated road mechanics.
The Cordia's 0.34 CD aerodynamic efficiency rating
superb fuel economy.
The Cordia's slippery body shape
an exceptionally spacious, comfortable cabin
the Cordia's excellent fuel economy
The Cordia's stylish cockpit and lively road manners
Beautiful flowing body lines
Sophisticated braking, handling and road holding
the Cordia's advanced automotive technology
the generation of fuel-efficient performance cars to come.

Even without taking into account many of the ordinarily less complex nominals like, *the FWD hatchback for the 80s, superb fuel economy, the Cordia's stylish cockpit, its sporting character*, the text displays an overwhelming use of long and complex nominal compounds full of adjectival attributes positively evaluating the detailed descriptive account of the car. Obviously, the use of complex nominal compounds makes available to the copywriter a number of possible syntactic slots to insert suitable modifiers to accomplish the right kind of product-detailing.

THE ACADEMIC AND SCIENTIFIC GENRE

Let us now turn our attention to academic scientific genres. As mentioned in the first section, we find a range of nominal expressions variously used in scientific writing for a variety of purposes. In fact, the nominal phrase is the main carrier of information in academic scientific writing. Compound nominal phrases, nominalization and, to a lesser extent, complex nominals phrases, all are used in academic scientific writing. Let me take the following two examples.

5. The discrete donor-acceptor pair (DAP) emission bands in ZnSe, which are recognized as the P, Q and R series, have been extensively investigated by means of time-resolved photoluminescence (PL) and selective PL excitation measurements. [Yamada, Kidoguchi, Taguchi and Hiraki, 1989, p. L837]

One of the major concerns of scientific research writing, as we all know, is to communicate very specific, specialized and precise knowledge to an audience who, in a number of ways, seem to share the required level of specialized knowledge of the subject-discipline. It is also well-known that scientists, as part of their specialist expression, constantly not only need to refer to technical concepts like the following:

> *The discrete donor-acceptor pair (DAP) emission bands in ZnSe, which are recognized as the P, Q and R series*

and

> *time-resolved photoluminescence (PL) and selective PL excitation measurements*

in example (9), but also to create new ones as they go on writing, as in the following extracts of a research article.

6.

Laser Glazing of Sprayed Metal Coatings

I. Introduction

The high power density of lasers permits the surface melting of many materials in a time during which negligible heat conduction occurs to the substrate. The resulting sharp temperature gradients cause rapid quench rates which have been utilized for the production of novel and useful metallurgical microstructures.

We have employed for another purpose the ability of laser melting to maintain low substrate temperatures while fusing a thin surface layer. It is often desirable to impart certain physical or chemical properties of one relatively expensive material to a less expensive substrate by applying a thin coating of the former to the latter. In particular, we wished to apply a thin layer of titanium to a graphite substrate...

Scanning the surface with a laser effectively cauterized the microporosity in the upper half of the titanium coating without causing titanium carbide formation at the titanium/graphite interface...

II. Surface

The preglazed surface consisted of a graphite substrate onto which had been plasma sprayed a titanium coating 50 um thick...

III. Laser Treatment

The microporosity apparent in Fig.1 renders the titanium coating permeable. If the material is to exhibit the corrosion resistant properties of solid titanium the film must be made impervious by sealing the microporosity endemic to plasma-deposited coatings...

Determination of the optimum conditions for sealing the microporosity involved varying the energy per unit area, as well as the power per unit area, delivered by the laser...

IV. Analysis of Treated Surface

The effect of laser treating the plasma sprayed surface is graphically depicted in Fig.2, a cross-sectional hotomicrograph of the tita-

> nium layer. Figure 3 is an enlargement of a laser treated surface. Comparison with Fig.1 shows that laser treatment produces a fused skin on the plasma-deposited titanium layer which is smooth and sound. The absence of cracking during the severe thermal cycling caused by the rapid quench rates characteristic of laser melting indicates that the titanium is ductile...
>
> V. Conclusions
>
> The rapid quench rates characteristic of laser melting have been successfully exploited to seal the porosity of titanium coatings, plasma sprayed atop graphite substrates, without the formation of titanium carbide.. [Pangborn, R.J. and Beaman, D.R., 1980]

The extract not only illustrates how a scientific writer uses nominal expressions to refer to specialized technical terms but also demonstrates how new knowledge is converted into known technical concepts for further reference. In the introductory paragraph of the article the writers refer to the use of lasers for the surface melting of materials and this very knowledge is referred to again in the second paragraph as a new compound nominal phrase *laser melting*. Similarly, the knowledge that there is negligible heat conduction occurring to the substrate is again converted into another compound nominal phrase *low substrate temperatures*. This process of creating new compound nominal phrases continues as and when the authors need to refer to the knowledge of the subject-discipline they have already mentioned earlier. In the article, this process of creating new compound as well as complex nominal phrases continues with the need to create new knowledge or to refer to already mentioned concepts, like the following:

titanium carbide formation at the titanium/graphite interface...
the titanium coating
the corrosion resistant properties of solid titanium
the microporosity endemic to plasma-deposited coatings
The effect of laser treating the plasma sprayed surface
a cross-sectional photomicrograph of the titanium layer
enlargement of a laser treated surface
the plasma-deposited titanium layer which is smooth and sound
the rapid quench rates characteristic of laser melting

In the concluding section of the article, the process is taken to its logical extremes when the authors summarize almost the entire article in terms of a few very complex as well as compound nominal phrases.

> *The rapid quench rates characteristic of laser melting have been successfully exploited to seal the porosity of titanium coatings, plasma sprayed atop graphite substrates, without the formation of titanium carbide...*

In academic scientific writing, therefore, the need to create compound nominal phrases arises from the fact that the scientific writer frequently needs to refer to very precise and complex concepts again and again and to facilitate that concise reference, he invariably creates compound nominal phrases, which not only promote discourse coherence but also spare him tedious repetitions of long descriptions.

Of course, good scientific writers are well aware of the difficulties that such compound nominal phrases might cause to their readership, particularly if they do not share the same background knowledge of the subject-discipline at a particular moment. That's why Dubois (1981) rightly argues that example (7) cited below is more likely to appear in the beginning of the article than the one in (8) which contains a relatively more difficult compound nominal phrase at the introductory part of the sentence. (8) is more likely to be suitable for the later parts of the article, where, it is assumed that the reader has acquired the relevant knowledge.

7. Studies of the oxidative NADP in enzimes in *Drosophilla melanogaster* have concentrated on the relationship of gene dosage to the in vitro tissue enzime level and on ellelozyme variation.

8. *Drosophilla melanogaster oxidative NADP-enzimes studies* have concentrated on the gene dosage to *in vitro tissue enzime level relationship.*

THE LEGISLATIVE GENRE

Finally, we shall turn our attention to legislative writing,which is notoriously rich in the use of nominals of a third kind, which we have earlier on referred to as nominalizations. Legislative writing is highly impersonal and decontextualized, in the sense that its illocutionary force holds independently of whoever is the `speaker' (originator) or the `hearer' (reader) of the document. The general function of this writing is directive. Legislative writing, as Bhatia (1987, p.1) indicates

> attempts to create a unique and model world of rights and obligations, permissions and prohibitions in which we live as members of civilized society. However, legal draftsmen are well aware of the age-old human capacity to wriggle out of obligations and to stretch rights to unexpected limits, so, in order to guard against such eventualities, they attempt to define their model world of obligations and rights, permissions and prohibitions as precisely, clearly and unambiguously as linguistic resources permit. They are also aware of the fact that they deal with a universe of human behaviour, which is unrestricted, in the sense that it is impossible to predict exactly what may happen within it. Therefore, they attempt to refer to every conceivable contingency within their model world and this gives their writing its second key characteristic of being all-inclusive.

Reconciling the two is not always an easy task. The writer's predicament is well described by Caldwell (1980), an experienced practitioner in the field.

> ...there's always the problem that at the end of the day there's a system of courts and judges who interpret what the draftsman has done. It is very difficult to box the judge firmly into a corner from which he cannot escape... given enough time and given enough length and complexity you can end up with precision but in practice there comes a point when you can't go on cramming detail after detail into a bin... you've got to rely on the courts getting the message and deducing from what you have said or it may be often from what you haven't said, what implications they are to draw in such and such a case... [Reported in Bhatia (1982:25)]

So, in spite of the seeming impossibility of the task no effort is spared in legislative provisions to `to box' the reader `firmly into a corner'. This is generally achieved by making the provision not only clear, precise and unambiguous but all-inclusive too. And it is this seemingly impossible task of achieving the dual characteristic of clarity, precision and unambiguity on the one hand, and all-inclusiveness on the other hand, that makes legislative provisions what they are. One of the many linguistic devices which make this possible is the use of nominalizations, others being the use of qualificational insertions, complex-prepositions, syntactic discontinuities, binomial and multi-nomial expressions etc. (for more details see Bhatia, 1882, 1983, 1984, 1987 and Swales & Bhatia, 1983).

To illustrate how nominalization is used in legislative provisions, let us look at an example from Singapore's Wills Act (1970).

9.

> No obliteration, interlineation or other alteration made in any will after the execution thereof shall be valid or have effect except so far as the words or effect of the will before such alteration shall not be apparent, unless such alteration shall be executed in like manner as hereinbefore is required for the execution of the will; but the will, with such alteration as part thereof, shall be deemed to be duly executed if the signature of the testator and the subscription of the witnesses be made in the margin or on some other part of the will opposite or near to such alteration or at the foot or end of or opposite to a memorandum referring to such alteration and written at the end or some other part of the will. [Section 16 of the Wills Act, 1970, Republic of Singapore]

The most striking characteristic of this type of writing is the way the verbal expressions are turned into nominals. If we count the number of nominalized expressions in the above sentence we find 11 of them in a sentence which, by legal standards, is not exceptionally long, a mere 132-words. In these 11 instances we find 5 different verbs being nominalized. Of these 11, there are only 2 which have been repeatedly used, *execution* twice, and *alteration*, which is the topic of the section, six times. This means that the legislative draftsman uses nominalization for two reasons. Firstly, of course, to refer to the same concept or idea repeatedly and, as in academic and scientific discourse, this promotes coherence and saves the writer from repeating lengthy descriptions. Secondly, and perhaps more typically, it is a convenient device to refer to as many aspects of human behaviour as required and at the same time to be able to incorporate as many qualificational insertions as necessary at various syntactic points in the legislative sentence. The use of nominal rather than verbal elements is likely to provide `more mileage' as it were to the legislative writer when one of his main concerns is to be able to cram detail after detail and qualification after qualification in his legislative sentence. It is an entirely different matter that such a highly-nominal style is bound to create processing difficulties for the un-initiated readership in what Halliday calls the `unpacking' of such expressions. Sometimes, even a seemingly simple and innocent-looking provision, like the one in (10) below, can make one wonder whether it is the best and the only way of putting it, when one finds that, of the three nominals, at least two are rarely, if ever, used in everyday normal discourse.

10. No will shall be revoked by any presumption of an intention on the ground of an alteration in circumstances. [Section 14 of the Wills Act, Republic of Singapore]

CONCLUSION

Although nominals have traditionally been treated as a single entity, particularly for various applied linguistic purposes, and there are good reasons for treating them so for some language teaching purposes, especially at lower levels, there are equally compelling reasons for treating them as distinct linguistic devices, particularly for more advanced and specialized language teaching purposes. Firstly, they display not only distinct linguistic forms but also seem to have a very different distribution in academic and professional genres. Secondly, and more importantly, they also realize somewhat different aspects of the genres in which they are often used. The writers of these genres are often led to the use of one or the other of these different nominal forms for very different genre-specific considerations. In order to understand and appreciate the full potential of these linguistic forms one essentially needs to adopt a generic perspective.

In advertising, nominals are more often in the form of complex nominals because the copywriter's main concern is to find as many syntactic slots as possible for adjectival insertions. This facilitates suitably precise, desirably positive and effective description of the product or service being advertised. Scientific research writing predominantly uses compound nominal phrases to refer to concepts which are either created as the discourse proceeds or to refer to further refined and often repeated scientific concepts. In this case, the use of compound nominal phrases is a convenient linguistic device to create and refer to technical terms. In legislative rules and regulations, we find an overwhelming use of nominalizations, simply because the parliamentary draftsman needs to condense his often longish provisions into somewhat more precise, unambiguous and all-inclusive statements by incorporating all types of possible conditions and contingencies that may arise during the course of the interpretation of a particular legislative provision. Nominalization has been a very ancient and trusted linguistic device used by the legal expert to achieve condensation and all-inclusiveness in his writing.

The analysis of nominal use presented here has strong implications for many applied linguistic purposes, particularly for ESL, ESP and the teaching of professional and academic writing. Grammar has long been an integral part of our language teaching programmes. In earlier days our approach was invariably prescriptive. With the availability of various linguistic descriptions of language, we brought in an important element of description in our language teaching programmes and then language teaching became more descriptive. Now, with the advent of discourse and genre analysis in recent years, our language teaching programmes need to be made more effective by making them explanatory so that the learner consciously knows why he is writing a particular essay, an academic or professional text the way he has been asked to. This will make him better aware of the rationale of the text-genres that he is required to read and write. After all, the most important function of learning is not simply to be able to read and produce a piece of text as a computer does, but to become sensitive to the conventions in order to ensure its pragmatic success in the academic or the professional context in which it is likely to be used.

This can be effectively achieved in language teaching by using a genre-based approach to syllabus specification and materials development. Instead of selecting and specifying texts and tasks on the basis of grammar, content, subject-matter, topic or theme, one could select syllabus content in terms of genres and specify text-task relationships (Swales, 1990, p.77) based on the findings of genre analysis of the selected text-types. Once this has been achieved, the choice of specific examples of text-genres in the classrooms can be left to individual teachers and even to learners themselves. This will give enough freedom to the teacher and the learner in the selection of texts, thereby ensuring their participation in the decision making process. This kind of genre-based approach to syllabus design and materials development will not only ensure greater flexibility in syllabus specification and learner participation in the learning process but also sensitize the learner to the value of linguistic expressions that they carry in specific generic contexts.

THE AUTHOR

Dr. V.K. Bhatia is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of English Language and Literature at the University of Singapore. He is best known for his extensive research into the language of the law, though he has also written a number of articles on genre analysis of other professional and academic texts, the teaching of ESP and curriculum design.

REFERENCES

Bhatia, V.K. (1982). An Investigation into Formal and Functional Characteristics of Qualifications in Legislative Writing and its Application to English for Academic Legal Purposes. A Ph.D thesis submitted to the University of Aston in Birmingham, U.K.

Bhatia, V.K. (1983). Simplification v. Easification : the case of legal texts. *Applied Linguistics*, 4, 1, 42-54.

Bhatia, V.K. (1984). Syntactic discontinuity in Legislative writing and its implications for academic legal purposes. In A.K. Pugh and J.M. Ulijn (Eds.), *Reading for Professional Purposes - Studies and Practices in Native and Foreign Languages*, (pp. 90-96). London: Heinemann Educational Books.

Bhatia, V.K. (1987). Textual-Mapping in British Legislative Writing. *World Englishes* 6, 1, 1-10.

Bhatia, V.K. (1988). A Genre-Based Approach to the Analysis and Teaching of Business Communication. Paper presented at the XIV International Association of Language and Business, Reutlingen, West Germany.

Bhatia, V.K. (forthcoming). *Genre Analysis - Theory, Practice and Applications.* To be published by London, Longman under Applied Linguistics and Language Study Series.

Bhatia, V.K. and Mary Tay (Eds.) (1987). *The Teaching of English in Meeting the Needs of Business and Technology, Volume 1 and 2.* Report of the UNDP-Government of Singapore Project, Department of English Language and Literature, National University of Singapore.

Dubois, B.L. (1981). The Construction of Noun Phrases in Biomedical Journal Articles. Paper presented at LSP Conference at Copenhagen, August 1981.

Pangborn, R.J. and Beaman, D.R. (1980). Laser glazing of sprayed metal coatings. *Journal of Applied Physics*, 51, 11, 5992-3.

Quirk, R., Sidney Greenbaum, G. Leech and J. Svartvik,. (1982). *A Grammar of Contemporary English.* London: Longman.

Salager, F. (1984). Compound nominals phrases in scientific-technical literature : proportion and rationale. In A.K.Pugh and J.M.Ulijn (Eds.), Reading for Professional

Purposes - *Studies and Practices in Native and Foreign Languages* (pp. 136-145). London: Heinemann Educational Books.

Swales, J.M. (1981). *Aspects of Article Introductions.* Aston ESP Research Report No.1, University of Aston in Birmingham.

Swales, J.M. (1986). A genre-based Approach to Language Across the Curriculum. Paper presented at the 1985 RELC Seminar in

Singapore. Also published in M.L. Tickoo (Ed.), *Language Across the Curriculum* (pp.10-22). Singapore: RELC.

Swales, J.M. (1990). *Genre Analysis - English in Academic and Research Settings.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Swales, J.M. and V.K.Bhatia (1983). An Approach to the Linguistic Study of Legal Documents. *Fachsprache, 5, 3*, 98-108.

Williams, R. (1984). A cognitive approach to English nominal compounds. In A.K.Pugh and J.M.Ulijn (Eds.), *Reading for Professional Purposes - Studies and Practices in Native and Foreign Languages* (pp. 146-153. London: Heinemann Educational Books.

Yamada, Y., Kidoguchi, I., Taguchi, T., and Hiraki, A. (1989). Bound-Exciton and Edge-Emisson Spectra Associated with Li and Na Acceptors in ZnSe. *Japanese Journal of Applied Physics*, 28, 5, L837-1840.

Pragmatics and Language Learning

Monograph Series Volume 3 1992

CONTENTS

i *Introduction*

1 Do We All Apologize the Same? — An Empirical Study on the Act of Apologizing by Spanish Speakers Learning English, *Montserrat Mir*

20 Conversational Openings in Kiswahili: The Pragmatic Performance of Native and Non-native Speakers, *Alwiya S. Omar*

33 Experimental and Observational Data in the Study of Interlanguage Pragmatics, *Beverly S. Hartford and Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig*

53 The Interpretation of Implicature in English by NNS: Does It Come Automatically — Without Being Explicitly Taught? *Lawrence F. Bouton*

66 Linguistic and Pragmatic Competence: Their Relationship in the Overall Competence of the Language Learner, *Sheila Hoffman Hicks*

81 Discourse Domains Revisited: Expertise and Investment in Conversation, *Shona Whyte*

103 Politeness Phenomena in South African Black English, *Elizabeth de Kadt*

117 Gender and Function of Language Use: Quantitative and Qualitative Evidence from Japanese, *Sachiko Ide*

130 Seeking a Pedagogically Useful Understanding of Given-New: An Analysis of Native Speaker Errors in Written Discourse, *[illegible]*

144 The Telling of a Tale: Discourse Structure and Tense Use in Learners' Narratives, *Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig*

162 Pragmatics of Elusive Language, *Salikoko S. Mufwene*

182 The Pragmatics of Codeswitching in Mexican Political, Literary, and News Magazines, *Erica McClure*

197 Modality as a Strategy in Interaction: Epistemic Modality in the Language of Native and Non-native Speakers of English, *Elise Kärkkäinen*

217 Pragmatics of the Use of Nominals in Academic and Professional Genres, *Yamuna Kachru*

BEST COPY AVAILABLE